inquisition and Q&ociety
- in the -
GKingdom of O^alencia
1478-1834
Q&tephen C^Valiczer
Inquisition and Society in
the Kingdom of Valencia,
1478-1834
Stephen Haliczer
Stephen Haliczer has mined rich
documentary sources to produce
the most comprehensive and en-
lightening picture yet of the In-
quisition in Spain. The kingdom
of Valencia occupies a uniquely
important place in the history of
the Spanish Inquisition because
of its large Muslim and Jewish
populations and because it was
a Catalan kingdom, more or less
"occupied" by the despised Cas-
tilians who introduced the In-
quisition. Haliczer underscores
the intensely regional nature
of the Valencian tribunal. He
shows how the prosecution of re-
ligious deviants, the recruitment
and professional activity of In-
quisitors and officials, the rela-
tions between the Inquisition
and the majority Old Christian
population, all clearly reflect the
place and the society.
A great series of pogroms
swept over Spain during the
summer of 1391. Jewish com-
munities were attacked and the
Jews either massacred or forced
to convert. More than ninety
percent of the victims of the
Valencian Inquisition a century
later were descendants of those
who chose conversion, the con-
versos. Haliczer argues convinc-
ingly against those who see all
the conversos as "secret Jews."
INQUISITION AND SOCIETY
IN THE KINGDOM OF
VALENCIA,
1478-1834
This On©
BWHL-GH1-WQLK
Copyrigtitod material
INQUISITION AND
SOCIETY IN THE
KINGDOM OF
VALENCIA,
1478-1834
STEPHEN HALICZER
University of California Press
Berkeley Los Angeles Oxford
The publisher wishes to acknowledge the generous assistance of the
Program for Cultural Cooperation between Spain's Ministry of Culture and
United States Universities in the publication of this book.
University of California Press
Berkeley and Los Angeles, California
University of California Press
Oxford, England
Copyright © 1990 by The Regents of the University of California
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Haliczer, Stephen, 1942-
Inquisition and society in the kingdom of Valencia, 1478-1834 /
Stephen Haliczer.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 0-520-06729-0 (alk. paper)
1. Inquisition — Spain — Valencia (Province) — History. 2. Valencia
(Spain : Province) — Church history. I. Title.
BX1735.H355 1990
272 ' . 2 '0946763— dc20 S9-48935
CIP
Printed in the United States of America
123456789
The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements
of American National Standard for Information Sciences — Permanence
of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984 ©
Copyrighlad material
For Deborah and Elena
Copyrighted material
Contents
Acknowledgments
ix
Abbreviations
\
Introduction
1
I
Between Monarchy and Kingdom: The Tribunal in
Regional Politics
9
II
Judicial Procedures and Financial Structure
59
III
Inquisitors and Officials
lOl
IV
The Familiares and Unsalaried Officials
151
V
The Converted Jews: From Persecution to Assimilation
20O,
VI
The Moriscos
244
VII
Illuminism, Erasmianism, and Protestantism:
The Problem of Religious Dissent
273
VIII
The Inquisition in the Post-Tridentine Era
295
IX
Decline and Abolition of the Holv Office in Valencia
33°
Conclusion
359
Notes
363
vii
viii Contents
Glossary 421
Selected Bibliography 423
Index 429
Copyrighled material
Acknowledgments
During the years of research and writing that went into this book,
the author has benefited, directly or indirectly, from the advice and
inspiration of various friends and colleagues. Jean-Pierre Dedieu
was kind enough to give me a general orientation to the Inquisition
records contained in the Archivo Historico Nacional when I first
started my research. Jaime Contreras, Virgilio Pinto Crespo, and
Jose Martinez Millan were also helpful at various times as the
research went forward. The author also remembers with great ap-
preciation stimulating conversations with Rafael de Leca Garcia
about mutual research concerns. John Elliott read through a late
draft of the manuscript, and his excellent suggestions helped me to
put it in its final and publishable form. I am also indebted to
William Beik, my colleague in early modern history, for his stimu-
lating critique of the manuscript.
I would also like to thank Karen Blaser who, along with her
assistants at the Manuscript Services Center, typed the manuscript
on several occasions. Eve Simonson of the NIU Computing Infor-
mation Center was extremely helpful with the computer analysis of
my data. The maps and table were prepared at the NIU Art-Photo
Laboratory.
Financial support for the project came from the U.S. -Spanish
Joint Committee for Cultural and Educational Cooperation. The
author was also helped by a grant from the NIU Graduate School.
Finally, this project would not have come to fruition without the
unflagging support, advice, and intellectual companionship of my
wife, Deborah Haliczer.
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Abbreviations
AGS: Archivo General de Simancas
AHN: Archivo Historico Nacional
AMV: Archivo Municipal de Valencia
ARV: Archivo del Reyno de Valencia
BNM: Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid
Note on Spelling and Usage
To maintain uniformity, I have decided to use the Castilian
rather than the Valencian or Catalan form of proper names. In the
case of institutions and currency denominations, however, I have
preserved the original Valencian. Place-names have been rendered
in Castilian throughout.
Introduction
From the earliest years of its existence to the present, the Span-
ish Inquisition has been a controversial institution. Its first vic-
tims, the converted Jews, accused it of being far more interested
in the money it could make from confiscations than in religious
heresy. It was a Spanish Protestant, writing under the name of
Reginaldo Gonzalez Montano, who gave the Spanish Inquisition
its reputation as barbarous, arbitrary, and cruel which remains
embedded in the public mind to this very day. Montano's book,
which was first published in Latin in 1567 and later translated
into English, French, Dutch, and German, strongly influenced
later Protestant writers like Limborch, Foxe, and Dugdale. An
opposing view was presented by Catholic authors like Caesare
Carena and Luis de Paramo who depicted the Holy Office as a
bulwark of orthodoxy that operated in accordance with widely
accepted judicial procedures. 1
During the eighteenth century, Enlightenment opinion blamed
the Inquisition for Spain's intellectual backwardness relative to the
rest of Western Europe. 2 Furthermore, judicial reformers demand-
ing a more rational system of justice with clearly defined crimes
and appropriately proportioned punishments were outraged by in-
quisitorial procedure and especially by the auto de fe where "they
chant, say mass and kill" all at the same time. So barbarous was this
spectacle that if an Asiatic were present, it was alleged that he
would not be able to tell whether he had stumbled across "a reli-
gious festival, a sacrifice or a slaughterhouse." 3
Modern Inquisition scholarship really began with the work of
2
Introduction
Juan Antonio Llorente, former secretary of Madrid's Corte tribu-
nal, who was put in charge of the archives of the Holy Office after
Napoleon abolished the Inquisition in 1808. Using the wealth of
material at his disposal, Llorente produced a four-volume history of
the Spanish Inquisition first published in French in 1817 and then
translated into most of the major European languages. Llorente's
position as a prominent supporter of Joseph Fs French-imposed
government and his criticism of an institution that became the
darling of nineteenth-century right-wing opinion made him a con-
troversial figure, and his book had little influence on the future
development of Inquisition studies. 4
Henry Charles Lea, the American publisher and historian, also
used an impressive number of copies of original documents, rare
books of early modern jurisprudence, and other original materials
to compose his A History of the Inquisition in Spain (1906-07).
This work, which represents the finest flowering of that wave of
nineteenth-century American fascination with Spain and her em-
pire was little known in Spain and was only translated into Spanish
in 1982. 5
Except for the publication of a few worthwhile works on special-
ized subjects, Inquisition scholarship languished from the turn of
the century to the early 1960s. But beginning in the mid-1960s,
powerful forces that were changing the history profession began to
revive interest in the archives of the Holy Office.
For one thing, historians began to realize that the achievements
of kings, princes, and statesmen were not the whole of history or
the whole of human activity. A growing number attempted to write
history from the standpoint of the ordinary person, but in doing so,
they had to explore nontraditional sources. It was soon realized that
judicial records were among the most valuable of these sources
because they were rich in sociological data about accused and accus-
ers. Italian historian Carlo Ginzburg was one of the first to make
use of Inquisition records to write social history in his / Benan-
danti, first published in 1966 and translated under the title The
Night Battles in 1983. This period also marks the beginning of the
use of the computer by historians to analyze masses of data that had
defied earlier generations. Among the first to apply computer analy-
sis to Inquisition records were Gustav Henningsen and Jaime
Contreras, whose work with the case summaries that provincial
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Introduction
3
tribunals sent to Madrid has inspired a generation of Inquisition
scholars. 6
Another important element in the changing historical perspective
of the 1960s and 1970s was the growing impact of the Annales school
on Spanish historical writing. The emphasis placed by the Annales
on the importance of detailed local and regional studies was particu-
larly important to a historical tradition always excessively concerned
with the accomplishments and tribulations of central government.
The best of these studies, like Bartolome Bennassar's Valladolid au
siecle d or (1967) or Angel Garcia Sanz, Desarrollo y crisis del
antiguo regimen en Castilla la Vieja (1977), are comprehensive,
dealing with all aspects of the life of a particular region — geography,
demography, social structure, mental attitudes — to create a rich com-
posite picture.
Directly or indirectly, the influence of the Annales on Inquisi-
tion scholarship has been to inspire a number of historians to work
on the history of provincial tribunals. Contreras's El Santo Oficio
de la Inquisicion de Galicia (1982), like Bennassar's book on
Valladolid, deals with all aspects of the tribunal and attempts to
place it firmly within a specific local and regional context. Jean-
Pierre Dedieu has recently published a study of the Toledo tribu-
nal, and Rafael de Leca Garcia is working on the tribunal of Gra-
nada. Valuable work on the tribunal of Sicily is being done by
Agostino Borromeo and on the American tribunals by Richard
Greenleaf and Bartolome Escandell Bonet. 7
The choice of the Valencia tribunal for my own study was based
on the comparative richness of the sources. Unlike certain other
tribunals (Barcelona, Cordoba), Valencia's archives preserve book
after book of letters to and from the Supreme Council (Suprema).
Valencia is also extremely rich in the genealogical records of those
who served the tribunal as inquisitors or officials. It has a particu-
larly large collection of the genealogies of familiares, those lay assis-
tants who, I felt, played a far more important role in the history of
the Holy Office than historians have given them credit for. Further-
more, while the archives of important tribunals like Valladolid or
Seville lack a significant run of case summaries and preserve few
original ones, Valencia preserves case summaries from 1560 to the
1720s as well as a significant number of cases. In addition to this
material, which may be found in the Archivo Historico Nacional in
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4
Introduction
Madrid, the researcher can also find valuable documents in Valen-
cia's local archives, the Archivo del Reyno de Valencia and the
Archivo Municipal.
When I began my work on the Valencia tribunal in 1977-78, I
was aware of the publication of the first volume of what eventually
became a two-volume study of the Valencia tribunal by Ricardo
Garcia Carcel. While I recognize the value of this pioneering effort,
my book differs radically from that of Garcia Carcel in both ap-
proach and interpretation.
In the first place, Garcia Carcel's study stops with the expulsion
of the Moriscos and its immediate aftermath, while I have extended
my own right down to the end of the tribunal's existence as an
institution in the 1820s. I have done this deliberately because I
believe that a longer time frame allows me to evaluate trends and
tendencies apparent in the early or middle years of the tribunal's
history in the light of later developments.
By stopping in the early seventeenth century, for example, Garcia
Carcel comes to the conclusion that the tribunal never had to deal
with the problem of ilium inism. As I demonstrate, however, the
tribunal encountered an important group of illuminists in the later
seventeenth century just when the same problem had assumed in-
creased importance in several other districts. 8 Garcia Carcel's
shorter time frame also gives the reader the impression that
Judaizing was no longer a major issue for the tribunal after the mid-
sixteenth century since the number of cases in this category declines
sharply after 1550. Nevertheless, Valencia's inquisitors did remain
extremely vigilant against any sigr. of Judaizing and participated
eagerly in the massive attack on prominent New Christian families
which involved several tribunals during the 1720s and 1730s.
I have replaced Garcia Carcel's system of categories for the of-
fenses tried by the tribunal and have adopted one that is as close as
possible to the working definitions in use by the tribunal itself.
Garcia Carcel places all of the tribunal's activity under three major
headings: counterculture, including the converted Jews, Moriscos,
and witchcraft/superstition; sexual crimes, including bigamy, solici-
tation, simple fornication, sodomy, and bestiality; and crimes of
thought and expression. Attempting to force all of the activity of the
Holy Office into these rather arbitrary categories (which were
never used by the Inquisition itself) is to do violence to the nature
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Introduction
5
of the offense as understood by contemporaries and obscure the
reasons the Inquisition became concerned with it. Bigamy and
solicitation in the confessional came under the jurisdiction of the
Holy Office because of the disrespect for the sacraments of holy
matrimony and penance implied in these offenses and not because
of their sexual content. In the case of bigamy, the Inquisition did
not even deal with the sexual aspects of the case because ecclesiasti-
cal courts were left to rule on the question of which of the mar-
riages was valid. The Inquisition's jurisdiction over solicitation was
initially confined only to acts or expressions during auricular confes-
sion itself, carefully skirting the issue of any wider sexual activity by
the accused.
A second major difficulty with Garcia Carcel's broad categories is
that they make it difficult to come to grips with the issue of the
social and religious differences among the accused. Not all of the
converted Jews, for example, formed part of a religious or social
counterculture. Many who were tried by the Inquisition consid-
ered themselves devout Catholics, and many others did not experi-
ence any significant discrimination on racial grounds and became
well integrated into Valencian society. By the same token, the solid
citizens who formed partnerships so as to find and release en-
chanted treasure would have been shocked to find themselves
classed with countercultural elements even though they were en-
gaging in superstitious practices.
Finally, I have approached the study of the Valencia tribunal not
only by making use of a much larger percentage of the available
documentation but by making more intense use of what other histo-
rians have skimmed over. More work with the books of letters, for
example, might have saved Garcia Carcel from one of his most
grievous errors — the assertion in Book I (only partially corrected in
Book II) that the tribunal did not have commissioners. 9 I have also
made intensive use of the genealogical records of those who served
the tribunal, a category of document that Garcia Carcel has barely
consulted. In dealing with the case summaries, I have gone consid-
erably further than Henningsen and Contreras in gleaning sociologi-
cal data not only about the accused but also about the way in which
trials were conducted and punishments handed out.
To those familiar with Garcia Carcel's work, my first chapter will
appear as a complex refutation of his interpretation of the political
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6
Introduction
history of the tribunal. Where Garcia Carcel mentions isolated
incidents of conflict with other local institutions, I trace a coherent
pattern of change and evolution in which a once-powerful tribunal
suffers a series of defeats beginning in the early 1550s and finally
stabilizes at a much lower level of prestige and political authority.
Furthermore, I cannot accept Garcia Carcel's interpretation of
the role of Valencia's inquisitors as the docile clients and servants of
the Inquisitor-Generals who appointed them. 10 Once in Valencia,
the inquisitors were far from the reproving eye of inquisitor-
general or Suprema, and each man tended to interpret for himself
the role of provincial inquisitor. I have chosen to illustrate this
point by telling the stories of several of the inquisitors who served
on the tribunal at different stages of its history, because it is only by
recounting the stories themselves that I can demonstrate to — and
evoke for — readers the extent to which inquisitors responded to
the needs and opportunities offered by local conditions.
As I stated above, one of the things that drew me to study the
Valencia tribunal in the first place was the relative abundance of
material about familiares. By making use of a far greater number
and variety of documents, I can offer a much fuller account of the
evolution of the corps of familiares than Garcia Carcel, who relies
mainly on two censuses, one of them incomplete. Furthermore, I
am able to document the political importance of the familiares in
giving the tribunal critical support in the rural areas of the
district — an issue that Garcia Carcel entirely ignores.
In these and many other ways, I have sought not to rewrite or
even to revise what others have said about the Valencia tribunal or
the Kingdom of Valencia itself but to recount an entirely different
story. This story involves the inexorable transformation of a once-
alien institution into one much more closely identified with the
Valencian scene. It is to be hoped that studies of tribunals like this
one will eventually result in a new synthesis in which a better
balance will be achieved between center and periphery and the
role of regional interests in shaping the overall history of the Span-
ish Inquisition will be given its proper place.
The Kingdom of Valencia, which with a few villages along the
Catalan border and the Teruel region of Aragon formed the tribu-
nal's district, had been overrun by the Catalans and Aragonese
under James the Conqueror in just sixteen years, from 1229 to
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Introduction
7
1245. Christian resettlement left mainly Catalan speakers along
the coast and Castilian speakers in upland regions, but both were
immersed in an Islamic sea as the population remained largely
Moorish for many generations. 12 By the time the Valencia tribunal
began its operations, the Moors had been pushed out of coastal
regions and reduced as a percentage of the population. But, as
Moriscos (after 1525), they formed a substantial minority of proto-
Moslems who were to provide the tribunal with a large number of
its victims.
Geographically, the region is one of sharp contrasts between the
lush coastal plains of Castellon or Alicante and the tortuous moun-
tain ranges of the interior. Agriculture, which was the mainstay of
the economy, followed the geographic pattern with dry farming in
the upland areas and intensive irrigation-based cultivation in the
densely populated huerta districts near the Mediterranean coast. 13
At the time of the Reconquest, Valencia joined Catalonia and
Aragon as the third major component of the Crown of Aragon.
Ruled by a Catalan dynasty and inspired by Catalan political
thought, the monarchy developed a series of unique institutions
based on a notion of reciprocity between ruler and ruled. This
contractual idea, which set limits to royal power in each of the
states, left the Kingdom of Valencia with its own distinct form of
government that was to endure until 1707 when it was abolished by
order of Philip V. 14
By the early Hapsburg period, administrative and judicial re-
sponsibilities were shared between the viceroy, who represented
the king, and the Audiencia (founded in 1506) staffed by Valencian
judges. The Audiencia acted as the viceroy's advisory council and
functioned as a high court of appeal in both civil and criminal
cases. 15
Like the other states forming the Crown of Aragon, the Kingdom
of Valencia had its own individual Cortes, composed of representa-
tives of the clergy, nobility, and towns. The Diputacio was a sub-
committee of the Cortes responsible for collecting the subsidies
granted to the crown. Unlike its counterparts in Catalonia and
Aragon, however, the Valencian Diputacio never developed into a
full-fledged constitutional watchdog able to check the encroach-
ments of overzealous royal officials against the kingdom's tradi-
tional contractual constitution. 16
8
Introduction
In spite of an increasing cultural Castilianization, the kingdom
was far from easy to govern. Valencia's traditional legal code (furs),
which went all the way back to the Reconquest, continued to form
the basis for the relationship between king and subject. Violations of
the furs by overzealous royal officials would lead to immediate pro-
tests by the Cortes, which could assemble whenever it wished. 1 '
On two occasions during the life of the tribunal, the tensions that
were always just beneath the surface of Valencian society boiled
over into violent social upheavals (the first and second Germamas
of 1519-1522 and 1693). I R 1705-06, the kingdom demonstrated its
disloyalty to the Bourbon Philip V by supporting his rival, Charles
III. As the demonstrations and processions in support of the saint-
hood of Padre Francisco Simon were to demonstrate in the period
1612 to 1619, even Audiencia judges could place regional pride
above their loyalty to the crown.
The Inquisition in Valencia was founded at a supreme moment of
religious fanaticism and strong centralization. As a new and weak
institution, it needed and received strong royal protection. By the
middle of the sixteenth century, however, local forces were reassert-
ing themselves. After sustaining a series of defeats in conflicts with
the cathedral chapter, the jurats, and other institutions, the tribu-
nal found itself largely abandoned by the crown and the Suprema.
The tribunal's gradual evolution into a primarily Valencian institu-
tion was, therefore, motivated by necessity, the necessity of sur-
vival in a world where regional interests had become paramount.
Copyrighted material
Between Monarchy and
Kingdom: The Tribunal in
Regional Politics
The Spanish Inquisition was not an institution that sprang fully
formed from the minds of Ferdinand and Isabella, even though
they were responsible for bringing the modern institution into exis-
tence and molding its early structure and development. During the
early history of the church, the ferreting out of heretics was the
responsibility of each bishop, and cases of heresy were heard in the
episcopal courts. 1 In the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries,
successive popes began appointing individuals with special powers
to investigate and see to the punishment of heretics, in part be-
cause of the manifest failure of local bishops to cope with the
Albigensian movement in southwestern France and in part out of a
desire to further extend direct papal control over the church. 2 By
the mid-thirteenth century, the Dominican order was becoming
more and more closely associated with these papal efforts to extir-
pate heresy, and by 1232, when the papal Inquisition came to
Spain, the bishops were clearly taking second place to the Domini-
can friars whose monasteries had the right to name inquisitors from
among their own brethren.
Among the states of the Iberian peninsula, the Crown of Aragon
appears to have had a much stronger medieval Inquisition than
Castile or Portugal, perhaps because it was linked geographically
and culturally to areas of France affected by the Albigensian heresy. 4
lO
Between Monarchy and Kingdom
The Crown of Aragon had Dominican inquisitors almost continu-
ously throughout much of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries,
including Inquisitor-General Nicolas Eymerich whose celebrated
work on legal procedures written in the fourteenth century had a
profound effect on the development of the modern Inquisition. 5
In Castile, the inquisitorial tradition appears to have been much
weaker. Although the Dominican provincial of Castile had the
power to name inquisitors for the province, there is little evidence
that this was ever done, and prosecution of heretics remained
largely in the hands of bishops. So far was Castile from having a
regularly constituted Inquisition like that of the Crown of Aragon
that in 1460, when the reformed Franciscans complained to Henry
IV concerning the religious practices of the converted Jews, he
referred them to Archbishop Carrillo of Toledo. 6
Several factors combined to alter this situation and endow Cas-
tile with the most formidable inquisitorial apparatus in Europe. For
one thing, the converted Jews themselves were becoming the ob-
jects of popular hostility, and their unpopularity was being used by
their enemies to exclude them from desirable positions on city
councils and cathedral chapters. 7 To end this mob violence and
deflect the hatred that Old Christians were expressing for all con-
verts regardless of their sincerity, certain converso intellectuals
came to favor the establishment of an institutionalized way of dis-
covering and punishing Judaizing. In this way, the stubborn and
irreconcilable could be justly punished and an example could be
set for the larger number of the confused, uninstructed, and unde-
cided. 8 Converso influence, or the suggestions of con versos like
Alonso de Espina, may have induced Henry IV to attempt to estab-
lish an Inquisition under royal control in 1461. 9
If the idea of an inquisition was the subject of a certain amount of
discussion in the 1460s and 1470s, it took the marriage of Ferdinand
and Isabella and their firm establishment on the Castilian throne
after the end of the first part of the War of Succession to create the
appropriate climate for its creation. Castile and Aragon were linked
politically by this marriage, and while they remained separate king-
doms, a channel had been created through Ferdinand for the migra-
tion of certain Aragonese institutions, whose worth had been proven
not only in governing a far-flung Mediterranean empire but inter-
nally in the political control of a kingdom that was really a confedera-
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Between Monarchy and Kingdom
11
tion of provinces. Whether in the area of industrial regulation, as in
the greater official toleration accorded to industrial guilds, or in
commerce with the establishment of the mercantile Consulate of
Burgos in imitation of the Barcelona Consulate of the Sea, or in
administration with use by Castile of the viceroy, an Aragonese in-
vention created to deal with the problem of long royal absences,
Aragonese influence was very strong throughout the last quarter of
the fifteenth century and during the first years of the sixteenth cen-
tury. 10 The Inquisition was still another Aragonese institution that
the Crown of Aragon had used so long and so successfully to prevent
the infiltration of unorthodox ideas from France.
Certainly, anyone who has worked extensively in the Inquisi-
tion archives is forced to concur with Lea's observation that the
Spanish Inquisition in both Castile and Aragon remained firmly
under Ferdinand's direction throughout the joint reign. 11 Ferdi-
nand's strong interest in the Inquisition was very much in the
tradition of the Aragonese monarchs, who had always been active
partisans and sponsors of the Dominican-controlled Inquisition in
their dominions. 12
The papal bull of November 1, 1478, however, which founded
the "modern" Inquisition in the Crown of Castile, provided for
the establishment of an institution that differed in some very im-
portant respects from its medieval Aragonese predecessor. The
Dominican-controlled Inquisition in the Crown of Aragon had al-
ways depended very much on the goodwill and support of the
bishops, who themselves continued their role in the suppression
of heresy and formulated cases against heretics in their own
courts. At most, the Dominicans had a parallel responsibility for
the suppression of heresy, but episcopal jurisdiction was never
wholly superseded. 13 In Castile, of course, whatever inquisitorial
activity there was, was carried out entirely by the bishops. The
kings of Aragon had little or no control over the institution; the
inquisitors were appointed directly by the pope. The papal bull of
1478, however, gave the Castilian sovereigns full powers to name
inquisitors who would enjoy the same powers and jurisdiction as
the bishops and papal inquisitors. The only vestige of papal con-
trol over appointments which remained was the right to formally
appoint the royal nominees. 14 Ferdinand and Isabella moved
quickly to take advantage of their new powers, and by the end of
12
Between Monarchy and Kingdom
1481, the first provincial tribunal was operating in Seville. The
careers of the two Dominican monks named as Castile's first in-
quisitors strongly indicate the essential unity of royal policy to-
ward the church. Both Juan de San Martin and Miguel de Morillo
were hardened veterans of the early struggles of the monastic
reform movement in the Dominican order, and Morillo had just
been appointed provincial of the reformed Dominicans of Ara-
gon. 15 In early 1479, just a few months after the papal bull found-
ing the Castilian Inquisition was issued, an embassy was sent to
Rome to request many of the same powers over monastic reform
that the crown had already obtained over judicial inquiry into
heresy, especially the right to appoint prelates who would carry
on the reformation of all the kingdom's monasteries. 16 Like the
Inquisition, the visitation and reform of monasteries was an exclu-
sively ecclesiastical (and papal) function before the reign of Ferdi-
nand and Isabella, and, like the Inquisition, that function and the
power and patronage it represented were eventually taken over
by the state with only nominal papal intervention. 17 After a brief
experiment with a papal/Dominican Inquisition when Sixtus re-
voked the 1478 bull and appointed seven Dominican friars to act
as inquisitors for Castile, the Castilian Inquisition was firmly re-
established by spring 1483 and began to spread to other parts of
the kingdom.
Ferdinand's eagerness to establish an Inquisition under royal
control in his own kingdom of Aragon is demonstrated by his at-
tempt to bring the institution into being in advance of the papal
response. On Ferdinand's instigation, the general of the Domini-
can order in Aragon appointed Gaspar Jutglar inquisitor-general of
Aragon with the power to appoint subdelegates, and on September
18, 1481, Ferdinand issued writs confirming the appointments of
Jutglar and his two nominees, Juan Orts and Juan Cristobal de
Gualbes, who began their work in Valencia in December 1481. 1 In
spite of papal reluctance to approve Ferdinand's original request
and the revocation of the powers that had been granted to Jutglar
by the Dominican general, there is no evidence that they ceased
their activities. The papal bull reestablishing the medieval Inquisi-
tion in the Crown of Aragon was dated April 18, 1482. But in May
of that year, Orts and Gualbes had proclaimed an edict of faith, and
eleven individuals presented themselves for reconciliation. 19 By
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early 1493, overt papal resistance had been brought to an end, and
on October 17, Fray Tomas de Torquemada, the royal nominee,
was named inquisitor-general of the Crown of Aragon. 20
Torquemada's nomination as inquisitor-general marks the real
beginning of the modern Inquisition in that kingdom as a central-
ized agency distinct from the Dominican and papal institution that
had been in operation during the fifteenth century. Even though
Ferdinand failed in his repeated attempts to obtain a papal bull that
would extend to Aragon the same absolute powers of appointment
and dismissal that he had in Castile, he proceeded as if he had
obtained it, naming inquisitors for Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia
in April- May 1484. 21
In Aragon, however, resistance to the new institution was tena-
cious, even violent, and the Inquisition required constant royal sup-
port to ensure its survival. In Teruel, on the Aragonese-Valencian
border, the converso community was powerful and well entrenched
within the local oligarchy, so that when inquisitors were sent there at
about the same time as the establishment of the Zaragoza tribunal,
they found the city gates closed against them and were forced to
retire to Cella, a village on the outskirts. 22 From charges brought
against the city council by fiscal Juan Jimenez de las Cuevas, it
appears that the members of the council and other municipal officials
had systematically intimidated all those who openly voiced support
for the establishment of the Inquisition, even going so far as to set up
a stake in the central plaza and threatening to use it to stone anyone
who entered carrying orders from the inquisitors. Alonso de
Santangel and other prominent conversos threatened to kill the in-
quisitors if they disturbed the graves of their ancestors, and the
entire city council openly declared that the city would never receive
the Inquisition because it would violate its liberties. 23 From their
refuge in Cella, the inquisitors responded by fulminating a ban of
excommunication against Teruel, but local authorities responded by
seizing and imprisoning jurado Fernando de Logrono, who brought
a copy of the ban to the city, and by threatening to punish Cella for its
support of the inquisitors. 24
Given the tenacity of Teruel's resistance to the Inquisition, only
direct intervention by Ferdinand himself could break the deadlock.
Ferdinand needed no urging from the inquisitors and proceeded to
resolve the crisis by calling on the Aragonese nobility to mobilize
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their forces to invade the city. While there is no evidence that such
an attack ever took place, the threat of armed action was sufficient to
force local authorities to yield and admit the Inquisition, which
proceeded to punish several members of the city council for their
role in the resistance. 25 The tradition of resistance to the Inquisition
died hard in Teruel, and even after it was absorbed by the Valencia
tribunal and a subtribunal established there in 1517, there was con-
stant friction between subtribunal officials and local citizens. 26
In Valencia, the opposition was less violent but more united,
taking the form of a series of complaints and demands for reform
made by the branches of the Valencian Cortes and then further
elaborated in an embassy sent to the king in October- December
1484. These demands, some of which were repeated at the Cortes
of Monzon in 1510-1512, would have drastically modified the struc-
ture and procedures of the Valencian tribunal and made it a much
less dangerous institution. In the first place, the deputies protested
against the use of outsiders, that is, non-Valencians, as inquisitors
and officials of the court. The Cortes protest was especially directed
against Inquisitor Juan Epila, a Dominican monk who was a native
of Aragon. The deputies demanded that only Valencians be em-
ployed as inquisitors and that these should work without pay. 27
Proposals to reform the actual procedures used by the tribunal
centered around two themes: a lessening of the economic impact of
confiscations on the families of the convicted heretic and the con-
cealment of the names of witnesses. Regarding confiscation, the
deputies demanded that it should be limited only to property ac-
quired from the day of sentencing and not from when the crime had
been committed. To further protect the heretic's family, it was
requested that the inquisitorial receiver automatically return the
dowry of his wife as long as it could be demonstrated that it had
been fully paid over to him. Cortes ambassador Juan Ruiz de Eliori
also made a point of criticizing the use of secret testimony on the
grounds that such testimony encouraged denunciations motivated
by a desire for vengeance rather than by an eagerness to punish
heretics. 28
Superficially, at least, Valencia's leading classes seemed to be
supportive of the Inquisition, with the Cortes delegates protesting
in their 1484 list of demands that they were not putting them
forward in order to prevent the Inquisition from operating effec-
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tively. Acceptance of these demands, however, especially the
ones voiced at the Cortes of 1484, would have severely handi-
capped the tribunal. Revealing the names of witnesses would un-
doubtedly have discouraged denunciations, especially among the
tightly knit converso community with its many intricate family con-
nections, while making confiscations date from the day of sentence
would have greatly reduced the tribunal's chief economic base.
Complaints from the Cortes about violations of the traditional
liberties of the kingdom had little impact on Ferdinand, who was
eager to use the new institution as a tool of centralization and who
reveled in the fact that he had helped to create a legal institution
that could operate free of such constraints. Ferdinand's obstinate
refusal to reform the tribunal was accompanied by a concerted
effort to defend its independence and authority from both the local
oligarchy and the royal officials in the kingdom alike. In response to
the series of complaints issued by the Cortes in 1484, Ferdinand
ordered his governor to discover the identities of those "malicious"
persons who were "threatening" the inquisitors. 30
Undaunted by Ferdinand's firm support for the tribunal, authori-
ties in Valencia city in collaboration with local notaries concocted a
scheme to paralyze it by depriving its notarial staff of the right to
certify legal documents such as those pertaining to confiscated prop-
erty. Supported by the jurats, Valencia's municipal councillors, the
chief of Valencia's notaries brought suit to prevent inquisitorial
notary Juan Perez from practicing in the city on the grounds that he
was not a member of the notarial college. After the tribunal had
apprised him of the situation, Ferdinand acted immediately, writ-
ing to the viceroy to order him to take the Inquisition's notaries
under his personal protection. At the same time, he addressed
himself directly to the head of the notarial college, ordering him to
desist from any attempt to prevent the notaries from carrying out
their functions and ordering suspension of the case that had been
brought against Juan Perez in the court of the racional. 31
One of the most consistent demands voiced bv local authorities
during this early period was that the inquisitors should show them
their powers before beginning to exercise their office. If the inquisi-
tors could be forced to do this, then a clear subordination to local
authority and local law would be implied and objections could legiti-
mately be put forward to any "irregular" appointments. This demand
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was first made with respect to the Aragonese Juan Epila whom
Ferdinand had appointed to serve as inquisitor in Valencia. Ferdi-
nand, who wished to retain total freedom of action with regard to the
new tribunal, had no intention of permitting this, and in 1485, he
issued a rather cynical statement justifying his position in which he
declared that the officials of the Inquisition occupied ecclesiastical
offices instituted by the pope and were therefore not subject to the
furs or subordinate to local justices. This royal recognition of papal
authority over the Inquisition would have been welcomed by Pope
Sixtus IV, from whom Ferdinand had been trying unsuccessfully to
obtain full powers of appointment since 148 1-82. 32 Regardless of
this anomaly, however, it was perfectly consistent with Ferdinand's
policy of unlimited support for the Inquisition that the inquisitors
should refuse to show their powers to the jurats or to other represen-
tatives of local authority and that Ferdinand should support them in
their refusal. Later, when this demand was renewed by the jurats,
Inquisitors Juan de Monestario and Rodrigo Sanz de Mercado re-
fused, while Ferdinand wrote angrily to the jurats telling them that
they had no right to make such a demand and congratulated the
33
inquisitors on their firmness.
If Ferdinand was concerned to prevent local authorities from
gaining any measure of control over the tribunal, he was equally
concerned to protect and enhance the autonomy of its legal jurisdic-
tion, especially in the area of confiscated property. In 1499, when
the governor, jurats, racional, and other local authorities attempted
to prevent the tribunal from carrying out a certain confiscation,
Ferdinand brusquely ordered them to desist from issuing any fur-
ther legal requisitions and stated that the only proper way to appeal
against anything that was done by the tribunal was to go before its
own superior — the Suprema. 34 It was probably as a result of Ferdi-
nand's constant and unremitting support that on June 28, 1500, the
Valencia tribunal felt itself strong enough to call all local officials
into its presence and demand an oath of loyalty and obedience. 35
From then on, such oaths were routinely demanded and acceded to
by the jurats and other local officials. 36 The day was long past when
local authorities could demand that inquisitors like Juan Epila pres-
ent their powers for verification; instead of making the tribunal
subordinate to local authority, the chief representatives of local
authority were becoming subservient to the tribunal.
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One result of constant royal intervention on behalf of the tribu-
nal was to make it dependent on the crown and open the way for
Ferdinand to intervene in every aspect of its operations. In spite of
Ferdinand's insistence that the authority of the inquisitorial court
be maintained inviolate, he himself had no compunction in inter-
ceding on behalf of certain individuals if he felt it to be necessary.
After learning that the tribunal's receiver was confiscating the prop-
erty of a group of conversos who thought they had an agreement
that protected them from such seizures, Ferdinand ordered further
confiscations to cease. Several months later, however, instead of
making the tribunal restore the already confiscated property, he
ordered it held by the receiver so that part of it could be used to
pay the debts owed by this group to certain condemned heretics
whose property was already forfeit. 3 '
In general, Ferdinand encouraged the zeal of the inquisitors
even when the tribunal's actions were of a questionable legality.
Certainly, when that zeal seemed to flag, Ferdinand could be caus-
tic in his criticism. The discovery of a secret synagogue concealed
in the home of Salvador Vives Valeriola in 1500, long after the
tribunal had commenced its operations against the converted Jews,
provoked Ferdinand to write an angry letter in which he accused
the tribunal of being "lazy and negligent'' because of its tardy discov-
ery of a synagogue where Jewish ceremonies were being "openly
performed." Ferdinand went on to castigate the tribunal for its
failure to obtain an accurate inventory of the property of the ac-
cused in this case at the time of their arrest. As a result, a great deal
of property that should have been confiscated for the royal treasury
38
was being retained by third parties.
During the reign of Charles V, the Spanish crown continued to
provide the Inquisition with strong political support, but where
Ferdinand had sought to exercise close control over the institu-
tion's operations, especially in the areas of personnel and finance,
Charles, who resided in Spain less than 16 years out of his nearly
40-year reign, moved to grant it greater autonomy. In September
1520, Cardinal Adrian of Utrecht, who had already been appointed
sole inquisitor-general for Castile and Aragon, was granted full
powers of appointment for both inquisitors and officials. 39 Gone
were the days when Ferdinand intervened freely to appoint and
dismiss inquisitors like Valencia's Juan de Monestario, who after
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nine years of faithful service was abruptly ordered to pack his bags
for Seville. 40
Finance was another area in which the Inquisition gradually
acquired a large measure of autonomy. Just before leaving Spain on
May 20, 1520, Charles gave Adrian full authority to issue payment
orders; this was confirmed by a September 12 cedula sent to the
receivers of all the tribunals. 41 The lengths to which the crown was
now prepared to go in abrogating any direct control over inquisito-
rial finances was demonstrated by an extraordinary royal cedula in
which Charles gave the Inquisition permission to ignore any royal
orders making grants from confiscated property unless they were
countersigned by the members of the Suprema. 42
Given this general background of firm and unwavering royal
support plus the advent of a series of viceroys who tended to per-
ceive the Inquisition as an agent of centralization in a kingdom
overly jealous of its privileges, the Valencia tribunal was able to
carve out a preeminent position for itself and for all those associ-
ated with it. If this preeminence did not outlast the early part of the
reign of Philip II, the tribunal's success in combating other local
authorities and winning special privileges for its friends enabled it
to build up enough political capital to sustain itself even in a later
period when its principal function, the pursuit of religious heretics,
had been much reduced in importance.
Perhaps the most formidable weapon that the tribunal could wield
in its innumerable conflicts with other authorities was its power to
lay down a sentence of excommunication that could only be removed
by the pope or by the Holy Office itself. 43 The weapon was especially
formidable against the mainly secular authorities (Audiencia, jurats,
financial agencies) with which the tribunal tended to have the major-
ity of its disputes, since they could not counterattack effectively and
were left to appeal to the king for relief. Even if the king was willing
to intervene, it was always by the gracious permission of the Holy
Office that the ban was lifted, so that the secular tribunal was always
placed in a position of inferiority.
The frequency with which the Valencia tribunal used this formi-
dable weapon against the Audiencia is attested by the Concordia of
May 11, 1554. In this earliest of all the agreements by which the
crown attempted to mitigate the worst abuses of inquisitorial juris-
diction over its own officials and familiares, the Valencia tribunal
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was ordered to exercise the utmost restraint in using the censure of
excommunication against the officers of royal justice, particularly
the recently established Audiencia. 44
The tribunal, however, had no intention of obeying the spirit of
the Concordia, as testimony received during the visitation of 1566
clearly indicated. According to the tribunal's judge of the civil cases
of familiares, Inquisitor Aguilera had frequently used ecclesiastical
censures against the Audiencia judges and other royal officials as
well as against the Cortes without attempting any prior conciliation
of the subject under dispute. The indiscriminate use of ecclesiasti-
cal censures as well as the frequent arrest and incarceration of
constables connected with the Audiencia had made the Inquisition
"hated in the entire republic." 4
By the late 1560s, when inquisitorial abuses had become so seri-
ous that the other royal courts were in danger of becoming discred-
ited, it was decided to dispatch a member of the Supreme Council
itself to make a special visitation to the tribunal. While in Valencia,
this official was presented with a long memorial by the judges of the
Audiencia which complained bitterly of the recent use of ecclesiasti-
cal censures excommunicating them along with the agents of the
royal treasury and prominent private individuals. According to the
memorial, these censures had been issued for matters of little impor-
tance, and their unceasing use was "ruining the respect" that was
due the Audiencia and the royal treasury as representatives of the
king's authority in the Kingdom of Valencia. 46
Another very powerful device that the tribunal could use to
intimidate its enemies was to accuse them of creating obstacles to
the free exercise of the Holy Office. Eymerich's manual for inquisi-
tors states that any such person was to be excommunicated with the
proviso that if the ban was not lifted within one year, they were
automatically considered heretics. In the sixteenth century, several
papal bulls further refined the definition of the crime of obstructing
the Holy Office and provided that anyone threatening the person of
an inquisitor or preventing the Inquisition from carrying out its
responsibilities was to be relaxed to the secular arm. 47 The impor-
tance of preventing opposition to the Holy Office was made known
to the general public by equating "impeders of the Holy Office"
with heretics in the oath to support the Inquisition that was sworn
by all present at the annual proclamation of the Edict of Faith. 48
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Given the Valencia tribunal's eagerness to enhance its power and
authority, it quickly recognized the value of being able to formulate
what amounted to a heresy case against its political opponents
whose opposition could be equated with attempting to prevent the
Inquisition from carrying out its proper duties. In 1528, the tribu-
nal was presented with an excellent opportunity to demonstrate the
power of this particular weapon. The seizure of Onofre Centellas,
an important Valencian noble, for aiding two of his in-laws in resist-
ing arrest by the Inquisition aroused a storm of indignation among
the greater and lesser Valencian nobility. Two well-known Valen-
cian lawyers, Damian Andres and Melchor Mont, but especially
the latter, played a leading role in organizing this opposition. An-
dres and Mont organized an emergency meeting of the Valencian
estates at the cathedral, while Mont drew up a petition for presenta-
tion to the viceroy. It was all very well for the Inquisition to exer-
cise its authority over the converted Jews, the protest declared, but
its extension to "other persons and cases," especially, it may be
presumed, cases involving the Valencian nobility, was denounced
as a usurpation of "imperial jurisdiction.'' After drawing up his
petition, Mont went on to loudly support a proposal that the dele-
gates arm themselves and march on the Inquisition to demand
Centellas's release and even proposed that the tribunal's prosecut-
ing attorney be seized as a hostage.
Fortunately for the tribunal, Fernando de Aragon, Duke of Cala-
bria, was one of those early sixteenth-century viceroys whose policy
was characterized by firm and unwavering support for the Inquisi-
tion. On receiving Mont's petition, the duke wrote immediately to
Inquisitor-General Alfonso Manrique to apprise him of the situa-
tion, and Manrique in turn ordered the immediate arrest of Mont
and Andres. On January 28, 1528, the two men were placed under
house arrest in spite of Mont's attempt to claim the archbishop s
protection by taking sanctuary in the cathedral, and fiscal Juan Gon-
zalez de Munebrega formally accused them of "obstructing the exer-
cise of this Holy Office." After being tried and found guilty, both
were publicly humiliated in such a way as to serve as a warning to
other members of Valencia's ruling elite who might have similar
ideas. The two men were forced to hear mass in the cathedral bare-
headed and holding lighted candles and then to swear obedience to
the commandments of the church and to fully support the jurisdic-
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21
tion of the Holy Office; they were also deprived of the right to plead
before the Audiencia until the inquisitor-general should decide to
lift the ban. Even though Manrique acted quickly to release the men
and lift the restriction on their practice of law, the point had been
made. The Valencia tribunal was prepared to intervene against its
political opponents on the grounds that they were "obstructing" its
work, and henceforth even the highest ranking nobles could not
consider themselves immune from prosecution. 49
One area of great and consuming interest to everyone connected
with the Valencia tribunal was the issue of obtaining tax exemp-
tions. Since royal policy was far from consistent, the degree of
exemption became the subject of a power struggle between the
Inquisition, on the one hand, and the representatives of the various
taxing bodies, on the other. In the Kingdom of Valencia, the
Diputacio was a committee of the Cortes empowered to collect and
administer the taxes that were used to defend the kingdom. The
major source of income was derived from customs duties payable
by everyone carrying merchandise across Valencia's land borders,
but according to a letter sent to Charles by the Cortes deputies in
1525, Valencia's inquisitors were regularly issuing licenses stating
that exported items were destined for the Suprema and were there-
fore under inquisitorial protection. While theoretically the several
tribunals had the right to send items that were for the exclusive
personal use of the members of the Suprema free of customs du-
ties, the Valencia tribunal was abusing this privilege and carrying
on a lucrative trade in contraband merchandise. All that the depu-
ties received for their pains was a letter from Ugo de Urries, a
secretary of the Suprema, blandly assuring them that the matter
would be handled to everyone's satisfaction, but when they sent
several delegates to court to make further remonstrations, they
were arrested by order of the inquisitor-general. 50
The Valencia tribunal's successful assertion of its right to avoid
paying the customs duties levied by the Diputacio was matched by
a similar attitude toward the Peatge and Quema, which were cus-
toms duties forming part of the royal patrimony and levied by the
Bailfa General, the royal treasury of the kingdom. 51 Licenses pro-
tecting cargoes from inspection were a sore point with the Bailfa
collectors who were always looking for a way to assert their jurisdic-
tion. An inadvertent declaration of part of a cargo that was being
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exported under the guidance of one of the officials of a Valencian
subtribunal seemed to establish just the sort of precedent that the
royal collectors were looking for, and high officials of the Bailia
were quick to instruct their agents to levy duties on all merchan-
dise being exported under license of the Inquisition. Confronted
with this threat to what they had come to consider their rights, the
Valencian inquisitors reacted immediately by excommunicating the
entire staff of the royal treasury. 52
One of the most delicate issues in the relations between the
Spanish regions revolved around the export of grain from regions of
relative plenty to areas of relative dearth. The needs of importing
regions like Valencia, which was never self-sufficient in grains,
were met in part by imports from grain-producing areas of the
Crown of Aragon, but such imports clashed with that kingdom's
natural desire to retain as much as possible against the possibility of
poor harvests. The Valencia tribunal and its agents had a real oppor-
tunity to profit by the kingdom's perennial need for imported grain
because two Aragonese grain-producing regions, Teruel and Albar-
racm, were included in the inquisitorial district and therefore sub-
ject to its authority. In Teruel, the opportunity was even greater
because there was a subtribunal in residence. Ostensibly, only
small amounts of grain were to be exported from the Aragonese
part of the district to meet the specific needs of the judges and
salaried members of the Valencia tribunal. Constant complaints by
the Council of Aragon of exports far in excess of these requirements
finally forced the tribunal itself to undertake an investigation and
bring criminal charges against its own lieutenant-inquisitor in
Teruel, canon Pablo Guillem. During the course of his trial,
Guillem was accused of issuing inquisitorial export licenses broad-
cast to members of his own family, local familiares, and other offi-
cials of the subtribunal and of personally leading raids on royal
customs officials who had confiscated contraband grain and other
items. Guillem was sentenced to be suspended from serving on
the subtribunal for four years, but the evidence suggests that the
pattern of illegal grain export from the Aragonese parts of the dis-
trict continued well into the latter part of the sixteenth century.
Even after the subtribunals had been abolished and replaced by
comisarios, the lure of quick profits to be made from grain exports
to Valencia proved irresistible, and the comisarios continued issu-
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2.3
ing licenses to local familiares in spite of the fact that the Concordia
of 1568 had specifically denied them that right. 54
The sweeping exemption from customs duties, whether levied
by royal or provincial taxing bodies, was of considerable benefit to
everyone connected with the tribunal, from inquisitors and officials
down to familiares. Iflicenses issued by the tribunal could be used
to avoid the ubiquitous transit taxes levied in early modern Spain,
then those who could obtain them would have an inestimable ad-
vantage over any potential business rival.
Of course, customs duties were not the only taxes paid by citi-
zens of the kingdom, and the licensing system could only benefit a
relatively few officials and familiares. For the larger group who did
not engage in the export trade, exemption from local excise taxes
and protection from creditors was far more important. On the
whole, and in spite of the protests voiced at the Cortes of 1510, the
tribunal was able to win complete tax exemption for titled officials
from at least 15 14. 55 The Concordia of 1568 specifically freed in-
quisitors and officials from payment of municipal taxes, while in
1570, an agreement between the viceroy and the local tax farmers
which provided for excluding titled officials from the tax rolls indi-
cates that such tax exemptions had become routine. 56
As far as the familiares were concerned, the Concordia of 1554
specifically denied them any tax exemptions from royal or munici-
pal taxes. 57 As we have already seen, however, many familiares
were able to exempt themselves and their merchandise from cus-
toms duties by making use of inquisitorial licenses. On a municipal
level, the Inquisition's protection was less effective, but in some
parts of the district, familiares were able to secure a measure of
exemption from local taxation. In other respects, the Inquisition
could and did extend its protection in ways that were beneficial to
the familiares. Prohibitions listed in the 1568 Concordia clearly
indicate that the tribunal had made a practice of interposing its
authority to protect artisans and merchants who were familiares
when they cheated their customers and familiares who were tax-
farmers when they defrauded the Diputacio treasury. 58
Familiares could also count on exemptions from quartering
troops or members of the royal court. That this exemption had
been fully observed during much of the sixteenth century is clear
in testimony taken by the tribunal from certain of its longest-
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serving officials and familiares in 1575 when the viceroy made an
effort to test the exemption by lodging a soldier in the home of a
familiar. According to testimony received from familiar Alejo
Castellano de Aguirre, who at age 66 had served the tribunal for
forty years, his own exemption had been tested when Charles V
visited Valencia in December 1542. On being asked by the vice-
roy's lieutenant to house several imperial halberdiers, Aguirre re-
fused, alleging an exemption on the grounds of his familiatura, and
the soldiers were billeted on someone else. 59 Testimony taken a
few days earlier from an official, Alcalde Juan de Oriate, indicates
that the tribunal had always tenaciously defended this exception,
using its favorite weapon — the ecclesiastical censure — when neces-
sary against royal captains who attempted to lodge their troops at
homes of familiares or officials. 60
By far the most significant benefits that were brought to the lives
of those associated with the Inquisition came because they, their
families, servants, and even slaves, all formed a distinct corporate
group enjoying a fuero, or separate legal status, of their own. Like
the members of the Order of Montesa in Valencia or of other mili-
tary orders in the rest of Spain, these privileged persons could not
be tried on civil or criminal charges before the ordinary courts but
had the right to a trial before their own court, in this case, that of
the Inquisition.
It was during the early period of the Inquisition's existence,
when Ferdinand was struggling to protect the fledgling institution
from its numerous enemies, that the principle of the Inquisition's
right to exercise complete jurisdiction over the civil and criminal
cases of officials and familiares was first stated. 62 Widespread
abuses, however, gave rise to a chorus of complaints, so the 1498
Instructions sharply limited inquisitorial jurisdiction by disallowing
any cognizance over civil cases and by limiting jurisdiction in crimi-
nal cases to officials only. 63 But accepting the limitations imposed
by the 1498 Instructions would have undermined the basis of the
alliance between the Inquisition and the growing body of familiares
who were providing it with increasingly effective political support.
In Valencia, where the corps of familiares was larger and more
important than anywhere else in Spain, the tribunal had no inten-
tion of observing the restrictions imposed by the 1498 Instructions.
Familiares and officials were accorded the fullest possible protec-
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25
tion, and even the well-established legal principle that the plaintiff
had to seek the court of the defendant was ignored. Familiares and
officials were routinely accorded the active fuero, being allowed to
bring accusations before the inquisitorial court in both civil and
criminal cases in spite of constant protests from the regent of the
Audiencia. 64 In their zeal to cement their alliance with the famil-
iares by extending the fuero, the Valencia inquisitors even went so
far as to issue edicts containing ecclesiastical censures against per-
sons suspected of robbing them and intervening to force their debt-
ors to pay what they owed. 65
To further enhance its authority and increase its income from
hearing ordinary cases, the tribunal extended its fuero to as many
people as possible. The 1568 Concordia allowed the fuero to be
extended not only to the wives and families of officials and familiares
but also to those commonly forming part of their household. 66 In
1589, testimony received by the tribunal from Francisco Baziero, its
longtime notary of civil cases, revealed that for the entire twenty-
five years that he had spent in the tribunal's service, his court had
even heard civil cases brought by reconciled persons since they too
"enjoyed the fuero." In his testimony, Baziero also gave a list of
persons who had successfully invoked the tribunal's jurisdiction to
collect debts owed to them. 6 '
Another very important privilege that the tribunal was able to
gain for its familiares was the right to bear arms of all sorts when-
ever they chose, including the feared flintlocks. In the 1554 Con-
cordia, Prince Philip turned a blind eye to any potential abuses of
this privilege in vendetta-ridden Valencia with the bland statement
that since familiares were to be chosen from among the most
"peace-loving" segment of the population and were committed to
the royal service, there was no need whatever to limit their right to
carry arms. Of course, this generous demonstration of royal sup-
port flew in the face of another royal policy, enunciated by succes-
sive viceroys and enforced by the royal Audiencia, which was to
limit the number of weapons in circulation and eliminate the flint-
lock entirely. Efforts by the Audiencia to enforce successive vice-
regal prohibitions, however, entailed a head-on clash with the Holy
Office on each of the many occasions when a familiar was arrested
carrying prohibited arms. One of the most bitter complaints voiced
by the Audiencia in the list that it prepared for visitor Francisco de
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Soto Salazar in 1567 was that the tribunal had never been willing to
cooperate informally to reduce the number of flintlocks in the
hands of its familiares and whenever the royal constables detained a
familiar for possession of a prohibited weapon, the inquisitors had
intervened to place the constables themselves under arrest. 68
Confident of automatic royal support or at least tolerance of its
activities and eager to build up a political clientele throughout the
kingdom, the Valencia tribunal was quite willing to intervene in
local disputes even though such intervention went far beyond its
stated responsibilities. During the 1560s, Tortosa was divided be-
tween the Molinar and Despuche factions. Juan Molinar was a
familiar and could count on the support of Tortosa's Lieutenant-
Inquisitor Pedro Boteller and his alguacil, Cosme Castellar. Cas-
tellar, in turn, enjoyed a warm relationship with the man who had
appointed him, the tribunal's chief constable Francisco de Her-
mosa. Whenever Castellar would come to Valencia, he would stay
with Hermosa, and Hermosa was not above accepting valuable
presents and favors from the Molinar group. In their struggle with
the Despuche faction, the Molinar family enjoyed some very signifi-
cant advantages as a result of their close ties with the Inquisition.
As an official of the Holy Office, Lieutenant-Inquisitor Boteller was
protected by the fuero from having to allow any royal constable to
enter his home. As a result, whenever the Molinar gang returned
from one of its violent forays, they would take refuge with Boteller
and thumb their noses at any constable who came to arrest them.
Boteller would also use his considerable political influence on be-
half of the Molinar group. On one occasion, when Molinar wished
to rid himself of Juan Perez Morena, a member of the opposing
faction, he had him denounced for murder, whereupon he was duly
arrested by the royal constables and brought to trial. Since the
charges against Morena were obviously false, he was acquitted and
was on the point of being released when Boteller intervened, fore-
ing the royal officials to continue his detention.
For their part, the Despuche faction bitterly resented the role
that the members of the subtribunal were playing in their conflict
with the Molinar, and they were determined to strike back. In Febru-
ary 1565, they attacked and burned Castellar's home. This direct
attack on a member of the subtribunal, whatever its provocation,
was considered an effort to "obstruct" the operations of the Holy
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Office by the tribunal in Valencia, and Castellar's friend, Francisco
de Hermosa, came to Tortosa to arrest the three leading members of
the rival faction and to conduct them back to Valencia. 70
Fully confident of the complaisance of a series of tolerant vice-
roys, the tribunal felt little need to show any outward respect for or
cooperate with other institutions, whether royal (the Audiencia) or
ecclesiastical. During the early 1560s, the Suprema received sev-
eral letters from both the Audiencia and the archbishop's court
complaining of a lack of even elementary cooperation by the tribu-
nal. The Audiencia was particularly angry because the tribunal
would frequently remove prisoners from the royal prison where
they were awaiting trial, try them for some minor offense, and then
let them go free without returning them. Since this practice was
becoming well known among the criminal element, it was increas-
ingly common for some dangerous criminal awaiting trial for mur-
der to utter a blasphemy in his cell, where he would be overheard
by other prisoners and then denounced to the Inquisition. Since
the penalty for blasphemy was usually rather mild and the offender
could count on being set free afterward, serious crimes were left
"without punishment" to the "great detriment of the administration
of justice." 71
As jurists and veterans of the imperial bureaucracy, the Valen-
cian inquisitors were well aware of the importance of seizing and
holding positions of preeminence at public ceremonies or in places
where others who could lay claim to similar status were present. By
permitting and seeming to approve of, or at least acquiesce in,
conspicuous displays of status by the inquisitors, their peers among
the social and political elite implicitly validated these claims, while
the general public, which witnessed the inquisitors occupying such
exalted positions, could not fail to be awed by the general respect
in which their persons and the institution that they represented
seemed to be held.
Naturally, the inquisitors played a leading role in the great pub-
lic autos de fe and the procession that preceded them, but high
visibility on other occasions or in other places not directly con-
nected with the Inquisition was necessary if the tribunal was to
attain the sort of prestige that it desired. At ordinary religious
processions such as Corpus Christi, therefore, the members of the
tribunal insisted on marching in a position of the greatest honor
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even if it meant displacing several canons of the cathedral. In the
cathedral itself, the inquisitors were able to obtain control over the
two most prestigious stalls in the choir, much to the dismay of the
canons.' 2 The inquisitors were also frequently present at other
public spectacles such as civic processions and bullfights. As specta-
tors, they made it their business to use the most magnificent cush-
ions and to place themselves in a conspicuous position at the win-
dows to the inquisitorial palace so that everyone would notice
them. 73
Quite apart from its frequently rather high-handed relations
with other institutions, the tribunal could behave in an aggressive
manner toward private citizens in ordinary matters that had noth-
ing to do with its area of responsibility. Typical of this aggressive
attitude was the way that the tribunal forced notary Berengario
Serra to leave the house he had been renting near the inquisitorial
palace. The tribunal wanted the house for Nicolas Verdun, one of
its notaries, who had himself been displaced because the owner of
the house he was renting had returned to Valencia and Serra's
house was cheaper and closer to the tribunal than any other. ' 4
Throughout the last years of the reign of Ferdinand the Catholic
and during most of the reign of his successor, Charles V, the Span-
ish Inquisition in general and the Valencia tribunal in particular
had enjoyed a golden age. Basking in the glow of royal favor and
approval, the Holy Office was openly disdainful of the other institu-
tions of royal justice and arrogant in its relations with the represen-
tatives of clergy or local government.
Several years before the reign of Philip II officially began in
1556, the climate in which the Inquisition had flourished so remark-
ably had begun to change. Philip's attitude — as prince and regent
and, later, king — toward the Inquisition was very much in line with
his general policy, which was to endeavor to bring the rather cha-
otic administration that he had inherited from his father under
firmer central control and to reduce the scope for private profit and
abuse of power by those connected with state service.
In the case of the Inquisition, Philip's unwavering support for its
role in preserving a Catholic Spain was never in doubt, but to allow
it to assume a position of superiority in areas outside its area of
competence was to undermine the principle of royal control and
damage the credibility of the ordinary courts whose operations
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were the most visible and continuous manifestation of royal sover-
eignty. Given the general orientation of his policies, therefore,
Philip was highly receptive to complaints from Audiencia judges
that the Inquisition was abusing its authority over officials and
familiares to the detriment of royal justice. Typical of these com-
plaints was a letter from the regent of Audiencia of the Valencian
Audiencia complaining of the excessively large number of famil-
iares in the kingdom and of the use of the active and passive fuero
in both civil and criminal cases. Similar protests from Castile had
already moved Philip to suspend the provisions of the July 15,
1518, cedula by which his father had granted the criminal fuero to
the familiares of the Castilian tribunals. 76
Alarmed by the complaints reaching him from the Audiencia and
other sources, Philip decided to replace his lieutenant-viceroy,
Juan Lorenzo de Villarrasa, with a new viceroy who would be given
full powers to investigate the situation and make recommendations
for reform." Already suspicious of the Inquisition because of the
mandate that he had been given to investigate its abuses, the new
viceroy, Bernardino de Cardenas, lost no time in becoming in-
volved in a bitter dispute over a familiar. Cardenas's arrest of Mateo
Juan on suspicion of murder forced the tribunal to issue a ban of
excommunication against him and destroyed any opportunity that
it might have had to create a more amicable relationship with him
during his term of office. Viceregal interference with the fuero,
however, prompted considerable soul searching by the tribunal
and a recognition that its activities were creating many enemies
among the politically influential.
In April 1553, the viceroy filed a report with Philip in which he
charged that familiares were committing "many crimes" under the
tribunal's protection and warned of the dangers to royal jurisdiction
that abuses of the fuero might entail. 79 But the viceroy's real oppor-
tunity to launch an attack on the tribunal was provided by a resolu-
tion taken at the Cortes of Monzon, which called for limitations on
the fuero and a reduction in the number of familiares. This rather
timid resolution, which was only supported by two of the three
estates, might have easily been ignored, and the fact that it was not
is an indication that the crown was now serious about reform. 80
Taking their cue from the resolution passed at the Cortes, Valen-
cia's jurats were quick to present a petition to the viceroy filled
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with specific complaints about abuses of the inquisitorial fuero and
the excessive number of familiares and echoing the viceroy's warn-
ings about potential damage to royal jurisdiction. For once, the
normally feuding representatives of municipal and royal authority
were in concert, and the regent of the Audiencia was instructed by
Viceroy Cardenas to undertake an investigation of the charges pre-
sented in the jurats' petition. What followed was a dramatic series
of hearings held before the judges of the Audiencia, with a parade
of witnesses drawn primarily from notaries and officials of agencies
with a history of frequent conflict with the tribunal. To no one's
surprise, the testimony was uniformly unfavorable to the fuero and
detailed abuses calculated to anger Philip, such as armed resistance
offered by familiares to royal constables. The tribunal had clearly
miscalculated the degree to which its enemies could coordinate
their efforts, and its response to the challenge posed by the
Audiencia hearings was so slow that it was a full fifteen days before
it was even aware that they were being held. 81
The most important result of this campaign was the Concordia of
May 11, 1554, which was drawn up at a joint meeting of the
Suprema and the Council of Aragon. In this agreement, which was
the first of the four Concordias regulating the Inquisition in the
Crown of Aragon, limits were placed on the number of familiares
that each town and village could have, wives and children were
excluded from the protection of the fuero, and the scope of the
fuero in civil cases was limited only to cases where familiares were
defendants. 82 The Concordia also excluded use of the fuero in cases
of commercial fraud and stated specifically that familiares were
subject to all royal and provincial taxes. 83
That Philip himself intended the Concordia to be interpreted so
that ambiguous cases would be tried by the ordinary courts was
made clear by his intervention in the case of Francisco Juan
Vergonoys, a familiar from Barcelona who was caught attempting to
export oil without paying the duties levied by the Diputacio. When
consulted by the tribunal after Vergonoys was arrested by local
officials, the Suprema stated that the tribunal had a right to take
cognizance of the case since the 1554 Concordia said nothing about
jurisdiction over cases involving tax evasion. But Philip had a differ-
ent interpretation, and on July 12, 1560, he ordered the tribunal to
surrender the case to the ordinary civil courts. 84
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The need to further define those areas of civil law where the
fuero would not be extended was one of the most important reasons
for issuing a new Concordia in 1568. In this document, the ordi-
nary civil courts were given jurisdiction over familiares who at-
tempted to avoid payment of duties levied by the Diputacio or who
committed frauds while acting as collectors for that institution or
for the city itself. Familiares who violated ordinances that set limits
on the amount of timber that could be imported and sold, or regu-
lated the planting of rice, could also no longer expect protection. In
criminal matters, the tribunal was not permitted to use ecclesiasti-
cal censures to force those who had robbed officials, consultores, or
familiares to reveal themselves or force debtors to pay their
debts. 85
Another important provision of the 1568 Concordia dealt with
the issue of the subtribunals. The corruption and abuses of the
subtribunals and their officials formed a large part of the evidence
taken during the visitations of 1560 and 1567, while the illegal
export of grain from those areas of the district that really belonged
to the Crown of Aragon were a sore point with the Aragonese
authorities. Philip's anger about this situation came to a head in
1567 when he insisted that the Suprema order the arrest of the
tribunal's lieutenant-inquisitor and lieutenant alcalde in Teruel be-
ii 1 86
cause they had issued numerous licenses for illegal grain exports.
The Concordia provided for the elimination of the subtribunals and
their replacement by comisarios. In matters of heresy, the comi-
sario would only be able to receive information that he would then
forward to the tribunal, and he would only be able to carry out
arrests when he believed that the suspect was about to escape.
Comisarios were strictly forbidden to issue licenses to individuals
wishing to transport wheat or other commodities. 8 '
In practice, however, the comisarios made use of their powers to
do a brisk business in the sale of export licenses in spite of the
growing opposition of royal financial officials and the Aragonese
Cortes. Finally, it was the Suprema itself, alarmed at the growing
chorus of complaints from the king, the Council of Aragon, and the
Cortes that intervened to halt this practice. When Philip relayed
information that had reached him concerning the illegal issuing of
licenses by canon Camarena, the tribunal's comisario in Teruel, the
Suprema cracked down, threatening him with severe punishment
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if these practices continued. The practice of issuing excessive num-
bers of export licenses had clearly become a political liability at
court and was embroiling the Suprema in an embarrassing series of
conflicts from which it could only emerge with dishonor. In 1607-
08 when the deputies to the Cortes of Aragon flatly refused to
tolerate any further licenses for the export of grain from the king-
dom and complained directly to the king about the activities of the
Valencia tribunal, the Suprema ordered the Valencia tribunal to
abstain from any further attempts to ship grain from Aragon with-
out special permission. 88
Philip was also concerned to regulate the relations between the
tribunal and the Audiencia. Noisy disputes and the public excom-
munication of royal officials were hardly conducive to maintaining
public respect for the institutions of royal government, and con-
stant feuding among the royal courts distracted them from carrying
out their primary responsibilities. One step in the direction of
promoting better relations among the various courts was to order
the Inquisition to cease its practice of removing individuals from
the criminal jails on suspicion of a crime against the faith and then
releasing them when their trial was concluded. It was also made
mandatory for the Holy Office to at least notify a royal court of a
disagreement before resorting to ecclesiastical censures. Finally, an
elaborate procedure was instituted which was designed to provide
for the settlement of jurisdictional disputes. If the tribunal found
itself to be in disagreement with the Audiencia as to the disposition
of a case, the oldest inquisitor and the regent of the Audiencia were
to meet and attempt to settle the dispute. If this effort were to fail,
then the case should be suspended and each tribunal would for-
ward a copy of the case to its respective superior, the Council of
Aragon for the Audiencia and the Suprema for the tribunal, with a
panel drawn from both councils making the final decision. 89
The Concordias of 1554 and 1568 represented a moderate and
reasonable approach toward making the legal machinery of the
state function more smoothly and with fewer acrimonious public
disputes. But the very fact that, for the first time, specific limits
were being placed on the extent of the jurisdiction that the Holy
Office could exercise over familiares and officiales gave the Audien-
cia a priceless opportunity to expand its jurisdiction at the Inquisi-
tion's expense. This was especially true because the Concordias
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reduced the effectiveness of the Inquisition's most formidable
weapon, the immediate imposition of ecclesiastical censures. In
fact, even before the 1568 Concordias in which these curbs were
initiated, the Suprema, no doubt painfully aware of the changing
climate at court, had introduced its own restrictions on the use of
such censures. After 1560, local tribunals could no longer automati-
cally impose them and were forced to send details of the dispute to
the Suprema, which would make the final decision. 90
Far from stabilizing the boundaries of the respective jurisdictions,
therefore, the Concordias put the Inquisition on the defensive and
marked the beginning of the Audiencia's long and ultimately success-
ful struggle to reduce or eradicate the special position that the tribu-
nal and those associated with it had made for themselves. That the
Suprema itself was nervous about the new climate is revealed by a
symbolic marshaling of the documents that conferred special status
on the Inquisition. Symbolic because its request to the tribunal to
forward a summary of all the papal bulls and even the cartas
acordadas, which demonstrated "how favored" were the things of the
Holy Office and "how its jurisdiction had been amplified and ex-
tended by popes and kings," was unnecessary as the Suprema had
copies of most of these items in its own files. Even if the Suprema
genuinely lacked some of these documents, the underlying reason
for its request and the tribunal's resulting dispatch of the desired
summary was a search for reassurance and an effort at mutual encour-
agement by the officials of an institution sensing the beginning of
decline. This was the first in a long series of frantic searches through
tribunal records for evidence that would support the Inquisition's
pretensions. While the searches and the institutional insecurity
were part of the process that led to the organization of the inquisito-
rial archive and greatly benefited future investigators, the endless
regurgitation of the same material provides an ironic counterpoint to
the decline of a once-formidable institution. 91
The Audiencia's efforts to undercut the provisions favorable to the
Inquisition in the Concordia began with the yearly oath by which
Audiencia judges and municipal officeholders alike promised to sup-
port the Holy Office. In the 1554 Concordia, the oath was required
of all officeholders, but the Audiencia judges and other royal officers
dragged their feet on compliance until they openly refused in 1563
on the grounds that as they had not sworn the oath every year since
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1554, the demand that they take it now was an "innovation. " Almost
one year later, the regent and judges agreed to take the oath but in a
modified form, leaving out words such as "preeminence" which
seemed to make the ordinary royal courts subservient to the tribu-
nal. 92 The tribunal had won a Pyrrhic victory in the matter of the
oath, but the Audiencia's strategy of seeking to establish precedents
that would support its long-term effort to undercut the tribunal's
position had become firmly established.
One rather peculiar aspect of the inquisitorial fuero was its exten-
sion to cover reconciled persons. Whatever their punishment, the
reconciled had, in effect, become "clients" of the Holy Office,
which claimed full jurisdiction over both criminal and civil cases
involving them. This unreasonable extension of the fuero, which
was clearly just a way for the Inquisition to tap a lucrative source of
legal business, was the subject of a bitter complaint in the Audien-
cia's memorial presented to visitor Francisco de Soto Salazar in
1567. This aspect of the fuero was ignored in the 1568 Concordia,
and according to testimony received from Jeronimo Almenara, an
Audiencia notary, later in the century, the tribunal had tried all
civil and criminal cases involving reconciled persons during the
entire time that he had been associated with that body.
The fact that the tribunal's jurisdiction over these individuals
was neither confirmed nor denied in the Concordia, however,
placed the whole issue in an unregulated zone where matters were
resolved by a struggle between the two tribunals, both using every
means at their disposal. In 1582, the Audiencia felt strong enough
to contest the tribunal's uninterrupted enjoyment of the right to try
reconciled persons by ordering the arrest and trial of Luis Picote,
who was accused of rape after his reconciliation by the Holy Office.
It also sought to create a precedent for the reconciled to appeal
directly to it by inducing Juan Corsi, a reconciled Morisco, to
denounce certain persons who assaulted him before the Audiencia
instead of before the tribunal. 93
In dealing with the Inquisition's clear and unambiguous right to
try the criminal cases of officials and familiares, the tactics em-
ployed by the Audiencia were subtler. Instead of making a direct
assault on the tribunal's criminal jurisdiction, the Audiencia sought
to use other provisions of the Concordias or other ordinances relat-
ing to familiares to undermine its authority in specific cases and to
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assert its own key role in the enforcement of viceregal pragmaticas
and royal laws to override the criminal fuero in others. If the
Audiencia could actually try a familiar for violating any of these
laws, a precedent would be established and the entire fuero would
become vulnerable to attack.
In the 1568 Concordia, there were a number of specific provi-
sions aimed at moulding the corps of familiares in such a way as to
make it more tractable, uniform, and obedient. One of these provi-
sions was that familiares should be chosen from among commoners
and that men with authority over others should be excluded. The
tribunal was naturally alarmed at the potential loss of politically
influential elements and so sought by a variety of means to retain as
many nobles as possible. The Audiencia was very well aware of the
fact that this violation of the Concordia presented it with a golden
opportunity to break the criminal fuero. When the tribunal ar-
rested Pedro Asensio Romero, a familiar who collected seigneurial
dues and exercised lesser jurisdiction in a small village, the
Audiencia demanded the case on the grounds that as a baron,
Romero had been given his license as familiar in violation of the
Concordia and could therefore not enjoy its privileges. 94
Another of the qualifications that candidates for the familiatura
were expected to have was to be either married or a widower. 95
This qualification was frequently waived by the Suprema, espe-
cially if the candidate was wealthy or had powerful connections, but
unmarried familiares were also vulnerable to attack by the Audi-
encia since they did not meet the technical qualifications for the
office. Vicente Millan, a young Valencian knight who had managed
to run through a rather considerable inheritance in just a few years,
found this out to his cost after his attempts to coerce a wealthy
widow into marrying him went too far and he was arrested by order
of the viceroy. In this instance, the tribunal's attempt to claim him
was halted by a royal order that he be stripped of his familiatura
and turned over to the Audiencia on the grounds that he was
unmarried and therefore should not have been granted the title in
the first place. 96
Alleged violations of viceregal ordinances and royal laws were
undoubtedly the most fertile source of jurisdictional disputes be-
tween the Inquisition and the Audiencia during the last decades of
the sixteenth century. In one instance, Francisco Jover, a familiar of
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Castellon de la Plana, was arrested for not removing his hat when
the lieutenant-governor passed him on a public street. The tribunal
stepped in immediately and secured Jover's release to the custody
of the comisario of Castellon, but he was promptly rearrested,
brought to Valencia, and incarcerated in the ordinary criminal
prison by royal constables acting under orders from the Audiencia,
which claimed that all cases of disrespect for royal officials fell
under its jurisdiction. 97
Not unnaturally, the Audiencia's attitude toward the Inquisition
and everyone connected with it was perceived as one of constant
and relentless hostility by observers at the turn of the sixteenth
century. During hearings held by the tribunal into the problems
that notary Jeronimo Sans was having in attempting to work for the
Audiencia and the tribunal simultaneously, one witness com-
mented that "there is no greater antagonism in the world than that
between the royal Audiencia and the Inquisition." 9 In 1589, a
familiar testified before the tribunal concerning the Audiencia's
general hostility to all familiares. At Audiencia instigation, royal
constables would arrest and harass familiares and would make their
imprisonment even more rigorous when they proclaimed their
rights under the fuero. As the tribunal stated ruefully, if a familiar
"takes a stroll in the sun they regard it as a serious crime." 99
Another part of the fuero that became a prime target for the
Audiencia was the tribunal's jurisdiction over compacts designed to
promote harmony among warring families. According to testimony
taken from Ramon Bernet, one of the Audiencia's own constables,
successive regents had encouraged familiares to take these agree-
ments before the tribunal even when the signatories were not famil-
iares. 100 This cooperative attitude changed abruptly in the early
1550s. When Mateo Juan indicated his desire to sign an agreement
with several persons whom he suspected of being accessories to the
murder of one of his relatives, Judge Roca attempted to persuade
him to sign it before the Audiencia. When Juan refused, pointing to
the tradition of familiares signing such agreements before the tribu-
nal, Roca ordered his arrest. After being imprisoned for nine days
and repeatedly threatened with the garrote, Juan renounced his
familiatura and signed the articles of concord before the Audiencia.
He was then released, but only after being fined twentv reales for
costs. 101
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By holding hearings in which a number of Audiencia officials and
constables testified that compacts involving familiares had always
been signed before it, the tribunal was able to stop the Audiencia's
offensive, but the Audiencia continued its efforts to establish a legal
precedent that would enable it to gain the upper hand. In the early
seventeenth century, the Suprema unwisely permitted an agree-
ment drawn up between a familiar and a knight of Montesa to be
signed before the Audiencia on what was supposed to be a one-
time-only basis. From then on, according to Inquisitor Ambrosio
Roche, "on every occasion that presents itself they try the same
thing. " In each case, Audiencia notaries would carefully record the
day and person who signed agreements before them to more fully
establish their claim to jurisdiction. Finally, in a letter to the
inquisitor-general which summarized the whole frustrating experi-
ence of the tribunal's dealings with the Audiencia from the mid-
1550s, Roche declared that "even though these matters appear to
be of little account, they serve as steppingstones for other, more
serious demands which Your Eminence must not agree to." 102
In its efforts to whittle down and eventually destroy the Inquisi-
tion's special privileges, the Audiencia had no more formidable ally
than the viceroy, its nominal president. These powerful officials
were mostly appointed for three-year terms and were therefore
quite dependent on the Audiencia judges who formed their council
of advisors. In spite of this dependence and the fact that both
viceroy and Audiencia were representatives of royal jurisdiction,
the Inquisition enjoyed good rapport with the viceroys up to the
early 1570s. The one exception came in 1553 when the duke of
Maqueda collaborated closely with the Audiencia and the estates in
their campaign against the tribunal, but the duke was operating
under explicit orders from Prince Philip and not out of any strong
sympathy for the Audiencia or local interests. Indeed, in the late
1560s and early 1570s, the tribunal enjoyed excellent relations with
both Viceroy Antonio Alfonso Pimentel de Herrera, count of
Benavente, and his lieutenant, Luis Ferrer. The count strongly
supported the proposed subsidy that the Morisco community was
to pay the Inquisition so as to obtain immunity from confiscation in
spite of strong opposition from the estates. In 1570, the tribunal
wrote the Suprema in glowing terms to praise "the enthusiasm and
good will that he shows in all matters touching this Inquisition." 103
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From the mid- 1570s, however, the relations between viceroy and
tribunal were transformed, until by 1600, Viceroy Juan Alfonso
Pimentel de Herrera considered himself an open ally of the
Audiencia in its efforts to undermine the fuero. As the most direct
representatives of royal authority in the kingdom, viceroys were
naturally highly sensitive to any institution or body of officials whose
prestige and authority seemed to rival their own. Ostentatious dis-
play by inquisitors and officials both at public ceremonies and proces-
sions and in the cathedral provoked the ire of Viceroy Pedro
Manrique de Lara, duke of Najera, who declared that he would no
longer tolerate the inquisitors' custom of observing public spectacles
at the windows of the inquisitorial palace seated on cushions more
magnificent than his own. The duke also demanded that the inquisi-
tors stop their practice of placing special chairs for themselves in
front of the congregation in the cathedral on important religious
occasions. 104 By 1619, the tribunal's inability to come to terms with
its reduced importance by accepting a lesser place on public occa-
sions caused it to drastically reduce its visibility and abstain from
witnessing or participating in them as much as possible. 105
Viceregal efforts to restrain an alarming increase in urban vio-
lence by enforcing ordinances against persons carrying prohibited
arms and circulating within the city without carrying lanterns pro-
vided a firm basis for the growth of a tactical alliance between the
viceroy and the Audiencia which was aimed at undermining the
inquisitorial fuero. The first serious efforts to prohibit the use of the
flintlock in Valencia were undertaken during the viceroyalty of the
count of Aytona (1581-1594). These efforts culminated in Philip If s
draconian royal ordinance of January 21, 1584, which was aimed at
obliterating "even the memory' of flintlocks. 106 It was the viceroy's
responsibility to enforce the ordinance, while cognizance of viola-
tions was vested in the Audiencia. Rule making during the early
modern period was always subject to exceptions for special interest
groups. In practice, the officials and constabulary of the Diputacio,
royal customs, captain-general, and crusade administration were
exempt as was a large percentage of the local clergy. 10 ' Familiares,
however, found it almost impossible to obtain viceregal licenses
even when many of their neighbors had done so. As familiar Martin
Hinoga of Guadasuar explained to the tribunal in a petition concern-
ing this matter, the fact that familiares could not obtain licenses to
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carry flintlocks put them at a grave disadvantage in the constant
violence, "with daily danger to their persons and possessions." 108
Nevertheless, in 1613, when the royal ordinance was reissued by
the marquis of Caracena, the tribunal acceded and issued its own
edict making familiares subject to its provisions. 109
On October 6, 1575, shortly after he assumed office, Viceroy
Vespasiano Gonzaga issued an ordinance aimed at reducing the
wave of violent assault plaguing Valencia by forcing everyone circu-
lating after curfew to carry a lantern. 110 This ordinance was very
strictly enforced, even for knights and other privileged individuals,
under Gonzaga's administration and that of his successor, the duke
of Najera, who reissued it in September 1578. The one group, apart
from the royal constables themselves, that was able to enjoy an
exemption from the ordinance were the familiares who merely had
to show their licenses to escape arrest. 111
Under the administration of Archbishop Juan de Ribera, who
served as viceroy from 1602 to 1604, the ordinance was issued
again, but this time familiares were specifically included under its
provisions since he considered many of them to be "troublemak-
ers." 112 The tribunal's reaction to this fresh attempt to reduce the
familiares' special privileges was cynical and shortsighted. A large
protest meeting was held involving more than three hundred per-
sons, including salaried officials, but privately the tribunal assured
the Suprema that it was quite willing to tolerate the ordinance as
long as officials were exempt and cases involving familiares were
1X3
placed squarely within its jurisdiction.
Loss of privileged status might make the familiatura less attrac-
tive for some, but in the short term, familiares' increased vulnera-
bility to arrest and prosecution would swell revenue from fines,
while by issuing a special edict of its own ordering familiares not to
carry prohibited arms, the Inquisition could lay claim to exclusive
cognizance and still protect familiares with the fuero. The scheme
was a failure. The Audiencia advanced its claim to try all of these
cases based on its preeminence in the enforcement of royal law.
Moreover, with strong viceregal support, it insisted on trying famil-
iares whom royal constables caught carrying prohibited weapons or
circulating after curfew without lanterns, and the tribunal was
forced to recognize the Audiencia's jurisdiction by allowing bail to
be posted in the name of both courts. 114 Finally, in 1613, a royal
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ordinance gave the Audiencia explicit authority to try all persons
enjoying special fueros who were arrested carrying prohibited
arms. 115 Beset by dozens of jurisdictional disputes over this issue
and fearing still wider assaults on the Inquisition's criminal jurisdic-
tion if it continued to resist, the Suprema agreed that the final
disposition of the cases of familiares presently being held by royal
justices for possession of prohibited arms be determined by the
Council of Aragon exclusively, which meant conceding most of
them to the Audiencia. 116
Confronted by a tacit alliance between a powerful and aggressive
Audiencia and several viceroys who were concerned about the
threat that familiares posed to public order and were committed to
reducing its prerogatives, the tribunal was thrown increasingly on
the defensive around the turn of the century. It took a direct con-
frontation with Viceroy Juan Alfonso Pimentel de Herrera, how-
ever, to demonstrate just how far the tribunal's prestige had fallen
from the period of splendor before 1550.
On August 7, 1600, three familiares who were also city notaries
were arrested on suspicion of having defrauded the public in the
exercise of their functions and incarcerated in the royal criminal
prison at Serranos gate. On the following day, the three prisoners
sent a message to the tribunal asking that it intervene to have them
transferred to its own prison, since as familiares they enjoyed the
fuero and were therefore under inquisitorial, not royal, jurisdic-
tion. Following normal procedures in such cases, the tribunal or-
dered Pedro Juan Vidal, one of the secretaries, to present himself
before the viceroy with this request. Vidal went to the viceroy
twice. The first time he received a courteous but evasive reply, the
viceroy merely telling him that he would contact the inquisitor-
general about the case himself.
Several days later, Inquisitors Honorato Figuerola and Antonio
Canseco de Quinones decided to try again, and Vidal returned to
the viceregal palace with yet another note asking that the three
familiares be sent to the Holy Office along with the evidence of
their wrongdoing so that it could begin proceedings against them.
It was at this meeting that Viceroy Pimentel de Herrera demon-
strated his complete contempt for the Holy Office by treating its
representatives in a manner that would have been utterly inconceiv-
able just twenty-five years earlier. Brushing aside the tribunal's
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request for custody, the viceroy demanded that no further requests
be made, and when asked by a now-bareheaded and trembling
Pedro Vidal what formal reply he should make to his masters, the
viceroy replied, "You can give them this for a reply; that I said not
to send me any more such requests because I'll send them (the
inquisitors) to Madrid aboard some cross-eyed pack mules and
throw the person who comes to present it to me out this window.
Now get along with you, get along with you and give them this
reply and let them be grateful that I don't send them to Madrid on
some cross-eyed mules." 117
The tribunal did not learn of the viceroy's next move until three
days after it happened, when the inquisitors had one of their secre-
taries translate a notarial document written in Valencian by which
the three familiares formally renounced the fuero and submitted
themselves to the judgment of the royal Audiencia. 118 The new
tactic was completely successful, and when the regent came to the
tribunal to discuss the case, Inquisitor Figuerola had to concede
that he had lost all authority over the three men. 119
In the gloomy assessment of the situation that they sent to the
Suprema on August 21, Inquisitors Figuerola and Quinones made
no effort to conceal the fact that the tribunal had sustained a major
defeat. While it was true that familiares accused of violating the
public trust while holding royal offices were to be tried by the
ordinary courts, the fact that the viceroy had previously arrested
several other notaries on charges of malfeasance and then released
them without trial after they had renounced their familiaturas dem-
onstrates clearly that he was less interested in purifying the notarial
college than in destroying the inquisitorial fuero. 12 The previous
arrest and release of notaries after they had renounced the use of
the fuero persuaded the three familiares to follow their example.
Moreover, the wide publicity given to the viceroy's humiliating
treatment of Pedro Juan Vidal and his insolent reply to the inquisi-
tors' messages hurt the tribunal's prestige, leaving it "without au-
thority so that if a remedy is not provided we will see ourselves in
greater difficulty every day." 121
By 1600, the Valencia tribunal that had once excommunicated
virtually every royal officer in the kingdom watched helplessly as
its criminal jurisdiction was steadily eroded through the joint action
of viceroy and Audiencia. Familiares who insisted on claiming the
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protections of the fuero were regularly harassed and feelings ran
high, even breaking out in violence during a confrontation between
the viceregal guard and a group of familiares who provided the
inquisitors with an escort when they came to the palace to give the
viceroy their annual Christmas greeting. 122 The tribunal was still a
powerful institution with important allies, but the tone of its rela-
tions with the kingdom's viceroys had changed. No longer able to
count on automatic support from these powerful officials, the tribu-
nal found it safer to approach them with "fair words and circumspec-
tion," to quote Figuerola and Canseco de Quiriones, and behave
diplomatically even in the face of insulting behavior. 123 Even more
inauspicious for the future of the tribunal, however, was the fact
that the weakness of its relationship with the viceroy and friction
with the Audiencia encouraged other anti-inquisitorial forces in the
kingdom to attempt to recover some of the authority and prestige
that they had lost during the heyday of the tribunal before 1550.
Without doubt, the institution that lost the most with the devel-
opment and extension of the modern Inquisition was the church,
specifically, the bishops, whose authority over religious and moral
offenses had been sharply reduced. Even though a representative
of the bishop acted as consultor in all trials of individuals from his
diocese, his vote was only one among several, and if he disagreed
with the inquisitors, the most that would happen was that the case
would go to the Suprema for review. 124 Frustration over the Inquisi-
tion's exclusive and expanding jurisdiction over matters of faith and
morality, which were normally within the purview of the ecclesiasti-
cal courts, was probably responsible for an edict issued in 1552 by
Archbishop Tomas de Villanueva in which he demanded that all
those with knowledge of heresy should denounce it before him. 125
In 1576, Archbishop Juan de Ribera published another such edict
that was equally unsuccessful but subtler than that of his predeces-
sor. Ribera called on those with knowledge of heresy to denounce it
before his court so that his officials could, in turn, inform the
Inquisition, but he reserved moral offenses like bigamy and blas-
phemy, over which the tribunal also claimed jurisdiction, for his
own court. 126
The tribunal's problems with the haughty and unpopular Arch-
bishop Ribera did not end with his attempt to limit its jurisdiction
over moral offenses. Ribera wanted to put himself forward, even if
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only symbolically, as the chief protector of orthodoxy in Valencia,
and since the Inquisition had long since established its predomi-
nant role in this area, he, at least, wanted to make it seem that this
was being done under his authority. To create that impression, he
demanded a preeminent seat at the public auto de fe even if it
meant displacing the oldest inquisitor and was offended by the fact
that the tribunal's cross, rather than his own, was carried in the
most outstanding place in the procession of the faith. In the end,
Ribera's demands were refused by the Suprema, but he took his
revenge on the tribunal after he became viceroy.
Relations with Valencia's powerful cathedral chapter also took a
turn for the worse in the 1560s, and here the tribunal sustained a
decisive defeat from which its prestige and authority never fully
recovered. In spite of the fact that the tribunal regularly employed
cathedral canons as consultores and notaries, there were certain
issues that tended to poison relations between the two institutions.
For one thing, the cathedral chapter, and the income of the canons
themselves, depended on the collection of tithes and mortgage
interest. The great increase in the tribunal's activity against the
Moriscos in the 1560s and the wholesale confiscation of their prop-
erty threatened to reduce the canons' income, which depended, in
part, on Morisco villages. In 1566, Inquisitor Aguilera wrote the
Suprema warning of a memorial that had been sent to court by the
cathedral chapter to protest his recent visitation to certain Morisco
villages in the district. 128 On December 21, 1568, the council of
canons even went so far as to defy royal and viceregal orders and
flatly refused to name a canon to assist Inquisitor-General de Mi-
randa in publishing the Edict of Faith in Morisco villages surround-
ing the capital. 129 In June of that same year, Jeronimo Carroz,
canon and sacristan of the cathedral, led a delegation from the
Estates to formally protest confiscation of Moriseo property as a
violation of a royal order that had been issued by Charles V on
December 24, 1533, prohibiting such confiscations for the crime of
heresy. 130 The embassy demanded that the tribunal suspend the
confiscations ordered at the auto de fe of June 7, 1568, but
licentiate Moyano, the tribunal's prosecuting attorney, replied by
denying the validity of the royal order itself on the grounds that
Charles could not possibly have granted such sweeping concessions
to those guilty of such "grievous and wicked" crimes. 131 In spite of
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this inquisitorial bluster, the political pressure exerted by the can-
ons during winter 1568 had its effect, and in January 1569, the
tribunal began negotiations for a subsidy to be paid by the Morisco
community in lieu of confiscations. 132
The canons' concern over the possible effects of the campaign
against the Moriscos paled in significance beside their resentment
over the way in which the inquisitors had made a privileged posi-
tion for themselves in the cathedral by displacing two canons from
their places in the principal choir and freely using its pulpit for all
kinds of inquisitorial functions. Encouraged by the poor relations
between the tribunal and then Archbishop Francisco de Navarra,
canons decided that the time was ripe for a bold stroke to recover
their prerogatives. 133 When Inquisitor Francisco Ramirez arrived
to take his accustomed seat in the choir on December 11, 1561, he
found it occupied by its actual proprietor, the archdeacon mayor.
There was a violent scuffle in which Inquisitor Ramirez managed to
force the archdeacon out of his seat with the assistance of the
tribunal's alcalde mayor, but the cabildo was quick to enlist the
support of Archbishop Navarra who ordered the inquisitors not to
return to the cathedral. 134
In its account of the incident, which was sent to court a few days
later, the cabildo cleverly managed to throw all the blame on the
inquisitors while insinuating that the crown's political interests
were being compromised by the insolent behavior of the tribunal.
According to the canons, the inquisitors had taken to claiming
places in the choir as their right instead of accepting them as a mark
of courtesy that could be withdrawn at any time. They warned that
forcible ejection of the archdeacon might have done the crown's
political interests lasting damage because he belonged to one of the
king's principal families. 135 Since the deputies from Valencia's cathe-
dral chapter were the only group to be largely immune from royal
control in the Ecclesiastical Estate of the Cortes, this was a power-
ful argument. As a result of the cabildo's protests, the inquisitors
made no further attempt to claim their seats in the cathedral choir,
and the Suprema recognized that the position had been lost by
ordering them to bring their own chairs to the cathedral when the
Edict of Faith was to be read so as not to disturb the canons'
prerogatives. 136
If the defense or acquisition of individual honor and prestige was
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the real source of both private vengeance and judicial duels in the
early modern period, institutions and collectivities were also en-
gaged in a constant struggle for that same elusive quality. To seize
and control a coveted position or to upstage representatives of an
opposing or competing institution before a public that was ex-
tremely sensitive to the nuances of place was an accepted way of
altering the balance of prestige and distinction, and with these
reduced, a decline in the public deference paid to the institution
and its officials could not be far behind. The sudden absence of the
two inquisitors from their accustomed seats in the principal choir of
the cathedral caused a sensation among the people of Valencia, and
as Inquisitor Ramirez ruefully commented in a letter to the
Suprema, the tribunal's prestige and reputation had suffered se-
vere, perhaps irreparable damage as a result. 13 ' A few years later,
the council of canons denied the tribunal the right to use its pulpit
for reading routine orders and announcements, and in 1674, the
canons completed the process of ejecting the tribunal from the
cathedral by receiving royal permission to prevent the reading
there of both the Edict of Faith and the Anathema. 138
There were several interlocking factors in the conflict between
Valencia's city council and the tribunal which only broke into the
open at the end of the sixteenth century. The jurats, as leading
members of the kingdom's local political elite, had always bitterly
resented the yearly oath of loyalty that they were obliged to take by
which they swore to support the Inquisition and uphold the privi-
leges of its officials. The Inquisition, after all, was a Castilian institu-
tion that had been imposed on the kingdom against its will, and to
be forced to swear a special oath of loyalty to a "foreign" institution
whose presence they resented seemed particularly galling. The
city's extensive financial responsibilities also made the jurats ex-
tremely sensitive to the tax exemptions claimed by the tribunal's
officials, and they made several unsuccessful attempts to force
them to pay the sises majors, the taxes on foodstuffs that consti-
tuted the basis of municipal revenues. 139
In practice, however, the jurats had to tread warily in any con-
frontation with a powerful institution like the Inquisition because,
on the one hand, they could not risk offending the monarch who
drew up the list of candidates from which jurats were selected, and,
on the other, they had to be careful to obtain the support of the
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sometimes turbulent Consell General, or local assembly. In the
decisive conflict, when it did come, the jurats were able to move
with the tacit encouragement of the viceroy and gain the enthusias-
tic support of the members of the assembly by waving the flag of
civic patriotism.
Once again, the dispute centered around a question of place and
position in one of the public spectacles that played such an important
role in the life of early modern Valencia. But, unlike the canons, the
jurats chose to confront the Inquisition on its own territory, during
the course of the procession that brought penitents to the auto de fe.
The very fact that the tribunal could be so confronted, not in the
cathedral where the canons were the acknowledged masters and the
inquisitors the interlopers but in this procession where the Inquisi-
tion had always dominated, provided a sensational example of just
how far the tribunal had slipped from its former ascendancy.
On July 15, 1591, just as the procession had formed to proceed
to the scaffolding that had been erected for the public auto, the
municipal constables, as if by prearrangement, shouldered their
way forward to a position alongside and in front of the standard of
the Inquisition. This was deliberate provocation, since such lowly
persons could never hope to claim such an exalted position, and it
quickly achieved its purpose by eliciting a violent reaction from the
supporters of the Inquisition. Several familiares and unsalaried offi-
cials forcibly ejected the constables from their position and Inquisi-
tor Giron ordered them back to their assigned place. But this did
not end the incident, because after the auto was over and the
inquisitors were waiting in front of the scaffolding for the customary
return procession to form, they were advised that the jurats and
constables had left before them. Moreover, as testimony taken in
the tribunal's chambers two days after the event revealed, the
jurats had not acted entirely on their own. Before deciding on this
unprecedented step, they sent an emissary to Viceroy Francisco de
Moncada to advise him of their intentions, declaring that they were
willing to accompany the Inquisition "if he so ordered." While
expressing a certain caution, the viceroy merely said that they
could do "what they wished," which in effect meant condoning the
jurats' intended action. 141
A few days later, while the tribunal was still taking testimony
about the events of September 15, the jurats moved to gain the
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support of the popular classes who were represented in the assem-
bly. Before a joint meeting of the jurats and the Consell, jurat
Antonio Matheu presented an account of the incident that was
carefully calculated to stir up popular passions. According to
Matheu, the municipal constables were peacefully occupying their
accustomed place near the jurats when they were attacked and
forcibly ejected by several familiares and unsalaried officials (al-
though why they should wish to do this was not made clear). Fore-
most in this attack were several familiares, including Alonso de
Borja and Felipe de Cardona and three unsalaried officials, Dr.
Pedro Asensio, a calificador, Dr. Jose Requart, physician to the
tribunal, and Dr. Francisco Burgos, abogado de presos. Nothing
could be done to the two familiares since they were members of
powerful noble families, but the city could revenge itself on the
three unsalaried officials since they held posts over which the city
exercised control. Incensed by the seemingly unprovoked attack on
the municipal constables, the assembly voted to strip the three of
their positions (Asensio and Requart both taught at the university),
elect others in their place, and send representatives to court to
protest before the king and the inquisitor-general. 142
Friends of the tribunal, many of whom had faithfully attended
the public autos de fe for many years, were astounded by the jurats'
failure to accompany the inquisitors on their return to the palace.
Fray Rodrigo Ximenez, the vicar-general of the order of minors
(minimos), told the tribunal that the monks of his monastery were
"scandalized" by the jurats' action. Another witness, Juan de la
Tonda, a parish priest from the district, also expressed amazement
and declared that in his forty years of attending these processions
he had never seen the municipal constables attempt to occupy a
different position. 143
The tribunal had been publicly insulted in front of some of its most
avid supporters from all over the district, but the opportunity to
capitalize on the sense of public outrage to launch strong protests or
ecclesiastical censures against the jurats was missed, probably be-
cause the inquisitors realized that it was not politically expedient to
do so. While lamenting the "disastrous outcome," the inquisitors
told the Suprema that "for our part, we have done nothing more than
receive testimony about these events." 144 The tribunal's perceptions
of the situation were probably correct, as in his final orders to Vice-
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roy Moncada regarding the resolution of this conflict, Philip II wrote
that he should intervene with the jurats to restore the university
posts and censos that had been seized from the officials but that he
should also rebuke the tribunal for having "overstepped the modesty
and reserve that it should have observed on that day." 145 Philip II
clearly preferred the city council's version of the events of Septem-
ber 15, not because it was correct but because of the importance of
maintaining good relations with the Valencian oligarchy. If the count
of Aytona's efforts to eradicate violent crime in the city of Valencia
through a campaign of forced deportation had already stirred pro-
tests from the Brae Real, overt royal support for the Inquisition
could only inflame center-periphery reactions still further and de-
tract from the main lines of royal policy in the kingdom. 146
Even after the royal letter of September 26, 1592, the Suprema
found it had to intervene directly to make sure that the city
returned the university posts and the censos that it had confis-
cated from the unsalaried officials. 14 Bv the end of October, there
is evidence that the city had done so, but not before leveling
another blow at the tribunal by passing a new municipal ordi-
nance that prohibited lawyers practicing in the municipal courts
from serving the Inquisition. 4 According to a letter from the
tribunal to the Suprema, this ordinance was motivated solely "by
hatred for this tribunal and its ministers," and by forcing local
attorneys to choose between well-compensated work in the ordi-
nary courts and the poorly paid work at the tribunal it threatened
to deprive the tribunal of defense attorneys and therefore make
trials more difficult. 149
Hostility and suspicion marked relations between the city coun-
cil and the tribunal throughout the 1590s, but a second open con-
frontation between the two institutions did not occur until the
viceroyalty of Juan de Ribera in 1603. During this conflict, the
tribunal was placed in the uncomfortable position of seeming to
interfere with the legitimate exercise of municipal jurisdiction over
local markets and was confronted by the united opposition of vice-
roy, Audiencia, and city council.
According to an account prepared for presentation to the Duke
of Lerma by the city's special ambassador, Gaspar de Monsoriu, the
city had received many complaints about certain fishmongers in
the plaza del mercat who placed their fish tuns on two rows of
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tables set up far outside the legal limits. Finally, on June 7, 1603,
the jurats ordered the municipal almotacen (the official in charge of
the market) to tour the plaza and force the fishmongers to remove
the tables that protruded farthest into the square. Everyone
obeyed the order except Antonio Ruis, whose tables were in front
of a house he rented from the Inquisition. Confiscated from a
Judaizer early in the previous century, the house had long been
rented by fishmongers who had taken advantage of the protection
of the tribunal's judge of confiscated property to flout the authority
of the almotacen. On this occasion, when asked to remove his
tables, Ruis mocked the official and claimed that he had no author-
ity over him because his tables were in front of property owned by
the Holy Office. The almotacen then fined Ruis, but the tribunal's
judge of confiscated property ordered the fine returned. When the
almotacen refused, he sent the tribunal's alguacil to his home to
obtain property worth a comparable amount. After Viceroy Ribera
had assured them of his support by denying that the tribunal had
"any authority over matters concerning the city, " the jurats ordered
municipal constables to burn the offending tables and place Ruis,
his wife, and his servants under arrest for his slander of a municipal
official. 150 The Ruis family was quickly released by order of Viceroy
Ribera, but the jurats delivered the coup de grace by stripping
them of their citizenship and forcing them to leave the city.
The tribunal's reaction to this attack was completely ineffective.
Refusing to join the Audiencia in a formal jurisdictional dispute
over the issue, it demanded that the jurats replace the tables they
had ordered destroyed on pain of excommunication. The old
threats had lost their potency, however, and in the face of a strong
reaction by the jurats and the estates, the threat of ecclesiastical
censures was removed and the tribunal was forced to accept a fait
accompli. 152 Several years later, the city completed its move against
the fishmongers by ordering the demolition of the remaining tables
and the sluices that carried water away from the area. On May 13,
1609, when the city constables dismantled the tables, a near riot
was caused when the tribunal arrested two constables and when
the jurats ordered the seizure of Nuncio Vidal Criado. Prisoners
were released by order of the viceroy, but the tables were gone
nonetheless, and the jurats took harsh vengeance on Jaime Juan
Sevillan, a familiar who had been particularly forward in his sup-
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port of the tribunal, by stripping him of his citizenship and refusing
payment of the censos he held on municipal revenues. 153
By the end of the sixteenth century, the Valencia tribunal was
being forced to operate in a much less favorable political climate
than it had enjoyed before 1550, and growing cooperation among
its enemies was demonstrated by the crisis over the fishmongers'
tables. Poor relations with successive viceroys ensured viceregal
support for the position taken by the jurats, while the endemic
conflict with the Audiencia over the fuero meant that that powerful
body would automatically support any effort to diminish the tribu-
nal's prestige.
Another element in the equation, already hinted at in the testi-
mony of Nuncio Miguel Juan during the hearings that the tribunal
held in 1553, was that of the antagonism felt by certain powerful
individuals for the Holy Office. 154 As testimony taken about the
events surrounding the incident in the plaza del mercat indicated,
several of the men who authorized the burning of the tables had no
great love for the tribunal. The almotacen himself was a member of
the confraternity of San Lorenzo and resented the presence of the
Inquisition in the parish, which meant that familiares were given
precedence over members of the confraternity in church functions.
Leading jurats like Francisco March were members of converso
families whose ancestors had been punished by the Inquisition. In
March's case, his own grandparents had been reconciled and
lashed publicly, and many other members of the family had been
reconciled and relaxed during the early, anti-Semitic period of the
tribunal's activities. Relatives of other men involved had also suf-
fered at the hands of the tribunal. Gaspar Daqui, the brother of
former jurat Juan Bautista Daqui, had spent two years in the in-
quisitorial prison. 155 While it would be misleading to suggest that
persons with individual grievances were orchestrating the anti-
inquisitorial campaign, the evidence does indicate that the tribunal
had made many enemies who could lend their weight to such a
campaign once it got started. Besides, memories were long in a
kingdom dominated by powerful families, and the tribunal had
good reason to be apprehensive about influential conversos like the
March family, whose wealth and political influence had greatly
increased in spite of the prosecution of their grandparents for
Judaizing.
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Confronted by a powerful and aggressive Audiencia, acrimoni-
ous relations with successive incumbents of the viceregal palace,
and a city council determined to avenge the slights it had suffered
at its hands, the Valencia tribunal had been thrown increasingly on
the defensive in the last half of the sixteenth century. At the same
time, however, this period also saw a significant expansion of in-
quisitorial jurisdiction over matters of faith and the exercise of
greater responsibility in other more strictly political matters. Quite
apart from the increasing importance of the tribunal's role in the
repression of the Moriscos and its involvement in the effort to
enforce the new post-Tridentine morality, the Inquisition remained
the one Valencian institution that maintained a high degree of inde-
pendence from local political influence and could be counted on to
represent the interests of the Spanish monarchy. In recognition of
this fact, Philip II never pushed his campaign to reduce the author-
ity of the Holy Office so far as to undermine its authority and
usefulness.
Certainly, for inquisitors like Bernardino de Aguilera, the author-
ity of the Holy Office and the crown were so closely linked as to be
almost interdependent. He once wrote in a memorial to the
Suprema, "Increasing the authority of the Holy Office is what is
most in the service of God and the king because without it his
Majesty could not carry out his will in this kingdom because of the
many fueros and privileges that it enjoys. " 156 In Teruel, where the
Valencia tribunal frequently came into conflict with local officials
who accused it of violating the fueros, it proved itself a firm enemy
of Aragonese autonomy When agents of the Justicia of Aragon
removed Antonio Gamir from the custodv of its comisario, the
tribunal arrested and punished those involved, including the
alcalde and Juan Perez, the Justicia's notary who was condemned to
1 5T
300 lashes and 12 years in the galleys.
One of the most potentially dangerous clashes between the inter-
ests of the Spanish monarchy and Valencian regionalism was the
movement that took place in support of the canonization of a bene-
fice holder in the parish church of San Andres, Padre Francisco
Simon, and that continued, with varying degrees of intensity, from
his death on April 25, 1612, to about 1620. When he died at thirty-
three, Padre Simon left behind a formidable reputation as a priest
who claimed to be able to invoke the powers of the supernatural in
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a unique and personal way. On one occasion, when Ana Llopis's
brother began a violent argument with him about his illicit relation-
ship with her, he promised that if he would accept Simon's assur-
ances that nothing sinful had taken place between them, he would
give him a signed warrant that would allow him to pass straight to
paradise after his death. 158
On May 19, 1612, another such warrant was brought to the
tribunal by a worried Fray Juan Catalan, one of its calificadores and
a very strong supporter of Padre Simon. In this document, Simon
assured the faithful that if they would "pray for the drops of blood
that fell from Christ's body during the crucifixion for fifteen years,"
they would gain as much merit as if they had "died as a martyr for
the faith and that Our Lord, the Virgin Mary, and the entire heav-
enly host would come to receive their souls after their death."
Believing that the paper contained serious doctrinal errors, Catalan
had come to the tribunal not to defame Simon's memory but to ask
that all copies be confiscated to protect his reputation. 159 Simon's
bold claims to control over supernatural forces must have made a
profound impression in a city where the ability to use them to
advantage was a topic of constant concern, and it no doubt explains
his close relations with Angela and Ines Perez, who were both
reputed sorceresses. The Perez sisters and Luis Colomer, who was
also suspected of superstitious practices, played a significant role in
creating popular support for Simon's canonization by going from
house to house calling him a saint and organizing processions and
demonstrations in his favor. 160
For their part, the parish clergy of San Andres, lured by the
prospect of an income from alms that would, in the words of one
benefice holder, "make benefices in San Andres as valuable as a
canonry in the cathedral," promoted the cult by every means at their
disposal. Word that a saint had just died was shouted to passersby as
the parish clergy busied themselves dressing the corpse and sur-
rounding it with roses. Priests from other parishes were brought into
the cult, and they led their faithful to San Andres, which was soon
inundated by a "great multitude of people." 61 By the third day, most
of Valencia's governing elite had been drawn in; the jurats came in
full regalia to pay him honor, mass was said by Tomas de Spinosa and
attended by all the cathedral canons, and the viceroy himself came to
visit the tomb accompanied by his entire guard. 162
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53
The cult was spread throughout the rest of the kingdom and even
into parts of Murcia and Aragon by preachers drawn from the parish
clergy, and within the city itself, devotion to Padre Simon was
reaching into all classes. Great processions marked the first anniver-
sary of his death in 1613; those marching included members of craft
guilds and many citizens, nobles, and clergy. Almost the entire city
was illuminated in his honor, and more than 1,000 altars were set up
to venerate him. 163 At the second anniversary celebration, even
greater numbers participated in the processions and the city or-
dered twelve cannons to be fired in his honor. 164 During this pe-
riod, many members of the kingdom's judicial elite became closely
identified with the movement, including the regent of the Audi-
encia and two judges, Ramon Sans and Dr. Pedro Juan Rejuale, and
some of the Valencian members of the Council of Aragon including
its prosecuting attorney, Dr. Jeronimo de Leon. 1
The reaction of the authorities in Madrid, meanwhile, was one of
growing alarm. For one thing, any movement involving very large
numbers of people, especially from the lower classes, conjured up
visions of earlier popular movements that had always ended by
endangering royal authority. For another, the fact that many of the
men the crown had regarded as key political supporters were so
closely identified with a movement inspired by a specifically Valen-
cian religious hero had disturbing implications for Madrid.
For the crown as well as the Vatican, the whole question of beatifi-
cation and canonization resolved itself into a question of time,
money, and political influence. A larger number of Spanish saints
would increase the country's prestige, but such negotiations should
be handled at the highest levels and mediated through the central
government, not by local political chiefs backed by mass demonstra-
tions. The crown, therefore, turned to the Inquisition as its only
reliable agent in the kingdom, and the tribunal was instructed by the
Suprema to dampen the movement by every means at its disposal.
Under constant prodding by the Suprema, the tribunal began to
pressure the provincials of the various religious orders to prohibit
their monks from mentioning Simon in their sermons, and when the
Jesuit Padre Sotello stated in a sermon that the Suprema had re-
viewed Padre Simon's case and pronounced in his favor, the tribunal
forced him to make a public retraction. 166 Following the Suprema's
orders, the tribunal then prohibited the public exhibition of Padre
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Simon's portrait and ordered the confiscation of a book recently
printed in Segorbe detailing his life and miracles. 16 ' Later that sum-
mer, the Vatican's attitude toward the cult was demonstrated when
Cardinal D'Este visited the city in August and never came to pay his
respects at Simon's chapel in San Andres in spite of urging by the
jurats and "much to the disgust of the populace." 168
By this time, the inquisitorial prohibitions had had their desired
effect, and public celebration of the cult was beginning to decline.
Some members of the local elite, like the marquis of Cocentaina,
had publicly opposed it. In 1615, no public ceremony marked the
anniversary of Simon's death. 169
With political support for the cult beginning to wane, it only
remained for the crown to eliminate the remaining focal points of
intense observance for the process of canonization to return to the
well-trodden paths of diplomacy. After a consulta held with the
Suprema on July 12, 1618, had concluded that the total elimination
of public worship was necessary so as not to hinder the canonization
process and cause further resentment in Rome, the king issued an
edict ordering that all images of Simon be removed within thirty
days. 170
But all those involved in these decisions had seriously miscal-
culated the mood in Valencia, and when Antonio Calafat, one of the
tribunal's secretaries, attempted to read out the decree in the cathe-
dral, there were cries of fury from the congregation and he was
compelled to descend from the pulpit. Two nights of rioting fol-
lowed during which the windows of the archbishop's palace were
smashed and mobs roamed the streets crying "Victory to Padre
Simon." The new viceroy, Antonio Pimentel y Toledo, marquis of
Tavera, was forced to voice approval of the illumination of buildings
in favor of Simon, while large groups of people were continually
presenting themselves at San Andres to worship at his tomb.
At the same time, the local political interests, whose earlier
support for the cult had helped it to flourish, seized their chance to
ingratiate themselves still further with the masses at the expense of
Madrid by making the defense of Padre Simon a matter of national
pride. Both the jurats and the Noble Estate sent embassies to
protest against any effort to interfere with the cult. The representa-
tive of the Noble Estate, Baltasar de Blanes, even succeeded in
having Pedro Cabecas, a Valencian who had attacked the cult be-
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55
fore the pope and in memorials to Philip II, arrested and incarcer-
ated by the vicar-general of the See of Toledo. In his point by point
refutation of Cabecas's statement made before that official, Blanes
took a strongly regionalist line, stressing that Cabecas deserved
punishment "as an imposter who bore false witness against such a
pious man of God, such faithful vassals of the king our lord, and
against a kingdom as pious as it is illustrious." 1 ' 2
The new viceroy, however, was made of sterner stuff than his
predecessor, and undaunted by the rioting, he soon reverted to the
crown's original policy of reducing the cult by ordering the removal
of the images of Padre Simon that had been set up on the street
running from San Salvador to San Andres. 1 ' The authorities were
also fortunate in that popular attention was being distracted from
Padre Simon by the recent beatification of another Valencian reli-
gious figure of a much more acceptable kind, former Archbishop
Tomas de Villanueva. There only remained the main focal point of
the cult in the parish church of San Andres, and here the tribunal
was supposed to use its influence with the rector and lay officials of
the parish to remove the votive lamps around the tomb.
This council's intention "is to remove the abuses in this affair,"
proclaimed the Suprema in a letter to the tribunal on May 27,
1619. ' But in spite of this show of determination, neither the
tribunal nor the Suprema was very anxious to become deeply in-
volved in any new confrontation with the supporters of the cult.
Although repeatedly urging the tribunal to take action in the mat-
ter of the votive lamps, the Suprema also advised it to ignore the
fact that the parish clergy were still collecting alms to promote
Simon's canonization. 1/5 For its part, the tribunal made only half-
hearted efforts to convince the parish clergy to remove the lamps.
Its lack of enthusiasm earned it a surprisingly mild rebuke from the
Suprema on July 22. 1-6 By August, the Suprema had abandoned
any effort to prod the tribunal into action and was openly urging
caution even in the matter of the lamps. The tribunal was told to
allow the viceroy to take the lead in repressing the cult and confine
itself to gathering information about those who took a leading role
in supporting it. 1 " Even after Juan Selma, one of the instigators of
the March 2 and 3 rioting, was arrested in Zaragoza, the Suprema
decided it would be safer to try him there than return him to
1 7ft
Valencia where his presence might be the cause of another riot.
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The wavering or outright disloyalty of many members of Valen-
cia's political and judicial elite over the issue of Padre Simon
brought the crown once again to realize the value of maintaining a
thoroughly Castilian institution in a kingdom where even religious
issues could take on a violently regionalist tinge. But by 1619, the
Inquisition was no longer in a position to openly confront local
political interests, and the rioting of March 2 and 3 proved that it
could easily become the first target of any movement directed
against Madrid. Nevertheless, the tribunal's loyalty in this crisis
earned it approval at court and was no doubt influential in winning
it very favorable treatment in the financial settlement that followed
the expulsion of the Moriscos. Moreover, royal and papal approval
meant a further increase in inquisitorial jurisdiction. In 1624, the
pope charged Inquisitor-General Andres Pacheco with the responsi-
bility for the investigation into Padre Simon's worthiness to receive
beatification, and in 1634, papal recognition of the dangers of unrec-
ognized saint cults led Urban VIII to give the Inquisition power to
repress them. 1 ' 9
Another reason the decline in the prestige and authority of the
Holy Office in Valencia was only relative but not absolute was that
even though the agents of the central government in Valencia com-
peted among themselves, these very same institutions were obliged
to understand one another and reach a modus vivendi. Therefore, in
spite of all of its ingenious attempts to whittle down the fuero, the
Audiencia never attempted to eliminate it entirely because it repre-
sented a fundamental constitutional principle that had become an
integral part of the social and political system of the Hispanic world.
Just as the Hapsburg rulers continued to recognize the political and
constitutional autonomy of the several states that constituted their
dominions, so they created special corporate bodies among their
subjects as a way of dividing them and tying them more closely to the
crown.
In obedience to the concordias and other pieces of royal legisla-
tion, the Audiencia and the tribunal found themselves collaborating
on cases involving familiares. When familiar Antonio Calvo was ar-
rested by royal constables on a charge of carrying prohibited arms
and threatening to murder someone, both tribunals agreed that the
Inquisition should have cognizance and that the criminal case should
be tried before a civil case pending against Calvo in the Audiencia.
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An even more striking example of the pattern of cooperation
between Audiencia and tribunal is that both were involved in the
protection of bandit leaders during much of the seventeenth cen-
tury. When the violence threatened to get out of hand, as it did in
1636, the crown called on both Audiencia and tribunal to collabo-
rate in restoring order by, in effect, restraining their followers. 181
Again, in December 1659, when Francisco Berenger de Blanes
Valterra, a familiar and brother-in-law to Jose Valterra, an infamous
bandit, came to the tribunal for protection, it was quick to send an
emissary to the Audiencia offering its mediation between royal
officials and the Valterra family to "end these conflicts through
some form of compromise." 182
Whatever their disagreement with it, Valencia's archbishops
could also rely on the tribunal, since in the last analysis they repre-
sented the principles of authority, orthodoxy, and hierarchy that
the Inquisition was established to uphold. When Archbishop
Ribera's heavy-handed campaign against the university theology
faculty and in favor of the Jesuit college of San Pablo resulted in
hostile lampoons being posted in the city, the tribunal intervened
to arrest the protestors in spite of its view that it would be better for
the archbishop himself if the issue was forgotten. 183 The tribunal
and the archbishop also found themselves on the same side in the
Padre Simon affair. For six years, Archbishop Aliaga was unable to
carry out a visitation because he was afraid of being confronted by
manifestations of the cult, while during the rioting of March 2 and
3, 1619, the windows of both the inquisitorial and archdiocesan
palaces were broken by angry mobs. 184
When it began its operations in the Kingdom of Valencia, the
Holy Office encountered powerful local opposition and needed
strong and consistent royal support to overcome it. Encouraged by
this, and virtually immune to any serious scrutiny from royal offi-
cials during the reign of Charles V, the tribunal became arrogant
and abused its power, seriously alienating the local interests on
whose support royal and viceregal authority rested. Even before he
became king in 1556, Philip II was determined to bring imperial
administration under more effective control and prevent any one
unit from becoming overly powerful. Ironically, Philip's successful
drive to curb the excesses of the Valencia tribunal provided its
enemies with the opening they needed to diminish its authority.
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The Concordias of the 1550s and 1560s marked the opening of a
conflict with the Audiencia that lasted for generations. At the same
time, powerful local interests interpreted the change in the crown's
attitude as an opportunity for a counterattack of their own.
After the first decades of the seventeenth century, the tribunal's
worst excesses had been curbed, and it remained the crown's first
line of defense against religious heresy. Conflict with the Audiencia
continued, but the two institutions also needed to collaborate to
maintain public order and political stability. However, both the
Suprema and the tribunal had learned a hard lesson from the sharp
confrontations of the early seventeenth century. If the remaining
privileges of the Valencia tribunal were to be preserved for the
enjoyment of its officials, Valencia's local political elite, whatever
its ethnic origins or current reputation, had to be brought to regard
the Holy Office more positively. The stage was set, therefore, for a
gradual but significant policy shift, one that involved accommoda-
tion and conciliation of powerful local families, soft peddling tradi-
tional anti-Semitism, and an effort to avoid direct confrontation.
During the later seventeenth and eighteenth century, "circumspec-
tion and prudence" became the watchwords of a tribunal that had
once relentlessly pursued its enemies.
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As an institution established in spite of strong local opposition, the
Inquisition had to employ a judicious combination of mercy, terror,
and public education to generate confessions and denunciations
and to break down the hostility to outside interference that pro-
tected the tight-knit local communities and interlocking families
that made up Valencian society from the encroachment of alien,
central authority. In the early years of the Inquisition, the tribunals
moved from place to place. Its arrival in a given town or village
would immediately be followed by a reading of the "edict of grace, "
which listed a series of heresies and invited those with something
on their conscience to confess during a term of grace. 1 Voluntary
confession during this period, which varied from three to six
months in Valencia, would entitle the individual to receive reconcil-
iation without confiscation of property, although the inquisitor him-
self could impose some monetary penance. 2
By offering an opportunity for reconciliation to the church with-
out incurring harsh penalties, the edicts of grace appeared to be a
reasonable and moderate solution to the persistence of Judaic prac-
tices among the converted Jews. In fact, however, the edicts con-
tained a trap for the unwary in the shape of a demand for complete
and full confession of all Judaic practices that they had ever en-
gaged in at any point in their lives as well as the names of others
whom they knew performed the same acts. Any concealment, even
of acts that took place many years earlier or in childhood, rendered
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the confession void and placed the would-be penitent in the danger-
ous category of a diminuto whose presumably deliberate conceal-
ment of apostasy demonstrated that he was really still a heretic.
Since Torquemada's 1484 instructions call for the diminuto to be
prosecuted if later evidence demonstrates that he has concealed
anything, the hundreds of confessions taken during the grace pe-
riod and carefully preserved by the tribunal really provided it with
its first file of clients. During the first years of the Valencia tribunal,
only twelve percent of those presenting themselves during the
period of grace escaped later persecution. 3
We must presume that the duplicitous character of the edicts of
grace became well known in the converso community. The declin-
ing numbers of those willing to come forward led to their partial
abandonment after 1500 and the substitution of a new device called
the Edict of Faith, which omitted the grace period. 4 The Edict of
Faith, which was proclaimed yearly in the seats of the tribunals and
in district villages and towns on the arrival of an inquisitor, was a
recitation of heretical practices and offenses against orthodox Ca-
tholicism and an invitation to the entire population to confess those
that they may have engaged in or to denounce those of which they
had knowledge. 5 On the third Sunday after the proclamation of the
edict, an anathema against heretics and those who sought to con-
ceal them was pronounced in the principal church. This reading of
the anathema was preceded and followed by a rather impressive
procession of the local clergy accompanied by the tolling of bells. 6
In its detailed reply to the series of objections to the use of the
anathema which were raised in 1587 by the cathedral chapter, the
Valencia tribunal stated that the anathema was desirable to inject a
greater element of "terror" into the ceremonial surrounding the
proclamation of the Edict of Faith. '
From the standpoint of the Inquisition, the edicts had the effect
of advertising the details of heretical acts and causing people to
search their memories for instances in which they had heard or
seen them performed. Moreover, like the public execution where
the presence of the masses was a way of "invoking the vengeance of
the people to become a . . . part of the vengeance of the sover-
eign," the edict involved the entire population in the Inquisition's
task of ferreting out and punishing offenders against the faith. 8 Use
of the edicts, and their regular annual recitation before the assem-
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61
bled population, had the effect of clearly advertising the existence
of specific boundaries of accepted behavior, although the general
conservatism that characterized all early modern institutions meant
that a mature edict such as the one preached in Valencia on March
16, 1642, was both a catalog of errors and a museum piece in that it
included certain items, like practice of the Islamic faith, that no
longer posed a threat to Spanish society or formed a significant part
of inquisitorial activity. 9
Periods of grace and Edicts of Faith were only two of a number of
devices that allowed the Inquisition to accumulate evidence that
could form the basis for the prosecution of offenders. One of the
most interesting of these devices was taking of an actual census of
suspect groups. In Valencia, the tribunal compiled a list of con-
verted Jews in 1506. This census, of which we only have fragments,
lists converso families by parish and street and includes an impres-
sive amount of detail about the situation of each family, including
the occupation of the head of the household and his father, ages of
the husband and wife, number of children, and the family "crimi-
nal" record of persons reconciled or relaxed. 10 The tribunal was also
interested in compiling information about Morisco settlement. In
1568, Inquisitor Miranda, then carrying out a visitation in Morisco
areas in the northern part of the district, carefully recorded the
names of all the new Christians (Moriscos) of Castellon de la
Plana. 11
In accumulating the evidence needed to undertake prosecution,
the Inquisition could count on important outside support. In the first
place, parish priests were always a faithful auxiliary. The division of
the 1506 census of conversos by parish indicates the key role they
must have played in formulating it. As confessors, moreover, the
parish priests were in an ideal position to receive confidences, and
when these concerned heretical practices they were required to
refuse to grant absolution unless their penitents agreed to appear
before the Inquisition. 12 In 1654, for example, the Valencia tribunal
received a visit from Basilia Ferrer, who had been urged to come by
her parish priest after he had confessed to having learned certain
love magic from Esperanza Badia. Basilia later appeared as a witness
against Esperanza in the latter's trial on charges of superstition, and
her testimony was important in obtaining the conviction of her erst-
while friend. 13
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The tribunal could also count on the active support of the net-
work of familiares scattered throughout the district. When inquisi-
tors toured the district on the periodic visitas, familiares would
come forward to testify to any suspicious behavior they had ob-
served or heard about. Comisarios, who were the tribunal's repre-
sentatives in the major towns, were frequently given information
by local familiares. In 1570, for example, Canon Lopez de Cama-
rena, the Valencia tribunal's comisario in Teruel, wrote to inform
the tribunal that he had received information from a familiar from
the village of Galve concerning acts of bestiality committed by a
married man in the village. 14
One of the most effective ways of obtaining denunciations
against suspected heretics was sending inquisitors to tour the dis-
trict. The presence of an inquisitor was an open invitation for peo-
ple to search their memories for heretical acts and naturally served
to focus local animosities by allowing individuals to denounce their
neighbors for a variety of motives.
Visitation to the district was among the most important responsi-
bilities of inquisitors as detailed on the earliest instructions for the
Holy Office, those of Torquemada (1498) and Deza (1500). 15 By
1517, the visitation had become regularized, with each of the two
inquisitors going to a different part of the district every four
months. 16 Before the instructions of 1561 were issued, the visita-
tion was an impressive affair in which the inquisitor made use of his
authority to arrest suspects and carry out all kinds of trials on the
spot. The danger of allowing inquisitors so much discretion was
revealed during the visitation to the Valencia tribunal which took
place in 1560. As a result of this visitation, Inquisitor Gregorio de
Miranda was charged with abusing his powers and violating proce-
dural rules during his visitations to Jativa and Teruel in 1557.
Among other things, Miranda was accused of ordering heavy pun-
ishments without sufficient proof, putting minors on trial without
providing them with a guardian as specified in the ordinances regu-
lating inquisitorial procedure, and totally ignoring the judge of the
episcopal court. 1 '
After the reforms of 1561, the inquisitors tended to proceed
more carefully when on visitation, dispatching the less important
cases on the spot but sending evidence concerning graver matters
back to the tribunal for decision. By the later sixteenth century, the
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visitation had become more and more an occasion for gathering
accusations to be included with those already in the tribunal's file.
To some degree, one can even refer to a certain specific targeting of
the visitations to areas where denunciations had already accumu-
lated and only a little more evidence was needed to trigger a series
of trials. Certainly that is the impression one gains from reviewing
the visitation by Inquisitor Pedro Giron to Gandia in 1590. In his
memorial of the visitation, Giron stated that he went there because
there were already a number of denunciations from that city so that
if additional evidence could be garnered during the visitation, the
suspects could be arrested. 18
Evidence derived from the results of visitations or from the
Inquisition's network of informers was always less important as a
source of prosecutions than the evidence provided by the accused
themselves when in the course of their interrogations they were
forced to reveal fully not only their direct accomplices but anyone
else engaging in heretical acts. Inquisitorial procedures in this re-
spect were a good deal stricter than in the ordinary criminal courts,
where the accused were not even expected to be asked about their
accomplices except in crimes such as sodomy where an accomplice
was necessary to commit the act. 19 In what must have been some-
thing of a record for a number of persons implicated in the testi-
mony of a single accused, Francisco Caffor, a Morisco, testified
against some 964 individuals in the course of his trial for Islamic
practices. 20 Sometimes the case against an individual could be
made considerably more serious by testimony given at another
trial. Evidence given against Francisco Sebastian, a Morisco of
Teruel, by Luis Caminero was sufficient to doom Sebastian to re-
laxation (execution by burning) after Inquisitor Juan de Llano de
Vargas changed his vote. 21
Perhaps the most remarkable tribute to the Inquisition's hold on
the popular imagination was the steady stream of individuals who
came forward spontaneously to confess their errors. Of course,
some "spontaneous" confessions were only motivated by the fear of
imminent arrest or by the knowledge that one had already been
denounced. Such was the case of Dr. Gaspar Jornet, who came to
the tribunal to confess his homosexual relations with Jose Castello,
a student at the law faculty. When Jornet came to the tribunal on
January 13, 1687, he must have been aware that Castello had come
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before it to confess only four days earlier. 22 Fear of denunciation
was behind the confession of Fray Anselmo de Gracia, guardian of
the monastery of San Antonio of Mora, who was engaged in a
strenuous effort to reform the monastery in the face of opposition
from many of his fellow monks. Fray Anselmo admitted that at a
moment of supreme frustration he had exclaimed in the hearing of
other monks that if some are given a crown in heaven for their
travail on earth, he would have to be given three. Although this
was perhaps not a very serious matter, he had been advised that
some of his enemies among the monks intended to denounce him
to the Inquisition and to distort his statement to make it appear like
a heretical proposition. To prevent this, he felt it was necessary to
appear before the tribunal on his own. 23
Another clear motivation was the feeling on the part of the indi-
vidual, which was shared by the Inquisition's defense attorneys,
that self-confession could lead to a reduction in penalties. This was
certainly true of Fray Augustin Cabades, whose spontaneous confes-
sion of soliciting sexual favors from his female penitents in the
confessional was cited by his defense attorney as exceptionally full
and truthful in his plea that his client be sentenced in private to
prevent damage to his reputation. The tribunal was evidently sym-
pathetic to the argument and agreed that Cabades should be sen-
tenced and admonished within the tribunal's own chambers and in
the presence of only three outside witnesses. 24 It was by no means
certain, however, that the tribunal would always react the same
way, as another solicitante, Dr. Juan Bautista Catala, rector of the
village of Yatova, found in 1764. Even though Catala s defense
attorney, Dr. Joaquin Solsona, argued that his client's spontaneous
confession indicated his "contrition and sincere repentance," the
tribunal turned a deaf ear, and while it did permit the sentence to
be read out within the audience chamber, as was customary in this
sort of case, it insisted on the presence of eighteen confessors
drawn from the secular and regular clergy and sentenced Catala to
four years of exile and one year of indoctrination in a monastery.
The trial record indicates that the tribunal took spontaneous confes-
sion into account as only one aspect of the case and that leniency
would be shown only if other factors did not mitigate against it. As
far as Catala was concerned, the number of witnesses and the fact
that they included several of the wealthiest farmers of the village
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indicated that he could no longer effectively serve his office and
made exile from the village a foregone conclusion. Moreover, his
amorous pursuit of village women had come to the attention of
several Franciscan friars as well as a Jesuit on mission, and this
made it necessary to call in a representative group of confessors so
that Catala could serve as an example. 25
The number of those making spontaneous confessions tended to
vary widely with the particular group. The Moriscos, for example,
accounted for very few because of the strong pattern of group
solidarity they had managed to maintain. Of all the groups subject
to inquisitorial jurisdiction, it was Old Christians, especially rather
simple people who were afraid that they had uttered some blas-
phemy, who were most apt to present themselves at the tribunal. A
typical representative of this group was the illiterate silk worker
Jeronimo Mevin who came all the way from Caspe to denounce
himself before the tribunal before having said, while playing ball,
"I deny God and his saints." The remorseful young man explained
that he had been angry at losing the ball game when he uttered
those words, that he had no real intention to blaspheme, and that
"he was deeply sorry. " 26
For certain persons, the very fact of the Inquisition's existence
was vastly reassuring as it was the obvious and accepted place to
unburden one's conscience regarding certain acts or statements. In
1678, one of the porters of the Diputacio came to the tribunal to
declare that fifteen years earlier he had practiced anal intercourse
with a woman named Jeronima Brunet. Confessing with his parish
priest did not seem to offer more than temporary solace, and he
was never able to "achieve peace of mind until he came to the Holv
Office." 27
The clergy, both secular and regular, were also well indoctri-
nated and regarded the Inquisition as the place to take their reli-
gious doubts and receive absolution. In 1691, Fray Jose Marti, a
Carmelite, came to the tribunal to denounce himself for a certain
statement that he had made during a sermon which might have
been heretical. In the same year, Fray Silverio Garceron, a reader
in philosophy at the academy of the monastery of La Merced in
Elche, came to denounce himself for certain positions that he had
defended during the course of his oral examination for the post of
reader of theology. 28
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Inner wavering as to the truth or value of Catholicism was also
felt to be something that should be brought to the Inquisition
before the individual fell into graver doubt. When Juan Montalva,
priest and benefice holder in the parish of San Martin, came to the
tribunal to confess his growing skepticism about whether Catholi-
cism was the only correct religion, he stated he had learned when
he was a seminary student that the Inquisition was the proper place
to come for such matters. 29
Once evidence had been accumulated from whatever source,
the tribunal's response to it was governed by the rules of evidence
followed in inquisitorial procedure modified by its own experience.
In Western Europe, inquisitorial procedure was the product of a
long historical tradition reaching back to the last half of the twelfth
century when criticism of the ordeal as a method of proof and the
growing centralization of governments, both papal and monarchial,
provided the means for the development of more rational alterna-
tives based on specialized legal procedures. 30 The chief characteris-
tic of Inquisition procedure was that the central power (state or
papacy) asserted the public interest in the punishment of crime and
that a government agency undertook all aspects of a criminal pro-
ceeding, from initial investigation to establishing the proof neces-
sary for punishment. 31
In general, it was the medieval church that took the lead in
establishing inquisitorial procedure, largely because it needed a
more effective means to combat the rising tide of heresy. The or-
deal could hardly help to reveal inner thoughts and feelings, and in
the heresy trial, it was the mind and not the body that chiefly
concerned the judges. Only a group of experts using sophisticated
legal methods could hope to discover offenders and bring them to
confess and abjure their sins. 32
The fact that inquisitorial procedure was first developed to de-
fend the faith against heretics lent to it an arbitrary quality that
would have probably been absent from a body of criminal law
designed to punish more ordinary offenders. The heretic, accord-
ing to Eymerich, was one who had deliberately chosen error and
had therefore placed himself outside of and in opposition to the
33
community of believers.
For Eymerich's sixteenth-century editor, Francisco Pena, the
heretic was particularly odious because he believes and actively
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teaches things contrary to the faith of Christ. Terrible conse-
quences would follow for nations that tolerated heretics in their
midst since sedition would be inevitable and would result in the
destruction of public order and prosperity. 34 This concept of the
religious heretic as an especially dangerous and hateful individual
whose crime had placed him automatically outside of and in opposi-
tion to the religious community and the social body is of key impor-
tance in understanding the emergence of a form of jurisprudence so
35
heavily weighted in favor of the prosecution.
Taking its departure from the urgent need to stamp out such
vicious criminals, the Inquisition tended to accept evidence from
any sort of witness, however discreditable. In answer to the question
of whether criminals, known perjurers, or persons of infamous repu-
tation should be allowed to testify for the prosecution, Eymerich
answered in the affirmative because "the crime of heresy is of such
gravity. " The only exception to this rule was in the case of mortal
enemies of the accused. 36 In practice, however, the accused's protec-
tion against ill-wishers and malicious denunciation was wholly de-
pendent on his ability to name his enemies specifically, because the
inquisitors themselves made little effort to cross-examine witnesses
to find out if their testimony was based on fact. It was not uncommon
for persons to be arrested and incarcerated on the basis of the flimsi-
est of accusations by a single witness of dubious reliability and only
saved from condemnation when the witness confessed the falsity of
the charge to a third party who came to the tribunal with the informa-
tion. In 1565, for example, the Valencia tribunal arrested thirteen
Moriscos who were accused by Angela Michaela of having been
involved in the desecration and burial of a cross but was forced to
release all of them after her confessor came to the tribunal to declare
that she had sought absolution for having lied to the tribunal to cover
3*7
up for some of her relatives. Interestingly, the arrest and trial of
these Moriscos on the basis of the testimony of a single and not very
reliable witness figured among the charges brought against Inquisi-
tor Bernardino de Aguilera during the visitation of 1566-67. 38 The
inquisitor defended himself by simply reminding the Suprema that
it had been fully informed about the case from the beginning and had
specifically authorized the arrests. 39
A standard item in Inquisition procedure as practiced on the
Continent was the requirement of two eyewitnesses for conviction.
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Frequently, however, this rigorous standard was of little help to the
aeeused because one eyewitness was sufficient to permit the inquisi-
tor to use torture to extort the remaining measure of "truth." 40
Insufficient evidence was not considered grounds for presuming
innocence, but it had the effect of leaving the accused "semiguilty"
and exposed to the next link in the chain of judicial procedures,
which was itself a form of punishment. 41
In accordance with the general secrecy of proceedings, wit-
nesses' names were not divulged to the accused. The reason for this
policy, which dates from the medieval Inquisition, was that inform-
ers would be in danger from the friends and relatives of the ac-
cused. Certainly, by making it easy and safe to testify in an inquisito-
rial court, confidentiality had the effect of ensuring a continuous
flow of denunciations. 42
After sufficient evidence had been accumulated, an arrest was
ordered at the request of the prosecuting attorney. Once brought to
the prison by the alguacil mayor or, as happened frequently, by
several familiares, the prisoner was made to declare all his prop-
erty, which was then sequestered and placed in the hands of a
factor appointed by the tribunal. This property would be returned
if the prisoner was found innocent, but in the meanwhile, portions
of it were sold to pay the costs of imprisonment. There was nothing
especially unusual about sequestration in a judicial system that
depended for its support on revenues from its victims or clients,
and Villadiego tells us that the same procedure of sequestration and
inventory of property was used in the ordinary courts. 43 When a
prisoner had no property, the tribunal undertook to feed and clothe
him out of its own resources, although this was only a part of the
tribunal's judicial function and should not be taken as an indication
of any softness toward the poor.
Ideally, the "secret prison" into which the accused was con-
ducted after his arrest was to be characterized by a political econ-
omy of silence and isolation. This, at least, was the intention of
the Suprema, which even wrote to the tribunals demanding that
the patios by which prisoners could communicate with one an-
other be closed off. Removed from the world and each other, the
prisoners were to be well fed, with meat at least every other day,
while the prison itself was to receive regular visits from the in-
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quisitors, who were to pay careful attention to any complaints or
special requests. 44
During the early years of the Valencia tribunal, the ideal could
not be realized because the Inquisition did not have its own quar-
ters and prisoners were housed in the ordinary city jail for common
criminals. Somewhat later, as part of the process whereby the Inqui-
sition acquired its own precincts, the prisoners were removed to
separate quarters near the Trinity Gate. 45 Silence and lack of com-
munication among prisoners do not seem to have been characteris-
tic of Valencia's secret prison even after this early period. For one
thing, prisoners were hardly ever placed in single cells, and usually
had at least one, and sometimes as many as four, cell mates. A
statement taken from Judaizer Brianda Gacente during the long
period of imprisonment before the conclusion of her trial revealed
that she was originally placed in a cell with four other women
prisoners and that she frequently had conversations with the jailer
about her case. 46
In spite of the violation of the ideal internal economy of the inquisi-
torial prison, the tribunal found it useful to continue the practice of
placing several prisoners together since cell mates could report con-
versations that they had with one another and could serve as wit-
nesses to shore up an otherwise shaky case with additional charges.
When Juan Casanyosas, a French silk winder living in Valencia, was
brought to prison on October 12, 1564, on a charge of Lutheranism,
there was only one witness against him. Casanyosas made the fatal
mistake of deriding Catholicism repeatedly in arguments with his
cell mate, a priest named Jeronimo Biosa. After several such argu-
ments in which Casanyosas declared that miracles were the inven-
tion of the devil and that he did not believe in purgatory, Biosa asked
for a special audience with the inquisitors to testify about what he
had heard and to plead for a change of cell so that he would no longer
have to listen to these "heresies." Apart from his confession under
torture and the one outside witness, the only evidence against
Casanyosas was the testimony of two fellow prisoners, Biosa and Jose
Esquerdon, who overheard the two quarreling. 47
After repeated complaints by officials of the tribunal about the
inadequacy and discomfort of the prison and at least one plan of
reform that was never implemented for lack of funds, Inquisitor-
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General Quiroga sent his own chaplain to investigate the situation.
It is to his report that we owe a detailed description of the precincts
occupied by the Valencia tribunal toward the end of the sixteenth
century. 48 According to him, the Inquisition formed an "island" all
to itself in which were contained the audience chambers and secret
archive as well as the residences of the two inquisitors and the
alcalde of the prison. What is the most striking about the layout of
the inquisitorial enclave is the physical closeness of judges and
prisoners. The prisoners' cells were not only right alongside one
another so that prisoners could easily communicate but they shared
a wall with the second inquisitor's bedroom through which he
could hear them speaking to one another "in loud voices" at night.
The prison had a total of nineteen cells for men and five cells for
women located in a separate loft area above the audience chamber
and archive. All the cells were no more than 15 to 15V2 feet square
and were frequently overcrowded with prisoners awaiting the auto
de fe. Since the prison was too small to accommodate the desired
number of suspects, this had the effect of reducing the scope of
inquisitorial activity. 49 In light of this situation, the chaplain pro-
posed the expansion of the prison space into the houses occupied
by the second inquisitor and alcalde. Although this plan would not
be very costly, the composition of the precinct out of a diverse
group of buildings constructed at different times and of varying
quality meant that several would have to be rebuilt; poor construc-
tion had already allowed many prisoners to escape. 50 In spite of the
reforms made later in the century, there is every indication that
many of the problems indicated in the visitor's report remained
unresolved. 51
As far as the prisoners themselves are concerned, the record
seems to be one of generally moderate treatment marred by spo-
radic abuse and exploitation rather than one of systematic ill-
treatment. During the visitation of 1528, Alcalde Juan Velasquez,
who apparently was an active silk manufacturer, was accused of
forcing the women prisoners to work up silk and paying them less
than the going rate. And prisoners were not fed properly because
Velasquez was off tending to his business. 52 In 1566 testimony
concerning Vicente Corboran, who was responsible for actually
cooking and serving the prisoners' food, revealed that he was in the
habit of withholding one-third of the ordinary ration (which he sold
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privately), and he consistently refused to purchase anv special
items even when given money to do so. 53
However, the inquisitors of Valencia did carry out their obliga-
tion to visit the prisoners at regular intervals, and there seems to
have been little systematic abuse or cruelty (beating of prisoners by
guards, etc.). If anything, the prison seems to have lacked sufficient
security. The guards, such as they were, were in more danger from
the prisoners than a danger to them. In 1605, the alcalde men-
tioned several deadly assaults on his assistants in a letter to the
c 54
Suprema.
One pathetic example of the way criminals with experience of
both the ordinary criminal jails and those of the Inquisition viewed
the latter comes from a request by Pedro Adel for transfer to the
inquisitorial prison in 1575. Adel, who had been tried by the Inqui-
sition and sentenced to a term of galley service, was so decrepit
that the galley captain would not accept him, and he was sent back
to Valencia where, blind and impoverished, he was thrown into the
municipal prison. He pleaded for a transfer to the inquisitorial
prison where he would be properly "fed and taken care of." The
tribunal referred his request to the Suprema, which would have
nothing to do with him and ordered him to be given two hundred
lashes and permanently exiled. 55
The relatively favorable view of the Inquisition's prison among
offenders and the harrowing description of the ordinary criminal
jails of Valencia city by Dr. Tomas Cerdan de Tallada, a late-
sixteenth-century defense attorney, would seem to support Lea's
conclusion that "the secret prisons of the Inquisition were less
intolerable places of abode than the episcopal and public gaols."
If prisoners in the "secret prison" were not subject to systematic
abuse by guards and workers, they were frequently forced to wait
long periods before their cases were concluded. A survey of all the
prisoners being held on July 18, 1566, reveals widely varying peri-
ods of incarceration before all stages of the trial process were con-
cluded, ranging from a few months to as long as two-and-one-half
years. 57 In general, prisoners were not exposed to such long peri-
ods of imprisonment; however, the average stay before sentencing
was around three months. 58 It was the numerous exceptions to this
general rule and the psychological impact that long incarceration
had on certain individuals which sometimes drove them to mad-
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ness or suicide that the Suprema must have had in mind when it
wrote the tribunal reminding it of the October 22, 1610, carta
acordada (administrative order) that ordered speedy trials to pre-
vent "the misfortunes that have occurred when prisoners become
desperate as a result of the long delay in concluding their cases." 59
Once incarcerated and interrogated concerning his property, the
prisoner was not at first informed of the charges against him but
was brought instead before the inquisitors who admonished him to
confess any heretical acts that he had committed or heard about.
Left in ignorance of the charges against him and denied benefit of
defense counsel at this stage of the proceedings, the accused might
confess immediately even to things the Inquisition was unaware of
at the time of his arrest. 60 Even if the prisoner did not confess, he
was left in an agony of doubt about what the Inquisition actually
knew about his case and what sort of evidence had been brought
against him. It was during the first three audiences with the pris-
oner that the inquisitors obtained the detailed sociological and bio-
graphical information that affords the historian fascinating insights
into the mental state of the accused. This included the standard
information requested of prisoners in the ordinary courts (age, mari-
tal status, occupation, and place of residence) but went far beyond
it to probe the prisoners' personal history and knowledge of Catho-
lic dogma and ritual.
Another interesting aspect of interrogation at this stage of the
proceedings was the effort made by the inquisitors to trap prisoners
into admitting their guilt or to at least say things that would support
the allegations of the witnesses. Pena's sixteenth-century com-
ments on Eymerich reveal the emergence of much more sophisti-
cated procedures, perhaps under the influence of the ordinary
criminal courts. Peria notes that the prisoner should be put at a
psychological disadvantage immediately by being placed on a chair
that was "lower and humbler" than that of the inquisitors them-
selves. In questioning the prisoner, the inquisitor should be careful
not to "irritate" or provoke him, for this would only get him angry
and make him more difficult to deal with. Instead, the inquisitor
should be subtle, never indicating or suggesting to the prisoner
what exactly was wanted from him, first questioning him in general
terms about any heretical acts he had seen or committed, then "by
degrees" moving to the chief indictment itself. 61 One example of
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73
just how effective this questioning could he comes from a bigamy
case tried before the tribunal in 1659. In this instance, Valencia's
inquisitors were successful in trapping the accused into admitting
that he had knowingly committed bigamy by going to live with his
third wife while his second wife was still alive. 62 Casanyosas, the
convicted French Lutheran, commented ruefully on the brutal ef-
fectiveness of the questioning that he had been subjected to by
Inquisitor Bernardino de Aguilera. According to him, Aguilera
"had a virtuous face but was really a villain because having impris-
oned men he makes them take an oath and forces them to admit to
things they neither did nor imagined." 63
At the end of the first three audiences, the charges against the
prisoner were presented to the inquisitors by the prosecuting attor-
ney or fiscal. The interposition of this official between judge and
accused was a refinement and modification of traditional inquisito-
rial procedure in the sense that the inquisitors themselves could
now preserve a formal impartiality, even though they had played
the major role in creating the case against the accused. 64 The prose-
cuting attorney also represented the emerging idea that the crime
was an offense to the public and should be prosecuted even in the
absence of a private complaint. 65
There was frequently a good deal of hearsay evidence presented
in the prosecutor's arraignment, even though it was largely super-
fluous to proving the crime and often amounted to little more than
one individual swearing that he had heard one of the principal
witnesses state that the accused was guilty of heresy. In spite of the
expense and time involved in interviewing these witnesses, the
purpose was to make the amount of evidence against the accused
seem greater than it really was and to buttress what was frequently
a slender case at the start of the trial. 66 Rhetorical flourishes were
also not uncommon, with some fiscales making an effort to make
the crime appear more deliberate and more serious than it really
was. The prosecuting attorney in the case of Brianda Gacenta, who
was accused of Judaizing and specifically of participating in the
lashing of a cross with Christ's figure on it, claimed that those
present "took great delight in the cruel passion and torment that
the Jews inflicted on his sacred person and proclaimed a strong
desire to have been present at the passion." None of the rather
flimsy and inconsistent evidence about the alleged incident as pre-
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sented at the trial indicated any such glorying in the torture in-
flicted on Christ by the Jews of biblical times, and the prosecutor's
statement was obviously meant to inflate the importance and signifi-
cance of the heretical acts attributed to Gacente. 67 After the accusa-
tion was presented to him by the tribunal's secretaries, the accused
was required to answer each item on the spot. After this, he was
permitted to choose defense counsel. 68
At the end of the arraignment, the prosecutor would fre-
quently ask that the accused be made to undergo torture until
he should admit the truth of the allegations made against him.
In practice, however, torture was not decided on until after the
prosecution and defense had concluded their arguments. If the
case was still in doubt, the matter would be discussed by the
members of the consulta de fe, and it was this body that would
make a recommendation regarding torture if the evidence was
insufficient for condemnation. 69
After the choice of a defense attorney had been made, the case
was formally received to proof, beginning with the ratification of
the testimony of the original witnesses on which the original ar-
raignment was based. Generally, ratification involved calling back
the original witnesses to repeat their testimony before the inquisi-
tors. And, according to the rules, no evidence could be used unless
it was ratified. While a rigorous system of ratification involving
careful reinterrogation of witnesses by the inquisitors could have
been an effective protection for the accused, few inquisitors ever
put themselves to so much trouble, and ratification was limited to
mere repetition of the original testimony. Moreover, witnesses
could ask to have their original statements read over to them to
refresh their memories and even add material to their original
testimony.
At the sixth audience, the summary of evidence was drawn up,
carefully omitting the names of witnesses, and presented to the
accused who was required to answer every allegation immediately.
After cross-examination by the inquisitors, the defense counsel was
called in and given the summary of the witnesses' testimony along
with the replies of the accused, although in fact those accused
before the Valencia tribunal were not always assured of a formal
defense until the mid-^os.' 1
In the Spanish Inquisition, the defense labored under some very
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particular constraints that made the preparation of an effective case
extremely difficult even if the court had not been biased in favor of
the prosecution from the very start. For one thing, there was the
ambiguous, even dangerous, position of the defense attorney him-
self. As a recognized, if minor, official of the court, the defense
attorney would naturally want to retain the respect and approval of
the inquisitors, especially if he wished to continue practicing be-
fore the tribunal. Under the circumstances, many defense attor-
neys were tempted to do little more than advise their clients to
confess and to offer only a very perfunctory defense even if a more
vigorous one were possible.
Another inhibiting factor for defense attorneys was that their
role was ambiguous. An individual who presented too strong a case
for his client might be seen as a protector of heretics and thus liable
to suspicion. In Peria's commentary, he stresses that such protec-
tors of heretics may "act with or without arms, during or after the
trial." Since anyone who "opposed" or obstructed the work of the
Holy Office in any way whatever could be considered a protector of
heretics, a conscientious defense attorney had to walk a narrow line
between presenting an adequate defense and avoiding the impres-
sion that he supported his client's erroneous beliefs. Torquemada's
instructions of 1484 contain a clear reference to this linkage be-
tween defense attorneys and the "defenders of heretics" when thev
are warned not to undertake the defense of any part of the case
where they know their client is guilty and not to impose "captious
objections or malicious delay" on the trial, which must have inhib-
ited them from deploying the full range of their legal talents on
their client's behalf. rl When the defense attorney agreed to under-
take the defense, he had to swear to defend his client but also to
"undeceive him" if he did not have justice on his side. 73
Some defense attorneys took their status as officials of the Holy
Office and defenders of the faith so seriously that they were unwill-
ing to carry out their responsibilities to their clients. When Abdella
Alcaxet, a Valencian Morisco turned Barbary pirate, was captured
and brought to the tribunal, Luis Sarcola was assigned to defend
him. Going beyond the usual admonition to confess and receive
mercy, Sarcola remonstrated openly with his client and urged him
to convert to Catholicism. Alcaxet remained obdurate, saying that
he wanted to live as a Moor and die in the Islamic faith. On hearing
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this, Sarcola said he would have nothing more to do with the de-
fense. Since Alcaxet was impenitent, the tribunal apparently did
not feel it needed to provide him with anyone to replace Sarcola,
and so no defense plea was entered and the case was closed.
Clearly, in the case of someone like Alcaxet who boasted openly of
his corsair activities against Christian shipping and of his landings
on the Valencian coast to pick up groups of Moriscos who wanted to
escape to Algeria, all pretense of fairness broke down. Alcaxet was
an avowed enemy of Catholic Spain, and it would have taken a far
better developed sense of the rights of the accused than that pos-
sessed by the Spanish Inquisition for him to have been afforded
procedural safeguards that he himself probably did not expect. 74
Quite apart from the difficulties presented by the awkward posi-
tion of the defense attorney himself, the defense labored under a
series of disabilities imposed by the nature of the procedures fol-
lowed by the Inquisition. The best known of all of these disabilities
was the Inquisition's refusal to divulge the names of the witnesses
for the prosecution or any particulars that might allow the accused
to discover them. As stated earlier, the accused was supposed to be
protected from having the evil-intentioned testimony of his mortal
enemies used against him, but to make use of this protection he
would have to separate his mortal enemies from the other wit-
nesses using the deliberately vague summary given to him by the
inquisitors. Just how useless the rule barring the testimony of ene-
mies was to a prisoner who was unable to guess the names of the
witnesses against him is demonstrated by the case of Pedro
Matheo, a Valencian velvet worker who was accused of Judaizing in
1521. Out of twelve witnesses against him, Matheo was only able to
name one (his wife) as a mortal enemy and was therefore convicted
and sentenced to perpetual imprisonment. 15
If a defendant was to formulate a case, he would need witnesses
who could help him disable opposing testimony by proving enmity
or demonstrate good character. The sorts of witnesses admissible
for the defense, however, were much more restricted than those
allowed the prosecution, which could even call criminals or excom-
municates. ' 6 When a list of defense witnesses was presented to the
inquisitors, they were also given a series of questions to be put to
them. Even here, conscious bias against the defendant may be seen
in the fact that the inquisitors did not have to accept either wit-
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77
nesses or questions in their entirety, and it was not uncommon for
some defense questions to be set aside as "impertinent." 7 '
In spite of these obvious problems, some defense attorneys la-
bored conscientiously on behalf of their clients. Dr. Ramos, who
represented Matheo in his Judaizing case, presented what may
almost be called an ideal defense. After establishing Matheo's repu-
tation as a good Catholic who went to mass regularly and accepted
everything as taught by the Roman Catholic church, Ramos went
on to impugn the testimony of his wife with whom he was always
quarreling. To buttress the testimony of the mainly converso wit-
nesses who testified to his frequent attendance at mass, Ramos
brought forward Yolante Martinez, an Old Christian, who had lived
and worked in Matheo's home for several months. Martinez testi-
fied that she had seen Matheo attend mass in San Lorenzo "many
times" and that work did not cease in his house on Friday nights
and Saturdays, when Judaic law dictated that no work be per-
formed. This testimony should have impressed the inquisitors as
they frequently attempted to ascertain whether converso families
would alter household routines to celebrate the Jewish Sabbath.
Ramos then expertly dismantled the prosecution's case. He be-
gan by pointing out that all the prosecution witnesses were "singu-
lar," that is, the specific incidences of Judaizing or blasphemy that
they testified to were not corroborated by any of the others. Even
though Matheo had performed certain Judaic ceremonies, the cir-
cumstances under which they had been performed did not indicate
any pattern of criminal behavior. As a young apprentice, when he
committed certain of the acts in question, Matheo would naturally
have felt compelled to conform to the customs of the household,
but mere conformity did not indicate conviction.
Matheo was sentenced to perpetual imprisonment in the house
of another velvet worker in spite of the fiscal's demand for relaxa-
tion and during a period when converted Jews were being rou-
tinely sentenced to death, and while it would be difficult to as-
cribe this relative leniency wholly to Ramos's defense, there is no
question that in this instance a defense attorney did well by his
client. 78 Procedural disabilities notwithstanding, it is clear that
conscientious defense attorneys were able to present a successful
and coherent defense that might well have been convincing in a
modern court of law. Unfortunately, the Inquisition was not a
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modern court, and although it was willing to go further in the
formal protection of accused than the French or English criminal
courts of the period which did not even permit defense attorneys,
the bias of inquisitorial procedure favored the prosecution, and
the efforts by defense attorneys could too easily be dismissed as
placing unwarranted delays in the way of just punishment. ' 9 More-
over, efforts by defense attorneys to remove some of the difficul-
ties under which they labored proved unavailing in the face of the
prosecutorial bias of the Holy Office. When Dr. Montaner, an
abogado de presos of the Barcelona tribunal, petitioned the
Suprema to allow names of prosecution witnesses to be revealed to
the defense, he and the other attorneys signing the petition were
threatened with arrest. 80
After the prosecution and defense had concluded their presenta-
tions, the trial itself was terminated and ready for sentencing. It
was at this point that the trial became open, as it were, to influence
from other centers of judicial authority, since the inquisitors could
not sentence alone and had to form a committee, called the con-
sulta de fe, with a representative of the bishop of the diocese in
which the accused as well as a judge of the chancery court lived. 81
The group responsible for voting on the sentence of Esperanza
Badfa, for example, included three inquisitors as well as Dr. Fran-
cisco Fenollet, dean of the cathedral chapter acting for the arch-
bishop of Valencia, and Dr. Basilio Esteve, a judge from the
Audiencia. 82 Although there was a certain controversy among ju-
rists about whether the vote of the consultores was decisive, when
the bishop's representative and the inquisitors disagreed, the case
was generally referred to the Suprema. Later in the history of the
Inquisition, when the tribunals were forced to refer most of their
verdicts to the Suprema anyway, the consulta served as little more
than a means for debating the issues in a case, while the Suprema,
which made the decisive judgment, was under no obligation to take
its deliberations into account. 83
If there was sufficient evidence, the consulta could then sen-
tence the accused directly or could vote for torture on the grounds
that although strong proof existed, the entire truth was not yet
known; therefore, a last effort to obtain a confession from the ac-
cused must be attempted, whatever the risk to the prosecution
case. To the contemporary mind, judicial torture is perhaps the
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most repugnant aspect of inquisitorial procedure, yet it must be
seen as a necessary element in a judicial system whose major goal
was to obtain the confession of the accused. Confession was vital
because of the high and often impossible standard of proof (two
independent eyewitnesses) necessary for complete certainty of
guilt. The frequent failure to produce two eyewitnesses led to a
whole legal "arithmetic" of partial proofs and to a considerable
degree of uncertainty in sentencing, while the absence of any em-
pirical method of evaluating circumstantial evidence made it very
difficult to supplement denunciations with any other proofs. If the
accused could be induced to confess, the court could resolve all of
these issues and the prosecution's case would be automatically
validated. 84
Judicial torture as practiced in early modern courts had a strong
connection to the trials and ordeals of an older, more primitive legal
tradition. As a real test of the veracity of the accused's assertions of
innocence, it could not be unlimited and beyond endurance because
the accused would obviously have to have a chance to prove his
innocence by passing the ordeal successfully. This notion of torture
as a "test" emerges clearly from Pena's disparaging comments about
certain judges who had invented new forms of torture, an activity
that smacked more "of the work of the hangman" than of the "theolo-
gians and jurists" who made up the inquisitorial tribunals. 85
In practice, the Spanish Inquisition used forms of torture that
were common to the entire judicial system and was undoubtedly
more careful than the secular courts in applying it. Moreover, in
spite of the considerable discretion given to judges in the 1561
Instructions, the repetition of torture was extremely unusual even
where the victim had revoked an earlier confession. In only 0.8
percent of the cases for which trial details are available was torture
repeated. 87 However, the Inquisition, like the secular courts, re-
sorted to torture because of the difficulty of producing the requisite
two witnesses to the same act.
Confessions obtained under torture, unlike those given freely
during interrogation, implied the failure of the entire effort to make
the accused "play the role of voluntary partner in the procedure"
and thereby to validate the politicoreligious role of the Inquisi-
tion. 89 Since the ritual of acceptance and repentance could not be
valid without a strong element of voluntarism, the accused who
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confessed under torture had to be brought back within 24 hours to
confirm the confession that he had made.
At the conclusion of the trial, the consulta de fe was required to
recommend sentencing. There were a number of possible sen-
tences that could be handed down by the tribunal. Of course, the
accused could be acquitted, but outright acquittal was rather un-
common in the Inquisition because it constituted an admission that
the tribunal was wrong to prosecute the case, and given the inquisi-
tors' sensitivity to their honor and reputation, they were extremely
unwilling to lay themselves open to such an inference. Between
1478 and 1530, the Valencia tribunal only handed down 12 absolu-
tions out of 1,862 sentences.
Simple suspension of a case was far more common than outright
acquittal, since suspension saved the Inquisition's reputation for
infallibility and left the accused under a permanent cloud of suspi-
cion. Suspended cases, moreover, could always be reopened if any
fresh evidence presented itself. Suspensions formed an increas-
ingly large number of the sentences handed down by the Valencia
tribunal from the mid-sixteenth century and continued to increase
as a percentage of all sentences through the eighteenth century. 91
Those who were penanced were required to "abjure" heresy, spe-
cifically, the heresy of which they were guilty. There were two
forms of abjuration: de levi, for a minor offense, and de vehementi,
for a more serious one. 92
Exile was another punishment that was frequently imposed by
the Inquisition. 93 Normally, a sentence of exile would simply be a
blanket prohibition to enter a certain place or places and their
vicinity for a period of years. During the seventeenth century, the
royal court (which really meant Madrid and its vicinity) was in-
cluded in the sentence regardless of any other places mentioned.
Sometimes the tribunal would go further in trying to make the
sentence appropriate to the situation and proclivities of the crimi-
nal. Cristobal de Centelles, one of the Valencian nobles who was
arrested during the tribunal's crackdown on Old Christian lords of
Morisco vassals in the 1560s and 1570s, was found not only to have
permitted his vassals to freely practice their traditional customs
and rituals but to have engaged in illicit sexual practices with cer-
tain Morisco women. Centelles was fined 600 ducats and perma-
nently forbidden from living in places with a predominantly
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Morisco population, which meant, in effect, that he could not live
1 • 94
on his own estates.
Spiritual penance, which could range from actual incarceration
in a monastery to religious instruction and the performance of
certain observances, was widely used, especially for the two privi-
leged classes, nobility and clergy, and for persons convicted of
lesser crimes like blasphemy. Reclusion in a monastery along with
religious indoctrination, and deprivation of the right to celebrate
mass or hear confession, was a punishment used in the solicitation
cases that became such an important part of the business of the
tribunal in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Occasion-
ally, the tribunal would even specify the nature of the religious
instruction that it wished the penitent to have while in reclusion.
On December 17, 1764, the tribunal sentenced Dr. Juan Batista
Catala, the rector of the village of Yatova north of Bunol who had
been convicted of solicitation and "evil doctrine" because of certain
statements he made to one of his female penitents, to one year of
exile in a monastery and instructed him to read the works of Fray
Luis de Granada. 96
A certain percentage of the sentences handed down by the
tribuanl called for scourging. Usually between 100 and 200 lashes
were laid on by the public executioner as the penitent rode
through the streets mounted on a mule the day after he had been
reconciled. 97
Public disgrace, which was administered by leading the criminal
through the streets on an ass, carrying the insignia of his offense,
could be considered one of the lightest penalties administered by
the tribunal. In a reputation-conscious society, however, such a
penalty could have a fatal impact on the social standing of the
victim and his family. 98
In 1567, at the beginning of the great naval buildup that led to
the battle of Lepanto, the Suprema ordered that all penitents sen-
tenced to perpetual imprisonment and the habit should have their
sentences changed to at least three years of galley service. 99 In
reality, what the Suprema was doing was falling into line with what
had already been done by the ordinary criminal courts in response
to a series of royal pragmaticas issued between 1552 and 1556 when
Philip II began taking control of the Spanish galley fleet from the
private contractors who had run it under Charles V. These laws
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changed the ordinary penalties for thieves, vagabonds, and perjur-
ers to galley service, which varied from several years for the first
offense to life for the second. 100 Direct administration and the rap-
idly increasing size of crews of the Spanish galley fleet required
ever greater numbers of men, so that in 1573, the Suprema, under
considerable royal pressure, ordered that even the so-called buen
confitente who confessed early and was normally given a light sen-
tence should be sent to the galleys for a three-year term. 101
Given the harsh conditions of the service, it was hardly surpris-
ing that many of the wealthier prisoners sought to reduce their
term in the galleys through a monetary payment. By the late six-
teenth century, this commerce in reduced sentences had become
so regularized that a standard price of 300 ducats and the purchase
of a slave who would serve the oars in perpetuity was established.
In 1593, several of the thirty-eight Moriscos from Valencia's inquisi-
torial district then serving in the galleys petitioned for a reduction
of their term through attorney Francisco Fuster, claiming that their
relatives would help them to pay the necessary fee. These requests
for remission of galley service usually became the subject of an
individual dossier, that is, the meritos de reos, which included a
brief summary of the case and details of the comportment of each
prisoner during the term of his sentence. It was the Suprema that
decided on the prisoner's merits, but normally it would agree to
commute the sentence as long as the monetary payment was forth-
coming, even though such early release ran contrary to royal policy
and the navy's need for manpower. 102 In the mid-eighteenth cen-
tury, galley service for all crimes was eliminated, and those who
would have received it were sentenced to hard labor in the
Almaden mines or the North African fortresses, where they were
frequently worse off than they would have been in the galleys. 103
In canon law, perpetual imprisonment was the ordinary punish-
ment imposed on the reconciled heretic, and the Spanish Inquisi-
tion in both its medieval and modern forms frequently handed
down such sentences. 104 During the early years of the modern
Inquisition, the tribunals frequently did not have perpetual pris-
ons and were forced to use the ordinary prisons, as in Valencia, or
make do with other expedients. Around the middle of the six-
teenth century, the Valencia tribunal established its own prison,
but the need to find some way to support the prisoners without
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placing an undue burden on its resources meant that the number
of persons actually in the perpetual prison at any one time tended
to be small. Testimony taken during the visitation of 1566 indi-
cated that there were only four people serving their terms in the
prison, while many others sentenced to perpetual imprisonment
were living in their own homes and freely practicing their trades
with little or no supervision. 105
There was also a tendency to reduce the term of perpetual im-
prisonment, usually for a money payment. Pena's 1578 commen-
tary on Eymerich's discussion of imprisonment, which reflected
current practice in the Spanish Inquisition, makes the point that
these sentences were generally commuted to a term of from three
to eight years, and in Valencia it was rare to have anyone serve
more than one year during much of the sixteenth century. 106
The sanbenito, a penitential garment made of yellow cloth
(green in Valencia) emblazoned with two oblique crosses, was al-
ways worn by those sentenced to prison during the term of their
imprisonment and even after their release. This garment was also
the key element in perpetuating the infamy of those convicted of
heresy and their families. Penitential garments worn by the recon-
ciled were displayed prominently in local churches when they were
removed either after the auto de fe or when they had served their
term of imprisonment; garments worn by the relaxed were dis-
played immediately after the auto. 10 ' Using the sanbenito to per-
petuate the memory of those convicted of heresy and apostasy was
consistent with the effort to bar the descendants of the convicted
heretic from holding public office, carrying on honorable trades or
professions, or entering an ecclesiastical career. 108 Transmission of
the penalty was a logical consequence of the hereditary nature of
sin, a concept defended by such sixteenth-century writers as Grego-
rio Lopez or Diego Covarrubias de Leyva and applied by them to
treason both "human" and "divine." 109
The Spanish Inquisition, which condemned many individuals to
the stake, did not actually carry out the executions itself. The
supreme penalty was incurred by heretics after they were in effect
"cut off from the church" and left to the secular authorities to deal
with. The secular authorities, for their part, had little choice since
canon law provided the penalty of excommunication for those offi-
cials who failed to punish heretics given to them by the Inquisi-
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tion. 0 In fact, the secular authorities needed no urging to carry
out executions.
Several different outcomes of a case could result in the death
penalty. The obstinate heretic who persisted in defending his be-
liefs in spite of all attempts to reason with him was judged pertina-
cious and condemned to the stake. The negativo, an individual who
continued to deny his guilt in the face of what was felt to be
overwhelming evidence against him, was considered an unrepen-
tant heretic and also condemned to be executed. Even if an ac-
cused heretic confessed during the course of his trial, he could still
be given the death penalty if his confession was judged to be incom-
plete. Imperfect confessions were regarded as false; they implied
obstinacy and therefore placed the individual in the same position
as the pertinacious heretic. A confession could be regarded as in-
complete or mendacious for two principal reasons: failure to men-
tion the names of accomplices or confession of heretical acts but
denial of the intention to actually commit heresy. 111
Finally, the relapsed heretic was liable to the supreme penalty.
This was a potentially fruitful source of condemnations because any
return to former practices or even former associates could indicate
that the individual was impenitent and that his conversion was
false. In actual fact, however, even during the early years of the
Valencia tribunal, most relapsed persons were not condemned to
be executed but were given other penalties. 112
Between 1817 and 1818, Juan Antonio Llorente, the last secre-
tary of the Corte (Madrid) tribunal, published the first major study
of the Spanish Inquisition to be based on extensive archival materi-
als. Llorente's work was the real beginning of modern Inquisition
scholarship, but whatever its value in other respects, Llorente can
justly be accused of greatly exaggerating the number of persons
actually executed. In light of current research, it is difficult to
accept Llorente's figure of more than 30,000 deaths. What is appar-
ent from the figures for the Valencia tribunal is that the ferocity of
the early years was succeeded by a long period of declining sever-
ity. During the forty-six years from 1484 to 1530, some 754 individu-
als, or 37.7 percent of the total of those whose penalty is known,
were sentenced to death. By 1530, the incidence of death sen-
tences had fallen sharply, with 81 percent of all the executions
decreed before 1592 having already taken place. 113 During the later
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history of the tribunal, both the number of executions and the
percentage of death sentences handed down had fallen dramati-
cally. Between 1580 and 1820, only 1.4 percent of those tried by
the Valencia tribunal were condemned to death, and only half were
actually executed. 114
Even when the death sentence had been imposed, the tribunals
did their utmost to bring about conversion and confession so that a
lesser penalty could be substituted. Monks, theologians used as
consultants by the tribunal, and others worked feverishly to bring
about an eleventh-hour conversion to reconcile the heretic with the
church, and their opportunity was made even greater when the
Suprema ordered that prisoners were to be notified of sentences of
relaxation a full three days before the auto de fe itself. 115
The auto de fe, at which prisoners' sentences were announced
before a vast crowd, was one of those great public spectacles that
played so large a part in the politicoreligious life of early modern
Europe. Early autos were relatively simple ceremonies, with con-
demned persons being unceremoniously marched to the central
plaza where their sentences were briefly read out before they were
taken away to be executed. 116
The auto de fe became much more elaborate later in the six-
teenth century as Spain emerged as the leader of the Counter-
Reformation and the struggle against Islam and as the state there-
fore became more involved in asserting its power over heretics. As
heresy became equated with treason against the ruler, it was neces-
sary to arrange a ceremony by which "injured sovereignty could
be reconstituted and in which "an empathic affirmation of political
power" could be arranged for the edification of the public. More-
over, such a ceremony, through the presence of troops and local
authorities and then the public burning of victims that took place
later, could provide a "terrorific example" of princely power while
advertising openly the limits of socially acceptable behavior. 11 '
In Valencia, the autos took place on the average of one per year.
In many ways, it can be said that preparation for this event set the
pace for the tribunal's life through much of the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries. After a sufficient number of convictions had been
obtained, permission was requested from the Suprema to proceed
with the auto. The ceremony took place before a large crowd as
well as before the viceroy, president, and judges of the Audiencia,
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the archbishop, and the canons of the cathedral. After the sen-
tences were read out, those sentenced to death were burned by the
public executioner at a location near the present site of the botani-
cal gardens. 118 By the end of the seventeenth century, the public
auto de fe had been largely superseded by smaller, cheaper ceremo-
nies held in one of Valencia's parish churches.
Significant gaps in the records, particularly between 1540 and
1570 and for several years in the seventeenth century, will probably
make it impossible to know the exact number of cases tried by the
Valencia tribunal. Combining the figures compiled by Garcia
Carcel and Henningsen and Contreras for the period before 1700
with my own computations for 1700-1820, I arrive at a total of
11,458 cases, which probably understates the true figure by several
thousand. (See table 1.)
In general, the tribunal's activity may be divided into three
distinct periods of unequal duration. The first of these, from 1481
to 1530, was the period of intense prosecution of converted Jews
who accounted for 2,160 of the 2,354 cases. The second period,
1560 to 1614, was dominated by activity against the Moriscos who
comprised 2,465 of the 3,366 cases, or 73.2 percent. During the
next, and much longer period, 1615 to 1820, the Inquisition concen-
trated on the majority Old Christian population for a variety of
offenses, primarily infringing post-Tridentine moral and religious
ideals. 119
One of the principal differences between the medieval and Span-
ish inquisitions was the subordination of all of Spain's provincial
tribunals to a central authority vested in the Council of the Inquisi-
tion (the Suprema) headed by the inquisitor-general. Like the Span-
ish monarchy's other governing councils, the Suprema had consid-
erable autonomy and carried on the day-to-day business of the
Inquisition with a minimum of outside interference.
In the early years of the sixteenth century, the Suprema's inter-
vention in matters of faith was limited primarily to appeals and to
the minority of cases where voting revealed disagreement among
the local inquisitors and the ordinary. Where unanimity had been
achieved, the Suprema was usually content to let well enough
alone and was even reluctant to offer advice when the tribunal
requested it. This extreme reticence was shown when, in 1512, the
Suprema refused even to offer its advice about a case springing
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from the murder of familiar Bartolome Molner and returned it to
the Valencia tribunal without comment. 120
During the 1540s and 1550s, however, there is evidence of grow-
ing interference by the Suprema, with an increasing number of
cases being submitted to it for comment and modification by the
Valencia tribunal. 121 At this stage, though, the Suprema's advice
was not always followed automatically. In 1556, when the Moriscos
of Valencia seemed particularly restive, the Suprema wrote the
tribunal ordering the suspension of several cases that were being
formulated against certain Morisco tagarinos (Moriscos reared
among Christians whose orthodox Catholicism had suddenly been
questioned). In compliance with these orders, the tribunal released
the Moriscos on bond, but when several of them used the opportu-
nity to flee the kingdom, those remaining were rearrested, tried,
and punished. To the Suprema's complaint that its express orders
were being violated, Valencia's inquisitors replied that they had
handled the matter in such a way as to "best satisfy their own
"122
consciences.
This pattern of sporadic and sometimes ineffective intervention
began to be replaced by a more rigorous central control with the
Valdes Instructions of 1561, where prior consultation with the
Suprema was mandated before an order to arrest persons of quality
could be carried into effect. 123 That this order was being obeyed by
the tribunal with not entirely satisfactory results from its own point
of view is demonstrated by the case of Gaspar Centelles, a Valen-
cian noble suspected of Protestant sympathies. After forwarding
the depositions of two witnesses to the Suprema and urging a quick
decision, the tribunal had to wait a full seven months before it
received a reply from the Suprema allowing it to proceed.
Ten years after its dilatory intervention in the Centelles case, the
Suprema was presented with another opportunity to deal with an
important Valencian noble, but this time the scope of its interven-
tion had broadened considerably. Pedro Luis de Borja, grand-
master of Valencia's own military order of Montesa, was half
brother to the duke of Gandfa, Francisco de Borja, and himself a
grandee of Spain so that his arrest on sodomy charges in 1572 was a
major national event. In this case, the Suprema had not only or-
dered the arrest (after consultation with the king) but guided every
stage of the conduct of the case itself, including his living accommo-
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89
dations while on trial, questions to be asked the accused, and a
review of the sentence handed down by the tribunal. 125 By 1566,
when the visitations that had been carried out into the proceedings
of the Aragonese tribunals revealed a disturbing pattern of arbi-
trary behavior and gross violation of procedural norms that con-
trasted sharply with Philip If s personal commitment to a fair and
impartial judicial system, the stage was set for an even greater
reduction in the autonomy of the local tribunals. 126 In June 1568, a
carta acordada (administrative order) mandated that all death sen-
tences should be submitted to the Suprema even if they were voted
unanimously. 12 Earlier that spring, another carta acordada brought
the Suprema even more directly into trials of Moriscos when it
ordered that all cases involving Morisco religious teachers (alfaquis)
should be referred to it. 128 During the early seventeenth century,
the last vestiges of the provincial tribunal's autonomy in matters of
faith were removed when a carta acordada of August 2, 1625, man-
dated that the records of trials that resulted in sentences of galleys,
penance, or lashing should be submitted to the Suprema before
sentence was carried out. 129
The process of judicial centralization, whereby provincial tribu-
nals were required to submit their proceedings for review by
higher courts, had become a part of seventeenth-century jurispru-
dence all over the Continent. In Spain, Villadiego informs us that
ordinary criminal judges were required to consult their superiors
before proceeding in all serious cases. 13 In 1624, the Parlement of
Paris, France's high court of appeals, ordered that all serious cases
of sorcery that involved torture, sentences of death, or other corpo-
ral punishment must be referred to it regardless of whether the
accused had requested an appeal. 131
In the case of the Spanish Inquisition, continuous oversight of
procedure in matters of faith was facilitated by requiring that the
tribunals send summaries of all cases tried by them to the Suprema
regardless of type or punishment. These relaciones de causas began
in a tentative way in the 1540s, but by the 1560s, continuous series
began to appear. By 1610, the Suprema began to insist on details
such as the date of incarceration and the date when the accusation
was presented which would permit it to monitor the entire trial. 132
In 1632, the Suprema increased its supervision still further by
ordering monthly reports on cases pending before the tribunal. 133
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Comments scrawled in the margins of the relaciones de causas or
relayed to the tribunal by the carta acordada are characteristically
terse and confined to procedural matters, while virtually ignoring
questions of precedent or underlying legal philosophy. Such issues
were addressed by the Suprema itself in the body of Instructions
that it drew up to guide provincial inquisitors, especially those of
1561. But Spanish Inquisition law also evolved through the work of
such distinguished canonists as Bishop Diego de Simancas or Fran-
cisco Pena, whose new edition of Eymerich's Manual with marginal
notes based on the experience of the Spanish tribunals went
through several editions. There were also a certain number of
Spanish inquisitors like Juan de Rojas who addressed themselves to
procedural issues. 134
It is in the area of sentencing that the real influence of the
Suprema on the tribunal may be discerned, since it became com-
mon practice to refer sentences to the Suprema after they were
voted on by the tribunal's junta de fe. The Suprema's impact on
sentencing was twofold: in supplying the details of the punishment
that the offender would have to undergo and in altering that punish-
ment both before sentence was actually pronounced and later when
it could consider reducing terms of imprisonment, galley service,
or exile.
The Suprema could also generally be counted on to intervene on
the side of greater leniency, frequently reducing the term of impris-
onment or exile suggested by the consulta de fe. In 1647-48, when
the tribunal sentenced several women to greatly extended periods
of exile for having violated the provisions of their original sen-
tences, the Suprema responded either by demanding to see the
original trial record or by drastically reducing the sentence. In
general, the Suprema was about two-and-one-half times more
135
likely to decrease a sentence as it was to increase its severity.
Sentences could be further reduced after the culprit had already
begun serving them for a certain period, although this would fre-
quently depend on the receipt of favorable reports on the way in
which the individual was serving his or her sentence. Thus, the
Suprema ignored Fray Pablo Cenedo's first request for relief from
the remainder of his term of confinement in a monastery and only
accepted his second request after receiving detailed information on
his behavior from the tribunal. 136 In the case of Fray Tomas de los
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Arcos who was condemned as a solicitante in 1677, sentence was
lifted but only after the Suprema had received many testimonials
concerning his exemplary conduct in the monastery to which he
had been confined. 137
There can be little doubt that a pattern of greater leniency im-
posed by a superior court could signal changed perceptions of cer-
tain social groups or the greater acceptance or tolerance of certain
sorts of behavior by the authorities. Thus it was by modifying sen-
tences in the direction of greater leniency rather than through
elaborate disquisitions on cases that the Suprema indicated the
path it wished the provincial tribunals to take. As in every other
respect, however, the penal practice of the Valencia tribunal was
not a passive response to the demands of the Suprema. By the early
seventeenth century, for example, the tribunal had taken on itself
jettisoning the harsh provisions of Valencian law that mandated the
death penalty for convicted sodomites and was following a new and
more lenient policy. 138
The structure of the earliest inquisitorial courts was extremely
simple, with a minimal number of officials. In 1483, according to a
memorial by Ferdinand the Catholic, each tribunal in the Crown of
Aragon was to be composed of two inquisitors, a trained jurist to act
as legal assessor, a prosecuting attorney (fiscal), a scribe, a consta-
ble to carry out arrests, and a porter. 139 Within a few decades,
however, the number of officials and the cost of maintaining them
had increased dramatically. 140 A letter to the Suprema by Valencia's
Inquisitor Martin Perez de Arteaga in 1553 complaining of exces-
sive staff mentions five nuncios along with two barber surgeons and
a doctor, all this in the face of increasingly inadequate funding. 141
As early as 1534, the Valencia tribunal was regularly staffed by
three inquisitors, a fiscal, and four (later five) secretaries as well as
chaplains and stewards, although by that time inquisitors were all
trained jurists and the post of assessor had been eliminated. 142
During its early years, the new Spanish National Inquisition
shared with its medieval predecessor the quality of not having any
fixed revenue base. The medieval Inquisition in the Crown of Ara-
gon had always depended on the somewhat grudging support of the
bishops and had supplemented what they chose to provide with
erratic income from the sale of confiscated property and fines lev-
ied against convicted heretics. 143 When it was first established, the
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modern Spanish Inquisition depended on the crown, which con-
trolled absolutely all inquisitorial finances, receiving all income and
paying expenses through the royal treasury until well into the reign
of Charles V. By the 1550s, however, the principle of royal control
was gradually abandoned, and, in 1561, we find the Suprema order-
ing the provincial tribunals to stop sending information to the
crown about confiscations. Instead, this information was to be sent
to the Suprema, which would decide what if anything should be
told to the officials of the treasury. 144
The Suprema used a variety of methods to gain a greater mea-
sure of control over the income and expenditure of local tribunals.
To regulate the activities of receivers or treasurers, a finance com-
mittee (junta de hacienda) was established in 1569. 145 This commit-
tee, which consisted of the inquisitors, the receiver, the notary of
sequestrations, and the judge of confiscations, met each month to
decide financial issues and to review the activities of the receiver
who was required to present his accounts and to declare how much
of the funds he had collected had actually been deposited in the
tribunal treasury. 146 By the 1570s, the deliberations of the junta de
hacienda were being reported to the Suprema on a regular basis,
and by the 1620s, it was insisting on a full status report on all
financial cases being tried before the tribunal. 14 ' Once the receiv-
ers' accounts were drawn up, they were audited yearly by the
Contador-General of the Suprema. 148
The Suprema also showed no compunction about using the infor-
mation provided by the receivers to tax the wealthier tribunals for
the benefit of its own treasury. 149 That this practice continued right
down to the final years of the institution is demonstrated by the
series of urgent payment orders sent to the Valencia tribunal be-
tween September 1806 and April 15, 1807, in which it was required
to send the Suprema a total of 300,000 reales and 470 bolts of
cloth. 150
In spite of these constraints, however, notorious laxity in the face
of official malpractice emboldened local receivers and other financial
officials to defy the Suprema and flagrantly disregard the safeguards
that had been designed to prevent embezzlement. 151 Distrust of the
accounts rendered by receivers led to a struggle between the
Suprema on one side and the local tribunal on the other, but the
Suprema's unwillingness to punish the receivers or challenge the
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93
control that a few families exercised over that office meant that its
efforts were doomed in advance and that receivers could continue
their peculations unmolested until such time as the tribunal's own
poverty made further profiteering impossible.
The Suprema's tenderness toward receivers and its reluctance to
interrupt the comfortable nepotism that had come to dominate the
office is perfectly illustrated in the case of receiver Carlos Albornoz.
After experiencing difficulties in obtaining his accounts for 1723 and
several other years, the Suprema permitted him to resign in favor of
his son in 1727. At this point, he was forced to render his final
accounts and disgorge some 6,000 reales that he still owed the trea-
sury. After his account was audited, however, it was found that he
still owed the treasury some 6,248 lliures besides censals collected
from several towns but not entered on his books. Efforts to collect
these not inconsiderable sums continued until 1734, producing an
extensive correspondence and consuming much time and energy.
Throughout this seven-year period, no thought was given to punish-
ing him or to ordering the sale of his property so as to cover the debt
he owed the treasurv, and his son continued to peacefullv serve his
office. 152
According to regulations laid down by the Suprema, receivers
were supposed to render their accounts every year so that they could
be reviewed by the auditor-general. Receivers were always dilatory
about this responsibility, but by 1800, the Suprema seemed to have
lost control completely and was forced to engage in a protracted
struggle with the Valencia tribunal and its receiver, Francisco Anto-
nio Polop, to obtain his accounts and those of his predecessors dating
back to 1785. In the end, Polop flatly refused to forward his own
accounts and sent only those of his two predecessors, which occa-
sioned an outburst from the auditor-general who accused Polop of
"bad faith" and demanded that he produce the accounts within two
months. 153
During the early period, the Inquisition derived its income
largely from three principal sources: compositions, rehabilitations,
and confiscations. Compositions were agreements whereby an indi-
vidual convicted of heresy, which normally meant the confiscation
of his property, could satisfy treasury claims by paying only a cer-
tain proportion. Sometimes these agreements were arrived at by
the offender himself or sometimes by his heirs, as in the case of Dr.
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Judicial Procedures and Financial Structure
Luis Esparca who arranged to pay the royal treasury 9,000 lliures in
return for which the Inquisition agreed to drop its efforts to seize
the property of his brother Manuel, a convicted heretic. 154 There
were also agreements of a more inclusive nature such as the one
arrived at between Ferdinand and the children of the condemned
heretics of the Crown of Aragon whereby they could enjoy all the
property of the condemned in return for a 5,000 ducat servicio. 155
In Valencia, compositions tended to diminish in importance after
1500, in part because the con versos themselves had learned to
distrust the local tribunal, which frequently violated composition
agreements by confiscating the property of those listed on them. 156
For the large number of reconciled persons, one of the most
fearsome penalties for themselves and their families was depriva-
tion of the right to hold honorable offices. This penalty was the
cause of numerous petitions to the pope by the affected individuals
and their families and resulted in a series of battles over jurisdic-
tion, until Alexander VI conceded the right to rehabilitate exclu-
sively to the inquisitor-general of Spain. 15 ' Rehabilitations then
became a fertile source of revenue for the Inquisition.
By far the most significant source of income enjoyed by the Valen-
cia tribunal during its early years was derived from confiscations.
The Furs of Valencia followed canon law and medieval custom in
prescribing death and confiscation of property as the penalty for
heresy, and the early Spanish Inquisition placed heavy emphasis on
efforts to seize the property of convicted heretics. 158 When an indi-
vidual was arrested, his property was subject to immediate seques-
tration, and he was expected to cooperate in making an accurate
inventory, which was drawn up by the receiver and the notary of
sequestration. This list was to be exhaustive, including such things
as the amounts he was owed, any dowry he had given or received,
even the slaves he owned and their purchase price. 159 A verdict of
innocence would of course involve the return of the sequestered
property, but such verdicts were rare, and in many cases seques-
tration became the equivalent of confiscation because as long as the
case continued, the Inquisition obtained the funds it needed to
support the prisoner in captivity from the sale of his property. When
the almost inevitable verdict of guilty was reached, the sequestered
property was usually sold at public auction.
While confiscation was the chief source of revenue enjoyed by
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95
the Valencia tribunal during its early years, there was always a
considerable gap between the amounts stated in the inventory and
the actual collections. The main problem here was the inability of
the Inquisition to collect the debts owed to the accused. The Inqui-
sition could not proceed arbitrarily against the property of third
parties, and it not infrequently lost cases brought before its own
judge of confiscated property. 160
Concealment of property, the uncertainty and expense of at-
tempting to collect debts owed to converso merchants, and, above
all, the decline in the number of cases involving conversos made
revenues from confiscations an increasingly unreliable source of
support for the Inquisition in the 1530s and 1540s. From 1487 to
1530, the Inquisition received a total of 6,431,517 sueldos primarily
from confiscations, but revenues fell drastically from 1529, and
from 1530 to 1544, the tribunal collected only 737,188 sueldos. 161
After 1579, moreover, revenues from confiscations dropped to prac-
tically nothing. 162
Sharply decreasing income from confiscations meant that the
Valencia tribunal was in serious financial trouble from the late
1550s. With conversos no longer comprising even a significant mi-
nority of the accused, the tribunal was left with a largely Morisco
clientele, some of whom were so poor that the tribunal spent more
to feed them while they were in prison than it could hope to
recover from the sale of their property. This situation prompted the
Suprema to issue an order to the effect that impecunious prisoners
were to be dealt with promptly without waiting for an auto de fe in
order to avoid the costs of imprisoning them for long periods. 163
The situation had changed radically from the halcyon days earlier
in the century. According to a letter to the Suprema written by
receiver Amador de Aliaga in May 1556, virtually nothing had been
received from confiscations recently. 164 The steep decline in reve-
nues from fines and confiscations plus the heavy burden of indigent
Morisco prisoners meant that the tribunal could not even meet its
most essential expenses. In August 1556, Aliaga drew up a list
showing that the tribunal was behind anywhere from eight months
to three years in its salary payments to officials, and he was being
forced to loan them money out of his own pocket so that they could
feed themselves and their families. 165 This situation continued into
the early and mid- 1560s when the new receiver, Bernardino Gutier-
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Judicial Procedures and Financial Structure
rez, reported that the tribunal still owed its inquisitors and officials
5,300 escudos. 166 There seems little reason to doubt this estimate
since it was confirmed in a letter concerning the tribunal's financial
situation written by the visitors who were carrying on a general
investigation into the tribunal's affairs at that time. In their analysis
of the reasons for this unfortunate situation, the visitors seem to be
echoing the words of Amador de Aliaga several years before. After
having carefully reviewed the tribunal's register of autos de fe, the
visitors concluded that the sorts of cases that the tribunal was trying
were generally of "poca calidad" and that little income could be
expected from them. Of the eleven prisoners presently in the "se-
cret prison" (mainly for Lutheranism), all were very poor and had to
be supported by the Holy Office. 16 ' In light of its manifest poverty,
the eagerness with which the tribunal greeted the prospect of seiz-
ing the extensive property of Gaspar de Centelles, who was relaxed
at the auto of September 17, 1564, is hardly surprising. 168
The ultimate solution to the Inquisition's financial problems had
already been perceived by Charles V in October 1519 when he
urged the tribunals to invest their funds in such a way as to yield a
steady source of income. The first steps toward providing the Inqui-
sition with a fixed endowment date from its early years when rental
houses as well as long-term loans (censals) were confiscated from
wealthy conversos. From 1528, the Valencia tribunal also absorbed
the revenues of the former mosques and began purchasing new
censals situated on Morisco and Old Christian villages. 169 The ar-
rival of Inquisitor-General Fernando de Valdes in 1547 marked a
watershed in inquisitorial finance, and his determination to give the
Inquisition a firm basis for its existence and make it independent of
the royal treasury led him to throw his full support behind the policy
of acquiring new censals. This policy was followed by his successors
who repeatedly insisted on the reinvestment of any monies derived
from the redemption of censals. 1 Under this prodding, the tribunal
greatly increased its holdings, especially at the end of the sixteenth
century and during the first years of the seventeenth century. By the
beginning of the seventeenth century, this policy was paying off
handsomely, and the average income from censals in 1604 was at a
level more than four times greater than it had been in 1529. 1/1
The other important new revenue source that was, at least in
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Judicial Procedures and Financial Structure
97
part, a product of Fernando de Valdes's efforts on behalf of the
institution that he headed was the setting aside of the income of
one canonry in each cathedral or collegiate church in favor of the
Inquisition. A papal bull issued by the compliant Pope Alexander
VI in 1501 had already permitted the Inquisition this right, but
successive popes refused to confirm it. It was not until Philip II
came to the throne, and the discovery of Protestant elements in
Spain itself pointed to the need for a more powerful Inquisition,
that Pope Paul IV could be induced to issue the briefs that would
allow for the implementation of this policy. 1,2 In January 1559, Paul
ordered that the first canonry in each metropolitan church, cathe-
dral, or collegiate church to become vacant should be suppressed
in favor of the Inquisition. In spite of tenacious resistance by some
cabildos in its district, the Valencia tribunal was able to boast of
receiving the income from benefices in the five most important
churches in the district by November 1566. 173
The third major change in the tribunal's finances was the result
of an agreement with representatives of the Morisco community
which provided the tribunal with a substantial subsidy in return for
abstaining from confiscating Morisco property. This agreement,
which was signed in 1571, had a long gestation period going back to
the tribunal's frustration with the comparative poverty of convicted
Morisco heretics in the 1550s and 1560s and opposition to the
policy of confiscation that had been voiced by cathedral canons and
other members of Valencia's ruling elite. By 1563—64, Inquisitors
Sotomayor and Aguilera were petitioning the Suprema for its sup-
port for a substantial subsidy from the Morisco community. 1/4 Sev-
eral years of negotiations followed during which the tribunal found
itself embroiled with the nobility and the aristocratic estate in the
Cortes before the issue was finally resolved in its favor. The agree-
ment, which provided a subsidy of some 2,500 lliures, was less than
the tribunal had originally sought but still gave it 42.7 percent of its
income in the late sixteenth century. 1 ' 5
Greatly aided by these important new revenue sources, the tri-
bunal's balance sheet improved drastically after 1565. By 1566,
collection of the canonries in Valencia, Jativa, and Teruel allowed
the tribunal to bring all salary payments up to date.
By the late 1580s, the Inquisition's new financial policy seemed
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Judicial Procedures and Financial Structure
to have paid off handsomely. The account of receiver Benito
Sanguino for 1587-88 shows a favorable balance of 100,663 sueldos,
with all salaries paid in full through August 1588. 1/6 No longer
dependent on the unstable income from confiscations, the tribu-
nal's finances seemed solidly based on assured revenues that would
have been the envy of any local rentier. In one respect, however,
the new revenue base was more precarious than the old since the
Inquisition's economic health was now heavily dependent on the
general prosperity of the Valencian economy as a whole and on the
survival of the Moriscos whose cheap labor was one of its strongest
elements. Even as the income from the Morisco subsidy, can-
onries, and censals grew during the 1570s and 1580s, declining
agricultural and industrial production and the increasing political
and social pressure against the Moriscos were threatening to under-
ITT
mine the whole basis of the new system.
Given the tribunal's dependence on the economy and its increas-
ing investments in censals paid by nobles like the duke of Gandfa
who was himself heavily dependent on his Morisco vassals, the
expulsion of the Moriscos could hardly fail to have a severe financial
impact. The most immediate effect was the loss of revenues di-
rectly connected with the Morisco presence: subsidies, fines, and
the censals paid by Morisco villages. The tribunal's financial prob-
lems were further exacerbated by the crown's policy of protecting
the Valencian nobility from its creditors. In a report filed on Octo-
ber 26, 1615, the Suprema's prosecuting attorney painted a gloomy
picture of the tribunal's situation and noted that royal protection
was preventing it from foreclosing on several censals owed by the
duke of Gandfa. 1 The reduction in the interest paid on censals was
a further blow to large censal holders and elicited widespread but
1T9
ineffectual protests from lenders, including the Inquisition.
In the last analysis, Philip Ill's government was not prepared to
sacrifice the Inquisition even in the interest of its local aristocratic
allies. In a step that mirrored previous royal policies of bailing out
the Holy Office with revenues drawn from the Spanish church, the
crown interceded with the Pope to obtain 3, 158 lliures in additional
income for the tribunal, drawn from the endowment of the now-
defunct Morisco colleges. The colleges, which were originally set
up by Archbishop Juan de Ribera, enjoyed an endowment drawn
from censals owned by the archbishopric. These censals were
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Judicial Procedures and Financial Structure
99
turned over to the Inquisition in exchange for a group of now-
worthless censals owned by the tribunal and situated on several
Morisco villages. 180 Bowing to further pressure from the tribunal,
Philip III also moved to indemnify it for its losses by making it a
substantial grant drawn from the proceeds of sales of ex- Morisco
property located in the royal patrimony. Finally, under the new
administration of Philip IV, the crown partially reversed its previ-
ous policies regarding aristocratic debtors and ordered the duke of
Gandfa's estate to repay some 6,949 lliures in principal and 2,200
lliures in accumulated interest to the Holy Office. 181
Royal largess and the extremely favorable treatment accorded
the Inquisition in the matter of aristocratic debt made for a rapid
recovery after the financial uncertainties of the immediate postex-
pulsion period. Favorable balances and the redemption of censals
in the 1620s and 1630s also allowed the tribunal to acquire new
censals. 182 But income from censals and canonries, which had be-
come the financial mainstay of the tribunal, depended heavily on
Valencian agriculture, which had been undermined by the expul-
sion of the Moriscos. By the 1660s, income had fallen to one quar-
ter of its peak in 1608-09, and by 1687, revenues had fallen to their
lowest level of the century. 183 The widespread economic disruption
that was caused by the War of Succession and the invasion of the
kingdom by foreign troops in 1706 only confirmed the tribunal's
i 1 184
financial decadence.
Rising population and the recovery of the Valencian economy
after the War of Succession, however, brought an improvement in
the financial condition of all institutions whose income depended
largely on agricultural rent. The Valencia tribunal was one of these
beneficiaries, and the mid-eighteenth century ushered in a "golden
age" of financial plenty that was to last until the wars of the 1790s
brought on the final crisis of the Spanish Old Regime.
If, during its early years, the Spanish Inquisition can be said to
have resembled its medieval predecessor in more than a few re-
spects, by the 1560s, it had evolved into a substantially different
institution. No longer dependent on traditional sources of financial
support, it had acquired its own revenue base derived from invest-
ments in censals, real estate, and canonries. Morever, as Pena's
marginal notes to his 1578 edition of Eymerich's Directorium in-
quisitorum indicate, the Holy Office had evolved its own proce-
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Judicial Procedures and Financial Structure
dures that were derived from its experience with a deviant popula-
tion far larger and more complex than that encountered by the
medieval tribunal. By the mid-sixteenth century, the prestige of
the Inquisition as a judicial institution had never stood higher, so
much so that it frequently received testimony from persons who
came to denounce themselves. Fear of persecution and an oppres-
sive and pervasive system of informants had something to do with
this, of course, but so too did public esteem for an institution that
had successfully established itself as a strong defender of the faith,
the monarchy, and the established order.
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Inquisitors and Officials
In a remarkable and suggestive book of essays published in 1970,
Julio Caro Baroja identified one of the most significant lacunae in our
knowledge of the Spanish Inquisition when he pointed out that
while frequent references to the lives and careers of inquisitors-
general may be found in the literature, we know very little about the
average inquisitor. This individual, at once the occupant of a middle-
ranking judgeship on one of the many royal tribunals and representa-
tive of a centuries-old tradition of uncompromising defense of the
Catholic faith, remains an enigma whose outlines are obscured
rather than revealed by what we know about the political activities of
a great ecclesiastical politician like Fernando de Valdes, a religious
fanatic like Tomas de Torquemada, or the romantic portrait of the
Grand Inquisitor sketched by Dostoevski in The Brothers Karama-
zov. Yet, as Caro Baroja has indicated, "for several centuries and up
until recently ordinary inquisitors walked the streets of Toledo, Se-
ville, Granada, and Cuenca and could be seen talking with canons
and letrados, caballeros and hidalgos, as well as people who were
humbler or more presumptuous. " Caro Baroja's basic question re-
mains unanswered: who were the inquisitors? What can we find out
about their origins, education, and careers? If the psychological and
ideological gulf between the first inquisitor-general, Tomas de
Torquemada, who was appointed in 1483, and the afrancesado, Ra-
mon Josef de Arce y Reynoso, who ruled the Inquisition in the first
years of the nineteenth century and died in Paris in 1814, is vast and
almost incomprehensible, so too the gulf between the earliest in-
101
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quisitors of Valencia, Fray Juan de Gualbes or Fray Juan Epila, and
those who sat on the tribunal in the seventeenth century or the early
nineteenth century is similarly vast.
Certainly, the specialist leafing through the pages of Lea's four-
volume work on the Spanish Inquisition in the hope of obtaining
such information about provincial inquisitors would be sorely disap-
pointed. In volume 1, Lea's entire discussion of these matters takes
up a scant four pages and confines itself to generalities about the
formal requirements for sitting on a tribunal. 2 Even though other
information on these topics is scattered throughout the work, it
would be nearly impossible to reach any accurate conclusions from
these references, and in this instance, one would be forced to agree
with Caro Baroja's observation that Lea's critical apparatus appears
more complete than it really is. 3
The task of gathering information about the judges who sat on
the Valencia tribunal is made easier because the Inquisition re-
quired extensive genealogical investigations of all those applying
for official posts. Analysis of seventy genealogies (out of 134 judges
who sat on the tribunal of Valencia between 1481 and 1818) reveals
much about their social origins, personal characteristics, educa-
tion, and careers and should serve to at least partially remove some
of the mystery that still surrounds the figure of the ordinary provin-
cial inquisitor.
One of the series of reforms that followed the Comunero Revolu-
tion of 1520-21 was the reservation of places on the councils and
other institutions comprising the Castilian central administration
for subjects of the Crown of Castile. 4 While this policy did not
extend itself to the Council of Aragon, all of whose members (with
the exception of the treasurer-general) were Aragonese subjects, it
did have the effect of ensuring an overwhelming preponderance of
Castilians on the Valencia tribunal, which represented the Spanish
National Inquisition in the kingdom. Of the 62 judges whose place
of birth is mentioned in their genealogies, 50, or 80.6 percent,
came from the Crown of Castile.
Within the Crown of Castile itself, moreover, the northern part
of the kingdom, including Navarre, Galicia, Leon, and Old Castile
(especially Burgos and its district), maintained a clear predomi-
nance throughout the period under review. Overall, some 48.3
percent of the inquisitors whose place of birth is known came from
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Inquisitors and Officials 103
these northern regions, and of the 50 who were born in the king-
dom of Castile, 30 were from the north.
There is no doubt that the predominant position of letrados drawn
from the northern part of the Crown of Castile in recruitment to the
Hapsburg bureaucracy can be explained principally by two factors:
the geographic distribution of the lesser nobility from whose ranks
most letrado bureaucrats were drawn and the greater availability of
educational opportunities at both a secondary and university level.
The de facto exclusion of Aragonese subjects from serving on the
tribunal was only strictly observed until the end of the sixteenth
century. Under the later Hapsburgs and Bourbons, it began to re-
ceive a few Aragonese judges. The numbers remained modest, how-
ever, with only twelve Aragonese subjects serving on the tribunal in
the 207 years between 1602 and 1809. Moreover, since nine of these
were either from the kingdom of Valencia or from Teruel, which was
within the inquisitorial district, the tribunal's belated move to re-
cruit local judges can be related to the critical need to reinforce its
local political base to counter the unrelenting hostility of the jurats
and the Audiencia rather than any desire to promote equalization of
employment opportunities among the regions. 5
One of its greatest successes in this campaign was the appoint-
ment of Dr. Honorato Figuerola as inquisitor of Valencia in 1598.
Figuerola was one of the very few canons of Valencia's cathedral
ever recruited for a judgeship. He came from an extremely influen-
tial Valencian family whose political support would be highly benefi-
cial to the tribunal. As early as 1506, Juan Figuerola, Honorato's
paternal great-grandfather, had enjoyed the status of ciutada ("citi-
zen" with rentier status) and held the key post of treasurer of the
city of Valencia to which he was reelected in 1511. 6 Honorato's
paternal grandfather had served as jurat of Valencia, while his
brother Melchor Figuerola, a wealthy cavalier who owned property
in Valencia and wheat fields in the countryside, had served as one
of the Estament Militar's two deputies on the Diputacio, the king-
dom's chief revenue-collecting body. ' Dr. Honorato Figuerola's ser-
vice as inquisitor, although brief (he left in 1600), was the begin-
ning of a long and fruitful involvement of the Figuerola and their
connections with the tribunal, which would continue right down to
the mid-eighteenth century and bring such notables as Bernardo
Boyl, lord of Manesis, into the ranks of the familiares. 8
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If the tribunal was concerned with the additional political sup-
port it could obtain by awarding judgeships to the members of
politically useful families, it was also compelled to reward at least
some individuals whose families had served the tribunal for long
periods, often in an unpaid capacity. Dr. Juan Joseph Martinez
Rubio, who served as inquisitor of Valencia from 1619 to 1625, was
himself rather typical in that he held an advanced degree in canon
law and had served as an official of the archbishopric, but what
distinguished him as a candidate for the judgeship was his family's
loyal support for the tribunal in the remote and mountainous east-
ern part of the district. Both his father, Pedro Martinez Rubio, and
his paternal grandfather had served the tribunal as familiares in the
isolated village of Rodenas in the Sierra Menera where Juan Joseph
Martinez Rubio himself had served as rector of the parish before
moving to Valencia. 9
Abdon Exea, at 64 the oldest person ever to begin his service on
the tribunal, came from Albalat de la Ribera on the estates of the
duke of Gandfa, where he had served as rector of the parish and two
of his brothers were familiares, which was far from easy given ducal
resentment of any outside authority. Normally, even this family
tradition of service in a difficult and dangerous area (which was the
scene of a violent feud between the Timors and the Talons during the
early sixteenth century) would not have been enough to give Exea a
post on the tribunal, given his complete lack of proper educational
qualifications. 11 In their commentary on his genealogy, Inquisitors
Ambrosio Roche and Herrera y Guzman noted that "he has not
followed any course of instruction at the university nor is it known
that he has improved himself by study." 12 Since posts on inquisito-
rial courts, like other high posts in the letrado hierarchy, were
reserved exclusively for university graduates holding advanced de-
grees, Exea's success in gaining a judgeship can only be attributed to
his long service in the church, which eventually brought him an
influential canonry in Valencia's cathedral, and his devotion to the
tribunal, which he served as comisario and calificador.
In the Aragonese town of Teruel, where the Inquisition had
been established despite stubborn resistance, the tribunal needed
important political allies to overcome strong local resentment about
Aragonese subjects being placed under the control of a Valencian-
based institution. 13 Given the tribunal's shaky authority in Teruel,
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Inquisitors and Officials
105
the only possible strategy was to establish close and durable rela-
tions with a few of the town's most influential families. A deep and
lasting involvement with the Inquisition on many levels would
serve to flatter these families' sense of importance and permit them
to join the national bureaucratic elite, while at the same time a
place on the tribunal itself would underscore their political support
for its continued presence in Teruel.
One of the most distinguished and influential families in Teruel
during the period of the later Hapsburgs and Bourbons was the
Campillo, the family of Doctor Francisco Antonio Campillo y Tann,
who served as inquisitor of Valencia between 1762 and 1780. This
family of hidalgos was so wealthy and influential that throughout
the seventeenth century, successive Campillos had housed the
Hapsburg rulers when they passed through Teruel, while Francisco
Antonio's father, Juan Antonio Campillo, not only housed Philip V
but was chosen to swear allegiance to him in the city's name. The
family's direct involvement with the Inquisition really began with
Francisco Antonio's brother, Dr. Joaquin Ramon Campillo y Tarin,
who served as secretary of the Santiago tribunal beginning in
1753. 14 Francisco Antonio himself made his early career in the
church as a canon of his native Teruel and as an official of the see of
Albarracm and Teruel. In the latter post, he served with distinction
and impressed his bishop, Francisco Perez de Prado y Cuesta, so
much so that when Prado y Cuesta was appointed inquisitor-
general in 1746 he entrusted Francisco Antonio with the care of the
bishopric. Scion of a distinguished and politically influential Teruel
family and faithful servant of the inquisitor-general, Francisco Anto-
nio could not fail to be an attractive candidate to serve on the
Valencia tribunal, to which he was duly appointed after serving as
fiscal in Murcia. 15
One interesting result of my analysis of the social origins of
Valencia's inquisitors is the discovery of several judges who were
only one or two generations removed from the peasantry. Although
the numbers involved are small, totaling no more than eight inquisi-
tors, it does appear to indicate that the several inquisitorial tribu-
nals scattered around the country may well have provided ambi-
tious commoners with an important path to upward social mobility.
If the Inquisition was genuinely popular among the vast majority of
Spaniards, it was not only because of its "decisively Old Christian
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ideology" but because it was perceived as an institution that wel-
comed persons of humble social origins into the ranks and, in some
instances, onto the tribunal itself. 16
Although the details offered by the genealogies concerning the
humblest ancestors of prospective inquisitorial officials are typically
scanty, they do provide some interesting insights into the forms
taken by social mobility during the Spanish Old Regime. In the
case of Miguel Fernandez, a labrador in the province of Toledo who
was Inquisitor Pedro Cifontes de Loarte's maternal grandfather,
upward social mobility really began with a favorable marriage. Mi-
guel Fernandez, who lived in the senorial village of Pinto, was able
to marry Catalina de Cifontes, the daughter, of his lord's steward,
Rodrigo de Cifontes. Catalina de Cifontes, their daughter, was
given her mother's name in preference to her father's because of
her maternal grandfather's superior social status, and the inquisitor
himself was known by that name. 1 '
Of course, it is to be presumed that our small group of inquisi-
tors of peasant origin came from only the wealthiest segment of
Spain's large and diverse peasant community. Certainly, the great
mass of impoverished landless laborers, who numbered almost as
many as all peasant proprietors and tenant farmers combined in the
census of 1797, were totally excluded from even the possibility of
social mobility. 18 Excluded also were those peasant landowners or
tenants who farmed miserable plots of land too small to give them
much more than a bare subsistence. Such individuals were always
at grave risk of being forced to abandon their holding to become
mere day laborers. 19 On the other side of the picture are families
like the Bertran, who came from the village of Sierra Engarceran
and had connections throughout the grain-producing region that
stretched from Morella to the sea. These Spanish versions of the
"coq du village" would seek to profit by withholding their grain
from market when prices were low, obtain tax exemptions for their
land, and oppress their neighbors by obtaining a stranglehold over
village government. 20 The Bertran were typical representatives of
this sector of the peasantry. Described by a witness in Sierra
Engarceran as "the most highly respected of all the property own-
ers of this village, " they had frequently acted as bailiffs and chief
constables, while one member of the family had been parish priest
for more than seventy years. Pedro Juan Bertran's son, Felipe
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107
Bertran, after a long and distinguished career in the church that
culminated when he was made bishop of Salamanca, was appointed
inquisitor-general in December 1774 after the resignation of Man-
uel Quintano Bonifaz. During his period in office, which lasted
until 1783, Felipe used his influence to place four of his nephews in
important posts in the Inquisition, including Dr. Mathias Bertran,
who entered as an official in 1780 and served as inquisitor of Valen-
cia from 1784 to 1809. 21
Whatever else we may conclude about the social composition of
Valencia's inquisitors, and in spite of a significant minority who
came from peasant backgrounds, there is no doubt that the vast
majority (66%) were drawn from the aristocracy. Throughout the
early modern period, the Spanish aristocracy was the most numer-
ous in Western Europe, comprising a full 10.2 percent of the Castil-
ian population in the incomplete census of 1591, while in other
societies of the period, no more than 2 to 3 percent could claim this
status. 22 Apart from the fact that the population of entire provinces
(Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa) in the north claimed noble rank, the enor-
mous size of the Spanish nobility resulted from the large number of
hidalgos, that untitled lesser nobility for which there is no real
equivalent in other parts of Western Europe.
During the fifteenth century, hidalgo status belonged above all
to those with three generations of noble ancestors in the paternal
line enjoying exemption from ordinary taxes (pechos) and leading a
certain life-style that excluded any "base occupations." The purity
of blood statutes, which had become all-pervasive by the mid-
sixteenth century, appeared to indicate a closing off of opportuni-
ties to enter the ranks of the hidalgos by erecting a formal barrier in
the shape of a heritable quality without which it would be impossi-
ble to claim noble rank. 23 This new barrier was made explicit by the
existence of genealogieal investigations governing entrance to col-
leges, cathedral chapters, and other honorable corporations. At the
same time, the growth and increasing prestige of the royal courts
made it acceptable for them to resolve doubtful claims to noble
status by hearing the so-called pleitos de hidalgufa, which would
usually begin when a village or town included on its tax rolls an
individual claiming exemption from ordinary taxes. 24 The result of
these two developments was, paradoxically, to open hidalgo status
more and more to those with money because only they could pay
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the costs of the genealogical investigations that were indispensible
if one wished to enter honorable corporations normally associated
with a noble rank or "prove" nobility in the salas de hijosdalgos.
The length (frequently up to 20 years) and excessive costs of such
litigation had the effect of making it easier for the wealthy plebeian
to prove a dishonest claim than for a poor but genuine hidalgo to
validate a legitimate one. By the sixteenth century, a noble could
no longer be made, and nobility was considered a product of cer-
tain heritable qualities (lineage and race) whose validity was para-
doxically wholly dependent on the reputation that one's family
possessed in the community. By the end of the sixteenth century,
then, the Spanish nobility had become a porous structure, open, in
spite of its impressive and seemingly exhaustive genealogical inves-
tigations, to those capable of forging royal documents, bribing wit-
nesses, or influencing local officials to act in their favor.
At the apex of the Spanish aristocracy stood the tiny elite of titled
nobility (titulos), each of whom possessed an important seigneurial
estate as well as a fully accepted claim to hidalgo status. 25 Such
titles were frequently granted for extraordinary services such as
raising troops at one's own expense, membership on the Council of
Castile or other important councils, or simple monetary payment. 26
Within the group of titulos, there was a still smaller group of
grandees composed of the leading noble families in Spain, many of
whom were related to the royal house. 27 While the number of
titulos remained small relative to the Spanish aristocracy as a whole
throughout the early modern period, the absolute numbers tended
to increase especially after the outright sale of titulos became ac-
cepted in the seventeenth century. By 1627, the 120 titulos of 1600
had increased to 168, of which 41 were grandees. By 1787, the
number of titulos had grown to 654, including 119 grandees. 2
Of the three Valencian inquisitors who came from titled families,
one, Dr. Pablo Acedo Rico, was the son of Juan Acedo Rico whose
title of count of La Canada was one of the many conceded by the
Bourbons in the late eighteenth century. 29 The other two, licen-
tiates Philippe de Haro and Pedro Pacheco Portocarrero, were the
illegitimate sons of two brothers, Luis Mendez de Haro, a member
of the Camara de Castilla, and Juan Pacheco de Cordoba, a judge
on the Chancillerfa of Valladolid. Haro and Cordoba were younger
sons of a titled father, Luis Mendez de Haro, marquis of El Carpio.
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Inquisitors and Officials
109
With the prestige of the family at stake, the two illegitimate chil-
dren could be neither disowned nor abandoned. Philippe de Haro
was brought up in part by his aunt, Beatriz de Haro, on her estate
of Luque in the province of Cordoba and in part by his uncle,
Diego Lopez de Haro, marquis of El Carpio, and then sent to the
University of Salamanca where he became a colegial of the Colegio
Mayor of Cuenca. 30 Pacheco Puertocarrero was raised by his two
uncles and then attended the University of Salamanca where his
father had gone before him and became fiscal on the tribunal of
31
Granada before coming to Valencia as inquisitor in 1613.
Some 25 out of the 40 judges for whom information about the
social status of parents or relatives is available can be classed as
members of the nobility, but fully 22 of these pertained to the
middle and lesser nobility of caballeros and hidalgos. Given the
lack of clear legal definitions and the confusion in the popular mind
about who exactly should be considered noble and what that status
should entail, it is difficult to define exactly the differences be-
tween these two classes of nobles. In general, however, the cabal-
leros may be distinguished by their greater wealth but more par-
ticularly by the greater prestige attached to the functions they
performed. In certain regions, for example, caballeros had a virtual
stranglehold on city councils from which they could gain easy ac-
cess to the Councils of State and other agencies of government.
To distinguish themselves from the mass of hidalgos still further,
these men sought to become members of one of the three great
military orders. Receiving a habito meant nothing in material terms
and few could hope to obtain one of the lucrative commanderies,
but membership in a military order meant that the caballero had
been able to meet rigorous entrance requirements that were a
guarantee of both impeccable aristocratic origins and purity of
blood. 33 So popular had the military orders become among Spain's
middle-ranking nobility that in 1625, there were 1,459 knights
distributed among the three orders, with Santiago alone number-
ing 957 — up sharply from 221 in 1572. 34
A firm grasp on positions in local government and habitos and
the ability to establish themselves on the highest councils of state
were all characteristics of the caballero families among this group of
inquisitors. Inigo Ortiz de la Pena, who was inquisitor from 1744 to
1763, came from a family that was closely associated with the elite
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"twelve families" of Soria, a special group of knightly lineages who,
with their allies, dominated local government and monopolized
positions on the city council. Ortiz de la Pena's father was a regidor,
and both his father and grandfather were Cortes deputies represent-
ing the nobility of the town. His brother, Joseph Ortiz, was perpet-
ual city councillor and acting Cortes representative, while another
brother, Francisco Ortiz de la Pena, was dean of Soria's cathedral. 35
Dr. Alonso de Hoces was another inquisitor who came from a
family that was firmly established within one of Castile's local oligar-
chies. Alonso's father and maternal grandfather were both veinti-
cuatros (city councilors) of Cordoba. Local distinction was not
enough to satisfy the members of this ambitious family. Both
Alonso's father and his brother became members of military orders,
as did two cousins, one of whom, Lope de Hoces y Cordoba, count
of Hornachuelos, served on the Council of the Indies between 1637
and 1639. 36
In sharp contrast to the group of caballero families, the hidalgo
families could not boast of membership in the military orders, and
when they served the crown, it was in lesser capacities. Dr.
Tomas de Soto Calderon came of an old-line hidalgo family origi-
nally from the north which became established in Seville in the
lifetime of Soto Calderon's grandparents. His father, licentiate
Alonso de Soto Calderon, was an advocate and was appointed one
of the three criminal justices in Seville's new Audiencia. 3 ' Antonio
de Canseco de Quinones also came of a family with a tradition of
practicing law. Canseco de Quinones's maternal grandfather, Juan
Ochoa de Urquixu, was one of that large number of Basques who
migrated to Old Castile in search of better economic opportunities
during the sixteenth century. A successful attorney in his adopted
city of Valladolid, he eventually became one of the thirty licensed
to practice before the chancilleria. His father, Gabriel de Can-
seco, practiced before the Inquisition and gained the rank of
hidalgo. 38
This general pattern of failure to join the prestigious military
orders or obtain positions on the leading institutions of state
(chancillenas, councils) holds true even for the Campillo y Tann,
easily the most distinguished hidalgo family in our sample. Even
though Dr. Francisco Antonio Campillo y Tarin's father, grand-
father, and great grandfather had greeted visiting monarchs in the
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Inquisitors and Officials
111
name of the city of Teruel and dominated city offices, they were
still very much a family of local and regional, not national, impor-
tance, and there is no evidence that the family had either habitos or
high state offices to its credit. 39
Interestingly, the social group that was substantially underrepre-
sented among Valencia's inquisitors was the middle strata, or what
might be termed the bourgeoisie. 40 Of all the inquisitors in my
sample, there were only three whose parents were professionals
without hidalgo status. One of these, Diego Garcia de Trasmiera,
came from the elite of this group since his father was a royal finan-
cial officer. 41 The other two inquisitors of bourgeois origin were
drawn from the ranks of lawyers and notaries. Merchants and shop-
keepers, generally agreed to be the lowest-ranking members of the
bourgeoisie, were entirely absent from the tribunal. It may be
assumed that the exclusion of merchants from the prestigious judge-
ships reflected in part the bias of Spanish society against trade,
which was reflected in the preferences of a social and political elite
whose wealth and social standing was based on landholding and
income from mortgages and annuities. 42 Of course, this social pref-
erence was greatly accentuated by the identification of commerce
with converted Jews and New Christians. In a society in which
honor and "purity of blood" were becoming inextricably linked, the
activities of merchants and traders could not fail to be suspect,
especially when the discovery of Judaizers among the Portuguese
merchants and financiers who flocked to Spain after 1600 re-
inforced old prejudices. 43
Among Valencia's inquisitors, the tendency toward aristocratiza-
tion that was characteristic of the Spanish bureaucracy as a whole
becomes evident from a comparison of the social origins of parents
and grandparents. As far as peasant origin is concerned, slightly
less than one-quarter of grandparents but only 7.6 percent of the
parents of inquisitors came from this social stratum. Apart from a
sharp decline in the number of peasants, the higher social status of
parents as opposed to grandparents can be measured by the larger
percentage of parents who counted themselves among the nobility.
Altogether, some 62.5 percent of the parents of Valencia's inquisi-
tors were either titulos or enjoyed lesser noble status, as compared
to only 51 percent of grandparents.
Throughout the entire Spanish Old Regime, even during the
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eighteenth century when the traditional educational system was
coming under attack from reformers, university training, especially
from the law faculties, remained the essential qualification for entry
and preferment in the letrado hierarchy. The Inquisition was no
exception to this rule, even though many of the early inquisitors
were actually theologians and not lawyers. The Spanish Inquisi-
tion, in common with other criminal courts of the period, used
Roman canon process, whose complicated procedures and detailed
trial records required a professional judiciary. 44 Thus, by 1545,
Spanish practice had altered definitively, and Diego de Simancas
could remark that Spanish experience indicated that it was "more
useful to select jurists rather than theologians as inquisitors. " 45
In common with other aspiring letrados, future inquisitors
tended to flock to Salamanca, Valladolid, or Alcala de Henares,
Castile's most prestigious universities, because of the greater em-
ployment opportunities enjoyed by graduates. 46 Information drawn
from the responses to a 1666 request from the newly installed
inquisitor-general, Father Juan Nithard, for information concern-
ing the careers of inquisitors and officials then serving on the pro-
vincial tribunals indicates that of the 38 inquisitors whose univer-
sity affiliation is indicated, 33, or 86.8 percent, had attended one of
the three major universities. 47 On the Inquisition of Valencia, the
percentages are similar if somewhat lower, with 72 percent of the
judges having attended one of the three institutions. Among the
three elite institutions, moreover, there was a clear preference for
the University of Salamanca, with 26 out of the 38 inquisitors of
1666 attending and 16 out of the 33 Valencian inquisitors whose
university affiliation is known. The reasons for this preference are
not hard to find as Salamanca had long been both the most presti-
gious and the largest of the universities in the Iberian peninsula. It
enrolled nearly twice as many students as the University of Alcala,
its closest competitor in the sixteenth century. 48 Prestige and num-
bers meant that there were more Salamanca graduates occupying
coveted university lectureships, which in turn led to important
appointments in the letrado hierarchy. 49 Preference for the "impe-
rial'' universities did not, however, preclude attendance at lesser
ones. The increasing costs of taking advanced degrees at the three
major institutions made it common practice to transfer to one of the
newer, less prestigious institutions. 50 A bachelor from Salamanca,
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Inquisitors and Officials
113
Alcala, or Valladolid could take an advanced degree at Irache,
Sigiienza, Onate, or Avila far more quickly and at much less ex-
pense than he could at his home institution. Judging by the results
of the 1666 survey, taking an advanced degree from a lesser institu-
tion was quite common in the seventeenth century and did not
present any obstacle to advancement in the letrado hierarchy. Of
the 33 inquisitors who attended one of the three major institutions,
15 took their advanced degrees at lesser ones. 51
Within Castile's great universities were a number of semiautono-
mous colleges mostly founded under ecclesiastical auspices during
the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Outstanding among these
colleges were the six Colegios Mayores, which were distinguished
from the others by their requirement of a baccalaureate for admis-
sion and the right to select their own members after rigorous exami-
nation of their academic ability and purity of blood. 52
Among Valencia's inquisitors, 54. 5 percent of those whose univer-
sity affiliation is known attended one of the six Colegios Mayores,
while among the inquisitors of 1666, 42 percent had a Colegio Mayor
affiliation, although some did not actually take advanced degrees
while in residence at their colleges. In light of the generally declin-
ing prestige of the Inquisition after the end of the sixteenth century,
it is significant that more of Valencia's inquisitors attended the rela-
tively less prestigious Colegio Mayor of Santa Cruz at the University
of Valladolid than any other college, while San Bartolome, the oldest
and most distinguished, enrolled the fewest. 53
Early in the history of the letrado hierarchy, during the reign of
Ferdinand and Isabella, students holding the bachelor's degree
were frequently appointed to important positions on the courts or
the councils of the realm. During succeeding centuries, however,
the advanced degree became the norm, and those holding the
licentiate and doctorate enjoyed a virtual monopoly of office. 54 As
time went on, even the licentiate suffered a loss of prestige, and
only the doctorate remained valuable, especially for ambitious stu-
dents who were unable to enter the Colegios Mayores (manteistas)
but who still wished to compete with colegiales for official posts. Of
the 65 inquisitors on the Valencia tribunal whose degree status
appears before their name in their genealogy, 36 were licentiates
and 27 had doctorates, but of that group fully 22 were taken by
individuals joining the tribunal after 1600. This marked preference
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for the doctorate by Valencia's inquisitors appears to confirm the
increased importance of that degree in the later history of the
letrado hierarchy.
Up to the end of their graduate training, there seems to be little
to distinguish those whose letrado careers were to be confined
mainly to the Inquisition and those who were to enter the broader
field of the secular bureaucracy. At this point, however, the career
patterns and experiences of future inquisitors diverge from those of
other letrados, and that divergence tended to make inquisitors less
attractive as candidates for positions on the councils or in other
areas of the secular bureaucracy.
Law graduates whose careers would take them to one of the
top-ranked secular councils like the Council of the Indies or the
Council of Castile tended to prefer their first job to be on one of
the two chancillenas of Valladolid or Granada or on the presti-
gious Audiencias of Seville or Galicia. Failing a judgeship on one
of these tribunals, they would accept a somewhat lesser post like
fiscal (prosecuting attorney) or alcalde de los hijosdalgo which
would almost inevitably lead to a judgeship after a few years. 55 A
rapid glance at the actual functions of the chancillenas reveals that
service on them would give a letrado excellent training for a ca-
reer on the Council of Castile. Like the Council of Castile or the
Council of the Indies, the chancilleria acted as an appeals court in
cases involving town councils, nobles, or royal officials as well as
in tax disputes and claims to hidalgo status. Furthermore, a
young letrado serving as prosecuting attorney or judge on the
chancillerfa of Valladolid would have the advantage of experience
in ordinary criminal cases as that body was court of first instance
for certain crimes committed within the city of Valladolid and five
leagues around it. This experience was useful training for service
in the chamber of the alcaldes de casa y corte of the Council of
Castile, which had jurisdiction over criminal cases in Madrid and
its immediate surroundings. 5 ' Service as an alcalde generally pro-
vided an excellent stepping-stone to membership on the Council
of Castile.
Other letrados would seek to avoid service as alcaldes (always
dangerous and unpopular) and go directly to another council. The
Councils of Finance, Indies, and Military Orders provided the
Council of Castile with the bulk of its recruits, while the Councils
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Inquisitors and Officials
115
of the Inquisition, Aragon, and the Crusade were the least impor-
tant. 58 A letrado with service on the Council of the Indies, for
example, was six times as likely as a member of the Suprema to be
selected for a post on the Council of Castile, while a member of the
Council of Finance was more than seven times as likely.
To explain the seeming inability of the Inquisition to place its
judges on the empire's most important council, it will be neces-
sary to consider certain peculiarities in the careers of inquisitors
after they left the university. In the first place, all of Valencia's
inquisitors took at least minor clerical orders just before or soon
after graduation. Unlike most other law graduates who sought
posts on the chancillerias or Audiencias, provincial inquisitors
tended to begin their service with a post in the ecclesiastical bu-
reaucracy, usually as chief judge of an episcopal court or as gover-
nor of a diocese. 59 Of the 58 judges of the Valencia tribunal for
whom information about previous positions is available 36, or 65
percent, had held a post in the ecclesiastical court system or in
episcopal administration before beginning their service with the
Inquisition.
The jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical court system, even though
somewhat reduced in scope by the expanding royal courts and by
the coming of the Inquisition, still encompassed many offenses
against public morality (like concubinage or sodomy) and religion
(like the failure to go to confession or attend mass). 6 These offenses
were closer in nature and origin to the sorts of things the Inquisi-
tion dealt with, some of which (like sodomy) had formerly been
under the exclusive control of the ecclesiastical courts. An even
more direct connection between service as an ecclesiastical court
judge and service on an inquisitorial tribunal was formed in certain
cases when the provisor, or chief judge, of the episcopal court was
called to sit in judgment with the inquisitors of that district when
they were dealing with cases involving individuals residing within
their diocese. In certain instances, regular service with a provincial
tribunal led directly to an appointment with the Inquisition. A case
in point is that of licentiate Luis Benito de Oliver, inquisitor of
Seville in 1666, who, while serving as provisor in the bishoprics of
Cordoba and Cuenca, sat regularly with the judges of the inquisito-
rial tribunals as inquisitor ordinario and was then appointed to the
post of fiscal on the Valencia tribunal. After four years of service in
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that post, Oliver was then promoted to the tribunal of Seville as
61
inquisitor in 1661.
In a society in which the prince considered himself "the most
competent defender of the church, " relations between church and
state could not fail to be very close. 62 Bishops and many other
lesser clergy were chosen for their posts by the Camara de Castilla
(which controlled all positions in the royal bureaucracy except
those on the Inquisition), and bishops were expected to act as loyal
agents of the monarchy in their diocese when they were not work-
ing directly for the crown in some administrative capacity. 63
However, there were serious problems in church-state relations
under both Hapsburgs and Bourbons and none thornier than defin-
ing the extent and limits of ecclesiastical jurisdiction over both lay-
men and priests. Spokesmen for the church like the Franciscan
Miguel Agia demanded ample powers for the ecclesiastical courts to
judge offenses against Christian morality, even including such things
as usury, dancing on holy days, and excessive display of luxurious
clothing and other items. Defenders of civil jurisdiction replied by
denying the ecclesiastical courts any such powers, and in the Nueva
Recopilacion, such courts were specifically prohibited from impris-
oning laymen or sequestering their property on their own authority.
In spite of this prohibition, the church courts continued to do exactly
that, and the boundary between the jurisdiction of the royal and
ecclesiastical court systems was never firmly delineated. 64
In the conflict between the royal and ecclesiastical courts, the
institutional and political history of the Inquisition placed it in an
ambiguous position. Founded by the Catholic sovereigns but insti-
tuted by a papal bull and enjoying a considerable measure of auton-
omy in financial and personnel matters, the Inquisition could and
did act as an instrument of regalism but could also abandon that
position and become the most fervent defender of ecclesiastical
jurisdiction. 65 The Inquisition's use of regalism and ecclesiastical
immunity as alternative flags of convenience could not fail to stir
the suspicion and enmity of the members of the secular bureau-
cracy whose interests wedded them to a strong regalist position.
This suspicion was greatly increased by the jurisdictional conflicts
that pitted the inquisitorial tribunals against the royal court system.
Given this political background, it is hardly surprising that a
letrado with several decades of experience as an ecclesiastical court
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Inquisitors and Officials
117
judge and provincial inquisitor would be too closely linked with a
different and rival judicial system to pass easily onto one of the
secular councils of state. 66
Quite apart from the suspicion with which they were regarded
by the members of the secular bureaucracy, inquisitors seeking
positions on the councils of state would also be at a disadvantage
because their experience on the provincial tribunals or the Su-
prema would have given them far less training in the kind of cases
that came before institutions like the Council of Castile than if they
had served as a judge on one of the chancillerias or Audiencias.
While it is true that provincial inquisitors would have some experi-
ence with civil and criminal cases involving officials and familiares,
this experience was necessarily limited by the small number of
persons included within the tribunals' ordinary jurisdiction and by
the fact that at least some of these cases would be lost to the
Audiencias after the inevitable competencia suit was decided. In
financial matters, the provincial inquisitor's experience was limited
by the fact that disputes involving confiscated property were de-
cided by a collateral court headed by a special judge. By the mid-
seventeenth century, this position had been suppressed in most
places and responsibility for those cases vested in one of the inquisi-
tors, but confiscations — and therefore the disputes arising from
them — had fallen off dramatically from their sixteenth-century
levels. Service with the Holy Office or other ecclesiastical courts
would provide little, if any, experience in the disputes over land,
water rights, or pasturage that were the stock-in-trade of the
Audiencias and chancillerias and were frequently appealed to the
highest councillor level.
Thus, confronted with the suspicious attitude of many members
of the secular bureaucracy and partially disqualified for service on
the councils of state by the narrow range of judicial experience
afforded by their service on the ecclesiastical courts and provincial
tribunals, letrados who had taken service with the Inquisition made
their careers largely or entirely within that institution. Of the 58
inquisitors of Valencia for whom information about previous posi-
tions is given in their genealogies, 27 had served as prosecuting
attorneys for the Inquisition (14 on the Valencia tribunal itself) and
15 had served on other provincial tribunals. After leaving Valencia,
options were similarly rather limited, with 20 of the 37 whose
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future position is known moving on to another provincial tribunal
and 10 ending their careers on the Suprema, either going there
directly from the Valencia tribunal or serving on other provincial
tribunals before their appointment. The Valencia tribunal can also
boast two inquisitors-general, Jeronimo Manrique de Lara (1595)
and Juan de Cuniga (1602). When inquisitors left the Inquisition, it
was frequently for one of Spain's minor bishoprics for which their
previous experience with episcopal administration and undoubted
orthodoxy were excellent qualifications. 67
Even though their career options were rather limited, provincial
inquisitors did have ample opportunities to add to their already
considerable salaries and living stipends by holding valuable ecclesi-
astical benefices. 68 When canons or other benefice holders were
appointed inquisitors, as they frequently were, they simply contin-
ued to collect the revenues from their benefice while serving the
Inquisition. The traditional requirement of residence was overcome
by a series of papal bulls permitting inquisitors who held ecclesiasti-
cal benefices to be considered as present and therefore able to enjoy
all the income from their preferment. 69 Fully 55.7 percent of our
sample of Valencia's inquisitors were canons, and the vast majority of
these were nonresident, as only three held their canonries in Valen-
cia's cathedral, while 60 percent of the provincial inquisitors sur-
veyed in 1666 held a benefice of some sort. The financial benefits
derived from these posts were very unevenly distributed. Some
inquisitors like licentiate Antonio de Ayala Verganza were veritable
collectors of prebends. Ayala Verganza held ten benefices in addition
to a canonry in Segovia's cathedral, all of which he occupied before
accepting a position as fiscal of Valencia in July 1642. These benefices
yielded the fabulous sum of 5,000 ducats annually, or 1,875,000
maravedfs (mrs.), which was more than the total salary and living
allowance of the inquisitor-general himself. /0 But many other provin-
cial inquisitors had no benefices, and others, like licentiate Carlos de
Hoyo of the Zaragoza tribunal, who received only 50 ducats from a
patrimonial benefice in Laredo, hardly benefited at all. 71
Recent investigations into the social history of early modern
Europe have pointed up the importance of the phenomenon of
endogomy for all social groups but most particularly for members of
the magistracy and legal profession. ' 2 Valencia's inquisitors were no
exception to this rule and came of families that could boast long
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Inquisitors and Officials
119
traditions of service to the Inquisition in both salaried and unsala-
ried capacities.
Royal service performed by the members of our inquisitors' im-
mediate or extended families appears to divide them into two sig-
nificant groups: a larger one whose service was mainly or entirely to
the Inquisition and a much smaller one that seemed able to place
its members in a variety of important positions. Family service
traditions oriented around one particular court or council do not
seem to have been unusual in early modern Spain, and even the
Council of Castile, whose prestige and authority should have made
it immune from being dominated by particular family networks,
was significantly affected.
Material drawn from the genealogies of Valencia's inquisitors
reveals very strong traditions of service among certain families, in
part because the many unpaid positions (calificador, familiar) pre-
sented them with ways to become associated with the institution
even without service as salaried officials. After many years, a family
would eventually be able to secure a place for one of its members
on the tribunal itself and thus found a dynasty of inquisitors that
could reach all the way to the Suprema itself.
Slightly over 41 percent of the families of Valencia's inquisitors
could boast two or more individuals serving the Inquisition in some
capacity. In certain cases, like that of licentiate Pedro de Ochagavia
who served on the Valencia tribunal between 1649 and 1660, that
association was entirely through the familiatura. ' 3 In other families,
like that of licentiate Antonio de Ayala Verganza, where there was a
venerable tradition of intellectual friars, the association was primar-
ily through service as calificador or consultor, even though the
family could also boast several familiares among the nine members
who had served the Inquisition. Ayala Verganza himself had a very
successful career with the Inquisition which included service on
the Valencia tribunal (1643-1658) interrupted by a year in Madrid
where he worked directly for the Suprema, then promotion to
Granada, and finally appointment to the Suprema where he served
until his death in 1683. 74
The fact that 21 out of the 29 families with two or more members
serving the Inquisition had no other record of royal service may
indicate that the prejudice against inquisitors that we have seen
reflected in their inability to move into other areas of the bureau-
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cracy was also directed against their families. It is probably also
true that once a family entered the royal service through a particu-
lar channel, it continued making progress along the same route as
its best and most reliable connections tended to lie in that direc-
tion. This was particularly the case as employment opportunities
for law graduates tightened at the end of the sixteenth century,
placing a premium on personal contacts and influence in the strug-
gle for preferment.
Only a handful of these families, set apart from the others by
wealth and social distinction, were able to free themselves from
these constraints and place family members wherever they chose in
the royal bureaucracy. For this group, a judgeship on a provincial
tribunal or even on the Suprema itself was just another remunera-
tive public office among many options that the family could exploit
and not, as in the case of so many others, the most they could aspire
to after generations of effort. One of these families was that of
licentiate Salvador Mateo y Villamayor who served on the Valencia
tribunal from 1714 to 1720, first as fiscal and then as inquisitor.
Salvador was the youngest son of Dr. Lorenzo Mateo y Sans who
served as regent (president) of Valencia's Audiencia and then was
posted to Madrid as a member of the Council of Aragon. While in
Madrid, he married Mariana de Villamayor, whose father, Fran-
cisco de Villamayor, had been royal secretary under Philip IV and
whose brother, Jeronimo de Villamayor joined the Council of Cas-
tile in 1681. Salvador's younger brother, Lorenzo Mateo y Villa-
mayor, was a knight of Santiago and followed his maternal uncle to
the Council of Castile in 1706, while his half brother, Domingo
Mateo y Silva, served as a judge on the chancillena of Valladolid.
Finally, there remains the question of just how open the Inquisi-
tion was to applicants from marginal groups in Spanish society. This
is not a question that can be fully or satisfactorily answered from
the genealogies of Valencia's inquisitors, since the inquisitors serv-
ing on other tribunals would have to be considered as well as the
entire range of lesser offices, both paid and unpaid. Nonetheless,
our sample of Valencia's inquisitors, combined with other informa-
tion, may indicate certain trends.
In the entry requirements for the exclusive military orders as well
as in the brief vita et moribus that those who wished to take clerical
orders had to file with their superiors, the candidate had to demon-
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121
strate legitimate birth. ' ' Yet, it does not seem that illegitimacy was a
serious barrier to entering the ranks of Spain's honorable corpora-
tions, especially if the individual came of an aristocratic family. Some
of early modern Spain's most distinguished prelates were illegiti-
mate, including Valencian Archbishops Juan de Ribera, son of the
duke of Alcala, and Antonio Folc de Cardona, the illegitimate son of
the admiral of Aragon who served as archbishop of Valencia in
1710. As far as the military orders were concerned, it seems to have
been relatively easy, especially from the beginning of the seven-
teenth century, to obtain a papal dispensation that would allow the
applicant to enter the order in spite of his illegitimate birth. ' 9 Among
the inquisitors of Valencia, only two were of illegitimate birth,
licentiates Philippe de Haro and Pedro Pacheco Portocarrero.
The other marginal element represented among Valencia's in-
quisitors were the Judeo-Christians. This group comprised the In-
quisition's first victims, but their ambition, abilities, and desire to
assimilate brought many of them to seek entrance into honorable
corporations in spite of the proliferation of the purity of blood
statutes designed to exclude them. 80
The evolution of a typical converso family from exclusion and
discrimination to acceptance and integration may be illustrated by
examining the background of Dr. Francisco de Alarcon y Covarru-
bias, who served on the Valencia tribunal from 1636 to 1638. Fran-
cisco de Alarcon's maternal grandfather was none other than
licentiate Sebastian de Horozco, the brilliant author of the Can-
cionero, which gives such an incisive portrait of Toledan society in
the middle of the sixteenth century. During their lifetimes, Sebas-
tian de Horozco and his two sons, Juan de Horozco y Covarrubias
and Sebastian de Covarrubias Horozco, suffered many disappoint-
ments and much bitterness as a result of Sebastian de Horozco's
well-known Judeo-Christian background. In spite of receiving an
excellent legal education at the University of Salamanca when oppor-
tunities for letrados were increasing rapidly, Sebastian de Horozco
remained a humble attorney practicing law in his native city of To-
ledo while his fear of the outcome of the required genealogical inves-
tigation prevented him from even applying to join the elite
confraternities of San Miguel and San Pedro. 82 His son, Sebastian de
Covarrubias Horozco, who became canon of Cuenca and one of the
royal chaplains, failed when he attempted to become an official of the
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Cuenca tribunal in spite of his ability, literary attainments, and zeal
for the faith. Sebastian's second son, Juan, who ended his days as
bishop of one of Spain's poorest bishoprics (Guadix), had trouble
very early in his career when he tried and failed to enter the elite
Colegio Mayor of Oviedo. After a second defeat, in 1573, when the
commission that was carrying on an investigation into his qualifica-
tions for an official post on the tribunal of Toledo suspended its
investigations in light of the damaging evidence that had come to
light regarding his father, Juan made no further attempt to secure a
position requiring a purity of blood examination. 83
The intense frustration that their blighted career prospects must
have caused Juan and Sebastian embittered relations between
them and their father. But the next generation of the family was
destined to succeed where they had failed. Sebastian de Horozco's
daughter, Catalina, was fortunate enough to marry into the family
of Sebastian's wife, Mana Valero de Covarrubias, whose first
cousin, Diego, had been president of the Council of Castile. Her
husband, Diego Hernando de Alarcon, also joined the Council of
Castile after serving as a judge on the chancillena of Valladolid for a
number of years. Their eldest son, Fernando de Alarcon, was
granted a habito of Santiago after the personal intervention of King
Philip III forced the Council of the Military Orders to reverse its
original finding against him and undertake another investigation
aimed at obscuring the Horozco connection and playing up the
"purity" of the Old Christian Valero. 84 The younger son, Dr. Fran-
cisco de Alarcon y Covarrubias, succeeded his uncle Sebastian as
canon of Cuenca and in 1624 applied successfully to the Cuenca
tribunal for an official post, the very same position that his uncle
had failed to obtain in 1606. The genealogy that was executed for
him on this occasion notes approvingly that he held "mucha renta
eclesiastica" and that his father was a member of the Council of
Castile but says not a single word about the Judeo-Christian origins
of his grandfather, Sebastian de Horozco. 5
Insofar as the experiences of the Horozco may be taken as typical
of many ambitious and capable converso families who attempted to
enter the ecclesiastical or bureaucratic hierarchy, the pattern seems
to have been rejection, partial acceptance accompanied by much
bitterness and frustration, and then full integration, with the entire
process taking three or more generations. Integration took time and
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123
a reputation for orthodoxy, which in Sebastian de Horozco's case was
gained in part by literary sallies and verbal abuse of other Toledo
conversos. 86 But, judging from the families of Valencia's inquisitors,
successful integration necessarily implied linkage with families of
impeccable Old Christian background. The Old Christian side of the
family would have little trouble with genealogical investigations,
and their service on courts and councils would confer respectability
on the entire family, including its Judeo-Christian element.
As the previous discussion has implied, purity of blood was only
one element in making a family acceptable for posts of the highest
rank. Other elements were confirmed hidalgo status, a certain level
of income, political connections, education, and prior royal service
traditions. With its Old Christian element leading the way, a family
of mixed Old Christian, New Christian blood would eventually
acquire enough of those other elements to outweigh the "impurity"
of certain of its members and make the entire family acceptable
whatever the degree of consanguinity with a New Christian ances-
tor. This was certainly the case with the Horozco, whose powerful
Covarrubias/Alarcon connections provided the keys to respectabil-
ity for the family as a whole. Another example of a successful
"mixed" family is provided by the Venegas de Figueroa. Dr. Luis
Venegas de Figueroa served on the Valencia tribunal from 1636 to
1637 even though his earlier application to become an official of the
Cordoba tribunal had been rejected because of the reputed con-
verso origins of his grandmother, Teresa de Cordoba. The Venegas
de Figueroa family, however, were solidly Old Christian and re-
lated to the dukes of Feria, while a strong tradition of family service
to the Inquisition had been established by Antonio Venegas, in-
quisitor of Granada and member of the Suprema. The power and
prestige of these Old Christian relatives were enough to overcome
the "impurity" of the Cordoba connection and permit Dr. Luis
Venegas de Figueroa to have a career on the Inquisition in spite of
the negative testimony contained in his genealogical record. 8 '
On the whole, the ability of certain mixed blood families to place
family members on the Inquisition or the councils serves to under-
score the difficulties rather than illustrate the ease with which
conversos could attain high rank themselves. Only six out of the
seventy Valencian Inquisitors in my sample were reputed to have
Jewish ancestors, and in at least two of the six cases, the evidence is
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inconclusive. Many con versos, unable or unwilling to face the
risks, costs, and potential humiliations of the genealogical investiga-
tions that were an indispensable part of rising into the letrado
hierarchy may well have decided to content themselves with other
careers, more lucrative or more satisfying. Some became distin-
guished and highly paid lawyers without ever seeking judgeships,
some pursued careers as wholesale merchants and financiers, and
still others formed a solid group of small merchants and retailers.
Such a one was Sebastian de Horozco's good-natured contemporary
Baltasar de Toledo, who once declared "others have only one "con";
I have two: confectioner and converted Jew." 88
United by common social and geographic origins and an educa-
tion that emphasized rote learning and made use of shopworn
ideas, the inquisitors of Valencia formed a small part of the letrado
elite that set the tone for Spanish society during the Old Regime.
Conformity, both religious and cultural, a strong respect for profes-
sional and social hierarchy, and an exclusivism based on racial preju-
dice were the distinguishing characteristics of this group whose
inability to adjust to the sweeping changes going on in the rest of
Europe was a major factor in the decline of Spain. Ironically, the
letrado hierarchy's very success in largely excluding the Judeo-
Christians may have worked to their long-term benefit. Barred
from easy access to a political and administrative career by the
genealogical investigation, the Judeo-Christians were able to profit
from rapidly expanding opportunities in law and international com-
merce while remaining solidly entrenched in the city councils
where they could reap substantial profits from revenue collection
and local politics. By the early seventeenth century, of course, the
Old Christian letrado hierarchy itself was in deep trouble. Infla-
tion, new and burdensome royal taxes, and forced loans had bitten
deeply into salaries, and the administrative class with few excep-
tions shared in the social and political debacle they had done so
much to bring about. 89
In moving from an analysis of the social origins, education, and
careers of Valencia's inquisitors to a discussion of their comport-
ment while serving on the tribunal, one is immediately confronted
with the problem first raised by Lea. As he observed, inquisitors,
especially in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, had
great power of discretion in judicial proceedings and were the
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objects of veneration and even fear on the part of the public as a
whole. At the same time, there were few restraints on their con-
duct since it was perfectly true that even those convicted of malfea-
sance were given what amounted to a slap on the wrist in the form
of a fine or suspension followed usually by reappointment to an-
other post. 90
What, therefore, was to prevent a large number of inquisitors
from becoming like the corrupt and odious Diego Rodriguez
Lucero, inquisitor of Cordoba, whose excesses are so graphically
described by Lea? Part of the answer is provided in my analysis of
the lives and careers of a large cross-section of the men who sat on
the tribunal of Valencia. It reveals them to be very much like their
colleagues in other areas of the "letrado hierarchy," with similar
social origins and education generating a similar set of values and
producing a body of men whose attitudes toward their official re-
sponsibilities were certainly no worse than those of other royal
functionaries. Moreover, additional constraints on the behavior of
inquisitors were imposed by the instructions that regulated their
conduct and by societal expectations that were rather higher for
inquisitors than they were for other royal officials precisely because
of the importance that contemporaries came to attach to the office
and the awe in which they held it. As the jurats of Valencia once
said in a memorial to the Suprema, preserving public respect for
those serving the Holy Office was of the highest importance since it
alone was responsible for "defending the honor of Our Lord." 91
One of the most remarkable characteristics of the reign of Ferdi-
nand and Isabella (1474-1504) was their effort to control the elabo-
rate public administration that they created through a series of
detailed ordinances designed to guide the conduct of royal officials
and regulate the activities of government agencies. 92 As an integral
part of the new public administration, the Inquisition could hardly
be expected to be exempt from this wave of regulation. During the
reign of Ferdinand and Isabella alone, three major sets of "instruc-
tions" were issued (1484, 1488, 1500) which were designed to regu-
late the functioning of the provincial tribunals and establish a code
of conduct for inquisitors and officials. Of course, it will not be
contended here that these instructions and the supplementary regu-
lations and cartas acordadas are an infallible guide to the actual
comportment of inquisitors, but they did provide a standard known
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to the inquisitorial class as a whole against which the behavior of
colleagues could be measured.
Given the very wide latitude granted to the early inquisitors with
regard to the initiation of cases, and the potential for favoritism,
corruption, and abuse of power that the office carried with it, the
general thrust of both the early instructions and later cartas acor-
dadas was to attempt to create a body of inquisitors whose contacts
with the outside world were sharply limited and confined mainly to
members of the official class. Inquisitors and officials were prohib-
ited from accepting gifts of any sort (even food and drink) with a
value of one real or more and were required to pay for their food
and lodging and to avoid staying in the houses of con versos. 93
The inquisitors were warned especially to be careful to avoid any
public perception of them as biased in favor of or against any indi-
vidual or family on the basis of their social contacts. One of the
major arguments in Valencia's petition against retention of Dr.
Honorato Figuerola as inquisitor of Valencia was that as the scion of
a powerful local family, he might well ignore accusations against
members of his family or their allies and unduly magnify the impor-
tance of accusations made against their enemies. Furthermore, as
the petition went on to point out, the prestige of the Holy Office
depended on the respect in which its inquisitors were held, and to
maintain that respect it was essential that they should "not be well
known by the entire populace." 94 In recognition of the need to hold
the inquisitor aloof so as to increase his reputation for impartiality, a
carta acordada of May 25, 1610, ordered provincial inquisitors to
sharply curtail their private socializing and confine themselves
largely to the customary official visits. 95 If the image that the inquisi-
tor was supposed to present to the outside world was as the aloof,
incorruptible defender of the faith within the tribunal itself, he was
to act to promote harmony between himself and his colleagues as
any major disagreements would reduce the effectiveness of the
Holy Office. 96
In practice, of course, the ideals of behavior set forth in the
instructions were modified by broader social values and by human
nature itself. As an important representative of royal authority in
the kingdom, the inquisitor would be expected to carry on an
intense and varied social life and maintain a life-style appropriate to
his position. The closest associates of Inquisitor Gregorio de Mi-
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randa, for example, included the archbishop of Valencia (with
whom he dined lavishly and took promenades through the city),
Governor Luis Ferrer, several ciutadans and jurats, canons and
benefice holders of the cathedral, and the provincials of the princi-
pal monastic orders as well as a group of wealthy local merchants. 97
Apparently, puritanical demands for modesty and sobriety in dress
and life-style were far more acceptable to the monks and theolo-
gians who manned the tribunals in the early years than to the
university-trained letrados who replaced them during the sixteenth
. 98
century.
The day-to-day conduct of inquisitors was also conditioned by
the expectations and anxieties of Valencia's political and social elite,
especially those whose involvement with the legal profession
brought them into frequent contact with the tribunal. In such sensi-
tive matters as religious heresy or apostasy or in genealogical inves-
tigations whose outcome might well affect a family for generations,
what was desired above all was fairness and impartiality."
Judging by the results of the two visitations that have come down
to us almost intact, harmony among inquisitors and between in-
quisitors and the fiscal was sometimes difficult to achieve. The 1528
visitation revealed deep divisions between the two inquisitors,
licentiate Juan de Churucca and Dr. Arnaldo Alvertm, with the
former strongly backing his fiscal, Juan Gonzalez de Munibrega.
The conflict between the two inquisitors came down to a fundamen-
tal disagreement over the role of the Inquisition itself. The niceties
of legal procedure could safely be ignored if the tribunal's chief
responsibility was to struggle against the odious crime of heresy.
However, manv of the university-trained letrados who sat on the
tribunals felt compelled to conduct trials in a juridically respectable
manner that should offer some protection to the accused. An in-
quisitor like Dr. Arnaldo Alvertm, who took his judicial responsibili-
ties seriously, could not fail to come into conflict with a colleague
like Churucca, who tended to see himself much more as a prosecu-
tor of religious heresy than an impartial judge. Accused of "weak-
ness" and excessive "scruples and doubts" by Churucca and Gonza-
lez de Munibrega, Alvertm was forced to look on helplessly when
the fiscal remained present while witnesses verified their testi-
mony in clear violation of the instructions of 1498, browbeat de-
fense witnesses, and subjected accused persons who came to con-
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fess their errors to a round of questions designed to trap them into
making admissions of a still more damaging nature. In one impor-
tant case, in which Alvertm had made known his scruples as to the
degree of guilt, his colleagues waited until he was away from the
city before convening the consulta de fe and passing a death sen-
tence on the accused. 100
Instructions, ordinances, and cartas acordadas, the expectations
of local political elites, and the professional aspirations of the
letrado class as a whole provided the essential framework that
guided the conduct of the men who sat on the Valencia tribunal.
But different individuals would interpret the role differently de-
pending on personality, the possibility of advancement, and the
particular circumstances in which the inquisitor found himself at
the time of his service on the tribunal. What follows is not an
attempt to give the entire range of possible behavior but an attempt
to show how three men who served on the tribunal at widely
differing periods interpreted the role of provincial inquisitor and
thereby shaped the history of the tribunal.
Licentiate Bernardino de Aguilera (1562-1566) was virtually a
model inquisitor according to observers both inside and outside the
tribunal. A highly competent jurist with a reputation for impartial-
ity, he was proud of his position and would frequently work long
hours in the Inquisition's service even when seriously ill. 101 On one
occasion, when admonished by one of the tribunal's consultores to
take better care of himself, he replied that "God would give him
health because he was working in his service in order to strengthen
our Holy Catholic Faith." 102
Aguilera's exalted view of the dignity of the institution that he
served frequently meant that familiares who came before him on
criminal charges could easily find themselves denied benefit of a
confessor and forced to appear in a public auto de fe along with those
who had committed crimes against the faith. 103 Pride in his office as
inquisitor manifested itself in an insistence on being treated with all
the honor and deference that he felt was due someone in his posi-
tion. So touchy was he on matters of etiquette and the proper forms
of address that he once angrily tore up a petition from his own
colleague, Gregorio de Miranda, because it did not address him as
"Serior" or use other customary civilities, thus "failing to recognize
the authority and honor that is owed to my office." 104
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This proud and inflexible man entered the Inquisition's service
at one of the most difficult moments in its history. Beset by financial
problems, the Inquisition now had to confront a ruler who was far
less willing to tolerate its excesses than its predecessor had been. 105
Aguilera's refusal to recognize the changed situation and his insis-
tence on maintaining and even extending the tribunal's authority
and privileges in the face of it alienated many of its supporters and
led to a disastrous confrontation with royal officials.
Quick to grasp any opportunity to promote the tribunal's judicial
business and thereby increase its income from fees and fines during
a period of financial stringency, Aguilera appreciated the fact that if
the fuero could be extended to cover more people, their quarrels
and disputes would soon help to fill its coffers. The tribunal had
always had a few artisans attached to its service who would provide
essential services (i.e., repair of the jail or of buildings owned by
the tribunal) in return for enjoying the protection of the fuero.
During the first months of Aguilera's tenure, this handful was in-
creased to several dozen, and they were not only permitted to
enjoy the fuero but also to place the seal of the Inquisition above
their doors. It was this presumption even more than the potential
loss of judicial business that angered Micer Roche, a consultor and
judge on the Audiencia, who declared during the visitation of 1566
that "it seemed very wrong for persons holding such vulgar and
profane offices to put up the cross of the Holy Office. " 106 Even
Gregorio de Miranda became incensed over this desecration of the
Inquisition's symbols and ordered all the offending parties to re-
move the crosses.
The mid-sixteenth century was a period of great insecurity for
the kingdom because of the constant danger to the coasts posed by
Moorish pirates. Raids on Christian settlements occurred fre-
quently, while Christian and Moslem attacked each other's ship-
ping and took prisoners who were either enslaved or held for
ransom. The relatives of several officials were caught up in this
turbulent situation and had been languishing in captivity in Algiers
when Aguilera joined the tribunal in 1564. Determined to do some-
thing to help them even in the face of an almost empty treasury,
Aguilera adopted what must have seemed to him a fair and reason-
able expedient. Wealthy Valencians who were convicted of offenses
before the Inquisition were given heavy fines even for such minor
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crimes as blasphemy with the money to be used to ransom captive
members of official families. This policy was very much in accor-
dance with the rough sense of justice that characterized so many of
Aguilera's judicial decisions, but it did little to improve the deterio-
rating relations between the Inquisition and Valencia's political
elite and much to reinforce the general impression of arrogance
and insensitivity that was creating so much political opposition to
the tribunal. 108
Aguilera's worst defeat, however, occurred when he came into
conflict with the officials of the royal treasury in the kingdom. The
use of inquisitorial export licenses to send large quantities of goods
outside of the kingdom without paying the royal export duty had
been tolerated by the officials of Valencia's royal treasury unwill-
ingly and only because the protection that the Inquisition enjoyed
at court was so great as to outweigh merely financial considerations.
But by the early 1560s, the climate had changed, and Philip II had
begun a policy of seeking new revenues and tightening the lax
financial administration that he had inherited from his father. Out
of this new environment came the dispatch of visitors to the Bailfa
in December 1565 charged with reviewing the operations of that
institution and seeing if the customs could be made to produce
more revenue for the crown. It did not take the visitors long to
decide that the inquisitorial export license was little more than a
particularly flagrant form of smuggling, but there seemed little that
could be done about the situation until one of the Inquisition's
minor officials mistakenly opened a cargo he was escorting on the
request of customs officials. The merchandise was found to be con-
traband being sent to a private individual, and the Bailfa used the
incident to demand Peatge y Quema for all cargoes being shipped
under inquisitorial license. 109 After attempting unsuccessfully to
get this regulation removed by negotiation, Aguilera received or-
ders from the Suprema to defend the Inquisition's rights, so he
decided to place an interdict on all the patrimonial officials. 110 In
the past, ecclesiastical censures of this sort had proven devastating
weapons against a variety of opponents ranging from recalcitrant
city councils to royal officials, but this time the treasury officials,
encouraged by the court's desire to raise revenues, decided to
resist. In a dramatic gesture, which was calculated to have the
widest possible impact, they closed down the treasury office en-
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tirely, suspending both revenue collection and financial litigation.
The repercussions of this move were felt almost immediately in
Valencia and at court since the crown began losing tax money as
soon as it was introduced and the result was heavy pressure on the
Suprema to intervene with the Valencia tribunal. Within fifteen
days, Aguilera was forced to remove his interdict, thus accepting
the most humiliating defeat ever experienced by the Valencia tribu-
nal in its long struggle to establish its power in the kingdom. 111
Inquisitor Bernardino de Aguilera came to the Valencia tribunal
at one of the most critical moments in its history. Caught up in the
severe financial crises of the 1550s and 1560s, the tribunal also
faced worsening relations with the powerful royal Audiencia, while
a less favorable attitude at court meant that the Suprema could not
offer the same degree of political support it had in the past. As if
this were not enough, Aguilera's harsh sentences and heavy fines
had alienated an important sector of Valencia's local patriciate.
When the crisis came, he found himself virtually alone, and his
enemies on the BaiKa were able to devise an effective strategy with
the help of several of their colleagues who had also served as con-
sultores to the Holy Office and were therefore in a position to know
the real weakness of Aguilera's position. Aguilera lost his struggle
with the Bailfa, and the defeat strengthened the tribunal's enemies
in the kingdom who were already demanding reform at the Cortes
of Monzon in 1564. The result of all this pressure was the 1566
visitation and the Concordia of July 10, 1568, many of whose provi-
sions read like a specific condemnation of Aguilera's policies. 112
Juan Chacon y Narvaez, who began his service on the Valencia
tribunal in 1649 as fiscal and then was promoted to inquisitor in
1651, came from a family with strong aristocratic and military tradi-
tions. On his father's side, he was related to the Marquis of los
Velez. His mother was descended from Alonso de Salinas, who
served as royal treasurer during the reign of Henry II. His father,
Captain Juan Chacon y Narvaez, had served as a squadron com-
mander with the Sicilian galleys and in Flanders, for a total of
twenty-four years with the Spanish navy. In this, Juan was following
in the footsteps of his grandfather of the same name who had served
many years as commissary-general of cavalry in the Flanders
army. 113 The family military tradition must have weighed strongly
with Chacon y Narvaez himself, and after his own brother was
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killed in Naples, he threw himself into recruiting activities among
the peasants of Toledo where he was serving as vicar-general.
Aristocratic and military connections plus a rather aggressive per-
sonality proved beneficial to both Chacon y Narvaez and his superi-
ors after he was appointed fiscal to the Valencia tribunal in 1649.
Promoted to inquisitor in 1651, Chacon y Narvaez soon discovered
that because of the laxity of his colleagues, the archbishop's ordinary
had been allowed to completely usurp jurisdiction over bigamy.
Within the first two years of his tenure, he was able to reverse this,
and the tribunal was once again trying numerous bigamy cases. He
also infused new energy into the tribunal's attempts to recover lost
revenue and brought several important financial cases to a successful
conclusion with considerable benefit to the treasury. His aristocratic
name and contacts also proved highly useful to the tribunal during
this period of acute crisis in the Spanish empire when the govern-
ment's desperate search for money and troops led to the adoption of
several expedients (like the media anata) that would have been un-
thinkable earlier and placed all kinds of privileges in jeopardy.
Chacon y Narvaez's intervention with the aristocratic viceroys of
Valencia, which was aided by the fact that two of his relatives had
recently served in that capacity, was instrumental in preserving in-
tact the privileges and exemptions of both officials and familiares.
His interest in, and understanding of, military matters plus his legal
training and undoubted patriotism brought him to the attention of
Inquisitor-General Diego de Arce y Reynoso, who was always look-
ing for ways to make his inquisitors useful to the government. In
1651, the Castilian campaign to recover Catalonia from the French
was in full swing, but the military commanders were hampered in
their efforts to obtain reinforcements from the Kingdom of Valencia
by laws that prohibited her soldiers from serving outside its borders.
It was Chacon y Narvaez who, at the request of the inquisitor-
general, intervened with the Estates and got them to place Valen-
cian forces, then being assembled for action against the French-held
fortress of Tortosa, at the disposition of the marquis of Mortara who
commanded one of the two Castilian armies preparing to enter the
principality.
Until 1652, then, Chacon y Narvaez's career closely resembled
that of another Valencian inquisitor, Alonso de Salazar Frias, who
joined the Inquisition after serving as vicar-general in the diocese
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1.33
of Jaen. Like Chacon y Narvaez, Salazar Frfas was marked out as a
troubleshooter and given special assignments by the inquisitor-
general, but Salazar Frfas ended his days on the Suprema while
Chacon y Narvaez languished in obscurity on the lowly tribunal of
Cuenca. 5 Perhaps the best explanation of this paradox is to be
found in the description of Chacon y Narvaez's personality written
by his colleague, licentiate Antonio de Ayala Verganza, in Decem-
ber 1653. Ayala Verganza, whose views are especially valuable be-
cause they come from a man who became a member of the
Suprema and therefore reflect mainstream attitudes about the way
that an inquisitor should comport himself, gives us a picture of an
individual whose need to emulate his military and aristocratic fore-
bears was so great that he behaved in ways that were inappropriate
to his role as letrado and jurist. His exaggerated promises and open
partisanship of certain individuals with business before the tribunal
undertaken out of a misplaced desire to build an aristocratic-style
clientele created problems for the very persons that he was attempt-
ing to help, while he himself gained a reputation as a person of
dubious character — at once "presumptuous, boastful and crafty " 116
A number of persons who were taken in by Chacon y Narvaez's
promises found later that his grand manner masked a lordly indiffer-
ence to their fate and that their situation was inevitably made
worse, not better, by their involvement with him. Boasting loudly
and publicly that "he was the absolute owner" of the Inquisition
"and that he could do whatever he pleased with the cases," Chacon
y Narvaez soon found himself besieged with requests for help by
individuals with business before the Holy Office. 11 '
It was his involvement with the Linan, a wealthy and ambitious
family of converso origin, that destroyed his reputation and blighted
his once-promising career. In 1653, Dr. Juan Bautista de Linan, a
prominent member of the family and an influential local attorney,
applied to become a familiar. The genealogical investigation, which
had already begun, promised to be long and difficult and the out-
come in doubt because of the family's reputation. Juan Bautista's
nephew, Gabriel de Linan, ciutadan of Valencia, was particularly
anxious about his uncle's case because failure would inevitably cast
suspicion on the rest of the family and adversely affect his own
chances to obtain honorable offices.
Searching for some means of helping his uncle, Gabriel remem-
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bered that he had frequently observed Chacon y Narvaez hearing
mass in the chapel of the Carmelite monastery of San Felipe and
decided to approach the prior of the monastery. After giving him a
sympathetic hearing, prior Fray Juan de Espirito Santo introduced
him to Chacon y Narvaez, who professed delight at being able to
assist any fellow devotee of the Carmelites and promised to do
whatever was in his power to bring the genealogical investigation to
a successful conclusion. In the ensuing weeks and months, Chacon
y Narvaez obtained large sums of money from Gabriel de Linan and
his uncle which he claimed to have dispensed to the inquisitors and
officials of the Zaragoza tribunal who were carrying out part of the
investigation. He also demanded and received a loan of 1,000
reales and received numerous presents from the Linan family, al-
ways using the priors of the Carmelite monastery as his chief inter-
mediaries. In response to increasingly insistent questioning from
Gabriel and his uncle about the progress of the case, Chacon y
Narvaez would declare that it was only "a matter of a few days" or "a
few weeks" until it was successfully resolved. 118 At the same time,
he repeatedly approached Inquisitors Ayala y Verganza and Pedro
de Ochagavia on behalf of Juan Bautista in spite of several warnings
against doing so by his colleagues on the tribunal.
Taken in by the rosy promises, both Gabriel and his uncle were
foolish enough to boast about their future success, thereby publiciz-
ing the fact that Diego was presently undergoing a genealogical
investigation for entrance into the corps of familiares and heighten-
ing the sense of expectation. Meanwhile, Chacon y Narvaez was
flattering his own sense of self-importance by telling anyone who
would listen how much he had already done for the family and how
"difficult the case was. " Of course, the effect of all this publicity was
to make it virtually impossible for the inquisitors to decide in favor
of the Linan, since to do so would have exposed the tribunal to the
charge of favoring a family with known converso ancestry. As Anto-
nio de Ayala Verganza declared when he explained why he had
carried out an especially careful search of the tribunal's registers to
be sure that no member of the Linan family had been penanced for
heresy, "it was necessary to satisfy the public because of all the
malicious rumours about this case." 119 Inevitably, perhaps, Juan
Bautista's attempt to gain a familiatura was a failure, but, as the
saintly Fray Cristobal de Linan told his nephew Gabriel, even if he
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135
had succeeded, the family had already been thoroughly discredited
by Chacon y Narvaez's loose talk. 120
The Linan family had been taught a hard lesson, but Chacon y
Narvaez was not to escape unscathed. Complaints about his con-
duct had already reached the Suprema and an investigation was
ordered under the direction of his colleague, Ayala Verganza. After
it was over, Ayala Verganza wrote the inquisitor-general to record
his opinion that Chacon was "unfit for our ministry" and to recom-
mend that he be suspended from all inquisitorial functions for four
121
years.
We next encounter Chacon y Narvaez serving as inquisitor on
the Barcelona tribunal, a difficult assignment because of the hostil-
ity of the stiff-necked Catalans to this distinctively Castilian institu-
tion and the notoriously bad relations between the tribunal and
successive viceroys. Chastened by his experiences in Valencia, and
determined to restore his career to its former luster, Chacon y
Narvaez sought every opportunity to improve the tribunal's posi-
tion. Fortunately, the viceroy at the time was the marquis of Mor-
tara, who had good reason to be grateful to him for his assistance in
providing Valencian reinforcements for the army with which he had
reconquered the principality five years earlier. To gain additional
favor with the marquis, Chacon removed one of the chief irritants
in the relationship between the viceregal administration and the
tribunal. With full support from Inquisitor-General Diego de Arce
y Reynoso, Chacon assisted the viceroy in pacifying the valley of
Laret where gangs headed by familiars had gone on a rampage of
arson, murder, and robbery.
With the marquis's gratitude now assured, Chacon y Narvaez was
able to reach a formal agreement with him which fully guaranteed
Catalan familiares exemptions from quartering in time of war and
safeguarded their fiscal immunities. This agreement had been ea-
gerly sought by the Barcelona tribunal and went a long way toward
reviving the flagging prestige of the familiatura in Catalonia. The
marquis's good offices also proved useful when Chacon undertook
negotiations with the powerful and traditionally hostile Diputacion
over payment of the censos that had been allowed to fall into arrears
during the rebellion. After protracted negotiations, he was able to
reach an agreement that gave the tribunal an immediate payment of
28,000 ducats in principal and back interest and restored interest
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payments on its remaining censos. He was also able to recover con-
siderable sums owed the tribunal from its investments in ecclesiasti-
cal rents, which had also not been paid during the same period.
Within a very short time, these measures resulted in the complete
economic recovery of a tribunal whose officials had once been so
destitute that they had been forced to request aid from their col-
leagues in Zaragoza.
Chacon y Narvaez's agreement with the viceroy and the success
of his negotiations with the Diputacion earned him two separate
letters of commendation from the inquisitor-general plus an invita-
tion to Madrid. At this point, he must have felt that he had com-
pletely rehabilitated himself and that an appointment to a more
important and prestigious tribunal like Toledo or Seville was in the
offing, followed by promotion to the Suprema itself. He must have
been grievously disappointed when, instead, he received 400 duc-
ats and a transfer to Cuenca, undoubtedly the poorest and least
prestigious of all the tribunals. 122
Ambitious and energetic, corrupt yet loyal enough to his "cli-
ents" to risk his career on their account, Chacon y Narvaez was
surely one of the most complex individuals ever to sit on the Valen-
cia tribunal. His conduct in Valencia and its long-term impact on
his career provides an instructive lesson on the effectiveness and
significance of institutional constraints as a way of regulating an
inquisitor's behavior. At the end of the 1653 investigation, with his
guilt in the Linan case established beyond any doubt, Chacon was
given what must seem to the outside observer a rather mild punish-
ment. No effort was made to force him to return the presents or
bribes that he had taken (with the exception of a token 30 ducats),
and after less than four years' suspension, he received an appoint-
ment to the Barcelona tribunal. But, in spite of his obvious energy
and loyalty and in spite of his brilliant success in Barcelona,
Inquisitor-General Diego de Arce y Reynoso and the members of
the Suprema obviously felt that he was unfit for a more important
appointment. Only fifty-six in 1666, when a report detailing his
career was filed with the Suprema, he had already served the
Inquisition for almost twenty years and even from the relative
obscurity of Cuenca was able to perform extraordinary and valuable
services in discovering a network of thieves among prisoners in
Cuenca, Toledo, and Valladolid. Even the confessions of the cul-
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137
prits and the recovery of many thousands of ducats for the treasury
were insufficient to gain his superiors' complete confidence. His
indiscretion and excessive partisanship for his "clients" during his
tenure in Valencia had damned him in the eyes of his mainstream
colleagues whose watchwords were discretion and impartiality, and
Chacon y Narvaez was destined to remain in the relative obscurity
of a minor provincial tribunal while his old nemesis, Antonio de
Ayala Verganza, rose to become an important and well-respected
member of the Suprema.
One characteristic feature of Spanish Imperial administration as
it developed during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was
the effort to insulate royal officials from the rest of society. By
issuing regulations preventing individuals from engaging in busi-
ness transactions, borrowing or lending money, and establishing
strong local ties through marriage, it was hoped that the loyalties
and aspirations of lesser officials would be focused on pleasing their
superiors on the central councils and getting ahead within the bu-
reaucracy. Even though there were many variations, these regula-
tions continued to be applied to career bureaucrats (with greater or
lesser degrees of severity and effectiveness) because they were the
onlv wav to guarantee both impartiality in office and lovalty to the
123
crown.
These reflections about the nature of the Spanish bureaucratic
ideal have a direct bearing on the unique career of licentiate
Ambrosio Roche (also known as Roig). Roche's career was remark-
able in part because he spent all of it serving on the Valencia
tribunal. Since movement from one post to another was customary
within the Spanish bureaucracy and was done to discourage func-
tionaries from developing close relationships with local groups,
Roche's unusually long term of service in Valencia indicates his role
as a transitional figure whose task was to link the tribunal more
closely to politically powerful elements within the kingdom.
During Roche's forty-year term, there was an ongoing process of
decentralization and devolution of power throughout Hapsburg
Spain paralleling a resurgence of "clan and clientage systems,"
whether under the patronage of the great nobles, as in the crown
of Castile, or lesser men, as in the Kingdom of Valencia. To pre-
serve its power and authority, the tribunal had to align itself with
this process since it had already alienated a powerful section of the
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local elite through its earlier persecution of conversos and more
recently by supporting Madrid during the agitation over Padre
Simon. As a person with close ties to Valencia's regional political
elite, Roche was acutely aware of the tribunal's vulnerability and
the critical need to mend fences and build up a clientage system of
■ . ^„ r „ 124
its own.
The first step in restoring the tribunal's popularity in the king-
dom, therefore, was for it to take a less visible role in the suppres-
sion of the Padre Simon cult. This was a very serious problem
because, as the hearings that were held by the tribunal after the
arrival of Alonso de Salazar Frias revealed, neither Governor Fer-
rer nor any of the judges of the Audiencia had done anything to
prevent the rioting of March 3 even though they had received prior
warning. 125 The tribunal stood alone and Salazar Frias's aggressive
attitude toward members of Valencia's political elite who had sup-
ported the cult and failed to aid the Holy Office would not help to
mend fences. By March 9, 1620, the tribunal had drawn up a total
of twenty-one indictments against leading figures in Valencian po-
litical life. 126
After Salazar Frias's departure in summer 1622, however, Roche
let these cases drop, and in the end, the tribunal confined itself to
punishing a few small fry who took a prominent part in the rioting.
With the cult having died out in most of the kingdom by October,
Roche was free to turn his attention to rebuilding the Inquisition's
regional political base, even going so far as to ask the Suprema to
intervene before the Council of Aragon in favor of Pedro Rejaule,
an Audiencia judge who had gotten himself into trouble over his
involvement in the riots.
Pedro Rejaule and other prominent supporters of the Padre Si-
mon cult could be of considerable help in improving the tribunal's
relations with the provincial elite, but Roche was also well aware of
the fact that Jose del Olmo, one of his own notarios del secreto, was
the scion of one of the most powerful and successful families that
ever served the tribunal in an official capacity. Del Olmo's wealth,
connections, and status as a cavalier enabled him to play a key role
in defending the Inquisition's jurisdiction over familiares at the
Cortes of 1626. 12 To make even greater use of his influence, Roche
supported his request for the Suprema's permission to stand for
city office. 129 After having been duly elected jurat, del Olmo was
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139
able to intervene effectively with his colleagues to prevent the
tribunal's income from censals from being reduced by the city. 130
Such distinguished services earned him the gratitude of Valen-
cia's inquisitors and commendations from the Suprema, but Roche
was well aware that mere gratitude would not be enough to main-
tain the enthusiasm of an ambitious man like del Olmo. Given the
failure of official salaries to keep up with inflation and the limited
amount of business performed by the notaries, substantial material
rewards could only be made available to del Olmo by allowing him
virtually to monopolize genealogical work, which was the real
means of livelihood of the tribunal's notaries throughout much of
131
the seventeenth century.
Concerned with the need to maintain good relations with the
powerful del Olmo family, Roche went out of his way to throw
every bit of lucrative business their way. After receiver Melchor de
Mendoza died, del Olmo was permitted to act as interim receiver
for nine months until a successor was appointed. This proved a
valuable prize because the tribunal's accountant (contador) was ex-
tremely slow to audit the tribunal's accounts, and the receivers who
served in the 1630s had numerous opportunities to profit by their
offices by underreporting income, pretending that certain accounts
were uncollectable, and retaining monev for use in their business
affairs. 132
While performing their duties at the tribunal, both Jose del Olmo
and his son and successor, Jose Vicente del Olmo, were permitted to
wear hats instead of the berets that were normally prescribed for lay
officials. This special mark of distinction was greatly resented by the
other notarios del secreto since when they dared to wear their hats to
the tribunal they were immediately reprimanded by the inquisi-
tors. 133 Nevertheless, such marks of distinction seemed appropriate
for someone like Jose del Olmo because his political importance in
the city was steadily increasing. On February 8, 1636, for example,
he was selected for the influential post of justicia civil (head of Valen-
cia city's civil court of first instance). 134
The period of Roche's tenure on the tribunal (both as fiscal and
inquisitor) was a time when many members of distinguished and
politically important converso families made their way into the
ranks of the familiares or obtained posts as consultor or calificador.
Of course, this policy of relative openness to converso families as
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far as membership in the corps of familiares was concerned was
received by great hostility by many people in the city and kingdom
who had been nurtured on hatred and disdain for the converted
Jews by the very institution that now seemed so willing to admit
them to honorable positions. As a result, the tribunal's newfound
tolerance drew outraged protests, and several memorials were sent
to the Suprema denouncing the fact that Dr. Onofre Bartolome
Ginart was now being considered for a familiatura after having been
rejected some years earlier. Of course, as one of the memorialists
declared ruefully, things had changed; years ago, Ginart had been a
mere abogado, while now he had risen to become "one of the most
important members of the royal Audiencia." 135
The enemies of this new policy, which included people who
were in a position to know about the inner workings of the tribunal,
like notario del secreto Jaime Antonio Calafat, found an ally in
Julian de Palomares, who had been appointed notario del secreto in
December 1625. Palomares, who was soon to become a thorn in
Roche's side, made it his business to search out evidence against
con verso applicants. 136
Palomares's attitude to pretendientes with doubtful claims to
"purity of blood" was certainly not endearing him to Inquisitor
Roche, whose whole program was based on attracting the politi-
cally powerful even if he had to turn a blind eye to their obvious
converso origins. Roche's annoyance with Palomares and his eager-
ness to approve certain powerful converso pretendientes was re-
vealed in his letter to the Suprema of January 28, 1631. Here, he
reported that Palomares had filed objections to several recent candi-
dates for familiaturas and other quasi-official posts, including Pedro
Sanz, a prominent Audiencia judge whom Roche was particularly
eager to attract into the tribunal's service. After making a thorough
search of the tribunal's records, Palomares was able to turn up no
fewer than twenty-seven cases of relaxed or reconciled Judaizers
connected to the judge's family, including eight for the name Sanz.
Fiscal Juan de E spina Velasco (who was later accused by Palomares
of being notably unwilling to give credence to evidence that turned
up against families of pretendientes) reviewed the trial records
himself and gave as his opinion that Palomares's charges were with-
out foundation. Since Inquisitor Roche and his colleagues warmly
concurred with this assessment, they had gone ahead to swear in
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141
Judge Sanz as consultor extraordinario, but they were still faced
with the dilemma of whether to include Palomares's extensive
memoir in his file. Since the fiscal and inquisitors had already given
the judge a clean bill of health, "this would be done only to satisfy
Julian de Palomares's objections," so Roche proposed instead that a
simple statement be inserted in his genealogy to the effect that
"none of the cases alleged against Sanz affected the candidate."
Significantly, given Roche's stated convictions about the erroneous-
ness of Palomares's memoir, the Suprema was not prepared to go
quite that far and instead suggested that it might be better to say
that one of the cases turned up by Palomares "appeared to affect
the Sanz family." 137
But there was an even more direct way to align the tribunal with
the new tendencies in Valencian society — to make the jurisdictional
fuero and even the carcel de familiares itself into a safe haven for
gang members. In the late 1630s, both Audiencia and viceroy com-
plained repeatedly about the tribunal's consistent refusal to prose-
cute or properly punish familiares accused of gang-related criminal
offenses. 138 A glaring example of the way in which the tribunal would
seek to protect certain of the mafia-style gang bosses came when
Viceroy Fernando de Borja attempted to expel Jeronimo and Ramon
Anglesola from the kingdom because of their involvement in gang
warfare. Since both brothers were familiares, the tribunal did every-
thing within its power to prevent the viceroy's order from being
carried out. It was not until King Philip IV wrote personally to the
inquisitor-general that the impasse was broken and the tribunal was
compelled to remove its protection from the two familiares. 139
But inquisitorial protection of gang members did not end with
the use of the fuero. During Roche's tenure as senior inquisitor, the
carcel de familiares itself was transformed into a safe haven for
gangsters. In 1635-36, Alcalde Domingo Gonzalez Carrero and his
successor, Melchor £apata, were arrested and incarcerated after
Julian de Palomares and others had complained to the Suprema
about their scandalous management of the familiares prison. Sev-
eral imprisoned familiares were being allowed to carry both offen-
sive and defensive weapons and use the prison as a base of criminal
activity, leaving to commit contract murders in the dead of night
and then returning to the safety of their cells. For their part, the
inquisitors were well aware of at least part of this but did nothing to
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stop it, even though there were many people who saw the famil-
iares enter and leave their cells. 140
An even more flagrant example of the way gangster familiares
could make use of the Inquisition's precincts occurred in 1659. Jose
de Espinosa, a gang leader who had been threatened with death by
his powerful enemy, Audiencia judge Arquer, used a room in the
inquisitorial palace itself as a hideout, paying rent as if he were at
an inn. 141
When Roche died in September 1647, leaving a small estate to
be administered by his colleague, Pedro de Herrera y Guzman, the
tribunal that he had led for so long had emerged from its early
seventeenth-century crisis with its privileges largely intact. The
familiatura had been enlarged and had recovered some of its former
splendor with the addition of many new cavaliers and ciutadans
even if their racial purity was somewhat doubtful and Inquisition
and Audiencia had reached a new modus vivendi with the inclusion
of several judges as consultores. 142 But in terms of Roche's own
career, the price that he paid for this success was high. In a bureau-
cratic system whose ideal was a kind of platonic detachment (how-
ever much this ideal might have been violated in practice), he had
been forced to become too closely identified with the local elite and
its aspirations for power and social distinction. It is this fact, proba-
bly more than his often-expressed love for the Kingdom of Valen-
cia, that explains his forty years of service on the tribunal.
One notable fact that emerges is the overwhelming preponder-
ance of Castilians and the small, almost insignificant number drawn
from the Kingdom of Valencia. Almost exactly the opposite can be
said about the corps of officials, who, with the single exception of
the fiscal (probably soon to be promoted to inquisitor) were very
largely men drawn from the kingdom and district and, as time went
on, from Valencia city itself. In my sample of 28 officials extending
from 1578 to 1744, 17 of the 22 whose place of birth is known were
born in the inquisitorial district and 13 of these in Valencia city. By
the mid-seventeenth century, recruitment of officials had become
so concentrated in the capital that residents of the district who
wished to enter the corps were almost obligated to marry into an
urban family and become established in the city before they could
apply. Lorenzo del Mor, who came to the city from Rubielos de
Mora, a village near Teruel, around the turn of the sixteenth cen-
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M3
tury, married twice in Valencia city and became a familiar in 1619
some twenty years before he applied for and obtained the post of
receiver on the tribunal. 143 Lorenzo's move to Valencia city and his
highly responsible position on the tribunal raised his family from
the relative obscurity of the village notable. His son, Dr. Carlos del
Mor, became an Audiencia judge while strengthening his ties with
the tribunal by marrying Fausta Tafalla, whose father, Miguel, was
a ciutada and familiar and whose uncle, Calixto, was familiar and
depositario de pretendientes. Before attaining his judgeship, Car-
los del Mor served as abogado de presos, and his son, Jose Carlos
del Mor, succeeded his grandfather Lorenzo as receiver in 1653. 144
In spite of the obvious differences in the geographic origins of
officials and inquisitors, the social composition of each group ap-
pears generally similar — with one important exception. Among the
parents of our officials, Jose de Esplugues y Palavicino, knight of
Montesa and baron of Frignestany, whose son Joaquin Palavicino
became secretary in 1733, was the only titulo. 145 At the other end of
the spectrum, only two officials, Juan del Olmo, who was to be-
come the founder of the tribunal's most powerful official family, and
Dr. Onofre Salt came from the sturdy labrador stock that also pro-
vided Valencia with a few inquisitors. The overwhelming majority
of the remaining officials came from exactly the sort of background
as the bulk of the inquisitors: the middling nobility of cavaliers and
ciutadans. Among the parents of these officials, fully 56 percent
were from the middling nobility, although, in part, this was the
result of a process of social mobility between the generations. At
the same time, the bourgeoisie, so conspicuously lacking among
the inquisitors, was well represented among officials, with 37 per-
cent of parents coming from professional and mercantile strata. The
fundamental similarity in the social origins of inquisitors and offi-
cials gave to the staff of the tribunal as a whole a certain uniformity
of outlook that was reflected in the treatment of certain types of
deviants or certain classes of prisoners, especiallv the converted
Jews. 146
In spite of a clause in the 1498 instructions that prohibited the
relatives of inquisitors or officials from being appointed to serve on
the same tribunal, the hereditary transmission of official posts be-
came acceptable at an early date. 147 In 1558, for example, Juan de
Oiiate, the tribunal's longtime jailor, requested permission to pass
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his office on to his son, Miguel Angel de Onate. The Suprema duly
approved his request, but in this case at least, the transfer was not
accomplished peacefully as Juan made a remarkable recovery from
the illness that had afflicted him and demanded the office back.
When his son refused to relinquish it, his father conceived such a
violent hatred for him that he attempted to besmirch his reputation
by writing letters to the inquisitors which were sharply critical of
his management of the jail. 148
Another way in which officials' posts were passed on was by
incorporating them into a dowry. As early as 1554, Pedro Sorell,
who was more than 70 years old, wished to retire after forty-five
years of service as notario del secreto. Since his post was not one of
the plazos de asiento with generous (if seldom used) retirement
provisions, he asked the Suprema to make provision for his old age
by permitting his new son-in-law, Miguel Bellot, a local notary, to
assume his office and live in the house that had been assigned to
him on condition that he remain in the house so that his daughter
could take care of him. Sorell's position was accompanied by a
letter of support from Valencia's inquisitors, who were so confident
the Suprema would grant his request that they were already using
Bellot's services. 149
Over a period of several generations, the families associated with
the tribunal through officeholding tended to divide themselves
roughly into two kinds: a core group who generation after genera-
tion occupy the same official posts and a much larger group whose
connections with the tribunal were less constant but nonetheless
formed an important and respected part of the family tradition. The
fortunes of the core group were very closely associated with the
Inquisition, and they were the first line of defense when the pres-
tige of the Holy Office was at stake or its privileges threatened by
viceroy, Audiencia, or city. The second group, which was no less
important to the survival of the tribunal, provided wider, more
diverse support. Even if a family member had held an official post
in the distant past, the basis for a relationship of mutual trust with
the core families had been laid, and in this tense and often violent
little society, a shared interest in and demonstrated loyalty to the
Inquisition could often provide the basis for business, political, or
marital relations.
The del Olmos were probably the best known of all the Valencia
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145
tribunal's core families, both because of their extraordinary record
of continuous service and the literary attainments of certain family
members. 150 In 1750, when Vicente Salvador y del Olmo sent the
Suprema a memorial relating his family history, he was the sixth of
his line to occupy the post of secretary and his family had served
the Holy Office for 172 years.
As related in the memorial, the saga of the del Olmo family
began inauspiciously enough with the arrival of Juan del Olmo from
Aragon sometime in the mid- 1560s. Juan, who came of humble
labrador stock on both sides of the family, was born in Monton, a
village near Calatayud. Like Miguel Bellot, Juan del Olmo first
attached himself to the Inquisition's service through the practice of
allowing serving officials to include their posts in the dowries of
their marriageable daughters. In 1578, after marrying sixteen-year-
old Madalena Onate, Juan del Olmo became alcalde de las carceles
secretas, a post that had been occupied by her father Miguel Angel
de Onate and her grandfather Juan de Onate y Churruca since
1540. Not content with the lack of status and the poor salary of the
post of jailer, Juan del Olmo must have picked up the rudiments of
the notary's trade sometime between 1578 and 1583 when he was
appointed notario del secreto. 151
It was under Juan del Olmo's son and successor, Jose (from
1609), that the family became firmly established among Valencia's
ruling elite. Jose del Olmo became a cavalier, served repeatedly as
jurat for the class of the nobility, represented the city in the Cortes,
held the lucrative contract to supply meat to the city, and capped
his career in municipal government by becoming justicia civil.
Jose del Olmo was succeeded by his son, Jose Vicente del Olmo,
in 1629, although he actually continued to serve his office until the
late 1630s at least. Jose Vicente, who served until 1669, was once
accused of taking prohibited books out of the secreto to read at
home and proved to be the intellectual of the family. It is to Jose
Vicente that we owe one of the best and most complete accounts of
an auto de fe (Madrid, 1680) as well as his Nueva description del
Orbe, a work dedicated to King Charles II. 152 By this time the
family had become so privileged that Jose Vicente was paid his full
salary from the time he retired until his death in 1696. 153 Jose
Vicente was succeeded by his son, Vicente, whose daughter, Isabel
Maria, carried the office of secretary with her when she married
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Inquisitors and Officials
Jose Salvador y de Leon whose great-grandfather, Francisco Jero-
nimo de Leon, had been a member of the Council of Aragon.
Finally, the author of the memorial, Vicente Salvador y del Olmo,
succeeded Jose in 1742 after his father died of a severe illness one
year earlier. 154
The Salvador y de Leon were a very good example of one of
these "peripheral" families that were sometimes drawn into a more
direct relationship with the tribunal through marriage into a "core"
family Jose Salvador y de Leon, who became secretario del secreto
in 1719 after his marriage to Isabel Maria del Olmo, came from
"one of the oldest and most aristocratic" families in San Mateo. At
the time of Jose's marriage, the Salvador y de Leon family's connec-
tion with the Holy Office was no more recent than Jose's great-
great grandfather, Francisco Jeronimo de Leon, who served as con-
suitor when he was a judge on the Audiencia. However tenuous
this connection with the Inquisition may appear, the fact that it
involved a revered ancestor (Francisco Jeronimo de Leon eventu-
ally became a member of the Council of Aragon) was sufficient to
inspire Jose himself to forge a relationship with a "core" inquisito-
rial family like the del Olmos and seek a position with the tribunal
in an age when choices about careers and marriage partners tended
to be dictated more by family tradition than individual choice. 155
The fact that many official posts (even down to the porters)
tended to be held by the same family or group of families for many
generations could make life very difficult for the newcomer, espe-
cially if he proved willing to challenge the stranglehold that certain
of the better-established officials had over the more lucrative kinds
of business. It was precisely this sort of situation that led to the
murder of Julian de Palomares.
Appointed notario del secreto in 1625 after several years of ser-
vice on the tribunal of Cuenca, Palomares arrived at a time when
ordinary officials would need either private means or substantial
additional income from tribunal-related business to support them-
selves, as special royal taxes, pensions paid to widows of officials,
and the Suprema's own financial problems caused it to be very
difficult to make appointments at full salary. 156 Palomares, there-
fore, like so many others appointed at the time, only had what
amounted to half the salary and maintenance normally accorded to
someone of his rank. This shortfall in salary plus the need to sup-
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Inquisitors and Officials
147
port an aged mother and three children made it imperative for him
to obtain additional income from performing the lucrative genea-
logical investigations that were fast becoming the chief business of
the tribunal. 157
Genealogical investigations, and the power and influence that
the right to perform them could confer, were a jealously guarded
preserve of Jose del Olmo, whose status as a cavalier and growing
influence in the city and the Cortes made him a key figure in
Inquisitor Ambrosio Roche's plans to defend the tribunal from its
political enemies. In the face of strong opposition by Jose del Olmo,
Palomares's efforts to gain extra income from performing genealogi-
cal investigations were of little avail. First, Inquisitor Roche and
del Olmo tried to discourage him by forcing him to accept 15 rather
than 20 reales per day in living expenses while he was in the
field. 158 When this failed, del Olmo, who had charge of paying the
other notarios for their work, delayed issuing the payment orders
for as long as several months in the hope that Palomares's growing
financial problems would force him to resign. 159
Palomares, however, refused to give in to this pressure and de-
cided to appeal to the Suprema. In response to his letters to Ma-
drid describing the situation and pointing out that on the other
Aragonese tribunals genealogical investigations were shared out
equally among the notaries, the Suprema responded by demanding
that the same policy be instituted in Valencia. Inquisitor Roche
chose to ignore this order, however, and sent an ambiguous reply
intimating that not all of the tribunal's notaries were "suitable" for
genealogical investigations and declaring that such an equal distri-
bution of work would be an innovation. To prevent Palomares from
learning about this letter, Roche made sure that it was not copied
into the official letter book, which was open to inspection by all
officials with access to the secreto. 160 In the meantime, the tribunal
continued to ignore the Suprema's demands for equity in the distri-
bution of genealogical work. 161
Infuriated by his worsening economic circumstances and the
stubborn opposition of Roche and del Olmo, Palomares decided to
send a detailed memorial to the Suprema which would expose all
the corrupt practices on the tribunal, from Roche's protection of his
nephew, former receiver Melchor de Mendoza whom he accused of
embezzlement, to the theft of prohibited books from the tribunal
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Inquisitors and Officials
storehouse. Less than one month later, on November 18, 1636, the
Suprema formulated a strongly worded memorandum demanding
that the tribunal immediately remedy the most serious problems,
particularly the failure to take the accounts of the two previous
receivers, Melchor de Mendoza and Jose del Olmo, the bribery and
corruption that was becoming such a strong part of the genealogical
investigations, and the inequities surrounding the sharing out of
genealogical work among the notaries. 162
Emboldened by his success with the Suprema, Palomares
stepped up his campaign against his two worst enemies on the
tribunal, del Olmo and fiscal Juan de Espina Velasco. Sometime in
early July 1637, he sent yet another memorial to the Suprema
complaining specifically about his problems with Espina Velasco
and del Olmo while at the same time moving to block efforts by
two of the del Olmos's close associates to obtain familiaturas.
Made desperate by the possible loss of their income from genea-
logical investigations and already in trouble with the Suprema be-
cause of Palomares's earlier memorial, Espina Velasco and del
Olmo began to threaten Palomares openly. Palomares, who had
already been the victim of one murder attempt in March 1629, was
extremely worried about this and had begged the Suprema at the
end of his 1636 memorial not to allow anyone on the tribunal to find
out about it since "they would have him murdered by the men that
are called 'jornalaros.' " 163 Given Palomares's penchant for calling
attention to himself and the fact that the other notaries had either
been cowed or driven away, it was not difficult for Espina Velasco
and del Olmo to figure out who was the author of the memorials.
On the morning of July 20, 1637, a violent scene took place be-
tween the three men in which the fiscal threatened to smash
Palomares's skull with a paperweight and Palomares was forced to
draw his sword to escape. Little more than five months later, Julian
de Palomares was found murdered, the victim of a conspiracy in-
volving the del Olmos (both Jose and Jose Vicente del Olmo were
arrested by the Audiencia but later released) and a disgruntled
pretendiente closely associated with them. 164
The Suprema's failure to see that its orders regarding the equal
distribution of genealogical business were carried out and its even
more glaring failure to order a formal visitation after receiving
Palomares's damning memorial must give pause to those who would
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Inquisitors and Officials
149
accept uncritically Lea's dictum that "from a comparatively early
period the control assumed by the Suprema over the provincial
tribunals was absolute." 165 While this was certainly true with regard
to the conduct of heresy trials, it may be argued that the heresy trials
themselves were of less and less importance to local officials as their
number and the potential income from confiscations decreased. In
the seventeenth century, what was really important to the tribunal
notaries was the genealogical investigation with its lucrative fee
schedule, and here the Suprema failed entirely in its campaign to
keep the bulk of these investigations in the hands of local comi-
sarios. 166 In this increasingly important area of the tribunal's activity,
at least, the Suprema was the victim of the disaggregation and decen-
tralization that was fast becoming the dominant tendency in Spanish
public administration. 16 ' Certainly, from the hearings into the
Palomares case that were held just after his death, the overwhelming
impression is of a group of officials who felt that Palomares got what
he deserved for having violated the "secrecy" of the tribunal. But the
secrecy referred to was not the traditional need to maintain confiden-
tiality about heresy proceedings; it was the all-important need to
prevent the Suprema from gaining knowledge about the day-to-day
workings of the tribunal. After all, Palomares's worst crime, accord-
ing to Diego Jeronimo Minuarte, the tribunal's new receiver, was
that he "informed Madrid about everything that happened on the
tribunal." 168
The murder of Palomares and the release of Jose and Jose
Vicente de Olmo, who were briefly imprisoned on suspicion of
having perpetrated it, indicates the vast change in the relationship
between inquisitors and officials from the early years of the Spanish
Inquisition to the seventeenth century. The clerkly bureaucracy, or
at least certain of its members, had evidently managed to carve out
independent positions for themselves and had become an impor-
tant part of Valencia's local political elite. For the tribunal, which
had been losing ground politically since the mid-sixteenth century,
men like del Olmo were essential, and neither provincial inquisi-
tors like Roche nor even the Suprema had the will or the desire to
punish them for their misdeeds. Paternalism and protection up and
down the chain of command had become the fundamental organiz-
ing principles of an institution that had entered into a long and
inexorable process of decline.
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But paternalism and protection did not lead to rampant corrup-
tion or massive abuse of power. Whatever the weakness of the
formal constraints on their conduct, inquisitors and officials were
part of a bureaucracy that imposed significant social and moral
constraints on its members. However much he may have tolerated
the dishonesty of others, Ambrosio Roche was never accused of
peculation himself, and his career and estate bear all the hallmarks
of selfless devotion to the institution he revered. Besides, loyalty
and conformity and not honesty or even efficiency were the ideals
of the self-serving and self-perpetuating bureaucratic elites of the
later Hapsburg era. The inquisitors and officials of the Valencia
tribunal were typical members of that bureaucracy, and whatever
the conflicts they may have had with one another, they shared a
belief in the Holy Office as the first and most important line of
defense of the social and religious values common to Spain's Old
Christian ruling elite.
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The Familiares and Unsalaried
Officials
The unpaid lay and clerical assistants — familiares, notarios, and
comisarios — spread the influence of the tribunals throughout their
sprawling districts, but the role they played in the repression of
heresy or other offenses has frequently been misunderstood, and
their political importance to an institution that was in constant
conflict with powerful enemies has been largely overlooked. The
origins of the familiares, like many of the other institutions charac-
teristic of the "modern" Inquisition established by Ferdinand and
Isabella, lay with the medieval Inquisition, which permitted its
inquisitors to surround themselves with armed guards as they trav-
eled from place to place. 1 During the High Middle Ages, when the
Inquisition became established in Aragon, the priors and senior
members of the Dominican order who acted as inquisitors made
use of young professed monks of the Third Dominican order to
assist them in a variety of tasks involving the arrest and transporta-
tion of prisoners. As a consequence of their close personal associa-
tion with the inquisitors, these individuals became known as famil-
iares. 2 In the late fifteenth century, when the modern Spanish
Inquisition was established, this title continued to be used even
though the group was now composed almost entirely of secular
individuals, many of whom never came in direct contact with an
inquisitor because they lived in remote areas of one of the inquisito-
rial districts.
The transformation of the familiares from a small group of young
151
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The Farniliares and Unsalaried Officials
Dominican monks who were occasionally called on to assist their
superiors to a much larger group composed primarily of laymen
distributed in hundreds of towns and villages throughout the coun-
try involved the beginning of important new social and political
responsibilities. But exactly what this new role entailed and how it
changed during the course of the Old Regime remains a subject of
considerable confusion among Inquisition scholars. Even the num-
ber of farniliares in a given district cannot easily be established be-
cause of the notorious unwillingness of provincial inquisitors to fur-
nish the Suprema, or local authorities, with lists of the farniliares. 3
Typical of this obstructionism was the Valencia tribunal's reply to the
Suprema's demand for a list of farniliares to be drawn up by the
district's comisarios in 1630. After claiming that appointments were
being made strictly in accordance with regulations, the tribunal
declared that complying with the Suprema's request would be a
time-consuming and difficult task for only seven commissioners to
handle and that an accurate assessment of the tribunal's corps of
farniliares could only be gained if the commissioners were also
charged with providing information about the population of all the
places in their area, even those that did not contain farniliares. 4 As a
result, it was not until 1697, some sixty-seven years later, that the
Suprema finally received the comprehensive list it had demanded.
The tribunal's extreme reticence about divulging information
concerning the number and distribution of farniliares combined
with the rudimentary nature of its own record keeping during the
first eighty years of its existence make it virtually impossible to
estimate the numbers of farniliares in the district before the visita-
tion of 1567. What is evident from other sources is that contempo-
rary observers, especially the representatives of the royal adminis-
tration in the kingdom, felt that the total was too high. As early as
February 1551, the president of the royal Audiencia sent a stinging
letter to court demanding that the number of farniliares be reduced
sharply. This letter might well have been ignored, but the atmo-
sphere at court had undergone profound changes since Prince Phil-
ip had taken charge of the government of the kingdom, and even
Inquisitor-General Valdes could no longer ignore the demand for
reform. 5 On March 12, 1551, Valdes brusquely ordered the tribu-
nal to reduce the number of farniliares to 100 in Valencia city, with
corresponding reductions and limitations in the towns and villages
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The Familiares and Unsalaried Officials
153
of the district. All commissions were revoked, reappointments
were to be made with great care, and new commissions were to
carry the signature of both inquisitors and were to be limited in
duration with the names to be sent to the Suprema. 6
Several weeks later, the tribunal vigorously protested Valdes's
order, claiming that because of the large number of Moriscos in the
kingdom and the protection that was being afforded them by power-
ful nobles, even 500 would be too few for Valencia city "since
without numerous familiares the alguacil would be unable to carry
out his orders. " Under increasing pressure from Philip, who had
taken a personal interest in the wave of complaints about famil-
iares, Valdes could not retreat (much as he might have wanted to),
and he insisted that the provisions of his March 12 letter be put into
effect without delay. This appears to have been ignored; but finally
on March 10, 1552, Valdes wrote again, this time offering to com-
promise on a figure of 200 familiares for Valencia city. 8 Evidently
this was acceptable to the tribunal, because it was the figure agreed
on in discussions that were held between Inquisitors Miranda and
Arteaga and acting Viceroy Juan Lorenzo de Villarrasa in spring
1552. In his letter to the Suprema informing it of these negotiations
(which had been undertaken without its knowledge or permission),
Inquisitor Arteaga indicated that the problem of excessive or un-
manageable numbers was being taken care of by the two inquisitors
themselves on their visitations to the district. His colleague, Grego-
rio de Miranda, had already regulated the number of familiares in
the important Jativa/Alcira area, while Arteaga himself proposed to
do the same thing on his upcoming visit to Tortosa. 9 Two hundred
appears to have been the number actually serving in Valencia city
at this period, since in a letter commenting on a criminal assault in
which familiar Antonio Pastor was badly wounded, he was termed
"one of those names in the list of 200" that presumably had been
furnished the viceroy at the conclusion of the earlier negotiations. 10
In spite of the evident willingness of Inquisitors Arteaga and
Miranda to accommodate themselves to the increasing pressure
from court, the situation was still far from satisfactory, and the
matter was taken out of their hands when the Suprema and the
Council of Aragon together ratified the Concordia of May 11,
1554. 11 According to this agreement, the number of familiares in
Valencia city was to be reduced from 200 to a maximum of 180;
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154
The Familiares and Unsalaried Officials
towns of more than 1,000 households were to have eight; those of
500 to 1,000 were to have six; and in those of 200 to 500, there
could be no more than four unless they were located on the border
or had ports, in which case, they could have two additional famil-
iares. Villages with less than 200 households could have a maxi-
mum of two familiares.
After 1554, concern over the actual number of familiares in the
district seems to have given way to a preoccupation with abuse of
the special fuero or jurisdiction that the Holy Office exercised over
them. While complaining long and loud about abuses of the fuero,
the Cortes of 1563-64 said nothing about the question of numbers,
and the Concordia of July 10, 1568, merely called on the tribunal to
observe the provisions of the 1544 document, in spite of the fact
that the visitation of 1567 had revealed substantial violations. 12
From now on, the number of familiares would depend primarily on
demand for the office, and that, in turn, was a function of the
economy, the family tradition, the prestige of the tribunal, and the
benefits, whether pecuniary or otherwise, that membership in the
corps could bring.
Inquisitor Soto-Salazar's 1567 visitation of the district revealed a
total of 1,638 familiares, of which some 183 corresponded to the city
of Valencia itself. 13 As far as Valencia city is concerned, numbers
throughout the latter part of the sixteenth century were at or close to
those permitted in the Concordia. In 1575, the account book of the
familiares confraternity revealed 178 familiares. 14 In 1591, according
to a letter sent to the Suprema some twelve years later, the tribunal
could boast 173, with 12 additional applicants making a total of 185,
or 5 more than that permitted in the Concordia. 15
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, official lists are
scarce. Thus, to draw any meaningful conclusions about the size of
Valencia's corps of familiares, we must rely on a combination of
official lists that are available and the names that can be gleaned
from the genealogical examinations that were required for new
entrants. During the seventeenth century, the picture is one of
gradual decline in both the city and the district. I was able to find a
total of 1,522 names of familiares serving in the district for the
entire century plus some 275 for Valencia city. This is considerably
lower than the number serving in the year 1567, but it is only an
estimate and probably understates the actual totals by a substantial
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The Familiares and Unsalaried Officials
155
margin. It would also appear that the number serving during the
first half of the century was considerably greater than the number
serving at the end. The official list of 1602, which covered only the
dioceses of Segorbe and Tortosa in the northern part of the district,
indicated that out of 66 places registered, all but 14 had lost famil-
iares, but 9 of the 14 had actually increased their number. ' In fact,
some five years earlier, the governor of one of these places,
Castellon de la Plana, had written to the Suprema to complain that
there were 15 familiares in his town instead of the 8 permitted by
the Concordia. 1 In the city of Valencia, the 1619 list that was
furnished to the viceroy contained the names of 161 serving famil-
iares, while the list presented in 1623 had 168 names — only 15
fewer than the census of 1567. As late as 1651, there were still 389
familiares, with 111 in Valencia city, but by the end of the century,
numbers had declined substantially, and the official list that the
tribunal furnished the Suprema in 1697 indicated a total of only 162
familiares for the entire district with 29 serving in Valencia city. 20
During the first half of the eighteenth century, there appears to
have been a sharp recovery in the numbers of serving familiares,
reaching a peak in 1748 with 356. By 1806, however, the number of
familiares had fallen to only 157. 21 The tribunal could also rely on a
network of priests, who served as notaries, and commissioners who
were in many ways more useful to the tribunal because they could
interview witnesses and informants. Furthermore, of the 386 nota-
ries in the sample, 201 belong to the eighteenth century, indicating
an upswing in interest and support for the Holy Office among the
clergy precisely at the time when the corps of familiares was static
or declining. This trend is also mirrored in the figures for Valencia
city — 64 out of 86 notaries served in the eighteenth century. The
evolution of the commissioners tended to follow that of the famil-
iares. Of the total of 177, 128 served during the seventeenth cen-
tury and only 49 during the eighteenth. 22
One principal goal the architects of the Concordias of 1553-54
attempted to achieve was to create a balanced network of familiares
that should cover the entire territory of a district and provide the
basis for the policy of "christianization" that was to consume so
much of the Inquisition's time and attention during the latter half
of the sixteenth century. 23 In reality, however, the geographic distri-
bution of Valencia's familiares corresponded much more to the
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156
The Familiares and Unsalaried Officials
accidents of geography and climate and the distribution of wealth in
the kingdom, since the costs of the genealogical investigations that
became a requirement for admission to the corps excluded those
without a certain amount of discretionary income.
Taking these factors into account, it is hardly surprising that our
map (fig. 1) reveals Valencia's familiares thickly clustered along the
coastal lowlands and spread thinly in the interior, especially in the
areas that had been the heartland of Morisco Valencia (Sierra de
Espadan, Vail de Uxo, Muela de Cortes, Cofrentes), regardless of
the ideal distribution pattern as set forth in the Concordia. Concen-
tration in the huerta zone even appears to have increased in the
eighteenth century (fig. 2). The nine largest huerta towns, Cast-
ellon, Villareal, Burriana, Sagunto, Puzol, Catarroja, Rusafa, Gan-
dia, and Valldigna, had 137 familiares in the seventeenth century
sample, or 9 percent of the total, and 125 familiares, or 16.5 per-
cent in the eighteenth century.
Apart from a favored location on the coastal plain, the participa-
tion of a town or region in the production and sale of a commercial
crop could spell prosperity, even as in the case of Morella, which
was located deep in the interior. Morella was called the "granary of
the kingdom" in the seventeenth century, and even though the
falling prices at the end of the century resulted in a crisis for local
landowners, it still had enough wealthy labrador families to provide
the tribunal with a total of seventeen familiares. 24 Sagunto, a port
town located between Valencia and Castellon de la Plana, was an-
other place that benefited from handling a commercial crop grown
in its immediate environs. During the early seventeenth century,
wine accounted for almost 50 percent of the value of the harvest. 25
The forty-one familiares, four notaries, and two commissioners in-
cluded in my sample are much more an indication of the prosperity
of the town and its district than of any decision by the tribunal to
reinforce its position against the dangers posed by the few foreign
ships that touched at the port.
As important as wine was in certain areas, it was silk that took
pride of place among the kingdom's commercial crops. Silk cultiva-
tion was largely concentrated around several towns in the Jucar
Valley, and it is in these towns with their rentiers, merchants, and
wealthy peasants that we find another heavy concentration of famil-
iares. The six towns that dominated the zone, Jativa, Alcira,
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The Familiares and Unsalaried Officials
157
Mora dc Ebro
Tortota □
□ Rodcnas
□
Alton-acin 015
Tcrucl
lODChtlva
Durriana
ScgorbcOll nl
Valle dc Uio
Numbers indicate number of
Familiares in immediate area
Jativa C»«
34 O Q 13
Mont" a 19 Benliaiilm
Onltnlcntt D35
Bocalr«ntt036 DCoctntalna
<r ...;
• • •••• •
kilometers
Figure 1. Distribution of Familiares in the Seventeenth Century
158
The Familiares and Unsalaried Officials
Figure 2. Distribution of Familiares in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth
Centuries
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The Familiares and Unsalaried Officials
159
Algemesf, Guadasuar, Carcagente, and Alberique, proved an excel-
lent recruiting ground for the tribunal and account for slightly more
than 1 1 percent of the familiares that I have counted for the seven-
teenth century. In the eighteenth century, the process of concentra-
tion that we have seen above increased the silk towns' share of the
corps to well over 14 percent.
But, as a recent study has amply demonstrated, most of the
seventeenth century was a period of economic stagnation or decline
for the Valencian economy. 26 Periods of economic depression do
not, however, spell disaster for everyone as those who already have
sufficient capital may be able to benefit from the troubles of the less
fortunate. It was precisely this phenomenon, the ability of a rela-
tively few to take advantage of the opportunities offered by hard
times, that sustained recruitment into the corps of familiares dur-
ing the seventeenth century and provided a group of new families
that continued to support the Holy Office until well into the next
century. In this connection, it is noteworthy that the ten communi-
ties whose landholding patterns were surveyed by Casey for the
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries all had a high degree of
social and economic inequality, with landholding heavily concen-
trated in the top 20 percent of the population. Jativa, Gandia, and
Castellon, the communities with the greatest concentration of
wealth and the worst social inequality, were also places with high
concentrations of familiares. Across the two centuries, these com-
munities could boast 259 familiares in my sample, with Castellon
de la Plana accounting for 80 and Jativa for 150.
Apart from economic factors, the fact that Valencia's inquisitorial
district straddled the borders of the Kingdom of Aragon and the
Principality of Catalonia created political problems that affected the
number of familiares that could be recruited in those areas. Cer-
tainly, the tribunal's punishment of several familiares from the Ara-
gonese town of Teruel for aiding Aragonese authorities in releasing a
prisoner from the custody of an alcalde of the Inquisition soured
relations between the tribunal and the local elite and sharply re-
duced the size of the city's once-flourishing corps of familiares. 28
In spite of the obvious correlation between the concentration of
wealth and the distribution of familiares, they were also present in
areas devoid of the economic opportunities of the huerta or silk-
producing zones. Since these remote villages could hardly be con-
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The Familiares and Unsalaried Officials
sidered hotbeds of heresy, the presence of familiares in them can
be explained more by the activity of individual inquisitors or the
relationship that the tribunal had with certain nobles than by any
plan to cover the kingdom with a dense network of informers.
Sometimes, as in the case of a group of villages in the extreme
northern part of the district near Mora de Ebro, the appearance of
a large number of familiares where there were few previously can
be accounted for by the zeal of an inquisitor. In this case, it was an
inquisitorial visitation to the Tortosa/Mora de Ebro region in 1601-
02 which resulted in the appointment of familiares in forty-one
villages, some as small as twelve households. But the Holy Office
could not expect to put down roots in such unpropitious soil, and
during the following century, when the corps of familiares tended
to be recruited primarily from places with a strong inquisitorial
tradition, most of these villages dropped out.
In other remote areas, the Holy Office benefited from the
friendship of the local lord who might have encouraged his vassals
when they sought titles. It should not be forgotten that most of
rural Valencia was under seigneurial jurisdiction and that the ma-
jority of the Valencian nobility were far from hostile to the Holy
Office. In fact, of the 350 towns where one or more unsalaried
officials were present, 133 were seigneurial and only 72 belonged
directly to the crown. Certain lords, like the mid-sixteenth-
century duke of Segorbe, might have had personal experience of
the way familiares could act to defend the social order. In testi-
mony before the tribunal on March 27, 1553, Benito Marco, the
alguacil of the Holy Office, recalled how some years earlier he had
taken a posse of eighty familiares from Valencia city to certain of
the duke's estates to guard against a possible Moorish seaborne
assault designed to carry off his Morisco vassals. Ever since that
time, the duke had favored the Holy Office and assisted it in
carrying out arrests on his estates. 30
Juan Boil de Arenos, baron of Boil and lord of the village of
Alfafar near Montesa, and Jeronimo Giron de Rebolledo, lord of
Andilla in the rugged Sierra de Javalambre, were two members of
the kingdom's lesser territorial nobility whose strong support of the
tribunal translated itself into the consistent recruitment of unpaid
officials among their vassals. In 1587, Boil, who was already a famil-
iar in Valencia city, had occasion to learn just how useful his special
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fuero could be when one of his vassals insulted and threatened him.
Boil promptly hauled the man before the bar of the Holy Office,
which condemned him to two years exile from Alfafar and a 30
ducat fine. 31 Boil's gratitude to the Holy Office for this and other
favors (like maintaining him as a familiar even though he was a
baron and therefore ineligible) translated itself into support for the
presence of familiares and notaries in Alfafar, a tradition that was
maintained bv his successors.
The Valencia tribunal also had a firm friend and supporter in
Jeronimo Giron de Rebolledo, a familiar who was already acting as
lieutenant alguacil of the Holy Office in Liria when he won a court
case and became baron of Andilla. In spite of this change in his
status, the tribunal insisted on keeping him as a familiar, thereby
maintaining good relations with this important gentry family. As a
result, he and his successors encouraged certain of their vassals to
become associated with the Holy Office, and the tiny and remote
village could boast two commissioners and a notary as well as at
least four familiares between the late sixteenth and mid-seven-
teenth century. Without the firm support of the nobility, which
controlled most of rural Valencia as well as many important towns
(Denia, Sueca, Segorbe), the tribunal would have had much
greater difficulty in establishing and maintaining a numerous and
widely distributed corps of unpaid officials.
Initially, the formal qualifications that every candidate had to
have to become a familiar were relatively straightforward. Candi-
dates had to be of pure Old Christian stock, married or a widower,
at least 25 years of age, peaceable and of good moral character,
legitimate and of native, not foreign, birth. 34 In addition, after the
Concordia of July 10, 1568, familiares could not be drawn from
among the powerful (barons and cavaliers) but instead had to be
plain, ordinary individuals without social pretensions. 35 In prac-
tice, however, whenever it seemed financially rewarding or politi-
cally expedient, the Valencia tribunal ignored or circumvented
these requirements.
It is ironic that during the same period that it unleashed its most
ferocious persecution of the converted Jews, the Valencia tribunal
should have allowed numerous conversos to become members of
the corps of familiares. Although "purity of blood" investigations
were apparently being carried on from the 1550s, testimony re-
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ceived during the 1566 visitation indicated that the tribunal rou-
tinely permitted applicants to present their own list of witnesses, a
practice that was apparently accepted without a murmur by its
official investigators. 36 Such procedural laxity was the cause of a
growing rumor among the public at large that successful candidates
did not have the proper personal and racial qualities. 3 '
It would have been difficult, however, for the Holy Office or the
Valencia tribunal to resist the growing pressure for the exclusion of
Judeo-Christians from honorable positions in Spanish society. In
the paranoid atmosphere that prevailed among Spanish ruling cir-
cles during the mid-sixteenth century, the hand of Jewry was seen
behind every threat to Catholic Orthodoxy, and more and more of
Spain's premier institutions were adopting statutes excluding those
of Judaic origin. Finally, in the Concordia of July 10, 1568, the
Valencia tribunal was ordered to revoke all the licenses it had
issued and to only reissue them after an official inquiry had been
performed which would encompass not only racial factors but also
the candidate's personal conduct. From these, the tribunal was
supposed to choose the members of a numerically limited but ra-
cially pure corps of familiares comprised of individuals who were
"Old Christians of untarnished lineage." 38 Even though the tribu-
nal was apparently willing to carry out the requisite genealogical
investigations, it balked at actually calling in all its licenses, as this
would make it appear that its critics were right in claiming that
there were many conversos in the corps. Furthermore, the obloquy
that would result might bring the entire corps into ill repute and
could damage the reputations of many families whose members
held titles, even those of the "purest" Old Christian stock. The
stalemate was broken only by the direct intervention of the viceroy
who bluntly refused to recognize the validity of any titles unless
they had first been collected and reexamined as provided in the
Concordia. 3 In the face of pressure from the viceroy and the
Suprema, the tribunal had to abandon its resistance and undertake
the first official series of genealogical investigations in its history,
which were carried out between 1569 and 1571. The results, which
demonstrated that forty-three of Valencia city's familiares and a
large number of their wives lacked the requisite racial qualities,
appeared to underscore the need for rigorous genealogical investi-
gations even though the number of familiares who actually lost
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163
their licenses was rather small because of the danger that massive
dismissals would pose to the reputation of the corps as a whole. 40
The genealogical investigation of familiares and other unpaid
officials began when the applicant for a position gave the tribunal a
copy of his genealogy and that of his wife, including the names of
parents and paternal and maternal grandparents. The tribunal's
records would then be searched, and if this failed to turn up any
evidence that would disqualify the applicant, then one of the tribu-
nal's secretaries or a commissioner was sent to the places where the
family lived to interview witnesses in accordance with a printed
questionnaire. 41 Both secretaries and commissioners would nor-
mally be accompanied by a notary as witnesses' testimony was
taken under oath. In practice, however, the requisite commission-
ers were frequently not available or were unwilling to undertake
journeys far from their homes, and the tribunal would frequently
use notaries or even parish priests to carry out all or part of the
investigations. 42
The veracity of the investigations was to be ensured not only by
the fact that they were to be "tornados de oficio y no ministrados de
parte," that is, using information obtained independently by an
official of the Holy Office and not simply furnished by the applicant
as formerly, but also because all the officials concerned were sup-
posed to have themselves undergone genealogical examinations. It
could be assumed that individuals who had successfully sur-
mounted the genealogical barrier would have a vested interest in
maintaining the purity of the corps to which they belonged and that
this would outweigh the appeal of any financial advantages offered
to them by nervous applicants. In 1630, the Suprema admonished
Inquisitor Roche for using a number of commissioners whose own
genealogical investigations were not yet complete. His explanation
was that they were all the brothers of familiares or the relatives of
officials so there seemed to be no harm in the practice. 43
The actual number of witnesses to be questioned varied substan-
tially. During the late sixteenth and very early seventeenth centu-
ries, when the form that the genealogical investigation was later to
follow was not firmly established, the investigators used only six
witnesses per location. A change seems to have occurred in 1607,
however, when the number "6" is crossed out on the form that was
used to investigate one Jaime Amaros and replaced by "12," which
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was to be the norm in future investigations. However, the investi-
gator's instructions encouraged him to exceed the prescribed num-
ber of witnesses whenever there was any doubt or contradiction
and to examine as many as he thought necessary. Those carrying
out the investigations were well aware of their superiors' bias to-
ward more rather than fewer witnesses, especially in difficult cases.
When the Suprema wrote questioning secretary Juan del Olmo's
decision to interview only five witnesses in Traiguera, the birth-
place of candidate Frances Vidal, where three had testified that the
family had Jewish blood, Olmo replied that instead of remaining in
Traiguera, he had gone directly on to the birthplace of Vidal's
maternal grandmother since the rumors concerned her. There, he
had interviewed sixteen witnesses, including three priests and two
familiares, all "among the oldest and most honorable in the vil-
lage." 45 The number of witnesses could mount quickly, lengthening
the time of the investigation and sharply increasing its cost. Pedro
Garcia Pons, who applied to become a familiar in 1623, had the
misfortune to have his parents and grandparents come from three
separate towns (Olerida, Flix, and La Granadella), while his wife's
maternal grandmother came from the village of Fatarella. In all, the
intrepid investigators took testimony from fifty-nine witnesses, and
the tribunal ended by rejecting Pons's application anyway, but not
before collecting 390 reales in costs. 46
The instructions gave the investigating official certain minimal
but very specific standards for the sort of person that he was to
choose to examine. Of course, witnesses were to be natives of the
place and of impeccable Old Christian stock. But, more specifically,
they were to be chosen from among the oldest inhabitants, were not
to have any direct relationship to the candidate (neither relatives,
friends, nor enemies), and the local unpaid officials were to be
included among them. In practice, investigating officials used their
own discretion in deciding when it was appropriate to vary the
official format. In my survey of the witnesses called in fifty genealo-
gies of familiares from 1575 to 1801, the average age was just over
60 years old, but the mandate to seek out the oldest inhabitants was
frequently not followed by investigating officials. In some places,
older people may simply not have been available to interview. This
problem was especially acute during the first half of the seven-
teenth century when disease and economic crises combined to pro-
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165
duce sharply higher death rates among the elderly. ' Moreover, the
most important thing about a witness was not age but what that
individual knew about the applicant and his family. In the case of
Diego Angel, a merchant living in Valencia, secretary Jeronimo
Sans, who was carrying out his genealogical investigation, clearly
decided that it would be more useful to interview Angel's associates
among the other merchants of the city than to seek out the elderly.
As a result, the average age of witnesses interviewed in Valencia
city was only 44. 48 Investigating officials only made a special point of
interviewing the very oldest inhabitants of a place when rumors of
some impurity in the applicant's background had surfaced. In such
a case, only the testimony of a person whose knowledge of local
events went back several generations would suffice. During the
investigation that was carried on into the background of Pedro
Badfa prior to admitting him to the corps of familiares, testimony
came from several witnesses that his maternal grandmother, Vi-
olante Batallar, was of impure blood. To test the veracity of this
testimony, the investigating official turned to what was undoubt-
edly the oldest inhabitant of the village, a 105-year-old peasant.
This individual acknowledged the existence of the rumor but
claimed that it was without foundation; that apparently sufficed, as
Badia's application was approved without further difficulty. 49
According to their critics, one of the most deplorable aspects of
the purity of blood statutes was their marked egalitarianism. In a
society where the statutes were becoming the indispensable pas-
sageway to social distinction, the reputations of the wealthy and
powerful were being held hostage to the opinions of mere plebe-
ians. In a country where a single ancestor of impure blood could
invalidate the purity and orthodoxy of dozens of others, critics
charged that the son of the vilest miller or blacksmith could use his
status as an Old Christian to hold in contempt the scions of the
noblest families in Spain. 50
Certainly, the results of breaking down the sample of witnesses
by social status appears to support the claims made by the critics of
the purity of blood examinations. In general, witnesses were drawn
from among persons of lower social standing, while there is a strik-
ing contrast between the social composition of the corps of famil-
iares and the witnesses in their genealogical examinations. More
than 72 percent of witnesses were drawn from the ranks of the
i66
The Familiares and Unsalaried Officials
peasantry and artisans, while gentry (cavaliers) and "citizens"
(ciutada) together comprised only 2.3 percent. Furthermore, there
seemed to be little disposition on the part of investigating officials
to select members of the local oligarchy, with only a minuscule 0.79
percent (18 individuals) identifying themselves as jurats or other
officials of local government. Even the injunction to always inter-
view local familiares or other officials of the Holy Office was seldom
obeyed. Only 110 familiares (4.8% of witnesses) were interviewed
by investigating officials in spite of the fact that they were ordered
to compile a list of the names of local familiares for the tribunal and
could, therefore, hardly be unaware of their existence. Even parish
priests, who presumably could have given the investigating official
a good deal of valuable information about the life and customs of
the applicant as well as the frequency of his religious observances,
were only represented by 95 individuals (4. 1%).
In marked contrast to the procedural laxity of genealogical investi-
gations carried out before the 1570s, seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century investigations tended to be characterized by punctilious
attention to detail and a willingness to follow up every rumor of
impurity of blood no matter how shaky its foundation. Of course,
there can be no doubt that the enthusiasm with which the various
officials in charge carried out their responsibilities was greatly
spurred by the knowledge that their further exertions would be
amply rewarded out of the funds the applicant had deposited with
the tribunal to cover the costs of his investigation. Miguel Jose
Alapont, who applied to become a familiar in 1726, was unfortunate
enough to have maternal grandparents who were both born in differ-
ent places in Castile, while his mother had been born in Murcia.
This unusual situation required investigations to be carried on not
only in the Kingdom of Valencia (Valencia city and Alcudia de Carlet,
his father's birthplace) but also by the officials of the tribunals of
Cuenca, Toledo, and Murcia. 51
Foreign birth, which was supposed to automatically disqualify a
candidate from admission, could be overlooked for exceptional indi-
viduals, but the tribunal did feel itself obliged to obtain information
about the applicant's family in his country of origin. To do this, it was
necessary to obtain the cooperation of foreign ecclesiastical officials
who normally proved themselves so eager to help the Spaniards that
they carried out their instructions more strictly than they were fol-
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167
lowed in Spain itself. In the case of Juan Abadia, a merchant who
came from the French province of Beam, the tribunal received
authorization from Inquisitor-General Manuel Bonifaz to write to
the bishop of Oleron and ask him to carry out a genealogical investiga-
tion in the family's native villages. Working from the standard set of
instructions given to all officials charged with carrying out such inves-
tigations, which told them to find twelve witnesses from among the
oldest and most honorable inhabitants, the bishop's agents selected
witnesses with an average age of 76 (as opposed to the Spanish
Inquisition's norm of 60), including four 80-year-olds and one peas-
ant who claimed to be 95. 52 The tribunal's concern with fulfilling its
instructions to the letter was demonstrated when Jose Ignacio Alama
applied to enter the corps in 1740. In this case, the applicant himself
was of pure Spanish stock since his family came from Valencia city
and the diocese of Tortosa. But his wife's paternal grandfather, Julio
Capuz, had come to the kingdom from Genoa, so, inevitably, the
Genoese authorities had to be consulted. By the time permission
was obtained from the inquisitor-general, letters were dispatched to
Genoa and a reply incorporating the results of the Genoese investiga-
tion was received; an investigation that should have taken a few
months had stretched to three years. 53
Of course, if the tribunal was prepared to go to such a lot of
trouble over the relatively trivial matter of foreign origin, it could
be expected to take infinite pains to establish the truth of any
allegations of impurity of blood. The fate of Antonio Albert's appli-
cation to become a familiar in La Olleria is a typical example of
the way such rumors could delay the conclusion of an investiga-
tion by imposing a need to carry on fresh inquiries in places not
originally scheduled. The investigation of Albert's family in La
Olleria having been successfully concluded, Commissioner Agus-
tm Vicente Lopez turned his attention to Beniganim, the birth-
place of his maternal grandmother, Catalina Moscardo. Here the
investigation ran into trouble as several witnesses repeated a ru-
mor that the Moscardos were of Morisco origin. This rumor was
strenuously denied by Eugenio Tudela, one of the local familiares,
who attributed it to petty jealousy arising from the time when the
village of Moscardon (from which the family had come originally)
had turned out en masse to repel a Morisco attack, and all the
members of the family, even the youngest, had gone on horse-
i68
The Familiares and Unsalaried Officials
back, while many who belonged to the village oligarchy had to go
on foot. Even though the testimony of such an important witness
as Tudela (just the sort of witness that the commissioner was
instructed to seek out) should have ended the matter, the fact that
these allegations were being made just at the time of the expul-
sion of the Moriscos turned a routine investigation into one that
would require a great deal more painstaking work before it could
be concluded.
After carefully considering the report of its commissioner, the
tribunal drew up a special series of instructions designed to track
down the ancestors of the original Moscardo who had migrated
from that village to Beniganim. The tribunal then appointed canon
Martin Rodrigo, its commissioner in Albarracm, to carry out the
investigation in Moscardon, which lay a few miles to the south,
sending Jose del Olmo from Valencia to accompany him. Of course,
del Olmo's presence was entirely superfluous since the commis-
sioner was perfectly competent to carry out the investigation and
could have used a local ecclesiastical notary if he needed one, but
the del Olmos were being favored in these matters, and the inquisi-
tors no doubt saw this case as a good opportunity for him to earn a
substantial fee. On May 4, 1612, seventeen months after Albert's
application had first been received, the two investigators arrived in
Moscardon and began to interview witnesses.
In spite of the care that the tribunal took to investigate the
origins of the rumors about the family's Morisco origins, however,
the outside observer cannot help wondering whether a decision
had already been taken in his case even before Rodrigo and del
Olmo were dispatched to Moscardon. The majority of the witnesses
they interviewed there were probably distant relatives of the candi-
date, and a subsequent inquiry in Beniganim seemed almost de-
signed to produce a favorable result since it was carried on using a
different official and an entirely different set of witnesses. Armed
with the "favorable results" of these two investigations, the tribunal
felt free to award Albert his title on November 24, 1612, twenty-
eight months after Albert had first applied for admission to the
corps of familiares. 54 In the case of Albert, as in so many others who
applied for familiaturas after the genealogical investigation had
been formalized, scrupulous attention to the regulations governing
such investigations and a willingness to pursue any rumor of "im-
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169
pure" blood, however farfetched, masked the fact that a decision to
admit the candidate had already been taken at a higher level.
Given all the concern over the impact of the purity of blood
statutes on Spanish society, it is somewhat surprising to note that
only 19, or just 2.6 percent of the 728 applicants whose genealogies
I studied, were actually rejected. Below the level of the judges who
sat on the tribunal, the imperatives of racial purity gave way to
political and financial considerations, so that for essentially honor-
ific positions, such as familiar, there was a built-in predisposition to
favor paying applicants — especially those who had some local politi-
cal power in spite of a family background that should have counted
heavily against them. The corps of familiares, therefore, provided a
channel for the somewhat grudging integration of the conversos
into Old Christian society. Even in this very small sample, how-
ever, the fundamental anti-Semitism of the tribunal is revealed as
thirteen candidates were rejected because of objections to their
Judaic background or that of their wives, but only one was rejected
because of his Moorish descent.
Curiously enough, several of the individuals whose applications
were rejected came from families that could boast of one or more
members serving the tribunal as familiares. Pedro Fargues, for
example, who applied in 1639, was rejected by the tribunal after
numerous witnesses had denounced both his and his wife's Jewish
ancestry. But, at the same time, testimony revealed that the couple
was related to no fewer than four individuals who had served or
were presently serving as familiares, including two from the Murioz
family, one of those denounced by the witnesses. 55
In certain cases, the failure of a particular individual to obtain a
familiatura should be seen as an isolated misfortune, interrupting
but not preventing the process of assimilation. The rejection of
Felipe Gaspar Capero of Traiguera in 1603 was one such case, all
the more peculiar because his father, Luis, had been a familiar.
Gaspar's failure, which can be attributed to the previous removal of
his wife's uncle from the corps and to the fact that there were
already enough familiares in the town, did not prevent the family
from entering the Inquisition as familiares, calificadores, and nota-
ries during the last decades of the seventeenth century. 56
Finally, a comparison of the social composition of our sample of
rejected candidates with the social composition of the familiatura as
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The Familiares and Unsalaried Officials
a whole indicates once again the justice of the charges made by
critics of the purity of blood investigations. If the overwhelming
majority of familiares in Valencia's district came from the plebeian
ranks of the peasantry, presumably less contaminated with Jewish
blood than the residents of towns and the upper classes, labradores
were underrepresented in the ranks of the rejected, which in-
cluded such notables as the ciutada Luis Alexandre and Antonio de
Cardona, a noble relative of the admirals of Aragon, the Borjas, and
other distinguished Valencian families. 57
Certainly, as far as their marital status was concerned, Valencia's
familiares largely conformed to the ideal set forth in the qualifica-
tions for admission. Out of the 709 successful applicants in my
sample, 615, or 86.7 percent, were married at the time of applica-
tion, while 10 others were widowers. Moreover, of the 32 bache-
lors, fully 23 were called "youths" or "minore" in the text of their
genealogy, and, with one exception, they were all under 25 years of
age. Of course, in these cases, it was virtually certain that most, if
not all, of these young bachelors would marry since the social and
religious pressure in favor of marriage was so strong. Indeed, even
widowers felt obliged to remarry, sometimes with almost indecent
haste after the death of their first wife. When Miguel Corachan
applied to enter the corps on February 23, 1639, he was married to
Madalena Voltes, but less than a year after his title was conferred,
his wife died, and he had requested permission from the tribunal to
remarry, this time to Esperanza Pujades, a widow whose brother,
Miguel Pujades, was a familiar in Campanar. 58
The fact that the overwhelming majority of Valencia's familiares
were married men or were expected to marry within a relatively
short time after they joined the corps meant that Valencia's famil-
iares were in substantial conformitv with the ideal as set forth in the
regulations for admission. The middle-aged man who had never
been married or the widower who preferred to remain single so as
to carry on freer, less inhibited sexual activity became an object of
suspicion and distrust who could even find himself harassed by the
local alcaldes if his behavior came to public notice. Confirmed
bachelors were rare indeed among Valencia's familiares, but some
were clearly acceptable regardless of the prevailing social preju-
dice. Jose Juan de Centelles, Marquis of Centelles, was one of
these. When the marquis applied for a license in 1699, at the age of
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42, the Inquisitor-General was only too happy to dispense with the
marital requirement, and in less than three months he was admit-
ted to the corps, in spite of the fact that one of his ancestors had
been executed as a Protestant heretic. 59
In the matter of the age of those accepted into the corps, the
Valencia tribunal achieved substantial if not entire compliance with
the twenty-five-year rule, with only twenty-two successful appli-
cants under 25 years of age. But, with an average age of 37, the
corps of familiares was relatively youthful; fully 62.5 percent of the
sample was aged 40 or younger, and only 8.7 percent was between
51 and 60.
Of course, there were exceptions. Twelve applicants out of the
sample of 216 were 20 and younger, with the youngest, Agustm
Fabregat, only 17 when he was accepted into the corps in 1740. 60
But the Valencian inquisitors had definite reasons for wanting to
bend the rules to admit these young men. In some cases, like that
of Fabregat, the tribunal wished to reclaim the support of a family
whose service had taken place in the distant past. 61 Confronted by
an eager youngster who declared that he wanted to "imitate my
ancestors," the tribunal could hardly have refused to consider him.
In return, Fabregat demonstrated his gratitude by long and faithful
service and even married his daughter, Francisca, to Vicente
Perciva, another of the familiares of the town. 62
The case of Dr. Felix Breva illustrates the tribunal's desire to
maintain its connections to families with strong and recent ties to the
tribunal. Breva's paternal grandfather, Jaime, had served the tribu-
nal as a familiar in the 1630s and 1640s, while his cousin, Luis Breva,
had served as inquisitorial notary in Castellon de la Plana since
1682. 63 Later, when Breva went on to become abogado de presos of
the Holy Office, two other members of the family, Bautista and
Vicente Breva, joined the ranks of Castellou's familiares. 64
In spite of the fact that both Fabregat and Breva were underaged
when appointed to the tribunal, it is difficult to criticize their ap-
pointments. They, along with the other underaged candidates,
met, and even exceeded, all the other formal requirements, and
they and their families were very much the sort of people the
tribunal wished to recruit and retain.
Valencia's corps of familiares was almost completely in compli-
ance with the requirement that applicants be natives of Spain. In
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fact, the corps was not only overwhelmingly Spanish but Valencian,
with only eleven individuals identified as being born outside the
kingdom and, of these, only six outside Spain. Moreover, several of
the Spanish applicants born outside Valencia came of families with
long traditions of service to the Holy Office in their home province.
One of these men was Juan Diego Aztira, who was born in
Zaragoza. In a note attached to his application, Aztira boasted that
he was following the footsteps of "many of his relatives and ances-
tors who have served as officials and familiares." On his father's
side, he was distantly related to Dr. Domingo de Aztira, a canon of
Zaragoza's cathedral and a former inquisitor, while his uncle, Juan
Calvo, had been a familiar in his native village. 65
Given the generally paranoid atmosphere that gripped Spanish
ruling circles during much of the sixteenth century and the fact that
most of the Protestant sympathizers arrested in Spain after 1560
were Frenchmen, it is not surprising that the tribunal admitted few
foreigners to the corps. In 1575, as if to underscore the importance
of caution in this respect, the Suprema even issued a carta acordada
requiring that no one of foreign birth should be given a title with-
out express permission from the inquisitor-general and that the
tribunals were to send a list of those foreigners already serving as
familiares. 66
Certain individuals of foreign birth made excellent candidates,
however, and it would have been foolish and counterproductive not
to admit them. Once again, quality and not mechanical compliance
with the formal regulations was the norm. Applicants like the pros-
perous Milanese-born merchant Marco Antonio Muceffi, who had
lived in Valencia city for twenty-eight years, or Juan Abadia, who
was born in Verdetes (Beaune) and whose Valencian wife Mariana
Mulet came of a family with a long tradition of service to the Holy
Office, were already so well integrated that no suspicion could
6*7
attach to them in spite of their foreign birth.
A recent analysis of the social composition of the familiares of
Cordoba during the mid-sixteenth century indicates that it was
dominated largely by artisans in the leatherworking and textile
trades. 68 What is known about the social structure of Valencia's
familiares for the same period seems to confirm the existence of a
large number of artisans within the corps. Of the 1,219 familiares
serving in 1567 whose occupations are known to us, 31 percent
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were artisans (mainly tailors and textile workers), while only 5.6
percent came from lesser nobility and 4.4 percent from the ranks of
the ciutadans. In Valencia city, the predominance of the artisans
was even more pronounced, with 46 percent coming from their
ranks. 69
A very different picture, however, is revealed by my sample of
533 familiares drawn from the seventeenth and eighteenth centu-
ries. Here, the percentage of artisans falls to only 2.4 percent, the
second lowest of any of the major status/occupation categories. The
decline was even more telling in the city of Valencia. My survey of
several lists of familiares furnished the viceroy between 1623 and
1628 indicates that of the 186 for whom status/occupation data is
available, only 17 individuals (7.5%) can be classed as artisans.
The large number of artisans among Valencia's familiares in the
mid-sixteenth century is all the more surprising in light of the
massive participation of that group in the Germama movement of
15 19- 1521. 70 Given Charles V's general policy of attempting to
pacify and coopt the urban classes that fought the crown during the
Comunero Revolution in Castile, however, it is tempting to view
the social composition of Valencia's mid-sixteenth-century famil-
iares in the same light. 71 By enlisting large numbers of urban arti-
sans in an honorable corporation where they served alongside their
social superiors to defend a loyal Catholic Valencia, the Inquisition
was providing the government with a way of moderating the social
tensions that led to a bloody civil war and imperiled royal authority.
This interpretation seems even more convincing when we add to it
the fact that at the Cortes of 1528-29, Charles made a deliberate
effort to appeal to the disaffected popular masses by accepting a
series of proposals that reflected certain of the long-standing com-
plaints of the popular classes of the towns. In Castile, as I have
already noted elsewhere, Charles followed a similar policy at the
Cortes of 1523, where he attempted to deal with some of the most
important proposals for reform that were voiced by rebel leaders
during the Comunero Revolution. ' 2
The process that would result in considerably reducing the num-
ber of artisans in the corps of familiares began as early as the 1550s
when changes in the structure of Valencia's textile industry led to the
elimination or impoverishment of many small master artisans: this
resulted in a market for familiaturas in which certain poor artisans
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who held them made them available to wealthy merchants and entre-
preneurs. This process appears to have operated through a series of
intermediaries who were in touch with familiares who wished to sell
and merchants and other wealthy individuals who wished to pur-
chase titles. Testimony taken during the visitation of 1566, for exam-
ple, reveals that several individuals, including a tavern-keeper and a
familiar, received fees for arranging the transfer of titles. In one
instance, Juan Bautista Miniu, a wealthy merchant, is reported to
have purchased a title from one Armengol, a velvet worker who is
described as "old and poor." In another case, Gabriel Gimeno, a
dyer, called "hombre necesitado" by one witness, sold his title to
another merchant, Antonio Misines. Both of these deals were accom-
plished through the good offices of one Alejo Botero, a familiar who
received a substantial fee for his services. 73
The exclusion of artisans from Valencia's corps of familiares,
therefore, was well under way long before the Suprema made it
official policy by issuing its carta acordada of May 9, 1602, which
introduced the requirement of "purity of office" and barred most
artisans from admission. 74 In spite of this ordinance, small numbers
of artisans did apply and were accepted into the corps during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but the apologetic tone
adopted in certain instances by the applicants and their supporters
indicates an awareness that their applications were unlikely to be
received favorably. Vicente Beltran, who incautiously listed himself
as a locksmith/labrador on his application, hastened to write the
tribunal again to declare that he only practiced the locksmith's
trade "for his own amusement and not because it is his profes-
sion."' 5 In 1643, when Jaime Esteve, a pottery maker, applied to
the corps from Traiguera, Dr. Felicio Pellicer, the local inquisitorial
notary, wrote on his behalf to point out that in Traiguera potters
were no ordinary artisans and that they had even been elected to
the town council.
Having established itself in the kingdom despite opposition
from the local elite, the Inquisition was perfectly situated to play a
social role that would allow it to make the corps of familiares into
a bridge between royal government and the popular masses of the
towns. Three well-attended autos de fe were held during the
Germanias, and after the war, the tribunal did not hesitate to
appoint Bernardino Arviso, a prominent former agermanado, lieu-
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tenant alcalde, much to the disgust of the cavaliers and ciutadans
in Valencia city. 77
By the 1560s, however, the radical, popular phase of the tribu-
nal's activity was at an end. Sustained persecution of the converted
Jews had given way to occasional trials, and the tribunal was acquir-
ing its own fixed sources of income, thereby converting itself into
just another one of Spain's conservative ecclesiastical/bureaucratic
corporations. No longer living precariously on the money from
confiscations but dependent on income from censals and tithes like
Valencia's elite of nobles and rentiers, the tribunal could no longer
afford to identify itself with a class that had once threatened to
overturn the established order. After the visitation of 1528, Bernar-
dino de Arviso was removed, and during the 1560s and 1570s,
Valencia's inquisitors watched complacently as licenses were trans-
ferred from poor artisans to wealthy merchants even if some of
them had Jewish blood. By the turn of the century, when the
Suprema issued its ukase instituting "purity of office" as a new
requirement for admission, the process by which the familiatura
was transformed into a monied elite was largely complete, and the
corps was taking on the shape that it was to retain for the next two
centuries. In the larger towns, it was recruited from a wealthy and
conservative rentier class of cavaliers and ciutadans solidly en-
trenched in local politics through the system of insaculacio, while
in the villages, the familiatura rested firmly on wealthy peasants,
the "coqs du village" who dominated village affairs.
Indeed, it may be argued that by forcing the tribunal to perform
formal genealogical investigations after the visitation of 1567, the
Suprema accelerated the process that was making wealth the sole
universal prerequisite for admission to the corps. Genealogical in-
vestigations were expensive. The average cost of the investigations
in the 206 cases where information is available amounted to 775
reales, or 51.6 Valencian pounds (lliures), in an age when the lower
third of the peasantry earned less than 20 lliures per year from the
agricultural sector. 78 In fact, many of these investigations were far
more expensive, with forty-five (21.8%) costing over 1,000 reales,
ten over 2,000 reales, and one a total of 3,306 reales, or 220 lliures,
which was more than eleven times the income of a poor peasant in
the early eighteenth century.
The wealth barrier became even more difficult to surmount
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when, in 1600, the Suprema insisted on substantial sums, usually
fixed at 300 reales, that had to be deposited before the investiga-
tion could begin. 79 Actually, in ninety-five cases, witnesses even
went out of their way to comment approvingly about an applicant's
wealth or ability to live off his rents. Given the sharp reduction in
the demand for manufactured goods after 1609 and the consequent
high unemployment rate among artisans, the cost of the genealogi-
cal investigation alone would have been enough to reduce their
numbers if social prejudice had not already done so.
Paradoxically enough, the aristocratization of the corps of famil-
iares gained momentum during the late sixteenth century precisely
at a time when the Suprema, under heavy pressure from the crown
and the Council of Aragon, had agreed to the Concordia of 1568
that specifically excluded caballeros and barons. The goal that was
sought by the Council of Aragon as well as by Viceroy Herrera and
the delegates to the Cortes of Monzon was to prevent the privileges
and special jurisdiction that were granted to familiares from becom-
ing a shield behind which powerful men could defy royal justice.
For its part, the tribunal was determined to avoid carrying out this
part of the Concordia, because, in an increasingly status-conscious
society, the fact that it could no longer enroll the nobility would
greatly undermine its prestige. In this effort, it found that it could
count on support from the Suprema, which had only agreed to the
Concordia under duress and with grave reservations.
The Suprema began by intervening directly with the viceroy and
the regent of the Audiencia to reach a compromise by which the
tribunal would be allowed to appoint caballeros who were lords of
vassals but not titleholders. 80 Accepting even this, however, would
have meant that the tribunal would have been cut off from recruit-
ing among Valencia's most influential gentry families. To circum-
vent this agreement, the tribunal adopted the practice of enrolling
the eldest son of titleholders as familiares, with the assurance that
these men would eventually inherit their father's title and with the
conviction that they would not actually be forced later to renounce
their membership in the corps. The most that the Suprema was
prepared to do was to make a tactical retreat by ordering the tribu-
nal not to take cognizance of the civil and criminal cases of the
count of Bunol, a familiar since 1587. But, as he reminded the
tribunal in 1607, his license had never been removed and he re-
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mained a familiar in good standing. In fact, as it admitted in 1660,
the tribunal had ignored this provision of the Concordia since it
could not do without the political support of powerful nobles with
83
votes and influence in the Cortes.
Use of these expedients permitted the tribunal to enroll a respect-
able number of nobles. Of the 533 men whose occupation/status is
listed in their genealogies, 34, or 6.3%, were noble. But most of
these men were clearly not drawn from the very top ranks of the
Valencian aristocracy. The one exception was the marquis of
Centelles, who obtained his license in 1699. 84 At best, the tribunal
could expect to enlist certain members of the twenty or so intermedi-
ate families who held a lesser title, lived in the kingdom (frequently
in Valencia city), and sought a title to enhance their social prestige or
to give them added protection from the royal courts. Guillen Carroz
y de Artes, who applied in 1639, came of just such a family. His
father, Francisco Carroz, was count of Cirat and a holder of one of the
thirteen encomiendas of the Order of Montesa. His mother, Teodora
Artes de Albanell, was linked to the gentry through her second
cousin, Gaspar Artes, who was a familiar and lord of the village of
Almassera, while her brother was a member of the Order of Santi-
ago. 85 Another good example of this group is Jose Boil, whose father
was the marquis of Boil and whose mother, Maria Figuerola, was
related to the former inquisitor of Valencia, Dr. Honorato Figue-
rola. 86 In certain instances, these men could demonstrate such singu-
lar devotion to the Holy Office that membership in the corps of
familiares must have meant more to them than the privileges or
exemptions that it could provide. The count of Buriol was one of
these, and, in a letter begging the tribunal to take cognizance of a
particularly delicate civil suit in which he had become involved, he
declared that "next to salvation, what he most wanted in this life was
the opportunity to employ his person, life and treasure in the service
of the Holy Office. " That this was not mere rhetoric is indicated by a
cover letter written by Valencia's inquisitors when they sent the
count's request on to the Suprema. In their letter, the inquisitors
attested to the fact that the count had always served the tribunal with
"great willingness'' and had frequently held one of the ropes attached
to the standard that was borne before the inquisitors when they
marched in religious processions.
Of course, many of the caballeros who became members of the
i 7 8
The Familiares and Unsalaried Officials
corps during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries belonged to
the 129 or so gentry families who held one or two villages and had a
relatively modest income from feudal dues which they supple-
mented with rent from land and houses that they owned. 88 Typical
of this group was Carlos de Calatayud, who was lord of the village of
Agres with its 200 families. 89
A far larger number of caballeros were not even lords of vassals
but simply held the title of caballeros and derived their income
entirely from rent. These were really almost indistinguishable from
the citizen rentiers (ciutadans) who were just below them in the
social scale. Their presence among Valencia's petty nobility must be
accounted for by the fact that in the 1630s it became possible to
purchase the status of cavalier for between 250 and 700 lliures, well
within the range of the wealthiest 20 percent of Valencia's property-
owning class. 90 Typically, these men would also belong to the re-
stricted political elite of the larger towns, which, through the
insaculacio system, had become virtually self-perpetuating. The
insaculats comprised the group of citizens who were eligible to hold
municipal offices and were selected for life by their fellows among
the officeholding class. 91
One family that almost perfectly illustrates the combination of
rentier and politician so characteristic of the majority of the cavalier
families in our sample is the Barberan of Onteniente. Gaspar Bar-
beran and his son Gaspar Jeronimo served together as familiares,
the first receiving his title in 1585 and the second in 1629, while
Gaspar's nephew Jose obtained his title in 1632. None of the Bar-
berans were fiefholders, but Gaspar Jeronimo was reckoned as hav-
ing more than 12,000 ducats in property. At the same time, they
were active in local politics; Gaspar served as justicia of the town at
the time of his application, and his nephew was insaculat and had
served as justicia and jurat on several occasions. In addition to
obtaining titles as familiares, the family was tied in with the Inquisi-
tion in other ways. Onofre Barberan, the comisario who served in
Onteniente at the time of Gaspar Jeronimo's genealogical investiga-
tion, was a relative; Gaspar Barberan's aunt was first cousin to Dr.
Miguel Jeronimo Blasco, canon and dean of the cathedral chapter of
Valencia and inquisitor of Barcelona. 92
Rentiers or small fiefholders, politicians and urban dwellers, the
petty nobles who entered the ranks of Valencia's familiares repre-
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179
sented a very different group from those responsible for the "aristo-
cratization" of the corps in Galicia studied by Contreras. 93 Rather
than a sturdy feudal class residing on their estates, Valencia's noble
familiares formed part of the burgeoning rentier class that took over
more and more of the kingdom's wealth after the expulsion of the
Moriscos.
Far more representative of this growing rentier class, however,
were the ciutadans. Urban based, tied closely to municipal govern-
ment through the system of insaculacio, this group accounted for
24.7 percent of the familiares for whom occupation/status informa-
tion is available.
Some of these men were very clearly the sons of peasants who
had made good and had used their wealth and local political power
to propel themselves into the lower ranks of the petty nobility.
Bautista Badia, from the village of Sueca, listed himself proudly as a
ciutada on his application but was the descendant of labradores
from Sueca and nearby Cullera on both sides of the family. 94 Joa-
quin Albuixech, who applied from Almusafes in 1762, studiously
avoided any reference to his family's social standing in his applica-
tion, but a letter by the tribunal's special commissioner, Dr. Juan
Zapata, reveals that they were wealthy peasants who now had suffi-
cient income so that they no longer needed to cultivate their own
land. Apparently, the family had quite a stranglehold on the
familiatura in this village of two hundred families, since Joaquin's
father and his two grandfathers were all familiares, as were his
cousin and several other relatives. At the other extreme were
certain individuals who could have fitted easily into the ranks of the
cavaliers. Jose Bonet, whose father was lord of the tiny village of
Palau, was one of these, and his presence among the ciutadans
illustrates the difficulties of making hard and fast distinctions be-
tween ciutadans and cavaliers. 96
It is particularly interesting to chart the evolution of the Carbonell
family from the important silk-harvesting town of Alcoy since their
connection with the Holy Office was maintained throughout their
rise to greater social prominence. Gines Carbonell, the first appli-
cant from the family, was a humble labrador whose application was
approved around 1595. 9 ' By the time his grandson Roque's applica-
tion was approved in 1631, the family had already achieved ciutadan
status. In his application, Roque referred proudly to "the services
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that his ancestors had rendered to the Holy Office" as his chief
reason for applying. His wife, Ines Mayor, came of another family
with strong traditions of service on both sides of her family. 98
In the case of the Feliu family of Benisa and nearby Teulada, the
tribunal not only recruited a ciutadan family of exceptional loyalty
but also of growing local political importance. By the mid-
seventeenth century, when cousins Juan and Miguel Feliu gained
entry to the corps, the family had already gained ciutadan status and
become very wealthy, with Juan's holdings estimated at more than
9,000 ducats. His cousin, who mentioned the services of his father
and grandfather, was related directly or by marriage to no less than
thirteen familiares." By the mid-eighteenth century, when Pedro
Feliu and his son Jose applied for entry, the family had attained
significant political power, having served as alcaldes, regidores, and
governors of both Teulada and Benisa. 100
The rise of the petty nobility and distinguished citizens in the
Valencia of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries exactly paral-
lels their increasing presence in the corps of familiares, where the
tribunal was only too happy to welcome them. But the cavaliers
and ciutadans who entered the corps, like their counterparts out-
side it, could hardly be called wealthy. Only 400 lliures in rent was
necessary for an individual to become eligible for municipal office
in Valencia city during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centu-
ries. 101 The average income of the fourteen nobles and citizens who
can be positively identified as familiares or relatives of familiares
and who gained insaculo status between 1660 and 1691 was only
582/2 lliures. Even this unimpressive total was inflated by just a few
individuals — like Felipe Gregorio Alfonso with his two large and
prosperous farms in the huerta — who earned far more than most. 102
Of the fourteen, eleven earned less than 500 lliures and two just
barely made the minimum of 400. Far more typical was the
ciutadan and later familiar, Francisco Ferris, who pieced together
his barely qualifying 405 lliures out of the rent of two tiny farms in
the huerta, a house in the city, and a butcher stall in the municipal
meat market. 103
Lawyers, notaries, and other professionals constituted the other
wing of the nonpeasant sector that had concentrated so much of the
kingdom's landed wealth in its hands during the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. 104 In my sample of genealogies, fifty-six indi-
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The Familiares and Unsalaried Officials
181
viduals comprising 10.5 percent of those with occupation/status
information can be classed as professionals, primarily lawyers and
notaries but including a number of distinguished and highly paid
physicians. A glimpse at the life-style and activities of familiar Barto-
lome Molner, a notary from Castellon de la Plana, where a good
deal of litigation was carried on, reveals a busy, prosperous individ-
ual with many business interests. Active in both the ecclesiastical
and secular courts, Molner was popular with clients and was able to
obtain a substantial income from fees. In addition, he did an exten-
sive and lucrative wholesale trade in silk and other textiles. De-
scribed at the time of his application as an exceptionally vigorous
man of fifty, Molner supported a wife and seven children and had
two fine horses, two maids, and several hunting dogs. Unfortu-
nately, he also had enemies, and one day in 1610, three of them
crushed his head with a stone when he intervened in a struggle
between them and his brother. 105
Given the increasing importance of lawyers to the life of early
modern Spain, incorporating a goodly number of them among the
familiares meant, at least in theory, that the tribunal could benefit
from their political support. In the always politically difficult city of
Teruel, for example, the tribunal enjoyed the firm support of the
Ambel family. Jeronimo Ambel was an attorney and a familiar,
while his son, Dionisio Ambel, another attorney, had attained
ciutadan rank by the time he applied in 1639. Not only did the
family connection with the Inquisition go all the way back to the
1560s when Dionisio Ambel's grandfather, Juan, acted as lieutenant
receiver to the local inquisitorial subtribunal but he was related to
two inquisitors, Jeronimo Gregorio of Barcelona and Francisco Gre-
gorio of Mallorca.
Merchants, who were so poorly represented among the parents of
Valencia's inquisitors, accounted for 11 percent of the successful
applicants. Having largely excluded themselves from the highly lu-
crative international export/import trade, Valencian merchants
tended to concentrate on local or regional commerce, on exchange
with other parts of Spain, or on tax farming, which appeared to offer
greater and more secure profits than any commercial endeavor.
Unfortunately, bankruptcy was all too often the fate of Valencia's
merchant-familiares, especially in the difficult years around the
turn of the sixteenth century. In 1596, Pedro Romero, Juan Lazaro,
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Jeronimo Salvador, and Mateo Salvador, all merchants in Valencia
city and all familiares, went bankrupt and registered their property
with the Holy Office, which had jurisdiction over the suits filed by
their creditors. 10 ' It is little wonder, then, that given the protection
that the special inquisitorial fuero offered to familiares, so many
merchants sought to obtain titles.
It is reassuring that the percentage of familiares who claimed to
be simple labradores is almost the same — 43 percent among the
familiares whose genealogies I analyzed as in the comprehensive
survey of 1567. Indeed, there is little reason to believe that the
percentage should have fallen, given the Suprema's marked prefer-
ence for labradores. 108 Arguably, this preference may be ascribed to
the widely held view that peasants were least likely of any social
group to have Jewish blood and therefore least likely to contami-
nate the corps. A far more cogent explanation, however, lies in the
sheer economic and political importance of the wealthiest segment
of the peasantry — from which our familiares were drawn. With as
much right to be called "rentiers" as those with fashionable titles,
the wealthy peasants who formed the backbone of the familiatura
were frequently ambitious and enterprising men of business. 109
Agustm Balaguer, for example, whose father and grandfather were
both familiares, did a substantial trade in silk from the important
Jucar Valley town of Carcagente. 110
Even more important to the tribunal, however, was the fact that
wealthy labradores held the key to political power in many of the
villages and towns of an overwhelmingly rural kingdom. In a letter
that was written by his parish priest at the time of his application,
labrador Francisco Pascual Angles was called "regidor primo,"
while one of the witnesses in his genealogical investigation testified
that he was not only one of the heaviest taxpayers in the town but
also that he had charge of apportioning taxes among his fellow
citizens. 111 Carlos Alabart, who applied from the tiny village of Flix
in the diocese of Tortosa, came of a family that had long served as
bailiffs and regidores and was able to obtain an impressive series of
letters from local notables, including the bishop of Tortosa, in sup-
port of his candidacy. 112 One of the most extraordinary examples of
the local authority of a labrador was the case of Luis Barrachina
who applied from the tiny mountain village of Villamalur. Coming
from a family that had long dominated both Villamalur and neigh-
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183
boring Jerica, Barrachina appeared personally — with a notary in
tow — to welcome the tribunal's commissioner. Properly impressed
by this visit from the local cacique, Ximenez referred to him re-
spectfully as "his honor" in the letter he wrote to the tribunal
relating this incident and proceeded to carry out his investigation
by concentrating his interviews on witnesses who were related to
the applicant. 113
Politically dominant across much of the kingdom and in a good
position to benefit from such economic opportunities as presented
themselves during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Va-
lencia's wealthy peasants formed a steady and vital element among
the familiares. In return, they received a position of honor and a
certification of "purity of blood," which could help them gain
higher social standing. Above all, by entering the corps, they had
identified themselves with an institution that appeared as the
staunchest defender of traditional Catholic Spain, the Spain that
had afforded certain members of the peasantry an opportunity to
prosper.
The tendency toward endogamy that was such a marked feature
of Mediterranean society during the Old Regime was also quite
marked among Valencia's familiares. Information contained in the
genealogies of the familiares of Valencia reveals that 348 out of the
709 applicants, or 49 percent, had a relative or family member who
had served or was serving the Holy Office. In fact, the connection
with the corps of familiares was even closer, with fully 26.6 percent
having a close family member in the corps, 33.2 percent having one
or more relatives, and only 82 applicants, or 11.5 percent, having
anyone from their family serving as an official.
The Suprema left the tribunal in little doubt about its preference
for applicants from families that already had served in the corps.
Sometimes the mere fact that someone from the family was serving
would induce the Suprema to waive some particularly onerous and
expensive requirement of the genealogical investigation. 114 In
other cases, the Suprema would intervene directly to recommend
someone to fill a vacant post on the grounds that it had been in the
family. As a result, certain families had truly impressive traditions
of service. Jose Barberan, the cavalier who applied in 1633 from the
town of Onteniente, could boast a total of eleven familiares in his
family in addition to a commissioner. 115 Francisco de Benavent
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The Familiares and Unsalaried Officials
brought his family's tradition of membership in the corps of famil-
iares with him when he moved to Valencia city from Murcia. When
he applied in 1641, he could boast of a total of thirteen familiares
and four commissioners who had served or were presently serving
the Holy Office in the districts of Murcia and Valencia. 116
The tendency toward endogamy already prevalent among Valen-
cia's familiares was further reinforced by marital choices. Famil-
iares themselves would tend to choose women who came from
families with traditions of service to the Holy Office. In the case of
Jacinto Jose Agullo, this choice was made twice as both his first
wife, Maria Cebria, and his second wife, Luisa Aracil, came from
families with members serving as familiares, commissioners, and
117
alguaciles.
The inevitable result of this process of intermarriage was to pro-
mote the creation of a network of allied families who might domi-
nate the familiatura of a certain region for several generations. In
the village of Benisa, near the Costa Blanca south of Valencia city,
matrimonial alliances between two sets of cousins brought together
the Feliu and Gavila families, who together were to dominate the
local familiatura throughout much of the late seventeenth and early
eighteenth centuries. 118 Similarly, the marriage between Tomas de
Borja, ciutadan and familiar of Jativa, and Anna Gil, of the nearby
village of Canals, linked a family that had enjoyed familiaturas for
several generations in that town with the Climent family, which
had virtually dominated the corps in Canals through Anna Gil's
mother, Anna Climent. 119
One of the features of early modern Spanish society which
earned the constant opprobrium of theologians, moralists, and re-
formers was the effort by the more ambitious and capable members
of the popular classes to enter the ranks of the privileged orders. Of
course, obtaining a license as a familiar was not the same as becom-
ing a petty noble or ciutada, but with the cost of purchasing such
status, never less than 250 lliures, it must have seemed like quite a
bargain to pay for a genealogical investigation, the cost of which
was 51 lliures. Once that investigation had been successfully con-
cluded, one had achieved formal recognition of "purity of blood,"
which was the indispensable quality required for attaining noble
rank. Such recognition would greatly assist in obtaining member-
ship in one of Spain's prestigious military orders or in helping one's
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The Familiares and Unsalaried Officials
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son enter a Colegio Mayor. More important, perhaps, in a land
where nobility depended on the ability to successfully assert the
right to the privileges accorded to those with noble status, the
corps of familiares enjoyed privileges less than but not unlike that
of the nobility. It could therefore provide a platform from which to
successfully assert noble status in one of the innumerable hidalgma
lawsuits by which such claims were frequently decided.
Among Valencia's familiares, this process of using membership
in the corps to improve social standing becomes evident if we
compare the relative rank of fathers and sons, especially for certain
social categories. While the percentage of cavaliers does not tend to
change very much between the generations, social advancement
can be seen in the marked increase in the percentage of ciutadans
(11.2% of the fathers as opposed to 24.7% of the sons) and in the
dramatic decline of artisans (13.3% to 2.4%) and labradores (49.2%
to 43%).
Two of the men whose advancement to the rank of ciutada was
clearly bound up with membership in the corps of familiares in-
cluded Bautista Badia from the village of Sueca and Francisco Bone
of Onteniente. The Badia family's involvement with the corps of
familiares began when Bautista's father and uncle, who were both
wealthy peasants, entered the corps during the early years of the
seventeenth century. By the 1630s, his brother and his first cousin
Miguel had joined the corps, while his sister had married another
familiar from the village. Finally, in 1653, Bautista himself applied,
having previously obtained the title of ciutada. 120 In the case of
Bone, social advancement was connected not only with his own
family's membership in the corps of familiares — both his father and
uncle were labradores and familiares — but also with that of his
wife, Jesualda Ruescas. Jesualda's father was a merchant, and her
maternal grandmother was related to several familiares. In addi-
tion, her brother, Melchor £apata, acted as alcalde of the Valencia
tribunal during the visitation of 1566. 121
Apart from the desire to gain social prestige, which was perhaps
best expressed by a peasant from Traiguera who declared that he
had applied to the corps to "embellish his person and house with
the honorable title of minister of the Holy Office," there were
several other personal motives that inspired men to seek the of-
fice. 122 The desire to demonstrate a fervent Roman Catholicism was
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certainly the motive for many who joined the corps in the sixteenth
century. Even as late as 1747, a letter concerning Agustm Barra-
china, a wealthy peasant from the huerta, attested to his piety and
devotion to the church. 123 In many other cases, an application to
the corps was simply the result of family tradition. In a society
where the family was of overriding importance, and where so many
young people were named after their fathers or uncles, we should
not be surprised to find many applicants simply declaring that they
wanted to "carry on the services rendered by my ancestors." 124
But, there were other, more tangible advantages to membership
in the corps. One of the most important and jealously guarded of
the privileges enjoyed by familiares was an exemption from the
obligation to quarter the king's soldiers. Although the Kingdom of
Valencia was not the scene of major military activities until the War
of Succession, and then only briefly, troops did move through the
kingdom on their way to Catalonia or occasionally on bandit-
hunting expeditions so that the privilege of exemption from quarter-
ing was a significant one. Moreover, the very fact that the kingdom
was not a theater of war meant that there was less direct pressure
from viceroys and quartermasters on the exemption. The privilege,
therefore, was much easier to maintain than in a place like Galicia,
for example, where the poverty of the region and the exigencies of
war forced the crown to suspend it on more than one occasion. 125
Even so, maintaining the familiares' blanket exemption from
quartering was far from easy, especially as most of them were com-
moners and not normally exempt. A letter to the Suprema, written
to obtain its support against the Count of Aytona's attempt to billet
troops in familiares' homes in 1583, reveals that both the tribunal
and the Suprema had intervened strenuously before Viceroy Vespa-
siano Gonzaga to prevent him from violating the exemption in the
1570s. 126 Vigilance and a willingness to react quickly when the
privilege seemed threatened, however, meant that the exemption
privilege was maintained virtually intact through much of the Old
Kegnne.
Less easy to maintain, especially in the critical years of the mid-
seventeenth century, was a blanket exemption from military ser-
vice. The fact that a specific article had to be inserted in the Con-
cordia of 1568 prohibiting the inquisitors from defending familiares
who refused to serve their turn guarding the coasts demonstrates
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187
that they had been able to lay claim to at least a partial exemption.
But by the late 1630s, with the French invasion of Catalonia, Valen-
cia was suddenly thrust closer to the front. As a result, the famil-
iares' military exemptions were suspended, and they were told to
be ready for military service whenever called on by the viceroy. 128
During the Catalan Revolt, moreover, when the count of Albalat
was put in charge of recruiting soldiers from Valencia, even famil-
iares who were awaiting trial on criminal charges were given in-
ducements to serve. 129
In the Concordia of 1568, inquisitors were specifically prohib-
ited from attempting to secure tax exemptions for familiares, who
were to pay their taxes like any ordinary pechero. In spite of this
prohibition, the tribunal and the Suprema were prepared to strug-
gle to protect familiares from the increasing weight of fiscal obliga-
tions that bore down on all citizens of the monarchy during the
seventeenth century. 131 Given the extent of the financial exigencies
facing the monarchy, such efforts could have but limited success.
All unsalaried officials, for example, had to pay the new tax on wine
that was imposed to fund the donativo general of 1626. 132 In 1639,
the Suprema thought it had won a significant victory when it was
able to persuade the king to exclude unsalaried officials from the
massive forced loan of that year; but pressure on a local level, from
corregidores and other officials responsible for raising the money,
forced their inclusion. 133 All officials, including inquisitors, were
also forced to pay the media anata, a tax of one-half year's salary
paid on appointment to office. For familiares and others who col-
lected no salaries, the media anata became an additional fee paid
when they received their office. 134 In 1646, however, Philip IV did
grant the familiares a small but significant concession by exempting
from all special war-related contributions the oldest familiar in each
village, the two oldest in towns over 1,000 families, and the four
oldest in places over 2,000 families. 135
Once an individual was accepted into the corps of familiares, the
Inquisition exercised jurisdiction over him and would try any civil
or criminal offenses he had been accused of. Special statutes that
granted certain groups exemption from ordinary royal courts and
the right to be tried by judges belonging to that same corporation
were an important feature of early modern Spain. The Council of
War exercised jurisdiction over cases involving soldiers, ecclesias-
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tics were protected by the ecclesiastical statute, and the Council of
the Military Orders was given the right to try criminal cases involv-
ing knights in the first instance. 136 Even Valencia's own military
order of Montesa maintained its own jail and tried criminal offenses
committed by the knights. 13/
Placed within the context of the patchwork of statutes compris-
ing the Spanish legal system, the inquisitorial fuero could hardly be
described as unusual. And the actual degree of advantage conferred
by being subject to inquisitorial rather than royal jurisdiction
would depend on the exigencies of the moment and the degree of
competition between the two legal systems. Certainly, as far as
familiares living on seigneurial estates was concerned, the fuero
could provide them with a precious measure of protection from the
arbitrarv and abusive behavior of their lords. 138 Indeed, at least in
some instances, use of the fuero may have worked to eliminate or
reduce already existing social inequalities, thereby creating the
basis for a measure of greater social justice. In one instance, Barto-
lome de Oviedo, a candlemaker and familiar in Valencia city, went
to the home of cavalier Jaime Roca to collect for some wax that Roca
had purchased. This was not the first time that Oviedo had come to
collect, and almost as soon as the servant had shown him into the
house, Roca began to shout at him, calling him a "Jew," "swindler,"
and "dirty pig." Then, before Oviedo could say anything, Roca
picked up the chair he had been sitting on and hurled it at Oviedo,
injuring him slightly in the arm. In the criminal case that resulted,
the tribunal's decision was favorable to Oviedo, and Roca was
forced to pay his debt and sentenced to two months' exile from the
.. 139
city.
In the case of Oviedo vs Roca, the social distance between an
artisan and a petty noble had been narrowed substantially by the
fact that the former was a familiar and could appeal successfully to
his own jurisdiction to protect his rights. But the fuero could not be
used in such a way as to overtly challenge existing social hierar-
chies, no matter how just the cause. In 1583, Francisco Sanz was a
knight of the Order of Montesa and a commander of Benicarlo, but
he was also a gangster whose band of armed thugs terrorized the
village and the surrounding area. Some of these men were cap-
tured and imprisoned by local citizens under the leadership of
Pedro Pellicer, a familiar and village councillor. Sanz came to the
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189
village and demanded their immediate release, and, when Pellicer
refused, he arranged for a high official of the order to come out
from Montesa to brow-beat the villagers. When even this failed and
three hundred villagers turned out with their arms to drive the
official from the village, Sanz decided to appeal to the Holy Office.
Denouncing Pellicer as a rebel, Sanz demanded that the tribunal
punish him for persuading the villagers that he could "free them"
from the legitimate authority of the order. Memories of the Germa-
ma made any rural uprising, no matter how justified, the terror of
Valencia's governing authorities, so the tribunal moved quickly,
stripping Pellicer of his title and sentencing him to six years of exile
from the village and a 50-ducat fine. 140
One of the charges most often levied at the Valencia tribunal by
viceroys and Audiencia judges alike was that it exercised its crimi-
nal jurisdiction in such a way as to shield familiares who had com-
mitted crimes from the rigors of royal justice. 141 Even though the
source of this view should have invited a certain skepticism, it has
been routinely endorsed by modern scholars. Lea, for example,
when referring to the Concordia of 1568, which limited the use of
the criminal fuero, implies that it was a dead letter as far as the
tribunal was concerned, as "the tribunal was not accustomed to be
bound by law. " 142
Lea's most glaring error of interpretation has to do with the
Suprema's reply to a consulta sent to Philip IV by the Council of
Aragon after the murder of Martin Sentis by four familiares in 1632.
This consulta incorporated a memorial by the viceroy, the marquis
de los Velez, which repeats many of the traditional charges levied by
the enemies of the criminal fuero. Peace and security were impossi-
ble to secure because inquisitors never punished familiares harshly
enough to deter them from committing crimes. As a result, famil-
iares were the leaders of the criminal gangs that plagued the king-
dom, and there was no major crime in which they were not in-
volved. 143 In replying to these charges, the Suprema first ordered
the tribunal to work up statistics on the relative severity of the
sentences handed down by the criminal chamber of the Audiencia so
as to specifically compare the way in which the tribunal dealt with
familiares who were guilty of criminal offenses and the way in which
the Audiencia dealt with their accomplices. The Suprema then re-
plied formally to the council's memorial denying the charges of exces-
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The Familiares and Unsalaried Officials
sive leniency and accusing the representatives of royal justice of
manifest hostility to familiares. Determined as always to demon-
strate the Inquisition's stubborn refusal to accept any limit on its
authority, Lea informs us that the statistics gathered by the tribunal
"were unsatisfactory" because they were not referred to in the
Suprema's reply and that the reply itself was little more than a
"passionate outburst, precluding all hope of amendment. " 144 But any
attempt to assess the relative leniency of the Inquisition in criminal
cases involving its familiares must be placed within the context of the
operations of the Spanish and Valencian criminal court system. Once
this is done, the Suprema's reply and the figures that the tribunal
developed for it appear to demonstrate not that the Inquisition was
aberrant or unusual for a criminal court of the period but that its
procedures and sentencing were, if anything, typical of Spanish
criminal justice as a whole.
As the trials and spectacular public executions of bandits and
criminals indicate, Valencian criminal justice could be extremely
harsh. The marquis of Castelrodrigo (viceroy, 1690-1696), for exam-
ple, had the executions of several important bandit leaders to his
credit. 145 However, as diarist Ignacio Benavent lamented, "pardon-
ing thieves is nothing new in Valencia. " 46 Hampered by the consti-
tutional privileges of the kingdom and by the lack of effective police
forces, many viceroys found it more expedient to induce bandits to
leave, by offering them a pardon in return for a period of military
service abroad, than to attempt to hunt them down. 14 ' In a survey
that they carried out on the Suprema's orders, Valencia's inquisi-
tors found that the marquis de los Velez, the very man who had
been complaining so bitterly about the tribunal's excessive le-
niency, had recently issued twenty-seven pardons for all classes of
offenders. 148 The death penalty, which was almost automatically
decreed whenever a serious crime had been committed and the
offender had fled, was not actually imposed very often. Between
January and December 1679, the Audiencia condemned forty-
three persons to death, but not one execution actuallv took
1 149
place.
As far as any comparison between the Audiencia and the tribunal
is concerned, the strong competition for judicial business that char-
acterized the Spanish court system would have made it difficult for
one court to be noticeably harsher than another where jurisdictions
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The Familiares and Unsalaried Officials
overlapped. During the seventeenth century, the decline in the
number of litigants and the increasing demands on official salaries
(media anata, forced loans) sharpened this competition and made
both tribunals eager to profit from criminal cases bv reducing corpo-
ral punishment or imprisonment in favor of fines. The tribunal's
increasing dependence on the income from fines in criminal cases
is graphically revealed in its reply to one of the many demands for
war contributions that were relayed to it by the Suprema. After
deploring the fact that some officials were several months behind in
their salaries, the inquisitors pointed out that the only way they
were able to maintain the financial health of the tribunal was
through fines from criminal cases. In the case of this most recent
demand — the salaries of four soldiers serving six years — the tribu-
nal declared that the money would only be forthcoming if the
Suprema interceded with the king to resolve favorably several juris-
dictional disputes in potentially lucrative criminal cases involving
familiares. 150
The military and financial crisis of the seventeenth century also
made for delayed salary payments and fiscal difficulties at the top
levels of the Spanish administration. In its search for additional
revenues, the Suprema made quite a lucrative business out of
selling reductions in sentences. The case of Jeronimo Torrelles,
who was convicted of attempted murder in 1632, illustrates the way
in which both the tribunal and the Suprema were able to profit
from a single criminal prosecution. In 1633, after he had been
imprisoned for thirteen months, the tribunal sentenced Torrelles to
four years exile and a 200-ducat fine. A few months later, on applica-
tion of Torrelles's attorney, the Suprema agreed to lift his exile in
return for a consideration of 50 ducats. 151
Since* the financial pressures on the Bailfa General, which paid a
large percentage of the salaries of Audiencia judges, were also
increasing, the Audiencia also tended to reduce or eliminate corpo-
ral punishments in favor of monetary fines. The tribunal was able to
turn up several interesting examples of this in its survey of the
sentences the Audiencia handed down when it tried the accom-
plices of familiares whom the tribunal had convicted of murder.
Antonio Caballer, who was deeply implicated in the murder of
Martin Sentis, was tried by the Audiencia and fined 500 ducats.
Caballer's accomplice, familiar Jaime Blau, meanwhile, was tried
The Familiares and Unsalaried Officials
by the tribunal and sentenced to both a prison term and a fine.
Agustin Vidal was sentenced to two years' imprisonment by the
Holy Office, but his three accomplices were only given a 70-lliures
fine by the Audiencia.
The case of Jeronimo Pitart is a perfect example of the way the
representatives of royal justice were willing to trade corporal pun-
ishments for heavier monetary fines at the very time they were
denouncing the tribunal for excessive leniency in criminal prosecu-
tions. Arrested in 1629 for his complicity in a murder, Pitart was
first sentenced to a substantial term in the galleys and a 500-lliures
fine. The Audiencia then revoked the galley sentence on appeal,
and the viceroy subsequently pardoned Pitart altogether after in-
creasing his fine to 500 ducats. 152
If competition in the judicial marketplace and the financial diffi-
culties experienced by the entire court system tended to place
limits on the severity of judgments in criminal cases, the interest
taken in criminal matters by high royal officials worked to prevent
the tribunal from being excessively lenient. The struggle between
Audiencia and tribunal most often expressed itself in the ubiqui-
tous jurisdictional disputes (competencias) in which the failure of
the senior inquisitor and the regent of the Audiencia to agree as to
which tribunal should have jurisdiction over a particular case would
mean that each would send their version to their respective royal
councils. Final decisions would then be made by the king after
consultation with councillor representatives. As decisions were
taken at the very highest level, they were the subject of intense
lobbying. If the tribunal came to be perceived as being excessively
lenient, thereby imperiling the maintenance of public order in the
kingdom, its entire jurisdiction over familiares would have been in
jeopardy. It was this struggle for influence at a higher level that led
the marquis de los Velez to write and send his 1632 memorial to the
Council of Aragon, which was then involved in numerous jurisdic-
tional disputes with the Suprema over Valencian familiares.
The impact of this competitive atmosphere on limiting the tribu-
nal's options can be seen quite clearly in the case of Vicente St.
German. St. German, a cavalier and familiar in Valencia city, was
tried and found guilty of murdering Pedro Jaime and, having fled,
was sentenced to death by the Audiencia. Then, after negotiating
with the tribunal, which was doubtless eager to have the "business"
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193
of such a wealthy criminal, St. German surrendered himself and
was placed in the familiares' prison, after having been promised
that he would be given only a moderate sentence of three years
service in the presidio of Oran. 153
During the course of his trial, St. German's attorney wrote to the
Suprema on his client's behalf asking that he be released on bail.
The Suprema then wrote to the tribunal asking for its opinion about
this request. In its reply we catch a glimpse of the pressures the
tribunal was operating under. Advising the Suprema that it would
be best to refuse the request, the tribunal noted the "extreme
interest with which the viceroy and the Audiencia are following this
case because of their resentment over losing the jurisdictional dis-
pute to the Holy Office." If they saw him let out on bail, the
tribunal went on, they would very likely conclude that the "sen-
tence against him would not be carried out and we believe that
they would draw up complaints against this tribunal and our mode
of procedure." 154 The Audiencia's extreme watchfulness, the possi-
bility that a lenient sentence might provoke a complaint to the
crown and weaken the Inquisition's case in future jurisdictional
disputes, and greed on the part of both the Suprema and the tribu-
nal all combined to dictate a final sentence far severer than the one
St. German was promised when he surrendered. Instead of three
years in the presidio of Oran, the tribunal sentenced him to eight
years exile from the kingdom, the first six of which were to be
served in the presidio of El Penol, and a 200-lliures fine. Even St.
German's appeal to the Suprema misfired since that body sen-
tenced him to ten years forced service in Oran and increased his
fine to 300 lliures. 155 Evidently, this sentence was considered at
least as severe as any that would have been handed down by the
Audiencia in similar cases as it was chosen by the tribunal to sub-
stantiate the Suprema's claim, in its response to the Council of
Aragon's memorial, that promises of leniency given to familiares so
as to induce them to choose the fuero were not always carried
out. 156
One of the most complicated and difficult tasks that the historian
faces in discussing the familiares is to evaluate their role in the
repression of heterodoxy. We have Lea's dictum that familiares
were an obedient army of servants eager to carry out arrests on
their own initiative and willing to act as "spies upon their neigh-
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194
The Familiares and Unsalaried Officials
bors." ' More recently, Henry Kamen has challenged this view,
denouncing the "exaggerated representation of familiares as a spe-
cies of secret police" and pointing out that "the majority of denun-
ciations . . . were made by ordinary people." 158 In fact, at least in
the Valencia district, the familiar's role in the system of repression
appears more complex than it is depicted in either of these interpre-
tations. Spy and arresting officer the familiar certainly was, but
more significantly, he could also act as a conduit for vital informa-
tion that was brought to him because his connection with the Holy
Office was known to his neighbors, while the oath that he had
sworn and the fact that he was normally a person of some local
prominence made him the informant of choice whenever the tribu-
nal needed to find out about local conditions. 159
If the familiar's role as spy is defined as active information gather-
ing about a certain person or persons which might lead to their
conviction on heresy charges, then we must conclude that this role
was only occasional and limited primarily to the relatively closed
ethnic and religious minorities (Jews, Moriscos, Protestants) whose
activities were not likely to become common knowledge. In 1567,
for example, after the tribunal had received a report about the
existence of a Protestant cell in Teruel, a familiar was sent ahead of
Inquisitor Jeronimo Manrique, who was making a visitation in the
region, with orders to insinuate himself into the same group of
French artisans whose utterances had formed the basis of the re-
port. Earlier that year, the familiares of Teruel were ordered to
gather information about a group of men who were suspected of
spreading Protestant propaganda while traveling the region dis-
guised as monks. 160
But it was much less common for familiares to actively gather
information than it was for them to relay information they had
received through their contacts in the community. Thus, in 1603,
when Pedro Linares, a familiar of Villajoyosa, came to the tribunal
to report Jaime Lucas de Miguel for harboring Morisco renegades,
he was merely passing along information he had been given by the
village rector. 161
In the case of Juan Sala, familiar of Pego, we can catch a glimpse
of the activities of a true intermediary between the Holy Office and
the community. As a longtime familiar and wealthy labrador, Sala
was so well known to his neighbors that they would come to him
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195
with information about matters that they felt might pertain to the
Inquisition. When Marcos Torres, a young laborer who boarded at
Elizabeth Sastre's farm, was observed by Elizabeth's son Jaime
having sexual relations with a mule, she went to inform Sala of the
incident that very morning. 162 On another occasion, information
about an attempt to locate buried treasure by supernatural means
was given to Sala by two of the participants in the hope that he
would act as their intermediary during the forthcoming visitation
by Inquisitor licentiate Hermengildo Jimenez Navarro. With the
approval of the two men, therefore, a few days after Jimenez
Navarro arrived in the village, Sala came to testify about what he
had heard, and the inquisitor then began taking testimony from
those implicated in the plot.
If the seemingly effortless accumulation of information by Sala
appears to demonstrate the truth of Contreras's assertion that by
1560 familiares and commissioners formed "small and efficient
cells" that allowed the Holy Office to enter easily into contact with
the population while keeping a close watch over any heterodox
tendencies, the way he actually handled the information should
warn us against any such generalizations. 164 In the first place, both
incidents had occurred from four to five years previously, but Sala
made no effort to report them to a nearby commissioner or to
inform the tribunal until an inquisitor actually came to Pego on a
visitation. Even more remarkable, perhaps, is the fact that the plan
to discover buried treasure had long been common knowledge in
Pego — and, therefore, could hardly have been unknown to Sala —
but he took no official notice of it until it came up directly in a
casual conversation with Juan Jose Ribera, one of the men involved
in the scheme, about the general subject of finding hidden trea-
sure. Since this conversation took place in public only one month
before the visitation began, the circumstances strongly suggest that
it might never have been reported by Sala at all if an inquisitor had
not come to the village in person. After all, schemes to locate
buried treasure were extremely common in cash-starved rural Va-
lencia during the late seventeenth century, and they involved not
only respectable, even distinguished citizens but close relatives of
familiares. 165
As Carlo Ginzburg has already pointed out, the intermediary
always plays an active role that "can take different forms, depend-
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ing on his own social position, attitude towards the culture of his
social group, etc. " Clearly, an intermediary like the familiar can act
entirely in the interest of the elite institution he represents on a
local level or he can "attenuate the cultural contents which he
■ • , "166
transmits.
The fact that it took the tribunal four years to learn about the
bestiality incident even though Sala had heard of it the morning
after it happened hardly reveals him to be an "efficient" link be-
tween the tribunal and the local community. That Ribera could
speak openly with Sala about his experiences as a treasure hunter
reveals either a complete lack of awareness of Sala's role as familiar
or, what is more likely, a feeling that Sala would not report him to
the Holy Office because their views on searching for treasure were
essentially similar. If an intermediary may be compared to a filter,
then, as Ginzburg has stated, "there are no neutral filters." 16 ' As
the example of Sala reveals, the extent and rapidity of the transmis-
sion of information by a familiar would depend very much on his
own attitudes toward the type of information and the individuals
concerned. In the case of ethnic minorities (Moriscos, conversos),
information might be transmitted rapidly and without scruple, but
in the case of a neighbor and fellow Old Christian like Ribera, the
information might be transmitted only under certain special circum-
stances — like an upcoming visitation — or not at all.
Fortunately for the Holy Office, it did not have to rely exclu-
sively on its familiares for information about what was going on in
local communities. Parish priests like Gabriel Riutort of Castell des
Castells, who wrote to Inquisitor Jimenez Navarro to report that
one of his parishioners had declared that hell did not exist, had a
definite interest in maintaining orthodoxy and enforcing the provi-
sions of the Council of Trent regarding respect for sacraments. The
case of Barbara Avargues, an ailing spinster who wrote to the in-
quisitor from Calpe to inform him that Jacinto Balaguer, a labrador
of her village, had declared that purgatory was a myth appears to
demonstrate the truth of Kamen's dictum that "there was no need
to rely on a secret police system because the population as a whole
had been taught to recognize the enemy within the gates."
Another and perhaps less ambiguous side of the familiar's role as
informant was the tribunal's reliance on him for general informa-
tion on local conditions. This reliance no doubt reflected the view
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197
that his loyalty to the Holy Office would to some degree transcend
self-interest and produce more reliable information than any that
could be obtained from an ordinary citizen. Thus, in 1575, at a time
of increasing concern about possible attempts by Protestants to
smuggle quantities of heretical books into Spain, the tribunal called
on Miguel Palao, a familiar in Denia, to testify about the activities
of the French and British sailors in that port and about what mea-
sures could be used to exert greater control over cargoes. 169 Before
the expulsion of the Moriscos, familiares living in heavily Morisco
areas were the preferred informants when the inquisitors wished to
1 TO
learn about conditions in those places.
Familiares were also used rather extensively to carry out arrests
and to convey prisoners to the cells of the Inquisition when they
were arrested outside Valencia city. Most often these arrests were
carried out at the request of commissioners or officials of the tribu-
nal. As Alcalde Francisco de Hermosa explained when he was
asked about this practice during the visitation of 1566, he preferred
to use familiares to make arrests even in Valencia city because he
was so well known that suspects easily became aware of his ap-
proach, while familiares could do the job "con menos escandalo y
con mas secreto." 171 During the tribunal's early years, moreover,
the frequent use of familiares to carry out arrests of suspected
Judaizers had the effect of actively involving them in the tribunal's
anti-Semitic campaign. In hearings held in 1553, familiar Juan Pe-
rez de Pandilla recalled that his house stood on the same street as
the famous synagogue that had been run secretly by the Vives
family and that in 1501, when the tribunal decided to arrest those
suspected of attending services, the familiares who carried out the
1 T2
arrests were hidden in his house.
Sometimes carrying out arrests could prove to be extremely
dangerous. This was especially true when the tribunal directed
most of its activity against the Moriscos, who were armed and could
count on a certain amount of protection from their lords. In 1599,
several familiares sent by the tribunal to arrest certain Moriscos in
the neighborhood of Albarracm were met with armed resistance
that had been encouraged by the lord of the village, the count of
Fuentes. 173
At times, familiares acted quite independently, without even
waiting for permission from a commissioner or without receiving
i 9 8
The Familiares and Unsalaried Officials
direct orders from the tribunal. When Francisco Pisa, a merchant
and familiar of Grau, received a report from a local citizen who had
seen two men engaged in homosexual activity on a nearby beach,
he immediately arrested one of the men and had him placed in the
local jail. He then went to Valencia to report to the tribunal, which
ordered him to bring in the culprit. 174 Pisa's alacrity in responding
to a report of sodomy should not be misconstrued. His response no
doubt reinforced the tribunal's authority in the town, but it is
legitimate to wonder if he would have been quite so eager if the
Inquisition's willingness to punish sodomites had not been so per-
fectly in accordance with communal rejection of homosexual behav-
ior. In moving quickly to arrest a suspected sodomite, Pisa was
acting as an official of the Holy Office but equally as a leading
member of the community engaged in upholding and enforcing its
sexual norms.
Since the role played by familiares in maintaining the Inquisi-
tion's network of control was ambiguous at best, we may well ask
ourselves why it was necessary for the tribunal to maintain such a
large number of familiares even when its activity had substantially
declined after the expulsion of the Moriscos. One obvious answer
to this question has been alluded to in our earlier discussion of the
inquisitorial fuero: familiares were a lucrative source of fines and
legal fees. 175 Moreover, the genealogical investigation itself gener-
ated considerable fee income that helped support the entire infra-
structure of the tribunal, from the secretaries who would usually
carry out at least part of it to local commissioners and notaries who
would be used in more remote areas. The Suprema also saw that it
had some claim to the financial support of the familiares since they
were, at least nominally, officials of the Holy Office. Just as the
crown levied special taxes on officeholders (media anata), the
Suprema required each familiar to contribute to the fabrica de
Sevilla (funds earmarked for the Seville tribunal) as part of the costs
of his genealogical investigation. 176 In good years, when there were
a fair number of applicants, revenues from this source could be
substantial. On December 9, 1631, the tribunal reported to the
Suprema that between November 18, 1627, and September 16,
1632, the depositario de pretendientes had collected 8,492 reales
for this account. 177
Even more important than their financial contribution, however,
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The Familiares and Unsalaried Officials
199
was the political support that familiares could provide. The increas-
ingly aristocratic composition of the corps from the early years of the
seventeenth century and the insaculacion of many of its members
meant that the familiares were a far more socially prominent and
politically influential group than they had been in the mid-sixteenth
century. Faced with the increasing hostility of the Audiencia and the
suspicious attitudes of several seventeenth-century viceroys, not to
mention strained relations with the canons of the kingdom's colle-
giate churches and cathedrals, it became vitally necessary for the
tribunal to mobilize this support. As the Suprema itself declared in a
letter advising the tribunal to turn out all the caballeros who were
familiares to escort the officials of the court when they were called on
to march in public processions, "such measures are all the more
valuable now when the other tribunals are attempting to reduce
,,170
your authority in every possible way."
Within Valencia city, the most visible way of capitalizing on this
political support was through the organization of a chapter of the
San Pedro Martir confraternity. Named for Saint Peter, Martyr, a
Dominican inquisitor who was murdered by Cathars in 1252, chap-
ters of the confraternity eventually spread throughout the Spanish
tribunals. 1 ' 9 The ordinances of the Valencian chapter, which were
drawn up in 1610, reveal an organization that combined ceremo-
nial, religious, and charitable functions. Theoretically open to all
familiares in the district, as each of them paid a fee to the
confraternity on receipt of their titles, meetings were comprised
almost entirely of familiares from Valencia city and its immediate
environs. For the purpose of electing officers, the confraternity was
divided into two groups, cavaliers and ciutadans, with the prior
always belonging to the cavaliers and the other posts being equally
divided between the two. The organization also had a receiver
whose responsibility it was to collect and disburse the fee that the
confraternity received from each applicant to the corps for the
expenses of the confraternity. Aside from the Procession of the
Faith, the most important event that the members of the confra-
ternity participated in was the annual ceremony commemorating
the death of their patron saint. Marching in procession behind the
inquisitors and officials, the familiares must have been an impres-
sive sight in their special habits and the crosses they wore as insig-
nia of Saint Dominic. 181
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The Familiares and Unsalaried Officials
The remaining ordinances reveal that the members of the famil-
iares' confraternity had many of the same concerns as other devout
individuals who founded such organizations in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries. The confraternity had a chapter house with
a chapel where the special feast of the Cruz Nueva was to be held
and where masses were to be said for the souls of the deceased.
Members were to accompany the body of a deceased familiar to its
final resting place, and the confraternity was expected to provide a
payment of 10 lliures out of its treasury to aid members who found
themselves in financial difficulties. By the middle of the eighteenth
century, these ordinances had fallen into desuetude, but in 1749,
new ones were drawn up by an energetic military officer, Jose
Manrique de la Romana, familiar and colonel of Dragoons, in col-
laboration with the inquisitors. 182
By marching with the inquisitors and officials in public proces-
sions, the confraternity demonstrated that the tribunal enjoyed the
open and explicit support of numerous influential members of Va-
lencia's political elite. But the confraternity had even more direct
ways of making its presence felt on the side of the tribunal when it
was engaged in a struggle with the Audiencia or another competing
agency of government. Since the prestige of the tribunal was
closely linked to its ability to defend the fuero and the other privi-
leges of the familiares, the confraternity would occasionally send
one of its more distinguished members to court at its own expense
to lobby in favor of the tribunal. In 1630, for example, Alexandre
Vidal de Blanes, the prior of the confraternity, received permission
from the inquisitors to send an ambassador to court to protest
certain recent actions by the Audiencia constables. Luis Sorell, a
knight of Calatrava, was eventually sent, and the Suprema ordered
the tribunal to furnish him with the information that he needed to
make his embassy more successful. 183 An analysis of the accounts of
the confraternity reveals that it, too, provided a steady source of
extra funds for the inquisitors and certain officials. The inquisitors,
for example, received 300 reales for attending the feasts of San
Pedro Martir and Cruz Nueva, while the tribunal's nuncio received
200 reales for convening the familiares when the confraternity held
184
a meeting.
Outside of Valencia city, where the tribunal encountered serious
difficulties with the canons' council, which continued to resent the
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The Familiares and Unsalaried Officials 201
fact that the Inquisition enjoyed the fruits of one of their benefices,
with city councils eager to seize any opportunity to enhance their
prestige, and with bishops for whom the coming of the Inquisition
represented a loss of authority, it used the visitation as a way of
mobilizing the political support of its familiares. These "political
visitations, " which really came into their own in the first half of the
seventeenth century, had as their ostensible purpose the repres-
sion of religious and moral deviance, but their extremely limited
geographic range and the small number of cases that they actually
turned up versus the time and energy that the visiting inquisitor
spent in ceremonial and political activities clearly indicates their
real purpose. At the same time, the political visitation was any-
thing but a one-way street. Touring the district's larger towns and
organizing bodies of familiares to march in the processions that
were such a conspicuous part of every visitation were an excellent
way of demonstrating the continued political importance of the
Holy Office. But the local familiares also benefited from the pres-
ence of the inquisitor. His visitation, with its religious processions
and special church services, was an opportunity for them to demon-
strate their link with an important national institution, while the
special role they played in ceremonies that involved the entire
local power elite could hardly fail to enhance their social prestige
and political importance.
Perhaps the best example of this reciprocity is provided by the
visitation of Inquisitor Ambrosio Roche carried out in 1632. Gan-
dfa, Denia, Jativa, and Alcira were the principal stopping places
along his route, which was the most frequently visited part of the
district during the seventeenth century. These towns, along with
Oliva and Carcagente where the inquisitor stopped briefly to rest
and obtain a fresh team, were in the heart of the heaviest concentra-
tion of familiares outside the immediate area of Valencia city itself.
In this region, it was not likely that Inquisitor Roche would find, as
he did on his visit to the northern part of the district in 1645, towns
refusing to pay the costs of his lodging and transportation. 185 How-
ever, even here, where familiares were numerous and politically
influential, towns were jealous of their authority, and city councils
would seize every opportunity to gain advantage by suddenly refus-
ing to participate fully in certain ceremonies or by insisting on
styles of address or marks of courtesy that had not been customary
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202
The Familiares and Unsalaried Officials
in the past. During the 1632 visitation, Roche experienced difficul-
ties in Alcira, where the city council at first refused to march in the
procession that preceded the reading of the Edict of Faith. 1 6 Such
problems made it all the more important for the visiting inquisitor
to surround himself with a large following of familiares, since this
would indicate that the Holy Office still enjoyed significant local
support. To ensure the presence of as large a number of familiares
as possible for the twin processions of the Edict and Anathema,
Roche sent letters ordering all the familiares of the area to assemble
in front of his lodgings before the procession of the Edict. 187 But
the visitation was so popular among the region's familiares that
orders were unnecessary.
On the outskirts of Denia, for example, Roche was met by the
local commissioner, Francisco Rico, the notary, Antonio Mulet, and
a large number of familiares drawn from the entire area around the
city. After effusive greetings, commissioner and notary entered
Roche's coach, while the familiares, their servants, and relations
ranged themselves behind it and followed it into the city, firing their
muskets all the way. This boisterous welcome was atypical, but the
inquisitor was usually met outside town by a delegation that would
include the commissioner and one or more priests as well as a delega-
tion of familiares. 188 In Denia, where six out of the eight city officials
were either familiares themselves or related to a familiar, Roche had
no difficulty in obtaining the eager participation of the city council in
the processions of the Edict and the Anathema. 189
A large and impressive retinue of familiares was a signal to jeal-
ous city councils and to the public at large that the Holy Office had
the political support and the manpower to maintain a strong pres-
ence in a given area, while the familiares themselves were pre-
pared to provide lodgings and even transportation to a visiting
inquisitor. In Jativa, Roche stayed in the home of Jeronimo Sanz de
la Llosa, a familiar and knight of Calatrava. On his visit to the
northern part of the district in 1645, the familiares of San Mateo
offered to pay the costs of transporting him to his next destination
after the city had reneged on its promise to pay. 190
At the same time, local familiares derived considerable benefits
from the visitation. Obviously, their social prestige would be en-
hanced by close association with a high royal official whose visit was
a rare event. Not only did they play a leading role in the proces-
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The Familiares and Unsalaried Officials
203
sions of the Edict and Anathema but they were given a special
place in church during the ceremonies that marked the reading of
these two documents. Local clergy would sometimes protest these
arrangements, and, when he was visiting Segorbe in 1649, Roche
intervened to prevent the cabildo of the cathedral from removing
the bench that had been set up for familiares in the principal
chapel. 191 Furthermore, group participation by all the familiares in
ceremonies where they rubbed shoulders with the social and politi-
cal elite of the town tended to obliterate the social distinctions
within the group, elevating the labrador and merchant to the level
of the cavalier and ciutada.
The exchange of political and material support for group recogni-
tion and social prestige that characterized the relationship between
the inquisitor on visitation and local familiares was never more
evident than during Roche's sojourn in Jativa from April 22 to May
12, 1632. Met outside the city by a delegation led by Francisco
Milan de Aragon, familiar and royal governor of the town, and
including the commissioner and several leading familiares, Roche
was brought back into the city to lodgings at the home of Jeronimo
Sanz de la Llosa. 192 Two familiares also accompanied secretary Ju-
lian de Palomares when he went to the city council to ask that it
march in the procession of the Edict. (The city council ultimately
refused this request, but since three out of the five principal offi-
cials were familiares, the city was quite well represented.)
In return for this hospitality and support, Inquisitor Roche was
only too pleased to accept an invitation from Milan de Aragon to
attend the ceremonies marking the festival of San Pedro Martir. It is
in the phrase that he used to accept this invitation that Roche uncon-
sciously reveals the radical change that had taken place in the under-
lying purpose of the visitation to the district. He declared that he
would attend the festival "with the greatest pleasure, since apart
from carrying out a visitation I have come to this city to make myself
useful to all those who wish to employ me." 193 As very few actual
prosecutions resulted from this or from any other seventeenth-
century visitation, it may be inferred that the search for heresy had
become little more than window dressing for the real (political) pur-
pose of the visitation. 194
Apart from its familiares, the Valencia tribunal enjoyed the ser-
vices of a network of notaries and commissioners (fig. 3). In the
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204
The FamUiares and Unsalaried Officials
□ Cities
A Commissioners
O Notaries
Numbers indicate more than one in
immediate area
kilometers
Figure 3. Distribution of Commissioners and Notaries Sixteenth to
Nineteenth Centuries
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The Familiares and Unsalaried Officials
Valencia district, the commissioner replaced the obnoxious lieuten-
ant inquisitors whose activities had given rise to so many excesses. 195
During much of the first half of the sixteenth century, these
subtribunals were established in every major town beginning about
thirty miles from Valencia, but the Concordia of 1568 substituted
commissioners and allowed them to be appointed only in the princi-
pal towns of Tortosa, Segorbe, Teruel, Gandfa, Castellon de la
Plana, Denia, Jativa, and Valencia city itself. In fact, this regulation
was bent to accommodate certain individuals, and the record reveals
commissioners from Onteniente, Mora, Morella, andjijona, none of
which had been included in the original group. 196 Unlike the lieuten-
ant inquisitors, commissioners were not permitted to try cases them-
selves but merely to collect information and send it back to the
tribunal. They could not even arrest a suspect unless they felt that he
was likely to flee. 19 ' Commissioners also carried out genealogical
investigations, made arrangements to lodge inquisitors making a
visitation in their locality, and were used to interview suspects and
administer reprimands in cases of lesser importance. Given the fact
that commissioners were primarily from towns with cathedrals or
collegiate churches, it is not surprising to find that more than 63
percent of my sample were provosts, canons, or benefice holders in
these institutions. 198 In spite of their relatively exalted rank in the
ecclesiastical hierarchy, however, the curriculum vitae of applicants
reveal them to be the products of an educational system for priests
that had long since lapsed into a dull and plodding conformity. Jose
Monterde de Azpeytia, for example, who was a canon in the colle-
giate church of Mora just outside Teruel, had spent his entire educa-
tional career, from grammar school to monastic college in Teruel,
only leaving that city to take up residence in Mora where he served
for seventeen years before applying for the post of commissioner in
the Teruel district. 199
Since commissioners were confined to relatively few towns out-
side of Valencia city, it became necessary for the tribunal to recruit
ecclesiastical notaries to supplement their activities. Reflecting,
perhaps, the new importance of the parish priests in the post-
Tridentine era and the Inquisition's desire to align itself more
closely with that group even while it attempted its moral regenera-
tion, almost 67 percent of the district's notaries were either parish
priests or benefice holders in parish churches or rectories. The
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2()6
The Familiares and Unsalaried Officials
parish clergy of Valencia city were particularly well represented,
especially those from the wealthier parishes in the center. 200
Although they were not empowered to carry out arrests, in many
other respects the powers and responsibilities of notaries and com-
missioners overlapped. Where a commissioner was unavailable,
notaries would step in to make the arrangements for lodging a
visiting inquisitor. Furthermore, notaries, like commissioners,
were used to take testimony from witnesses and suspects. Some of
these men proved to be as effective and zealous as any inquisitor.
During the 1672 visitation, for example, Inquisitor Hermenigildo
Jimenez Navarro ordered the inquisitorial notary in Gandia, Fran-
cisco Tosca, to follow up on information that had come to him
regarding an attempt to find treasure using magic spells and other
superstitious means. Tosca not only followed the instructions that
he had received but exceeded them as skillful examination of the
original two suspects turned up more accomplices, whom he pro-
ceeded to interview on his own initiative. 201
Apart from carrying out these important functions, notaries and
commissioners occupied a special place in the network of control.
Like the familiares, commissioners and notaries were prominent
and visible representatives of the Holy Office so they were likely to
be the recipients of information that would lead to cases being
formulated by the tribunal. In one example, the commissioner of
Teruel received information from several weavers about certain
statements of a Protestant character that were made by a certain
Anton Gache. The commissioner acted quickly to carry out the
arrest and did the initial interrogations of witnesses. 202 But it was
precisely in their capacity as clergy that they were uniquely valu-
able to the tribunal, not only because of the information that they
received from their flock but because of their ties to the ecclesiasti-
cal network itself. As in any other closed professional group, priests
gossip with other priests and tend to have an intense interest in the
behavior of their colleagues. It was this interest that led licentiate
Pedro Martir Mateo, one of the tribunal's Valencian notaries, to
denounce the activities of Fray Vicente Oriente, a Franciscan
whose public ecstasies and relationship with beata Juana Asensio
were arousing considerable comment in the city 203 In another in-
stance, the commissioner of Tortosa, Jeronimo Terca, heard about
the flagrant homosexual activities of Melchor Armengol, rector of
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The Familiares and Unsalaried Officials
207
the tiny village of Bot, from the rector of the neighboring village of
Gandesa. After writing the tribunal for instructions, Terca was au-
thorized to examine witnesses and accomplices and accumulate
evidence to be used by the tribunal when it formulated its case. 204
In the light of the preceding discussion of family ties among the
familiares of the district and the strong tendency toward endogamy
throughout the Spanish bureaucracy, it is not surprising to find
that, very frequently, notaries, commissioners, and familiares came
from the same or related families. Among the commissioners, six
out of the ten in my sample had at least one member of his immedi-
ate family in the corps. This group included such men as Dr. Juan
Fababuix, a canon in the cathedral of Segorbe who applied to be-
come a commissioner in 1616. At the time of his application, his
father, Francisco, was serving as familiar in Vivel where both his
paternal and maternal grandfathers and his uncle on his mother's
side had served before him. 205
The relationship is even clearer and more direct in the case of
the notaries. Here, a comparison of the overall figures for the social
origins of parents suggests the possibility of close family relation-
ships as over 60 percent of both the familiares and notaries were
drawn from among artisans and labradores. This indication of
broadly similar social origins is strengthened by the fact that nota-
ries and familiares tended to be concentrated in the same geo-
graphic areas, with some 57.6 percent of the notaries drawn from
the rich silk-producing towns stretching from Alcoy to Almusafes.
Not surprisingly, therefore, 29 out of my sample of 55 notaries had
one or more familiares in their immediate family, while 40, or 71.7
percent, had one or more among their relatives. An outstanding
example of a notary related to a number of families closely tied to
the corps of familiares was Mosen Bernardo Calduch, a benefice
holder in the tiny village of Chert located deep in the Maestrazgo.
Calduch's father and paternal grandfather both served as familiares
in Chert, and he was related to no fewer than eight other individu-
als whose families dominated the corps in Chert and in the nearby
villages of Salsadella, Mas des Estellers, and Traiguera. 206 In cer-
tain cases, like that of Dr. Francisco Alexandre who applied from
Rusafa in 1752, family traditions of service in the corps of familiares
provided the inspiration for service as a notary. In his letter of
application, Alexandre made a point of declaring that he was apply-
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208
The Familiares and Unsalaried Officials
ing in order to "emulate" his father and several relatives who had
served the Holy Office as familiares from Rusafa. 207
If, as Kamen has insisted, those who opposed the Spanish Inqui-
sition were a tiny minority of intellectuals and conversos while the
Holy Office was overwhelmingly popular with Spaniards of all
classes, it was not only because "it helped to institutionalize the
prejudices and attitudes that had previously been commonplace in
society." 208 By recruiting a large corps of unpaid officials, the Inqui-
sition was able to associate itself with representatives of a broad
cross section of Valencian society. The corps of familiares, in particu-
lar, was unique among Spain's honorable corporations in containing
a majority drawn from the nonprivileged. As a result, an important
segment of the population were not merely passive observers of an
institution whose aim was to protect and enhance Spanish Catholi-
cism but were participants in its operations and beneficiaries of the
social prestige it could bestow.
At the same time as the Valencia tribunal began to lose ground in
its struggle with other powerful local institutions, the large and
influential corps of familiares, notaries, and commissioners bol-
stered its political power by providing it with a network of support-
ers in the most important towns and villages of the district. In this
way, a body of men originally formed to combat a perceived threat
from religious heresy began to resemble more and more the gangs,
clientage networks, or mafiosi that flourished so remarkably in
seventeenth-century Valencia.
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V
The Converted Jews: From
Persecution to Assimilation
The origins of the converted Jews, or conversos, who provided the
Valencian Inquisition with 91.6 percent of its victims during the
period 1484-1530 may be traced to the great series of pogroms that
swept over Spain during the summer of 1391. Everywhere, Jewish
communities were attacked and the Jews massacred or forced to
convert. In Valencia city, the pogrom began on July 9 when a group
of young men forced their way into the Jewish quarter. When the
Jews, now thoroughly alarmed, shut the gates to prevent others from
entering, the Christians trapped inside cried for help and a mob
composed primarily of artisans, vagabonds, and soldiers stormed the
ghetto. Amid scenes of religious exaltation, a number of Jews were
killed, and many others took refuge in the churches and accepted
conversion. 1 The same scenes were repeated, on a smaller scale,
when the pogroms spread to Alcira, Jativa, Sagunto, and other
places. 2 Deteriorating economic and political conditions in both Cas-
tile and Aragon, popular hatred of the Jews for their role as tax
farmers and moneylenders, and the vicious attacks launched against
them by fanatical anti-Semites like Ferrant Martinez, the archdea-
con of Ecija, had combined to severely disrupt the centuries-old
pattern of Jewish life in Spain. In spite of official statements deplor-
ing the rioting and forced conversions and the protection extended
to the remaining Jews by the kings of Aragon and Castile, restoration
of the Jewish communities to their former size and prosperity had
become impossible. 3
209
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210
The Converted Jews
Faced with growing discrimination and legally barred from hold-
ing offices in the towns or in the royal administration, most Jews
found their economic opportunities limited and worked as artisans,
peddlers, and shopkeepers. As a result, the Jewish community
continued to decline, and there was a slow but steady stream of
conversions to Christianity.
The legal and social disabilities that led to the decline of Spanish
Jewry in the fifteenth century did not affect the con versos. During
the first decades of the fifteenth century, there appear to have been
few obstacles to the assimilation of converted Jews into Spanish
society, and even such religious leaders as San Vicente Ferrer, who
dedicated himself to converting the Jews of Aragon, harshly criti-
cized those Christians who refused to accept the converts because
of their Jewish origins. Hard work, financial acumen, and the
traditional role of persons of Jewish origin in finance and revenue
collection made it possible for many conversos to obtain official
positions in the royal administration, enter the church, and join
city councils. 5
It was in Castile, where the conversos' rapid rise to power on
municipal councils coincided with the intensification of the strug-
gle between the disenfranchised popular classes and the munici-
pal oligarchy, that a virulent form of popular anti-Semitism
emerged. Spurred by the economic distress of the years 1447-
1449 and 1465-1473, this popular hatred culminated in a violent
series of riots reminiscent of the pogroms of 1391, directed not
against the Jews but against the conversos. 6 At the same time, the
entire basis for the conversos' integration into Spanish life was
being called into question. For confirmed anti-Semites like Pero
Sarmiento, the leader of Toledo's violent anticonverso rebellion of
1449, the conversos had continued practicing Judaism in spite of
their nominal conversion. Since they were really Jews masquerad-
ing as Christians, they had no right to occupy municipal offices in
the city of Toledo, offices from which it was alleged they had
already done incalculable damage to the city and its Old Christian
inhabitants.' For the chronicler and parish priest of Los Palacios,
Andres Bernaldez, there was no such thing as a sincere convert.
The conversos consisted of two groups only: those who had left
Spain to practice Judaism openly and those who had remained to
become crypto-Jews. 8
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The Converted Jews
211
The conversos' response to this polemic was to lay stress on the
traditional church position, which was reiterated by Pope Nicolas V
in a Bull of September 24, 1449, that baptism makes all men Chris-
tian regardless of their origins "siue Judaei, siue Gentiles." 9 For the
converso general of the order of Saint Jerome, Alonso de Oropesa,
the conversos' sincerity could not be doubted, and attempts by Old
Christians to place the conversos in a separate category were tanta-
mount to "dividing the body of Christ. " 10
It was this controversy over the sincerity of the converted that
spawned the first proposals for the establishment of a Spanish na-
tional Inquisition, and that very same controversy continues to
affect the way in which historians view the operations of the Holy
Office during the first phase of its activity. But how Jewish were the
conversos? It is on this issue that any moral and religious justifica-
tion for inquisitorial action against them must rest. If the vast major-
ity of the conversos were secret Jews, then, even though we might
criticize the Inquisition's procedures, it would be difficult to deny
some moral basis for its actions given the prevailing attitudes to-
ward religious heresy. However, if the conversos can be considered
largely Catholic in terms of their religious beliefs and practices,
then the Inquisition could be justly condemned for persecuting
them for reasons of racial hatred, greed, or political expediency.
Historians have been deeply divided over this issue. Some, like
I. F. Baer or, more recently, Haim Beinart, have insisted on the
essential Jewishness of the conversos. For Beinart, "the conversos
were, and remained, Jews at heart, and their Judaism was ex-
pressed in their way of life and their outlook. " 11 Virtually the oppo-
site position is held by Benzion Netanyahu, who insists that "the
overwhelming majority of the Marranos at the time of the establish-
ment of the Inquisition were not Jews but "detached from Judaism,
or rather, to put it more clearly, Christians." 12 Yet a third position is
represented by Caro Baroja, who holds that some of the conversos
formed a distinct religious tendency neither Jewish nor Christian. 13
Analysis of the cases of Judaizers brought before the Valencia
tribunal, however, reveals a complicated picture that does not
seem to entirely fit any of these views. When the Inquisition began
its operations in the district during the mid- 1480s, the conversos
appear to have been divided into three broad groups: those who
did everything possible to maintain a Judaic style of life and were
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The Converted Jews
Jewish in all but name, those who believed in and practiced both
Judaism and Catholicism simultaneously, and those who believed
themselves to be fervent Catholics. Representatives of all three
tendencies fell into the Inquisition's clutches because even in the
case of persons in the latter category, the slightest lapse of memory
regarding the performance of a Judaic ceremony or mitzvah or the
failure to mention even one person who was present during the
performance of such a ceremony in a confession made during a
period of grace could, and often did, result in serious trouble with
the Holy Office.
The rich and devout Jewish life-style led by Valencian notary
Pedro Alfonso and his family attests to the continued strength of
Judaism among the conversos long after they had been all but
written off by rabbinical observers in both Spain and North Africa.
Alfonso and his family observed the Sabbath rigorously and regu-
larly. On Friday evening, candles were lit and food was prepared to
be consumed cold on the Sabbath when no work of any kind could
be performed. Alfonso practiced Jewish ritual slaughter, and the
family observed the kosher dietary rules by rigorously refraining
from eating pork or other forbidden items. All the major Jewish
Holy Days were celebrated, including Yom Kippur (when the fam-
ily would be joined by other devout conversos), Passover, and
Succoth, when Alfonso would build the ritual Succoth hut with his
own hands. Apart from the performance of Jewish mitzvah, Al-
fonso's immersion in Jewish culture is demonstrated by his ability
to speak and read Hebrew. This was so widely known that when a
Jew who was carrying a Hebrew book was asked who in Valencia
could read it, he answered, Pedro Alfonso. Witnesses also testified
that Alfonso and his wife spoke Hebrew in the home.
Alfonso's devotion to Judaism was only equaled by his disdain for
Catholicism. According to former servants and other witnesses, he
did not maintain any images of Christ or the saints before which
prayers could be said. He regularly ate meat during Catholic fast
days and took great pains to avoid going to mass. He had also been
heard to denounce Christians as idolators because belief in the
Trinity implied belief in three separate gods. Finally, Alfonso made
no secret of his belief that Judaism was superior to Christianity and
frequently declared publicly that he "would rather be a Jew than a
Christian." 14
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213
Frequently, the flame of Jewish belief among the conversos was
kept alive by women. In fact, Judaizing was one of the few offenses
tried by the Valencia tribunal in which there was a rough equality
between the sexes. One of these devout women was Brianda
Besant of Teruel. Like Alfonso, Besant was assiduous in observing
the Sabbath and the Jewish High Holy Days. In addition, she
would pray in Hebrew several times each day and attend services
in Teruel's synagogue each Friday evening and twice on Saturday.
Besant was also recognized as a leader of Teruel's con verso commu-
nity and would frequently hold services in her own home. On High
Holy Days when it was too dangerous to go to the synagogue, she
and several other devout conversos would go to a house near the
Jewish quarter from where they could hear the Jews pray and sing.
Her rejection of Christianity was complete. She had frequently
declared that Christians were her enemies and denounced them as
idol worshipers and "believers in many gods instead of one only. "
She specifically denied the Trinity and was accused of refusing to
learn any Christian prayers until after the Inquisition had com-
menced operations in the city. 15
Devoutly Jewish conversos maintained a close relationship with
the local Jewish community, and their financial support for Jewish
worship, charitable contributions, and purchases helped to sustain
those communities economically in the face of the growing pres-
sure against them. Both Besant and Alfonso contributed money and
oil to the synagogue, while Besant even paid for a reserved seat
there so that she could attend prayers on the High Holy Days.
Alfonso also gave charity to poor Jews and gave Jews gifts of oil so
that they would pray for him when he fell ill. A desire to maintain
ritual purity in their lives and religious observances also led these
conversos to make certain purchases from Jewish merchants. Jew-
ish butchers were popular as a source of meat that had been ritually
slaughtered, and if the converso wanted to slaughter in his own
yard, he would frequently hire a Jew to do it. 16 Sometimes Sabbath
food was obtained ready cooked from the ghetto, and Besant, Al-
fonso, and other devout conversos would send flour to the ghetto so
that Jewish bakers could bake matzohs for Passover. Alfonso even
went so far as to purchase most of his wine from a Jewish-owned
tavern. For such devout converted Jews, the existence of a viable
and functioning Jewish community close at hand was more than just
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214
The Converted Jews
a source of ritually purified products. They felt themselves to be a
part of that community and were considerably less "detached" from
it than those Jewish intellectuals of the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries whose rationalism and epicureanism had been con-
demned by orthodox rabbis long before any large number of Jews
had converted. On occasion, the rigid orthodoxy of these conversos
exceeded that of the Jews themselves. Jose Alfara, a Jew from
Valladolid who was a witness in the trial of Enrique Fuster, testified
that one day when he was visiting Fuster in Valencia, he expressed
a desire to witness a Christian procession in honor of the Virgin
Mary which was about to take place. Both Enrique and his son
Adrian were horrified at the suggestion and refused, declaring that
it would be a sin and that the Bible prohibited idol worship. 17
Enrique and Adrian Fuster, Pedro Alfonso, Brianda Besant, and
her husband, Luis de Santangel, were all executed during the
period when the Valencia tribunal devoted most of its attention to
the converted Jews. There can be little doubt that they, along with
hundreds of others like them, "perished at the stake as martyrs to
their faith" and were the victims of a religion that they neither liked
nor understood. 18
The term martyr cannot, however, be applied to all conversos
tried by the Spanish Inquisition. Those within the ranks of the
conversos who saw nothing incompatible in believing in both Juda-
ism and Catholicism at the same time also suffered. Sincere believ-
ers in the promise of salvation made by both religions, their trag-
edy was the tragedy of people who assume a degree of religious
toleration in an age of religious totalitarianism.
Pedro Besant, Brianda's brother, had been brought up in a pro-
foundly Jewish environment, but he, unlike his sister, had taken
pains to learn Christian prayers and observances. At the same time,
he was intensely curious about Judaism and had numerous conver-
sations about it with local Jews. One of these, a certain Zacarias,
had written down some of the psalms of David for him. The result,
as he declared in his i486 confession, was that during the period in
which he confessed engaging in Judaic observances, he derived
great pleasure from reciting Christian prayers so that when he
awoke in the morning he would first recite the articles of the faith
and Our Father and then, after washing his hands, he would say
several of the psalms of David that he had been taught. Moreover,
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The Converted Jews
215
he insisted that during this entire period, he "believed firmly and
completely in both faiths." 19
The case of Pedro de Ripoll, a merchant and tax farmer in the
town of Albarracm, illustrates how a con verso could practice both
Judaism and Catholicism while experiencing strong ambivalent feel-
ings that came from an inability to feel entirely at home in either
religion. In the course of his trial, witnesses described Ripoll as
celebrating the Sabbath and other Jewish festivals, frequenting the
company of Jews, and eating matzohs and ritually slaughtered meat
in his home. During the same period, other witnesses observed
him violating the Jewish Sabbath by working on Saturday, attend-
ing mass regularly, and going to confession. During the time when
he was most eager to welcome Jews into his home, he was also
reported to have denounced his first wife in public as a "mala
cristiana" who "had dealings with Jews." In 1473, Juan Montarde,
the bailiff of the town, caught him beating his first wife with a stick,
but when he ordered him to stop, Ripoll said, "Let me alone . . .
leave me with this bad Christian." This tense and conflict-ridden
equilibrium could not last forever, and when the Inquisition ar-
rived in the mid- 1480s, an abyss opened before Ripoll. His initial
reaction was to denounce the Inquisition. "Inquisition, what Inqui-
sition . . . they are robbers, not inquisitors." But soon after, he
began instructing the servants not to let any more Jews in the
house, had several pigs slaughtered, ate pork for the first time, and
began fighting with his second wife over her continued desire to
observe Jewish dietary precepts. They began eating separately, and
he refused to eat the unleavened bread she bought from the Jewish
baker. 20 With the arrival of the Inquisition, Ripoll hastily aban-
doned his effort to be both a Jew and a Christian, but his previous
Jewish observances had made him vulnerable to denunciation. In
1522, after several separate trials, Pedro de Ripoll finally ended at
the stake.
The third tendency among the conversos, and the one that
church, crown, and Inquisition were ostensibly trying to promote,
was to assimilate freely into the wider Christian community. Unfor-
tunately, they could not escape their past, and rigid inquisitorial
procedures, which seemed to take little cognizance of shades of
guilt, frequently resulted in heavy punishment.
In some cases, the con verso had practiced Jewish mitzvah as a
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The Converted Jews
teenager in his parents' home but abandoned Judaic practices soon
after he set up an independent establishment. Jaime Almenara, a
Valencian draper, clearly fell into this category since all the testi-
mony in his case related to the period some 35 to 40 years earlier
when Almenara was between twelve and fifteen years old and still
living in the home of his parents. In fact, he seems to have had only
the vaguest notion of the real significance of the Jewish ceremonies
that he had celebrated so long ago. This was shown when he re-
sponded to an inquisitor's question about whether he had ever
observed a fast in honor of Queen Esther. In reply, Almenara de-
clared that "he had fasted not eating all day until evening and knew
that they were Jewish fasts but did not know what they were called
except that he thought that they were in honor of the devil. "
In spite of the complete absence of any evidence for Judaic obser-
vances as an adult, Almenara' s problem was that he had failed to
confess two instances of celebrating Yom Kippur as a teenager in the
confession that he had made during the 1491 period of grace. Evi-
dence of these instances having surfaced, Almenara was promptly
arrested and tortured. These omissions, combined with his failure to
mention the names of his parents and other family members who
celebrated with him, were sufficient to open him up to the charge of
having confessed "falsely and incompletely." After a long trial,
Almenara was condemned to the stake on May 29, 15 18. 21
In the case of Pedro Mateo, a master velvet worker brought to
trial in June 1519, Judaism seems to have been little more than a
flag of convenience required to get through his apprenticeship. All
of the evidence of Judaic observance (Yom Kippur and the Sabbath)
dealt with a period some 40 to 45 years earlier when Mateo was
learning his trade from a succession of converso masters. Since, like
all other apprentices, he lived with the family of his master, he was
in no position to refuse when Antonio Palau's wife insisted that
everyone in the house take part in Yom Kippur observances. Appar-
ently, after he had become established as a master in his own right,
these Judaic observances were forgotten. He married a woman who
was half Old Christian and was regarded by both conversos and Old
Christians as a practicing Catholic who went regularly to mass and
confession. Mateo had become so assimilated that even when he
swore his oaths, they were exactly like Old Christian blasphemies,
and his occasional expressions of doubt about the Immaculate Con-
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The Converted Jews
217
ception were no different from those expressed by hundreds of Old
Christians. 22 Mateo was fortunate; after a long trial lasting almost
two years, inquisitors Juan Calvo and Andreas Palacio rejected the
prosecuting attorney's call for the death penalty and sentenced him
to confiscation of property and perpetual imprisonment. 23
In certain cases, there can be little doubt that an inquisitorial
trial interrupted the process of assimilation, sometimes with tragic
consequences. Rafael Baro was another artisan who performed
most of his Judaic ceremonies either as a child or when he served
con verso master artisans during his apprenticeship. In fact, he gave
every evidence of being a devout Catholic. He attended mass regu-
larly, went to confession, celebrated Christian holidays and fast
days including Lent and Good Friday, and claimed special devotion
to the Virgin. Baro was a con verso already well on his way to
becoming a devout Catholic, but arrest by the Holy Office was a
shattering blow to his precarious new identity. On November 16,
1520, a little more than two months after his arrest, Baro commit-
ted suicide by hanging himself in his cell. 24
When the Inquisition began operations in the district during the
mid- 1480s, it found a close-knit con verso community whose rela-
tive affluence and local political influence could have made it al-
most impossible to successfully prosecute any large number of
Judaizers. Its success in meeting this challenge was due, at least in
part, to the con versos' own social relations. Jews, Old Christians,
and conversos had much to tell the Inquisition about the activities
and beliefs of conversos who practiced Judaic ceremonies. The fact
that the Inquisition was able to make use of witnesses from all of
these groups is less a tribute to the perspicacity of judges and
prosecuting attorneys than to the ambivalent nature of the con-
versos' position in Valencian society.
In the famous decree of March 31, 1492, by which Ferdinand
and Isabella ordered the Jews expelled from Spain, they stress that
the major reason for their decision was the aggressive efforts made
by Jews to "subvert" Christians and draw them to Judaism. The
decree asserts that the Jews did everything possible to achieve
their goal: instructing Christians in the Judaic ceremonies and fasts
they had to observe, organizing meetings where neophytes would
be instructed in Jewish law, and giving them Hebrew prayer
books. 25
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Coolness and reserve rather than the zealous wooing implied by
the decree of expulsion seem to have characterized the attitude of
Valencia's remaining Jews toward the conversos of the district. Of
course, there were rare instances of a Jew whose behavior toward
the conversos matched exactly the description of converso/Jewish
relations given in the decree of expulsion. In 1488, Saloman
£aporta, a Jew from Sagunto, was fined and exiled for having in-
vited conversos to his home for kosher meals, reading the Old
Testament to them in Hebrew, and teaching Hebrew to converso
children. 26 Almost equally rare were Jews who openly expressed
hostility or disdain for conversos. When Juan Aguilaret went to a
Jewish acquaintance in Valencia city and confessed with tears in his
eyes that he was sick of Catholicism and wanted to turn Jewish, the
Jew replied, "Go along with you, you have worn out one faith and
now you want to use up another." Most Jews were willing to
provide wealthy converso homes with services like slaughtering or
ritual products like matzohs, and they certainly were not unwilling
to accept contributions of oil or money for the synagogue or charity
for themselves. The danger to the converso and the thing that
exposed him to inquisitorial persecution was that the Jews then
became a source of information about his activities.
In three separate trials held in 1485, for example, the tribunal
found that David and Pastor Enforna were quite willing to give
evidence about contributions of oil and money given to the syna-
gogue by three of Teruel's most devout conversos, Francisco de
Puigmija, Pedro Besant, and Ursula Navarro. Their testimony was
all the more damaging because the Enforna brothers had an official
28
connection with the synagogue. In two of these trials, the Inquisi-
tion even received testimony from a Rabbi Samual who had been
hired to slaughter animals by both Pedro Besant and Francisco de
Puigmija. In Besant's case, the rabbi was able to add that he had
observed him performing Jewish prayers some fifteen years earlier.
With the exception of fanatics like £aporta, the relationship be-
tween Jews and conversos in the Valencia district seems to have
been one-sided. Far from seeking to attract conversos back to their
old religion by active proselytizing as implied in the decree of
expulsion, the Jews were content to let the conversos come to them
for services, products, and occasional instruction while maintaining
an attitude of coolness and reserve toward even those who seemed
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The Converted Jews
most devout. At Ursula Navarro's trial, for example, Pastor Enforna
testified that he considered her "neither Jewish nor Christian." 29 As
far as the Inquisition was concerned, many of Valencia's orthodox
Jews may well have agreed with such Jewish leaders as Don Isaac
Abravanel that it was part of God's plan to punish those who had
willingly rejected the faith of Israel. There could be nothing wrong
with a Jew testifying against conversos and thereby causing their
downfall, for as Jose Jabez, another contemporary Jewish writer,
observed in referring to the conversos, "When the wicked are lost,
... r ... "30
it is a cause tor rejoicing.
During the trial of Manuel Manrana, one of the defense wit-
nesses declared that he believed him to be a "good Christian"
because he "got along well with Old Christians, went to mass, ate
pork and gave alms to poor Christians." 31 In an age when popular
religion consisted of little more than a collection of rituals and social
customs, there was no other way to judge, and it was the conversos'
failure to conform to the behavioral patterns expected of a Catholic
rather than any deeply held religious views that made him an
object of suspicion and denunciation for his Old Christian neigh-
bors, servants, and associates.
Occasionally, the converso would be unfortunate enough to run
across a hardened anti-Semite who would watch every movement
for signs of religious nonconformity. Aldonza Miro had been left
impoverished and embittered after she had been reconciled with
confiscation of property in March 1491. She made the mistake of
criticizing the Holy Office to her neighbor, Diameta Culla, a beata
(a laywoman living in pious retirement) who had already de-
nounced three other conversos, one of whom, Frances Vicent, had
died at the stake. Her suspicions thoroughly aroused, Culla and her
sister Margarita, another beata who lived with her, began watching
Miro's every move. Observing Miro and her daughter from a little
window from which they could see directly into the main room of
her house, the Culla sisters saw her light Sabbath candles and
celebrate the Sabbath and eat meat on days prohibited by the
church. At Miro's trial in 1501, the only witnesses against her were
the Culla sisters and their servant, but that was sufficient, in spite
of the fact that Miro had identified the Cullas as her enemies, to
have her condemned to death as a relapsed heretic. 32
Old Christian domestic servants were an especially rich source
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220
The Converted Jews
of testimony for the tribunals. As a servant and dependent of a
eonverso household, an Old Christian could find herself directly or
indirectly helping the family to perform Jewish ceremonies. In
Pedro Besant's home, for example, even the servants were prohib-
ited from working on Saturdays and were expected to help with
ritual slaughtering. 33 At the same time, given the social distance
that separated masters and servants in Valencian society, a servant's
assertion of her religious attitudes could lead to abuse. In Manuel
de Puigmija's devoutly Jewish home, his wife, Violante, beat a
servant who refused to eat meat at Lent, and the family prevented
another servant from attending mass during the entire two-year
period that she worked for them. 34 Both servants had the satisfac-
tion of taking revenge for these and other abuses by denouncing
their eonverso masters to the Holy Office.
But it was not only domestic servants (mainly female) who could
be a source of danger to con versos. They were in constant danger
from others whom they employed in a variety of capacities. In
1483, for example, Fernando Ligador was denounced for Judaizing
by his former apprentice, Rodrigo de Morales. 35 The person who
first came forward to denounce Pedro Alfonso, a wealthy Valencian
notary and tax farmer who was executed in 1487, was a scribe who
had worked in his home, while one of the most important witnesses
in Pedro Besant's trial was a man whom he had hired to assist him
while he traveled through the district on business. In each in-
stance, the Old Christian had noticed something unusual about the
converso's behavior and came forward later to denounce him to the
Holy Office. 36 The domestic servant beaten by her mistress, the
poor scribe envious of the wealth and influence of the notary for
whom he worked on an occasional basis, the manservant paid starva-
tion wages — to all these the Inquisition offered an opportunity for
revenge that they would not have had if their masters or employers
had been Old Christians.
In constant danger of denunciation by Old Christians, and ex-
posed to grave risks because of their relations with Jews, Valencia's
conversos were also vulnerable because of the divisions within
their own community. Within families, the appeal of the wider
Christian society varied with the individual and generated strong
tensions between the more assimilated and those who endeavored
to remain faithful to the old ways. Even Manuel de Puigmija, who
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The Converted Jews
221
was rigorous in carrying out a large number of Jewish mitzvah, had
been expelled from his parents' home because his father felt that he
was lax in his Sabbath obligations. 3 ' Frequently, tensions such as
these produced denunciations. Gracia Garbellent, who had been
reconciled during the 1485 period of grace and then continued to
carry out Judaic observances, made the mistake of remonstrating
with her son's fiancee Beatriz about her habit of saying Ave Maria.
She also forced the girl to celebrate the Sabbath, then quarreled
with her and ordered her out of the house. In 1491, a conscience-
stricken (or perhaps merely fearful) Beatriz came to the tribunal to
confess having celebrated the Sabbath in her prospective mother-
in-law's home and testified to the large number of other Judaic
ceremonies that were regularly practiced there. Gracia's son Juan
also provided the tribunal with evidence that led to his mother's
condemnation as a Judaizer and execution as a relapsed heretic in
January 1492. 38
Conversos who performed mitzvah were also vulnerable to black-
mail from unscrupulous acquaintances whose capacity to extort
money from their victims was a direct result of the Inquisition's
campaign of persecution against Judaizers. One of these converso
blackmailers was Alfonso Fusillo, who made a career out of extort-
ing money from his fellow conversos while himself carrying out
Judaic observances. Fusillo, who would frequent the homes of
many converso families and seek to gain their confidence by recit-
ing some of the Jewish prayers that he knew, never lost an opportu-
nity to wring money out of conversos who appeared vulnerable to
denunciation. In one instance, he insinuated himself into a quarrel
between Daniel de Artes and Miguel Ferrer after the former had
threatened to expose Ferrer to the Inquisition as a Judaizer and
"have all of you burnt." Fusillo calmed Artes and persuaded him
not to denounce Ferrer but then proceeded to blackmail Ferrer
himself. 39
Every success that Fusillo had in extorting money from his
converso acquaintances and business associates, however, made
him more vulnerable to denunciation in his turn. The conversos
who paid him and feared him were also in a position to denounce
him since he had recited Jewish prayers or celebrated mitzvah in
their company. At the same time, by not revealing to the Holy
Office the names of conversos whom he knew to be guilty of
222
The Converted Jews
Judaizing so that he could blackmail them, he had committed the
serious offense of failing to inform the Holy Office concerning evi-
dence of heresy. In the end, Fusillo was arrested when one of his
victims denounced him in the course of his trial. Tortured and
forced to admit his own Judaizing as well as his activities as a
blackmailer, Fusillo was condemned to death not only as a Judaizer
but as a "concealer of heretics." 40
Like any other criminal court under the Old Regime, the Inquisi-
tion provided the community with a powerful weapon of social
control that could be used to increase the cohesion of already
tightly knit communities by permitting them to settle disputes at
the expense of unwanted or marginal elements. Under these cir-
cumstances, the Inquisition became a powerful new weapon in the
social struggle.
In the late 1490s, one of the vendettas typical of all Mediterra-
nean societies of the period broke out in Gandia between neighbor-
ing converso and Old Christian families. It started, as many of them
did, with a quarrel among women, in this case, Onafranca Guitart,
the wife of Pedro Guitart, and Blanca Manrana, Manuel Manrana's
mother. The two women fought, and when Blanca retreated to her
own home, she was followed by several angry members of the
Guitart family carrying weapons and bent on revenge. But when
Julio Guitart and several other men invaded the Manrana home
and attacked young Manuel Manrana, he fought back and killed
Julio with a lance thrust to the face. In revenge, Pedro Guitart
killed Francisco Tristany and Francisco Francoli, two close relatives
of the Manrana family. Both extended families now became in-
volved in the vendetta, which went on with more killings until
even Martin Giner, an important judicial official of the city, who
happened to be Pedro Guitart's son-in-law, was assassinated by a
member of the Tristany family who was linked with the Manrana.
The Old Christian Guitart and their allies, the Fortuny, appeared
to be losing the struggle against the combined weight of the
Manrana, Tristany, and Francolin families when they decided to
denounce Manuel Manrana to the Inquisition. The strategy proved
brutally effective. Manuel Manrana was arrested, and after a two-
year trial in which he was tortured three times, he admitted to
performing some Judaic ceremonies. He was sentenced to die at
the stake on September 19, 1505. Not content with this, and with
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The Converted Jews
223
its suspicions thoroughly aroused, the Inquisition moved against
the entire clan, and in the years after 1503, eight other members of
the Manrana family and six members of the Tristany were tried,
and seven were executed. 41
The Valencia tribunal's activity against the converted Jews may
be divided into two major periods. The first of these, a span of only
forty-six years lasting from the commencement of its operations in
the kingdom in 1484 to about 1530, was a period of intense persecu-
tion in which highly motivated inquisitors and officials decimated a
weak and divided converso community. During this time, the Va-
lencia tribunal tried 2,160 Judaizers and handed down 909 death
sentences. The second period, from 1540 to 1820, witnessed a
sharp decline in the number of Judaizers, with only 100 trials taking
place. The most intense persecution occurred during 1701-1730
when 55 trials are recorded. Thus, in the period before 1530, the
Valencia tribunal had already tried 95.4 percent of the Judaizers it
was to bring to trial during the entire 336 years of its history. This
second phase was also one of decreased severity, with the tribunal
only handing down seven death sentences and suspending thirty-
one cases, or 29.2 percent. The precipitate decline in this aspect of
the tribunal's activity stands in marked contrast to certain other
tribunals where conversos continued to make up a surprisingly
large percentage of the accused. Of course, in most of these cases,
the tribunals involved were either close to the Portuguese border
(Llerena, Galicia) or received a large influx of Portuguese New
Christians because of the economic opportunities offered in these
areas, or because they were close to Madrid (Toledo). As far as the
Valencia tribunal was concerned, the ferocity and intensity of the
first phase meant that the majority of devout Judaizers among the
Valencian conversos had been either physically eliminated or
forced to assimilate, while the relatively small number of Portu-
guese who made their way to the kingdom provided the tribunal
with very few victims.
Apart from a sprinkling of nobles and priests during the first
phase of persecution, the social composition of the Judaizers re-
mained substantially uniform. The group was dominated by a mid-
dle class of merchants, money changers, and shopkeepers (44.6%)
and a popular class of artisans (43%) in the period 1478-1530. After
1540, the tribunal dealt almost entirely with Portuguese, some of
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224
The Converted Jews
whom, especially during the early eighteenth century, occupied
important positions in tax farming and the administration of royal
monopolies. Many of the New Christians may be placed in an
upper middle class of tax farmers and fiscal agents comprising some
34.2 percent of the accused; merchants and shopkeepers comprised
another 34.2 percent, and the number of artisans fell substantially
(8.5%), indicating the transient nature of the New Christian popula-
tion. This impression is also confirmed by the small number of
soldiers (14.5%) in the group. 42
Apart from the profound divisions within the converso commu-
nity and the atmosphere of insecurity and suspicion that surrounded
the conversos, three other elements were essential to the tribunal's
success in mounting the violent wave of persecution that took place
between 1485 and 1530: detailed knowledge of Jewish ceremonies
and practices, special procedures that would permit the tribunal to
gain an intimate knowledge of the converso community, and a group
of committed, even fanatical inquisitors and officials.
Official awareness of and sensitivity to Judaic ceremonies in-
creased rapidly in the fifteenth century in response to the growing
national preoccupation with the converso problem. By 1460, Catho-
lic lay and ecclesiastical authorities could turn to Alonso de
Espina's Fortalitium Fidei (Fortress of the Faith), which provided
them with a kind of "master catalog" of typical offenses against the
Catholic faith committed by conversos. These twenty-five offenses
were divided into three broad categories: specific Jewish ceremo-
nies and customs, ways in which the conversos avoided participa-
tion in Catholicism, and deviant or superstitious practices that they
engaged in. 43 As this last category of offenses reveals, the process of
"demonizing" whereby Spain's conversos were coming to be ac-
cused of employing magic, worshiping evil spirits, and committing
particularly horrible and inhuman crimes in addition to religious
heresy was well advanced. 44
Espina's catalog not only represented a considerable improve-
ment over the rather sketchy description of Judaic customs de-
scribed in Eymerich's late-fourteenth-century Directorium inquisi-
torum but its system of classification of offenses provided the
Inquisition with a model for interrogation of suspects. 45 This is quite
evident from the list of questions that the inquisitor-general ordered
the Valencia tribunal to ask conversos coming before it during the
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The Converted Jews
225
1491 period of grace. Here we find an Espina-style classification of
offenses including a fairly complete series of mitzvah (Sabbath, Yom
Kippur, Passover, Succoth, and Shivah) and the ways in which
conversos violated church precepts (eating meat on days prohibited
by the church, refusal to go to confession or take communion, and
refusal to attend mass) along with a series of questions that reveal
the degree to which the demonizing process had taken hold in
official circles. Conversos were to be asked if they had participated
in whipping or otherwise abusing a crucifix or image of the Virgin,
had crucified and lashed an animal as a way of denying and denigrat-
ing Christ's passion, and had invoked evil spirits, employed magic
spells, or used other "magical arts" prohibited by the church. 46
Armed with fairly complete knowledge of the Judaic practices
likely to be engaged in by conversos, the tribunal then had to
confront the problem of identifying the converso population and
gaining an intimate knowledge of the networks of interlocking fami-
lies that comprised it. For this, the tribunal was able to make highly
effective use of the period of grace. 4 ' Expecting to be fully recon-
ciled with the church and let off with a fine, many hundreds of
conversos presented themselves before Valencia's inquisitors and
endured the humiliation of being forced to march bareheaded
through the streets of the city enduring the taunts and hostile
glances of their neighbors. Unfortunately, in the majority of cases,
the hope of being free from future persecution proved illusory, and
88 percent of those who came forward during the grace period were
subsequently brought to trial. 4
After 1500, as the conversos became more suspicious, the use of
the period of grace as a way of recruiting a pool of potential victims
became far less effective. But by that time, the tribunal had already
gained a great deal of knowledge about dozens of interlocking fami-
lies who comprised the converso community, while the use of such
innovative techniques as the converso "census" of 1506 allowed the
tribunal to monitor changes in family structure and relations. 49 The
census includes some 275 extended families from five parishes and
gave such information as occupation, marital status, number of
children, names of parents and siblings, and previous involvement
with the Inquisition. Interestingly enough, several of the individu-
als listed had recently arrived in Valencia from Italy where they had
converted to Catholicism. 50
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Given the ferocious anti-Semitism that pervaded fifteenth- and
early sixteenth-century Spain, the identification of conversos with
Jews, and the process of "demonizing" by which they were singled
out as an especially dangerous element capable of the most heinous
crimes against Old Christians and their religion, it is not surprising
that many of the early inquisitors and officials brought strong feel-
ings of hostility and suspicion to their task. For certain inquisitors
and officials, these feelings manifested themselves in expressions of
profound antagonism toward the conversos and their families, an
antagonism not unmixed with a desire to exploit them for financial
gain. These attitudes were quite persistent and continued long
after the tribunal had ceased to deal with any large number of
converted Jews.
A broad range of anti-Semitic attitudes, from mild hostility to
outright belligerence, were revealed by testimony taken from the
tribunal's staff during the visitations of 1528. The families of
conversos whose property had been confiscated by the tribunal were
particularly vulnerable to the petty tyranny that was exercised by
the officials of the court. According to testimony received from Dr.
Martinez, the judge of confiscated property, both the receiver and
the fiscal frequently insulted those who appeared before the court,
while the receiver was notorious for failing to pay out claims made by
successful litigants "except to those he wishes." 51
Juan de Velasquez, the chief jailer, appeared to have a particu-
larly exploitative relationship to conversos. Accused by several offi-
cials of abusing prisoners verbally and physically, he also used
prisoners as a source of cheap labor in his silk business, forcing
them to work up cloth and then paying them less than the going
rate. 52 Velasquez also exploited the anxiety felt by the wives and
families of the accused. In return for bribes and presents, he al-
lowed members of the family to communicate with their loved ones
from the roof of his house, which adjoined the jail. 53
Inquisitors themselves were far from immune from anti-Semitic
feelings that affected the way they conducted themselves with pris-
oners. Juan Gonzalez de Munibrega, undoubtedly the most overtly
and violently anti-Semitic inquisitor ever to sit on the Valencia
tribunal, was appointed in 1535 after having served as prosecuting
attorney in the mid- 1520s. During the six years that he spent on
the tribunal, he carried out a virtual reign of terror during which
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227
the most basic legal procedures were violated, prisoners were left
to rot in the Inquisition's jails without being brought to trial, and
the inquisitor heaped abuse on the prisoners during interrogation.
In 1538-39, Munibrega thought he had discovered an entire
network of Judaizers among certain converso families of Gandfa
who were suspected of performing Jewish ceremonies and abusing
the crucifix with whips when they all took refuge together in the
Valldigna Valley during the plague year of 1519. Insight into the
way in which Munibrega ran the court may be gained from the case
of Miguel Oriola, one of a number of hapless conversos who were
swept into the tribunal's net by Munibrega's zealous pursuit of all
those involved in the Valldigna conventicle. Oriola, a silversmith of
modest means, protested his innocence of any wrongdoing and
begged Munibrega to begin his trial so that he could secure his
release and support the nine children he had left at home "in much
peril and with little to sustain them." Munibrega's only reply to
these entreaties was to insist that "no accusation is necessary for
you to unburden your conscience." 54 In the end, Oriola spent a
total of three years and eight months in captivity without even
hearing a formal presentation of the charges against him.
Apart from habitually keeping prisoners in jail without trial for
long periods, Munibrega used verbal abuse, threats, lies, and tor-
ture to get confessions even to charges that had little foundation. It
was one such confession, extorted from a member of the Almenara
family, that led to the intervention of the Suprema and cut short
Munibrega's career on the court. Pedro Luis Almenara, a wealthy
merchant and member of a family that had suffered heavily from
inquisitorial persecution, was apparently a devout Catholic who
went regularly to mass and confession, visited famous shrines like
the Catalan monastery of Montserrat, and served faithfully as a lay
official of his parish church. 55 Arrested and accused of having cele-
brated Yom Kippur along with his parents in Valldigna (when he
was six years old), Almenara at first stoutly maintained his inno-
cence, but Munibrega's response was a stream of hysterical abuse:
"Ha, you son of a whore, what a cunning one you are. I hope to God
that you confess one-third of the heresies that you have commit-
ted." Undaunted, Almenara declared that he wished to defend
himself and asked for a defense attorney, but Munibrega said,
"Take care, if you defend yourself well you will be here more than
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The Converted Jews
two years. " He then refused to allow the appointment of a defense
attorney, remarking, "Now I want to prepare an auto; I have no
time to judge defenses. " Almenara was then turned over to jailer
Fernando de Cabrera, who assured him that there were already ten
witnesses against him (there were actually only three) and warned
him to "confess if you don't want to die." In the next few days,
while Almenara languished in his cell, Cabrera, who had fre-
quently demonstrated his zeal by spying on prisoners late at night,
kept his anxiety at a fever pitch by telling him that the confessions
made in other trials had implicated his entire family and that what
he did not confess now, "he would end by confessing two or three
years from now. "
In spite of this campaign of psychological warfare, Almenara
continued to maintain his innocence. As a result, he was brought to
the torture chamber, where to increase his terror, Inquisitor
Munibrega told him, "Today's work will be very tedious; do you see
those beams, you will have to reach them with your head." After
the torture was over, and Almenara was lying on the floor doubled
up with pain, Munibrega informed him that he would decide later
when to resume the torture "in hours or days, whenever I think its
best." 56 It was this threat to renew the torture almost indefinitely
that finally broke Almenara's nerve and, aided by leading questions
from Inquisitor Munibrega, brought him to confess his participa-
tion in the Yom Kippur ceremony. He appeared at the auto de fe of
June 22, 1539, and was sentenced to imprisonment and confisca-
tion of property.
In the days and weeks that followed, Almenara became more and
more convinced that he had sinned grievously by confessing to some-
thing that he had not done. Good Catholic that he was, he was
haunted by the thought that his soul would burn in hell for having
confessed falsely, and he spurned an offer by Melchor de Perelles to
use his influence with Inquisitor Munibrega to lighten his sentence,
declaring that "he wanted nothing more than to save his soul." At
length, after being confronted by his confessor's refusal to give him
absolution because he had perjured himself, he appeared before the
tribunal to retract his confession. By this time, however, several of
Munibrega's other victims had revoked their confessions, and their
cause had received the support of one of Valencia's most power-
ful nobles, Sancho de Cardona, admiral of Aragon. Cardona, who
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The Converted Jews
229
wanted to weaken the Holy Office in the hope of blunting its cam-
paign against his Morisco vassals, would later pay dearly for his
temerity in supporting conversos, but for the moment, the Suprema
was forced to send several of its own members to take over the
tribunal and hear the cases of those who had retracted their testi-
mony before Munibrega's court.
As a result, the next few years saw the gradual rehabilitation of
his victims. Pedro Luis Almenara was at first sentenced to imprison-
ment at the discretion of the inquisitor-general and to a fine and
penitential garment. This was later modified to allow him to return
home, but he was restricted to travel only within Valencia city.
Finally, by special order of the Suprema, all restrictions on him
were lifted, and he was permitted to travel anywhere in Spain.
Miguel Oriola also benefited from the change of regime. After
looking into his case, Navarra and Lagasca evidently decided that
there was no substance to the charges against him and ordered him
released from prison and placed under house arrest within Valencia
city. Less than a year later, the two inquisitors terminated the case
by allowing him to return to his home in Gandia. 58 As for Muni-
brega, he was permitted to follow the typical cursus honorabilis of
the provincial inquisitor and retire to a lesser diocese, in this case,
that of Tarazona in upper Aragon. But when Catholic Spain's ruling
circles were thrown into a panic by the discovery of Protestant
conventicles in Seville and Valladolid, the old war horse was
brought back to service and sent to Seville to help with the large
number of cases the tribunal had to prepare. Once there, he be-
haved in his accustomed manner, quarreling with his colleagues,
forcing appeals to the Suprema, and "desiring to burn everyone." 59
The strongly anti-Semitic attitudes expressed by inquisitors and
officials during the first wave of persecution eventually became so
ingrained in the minds of Inquisition staff that they formed a perma-
nent part of the bureaucratic tradition and persisted long after the
tribunal had ceased trying significant numbers of Judaizers. In
1551, long after the first phase of inquisitorial persecution was over,
Baltasar Vidanya, a wealthy converso attorney, came to the tribunal
to present a papal brief absolving him of any disabilities incurred
through the condemnation of his mother's memory by the Holy
Office. Presentation of this brief sparked an immediate protest
from prosecuting attorney Luis Ferrer, and the tribunal asked the
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The Converted Jews
Suprema to appeal the brief to Rome in terms that would have
done credit to an Alonso de Espina or a Pedro Sarmiento. Allowing
conversos like Vidanya to benefit from papal concessions, the in-
quisitors declared, would only encourage them in their diabolical
intention to destroy Old Christians. Already, the tribunal's letter
alleged, they had condemned many innocent persons to death act-
ing as judges and royal officers. As lawyers, they cynically helped
both sides in judicial disputes in order to lengthen trials and gain
more fees, and as doctors, they have murdered their patients by
prescribing poisons instead of drugs. 60 Violent persecution of na-
tive converso Judaizers was over by the 1550s, but anti-Semitism
among inquisitors and officials remained as an enduring legacy of
the first wave of persecution.
During the last half of the sixteenth century, merchant-bankers
from the Republic of Genoa dominated Spanish imperial finance by
handling the transfer of funds from Spain to Flanders. The Spanish
treasury paid dearly for its dependence on the Genoese, but Span-
ish efforts to break free of them in the last quarter of the sixteenth
century proved unavailing since no rival network of bankers existed
which could provide the same services. After an abortive attempt
to substitute a group of Spanish and Portuguese financiers in 1575,
Philip II reluctantly turned back to the Genoese, signing an agree-
ment with them in December 1577 which ushered in the golden
age of Genoese finance during the last quarter of the sixteenth
century. 61
The failure of their earlier efforts to replace the Genoese did not
prevent the crown and its treasury officials from renewing the
search for an alternative set of bankers in the seventeenth century.
This time their search was rewarded. The union of Spain and Portu-
gal after 1580 and the general expansion of Atlantic trade in the late
sixteenth century opened up commercial opportunities that Portu-
guese New Christian merchants were quick to exploit. Many of
these men made vast fortunes by trading in Asian products, invest-
ing in the Brazilian sugar industry, and supplying slaves to both
Brazil and the Spanish Americas. 2 As a result, when a reformist
regime led by Philip IV's chief minister, the Conde Duque de
Olivares, came to power in 1621, the Portuguese New Christians
were ready and willing to take up the challenge of replacing the
Genoese as the crown's principal bankers.
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The Converted Jews
231
In spite of their key role in Spain's remarkable military and
strategic recovery in the first decades of the seventeenth century,
however, the Portuguese New Christians found that they had many
enemies. The strength of anti-Semitic feeling is demonstrated by
the rapid translation into Spanish of a violently anti-Semitic work
by Vicente de Costa Mattos, a Portuguese who denounced New
Christians as idolators and sodomites and claimed that all heretics
were either Jews or descendants of Judaizers. 63 The New Christians
were also victims of street violence and the subject of attacks by
poets and writers like Francisco de Quevedo. It was the Inquisi-
tion, however, that was in the best position to undertake a cam-
paign of persecution. Royal support notwithstanding, anti-Semitic
feeling among inquisitors remained strong, and both the Suprema
and the regional tribunals remained highly suspicious of the New
Christians. In 1586, for example, just at the time when the New
Christians were first becoming active in tax farming and military
and naval contracting, the Valencia tribunal wrote the Suprema to
ask for instructions regarding the Portuguese "confessos" who
passed through the kingdom on their way to foreign countries be-
cause it was suspected that they were emigrating so as to practice
Judaism freely. 64
Since the New Christians had been able to prevent the Portu-
guese Inquisition from operating effectively until well into the
sixteenth century, Judaic traditions remained strong among them,
and evidence of Judaizing was not difficult to find. Moreover, the
fact that their business success depended, at least in part, on main-
taining relations with the Jewish communities in Amsterdam and
Italy meant that they could renew their Jewish traditions by con-
tact with practicing Jews. But the New Christians, like the
conversos before them, were vulnerable to attack. The issue of
assimilation had divided the community deeply, and the hostility
between those who wished to become Roman Catholic and those
more closely tied to Judaism was productive of denunciations. Ma-
ria Rodriguez, who testified against Fernan Vazquez during his
trial in 1586, was the daughter of Portuguese New Christians who
had been imprisoned by the Inquisition in Seville while attempt-
ing to leave the Iberian peninsula so that they could practice Juda-
ism. Apparently while still in Seville, she secretly married an Old
Christian, but when her father found out, he beat her so severely
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232 The Converted Jews
that she still carried the scars twenty years later. Her second hus-
band was a New Christian, but the women in Valencia's small New
Christian community were very suspicious of her, refusing to in-
vite her to meals and showing hostility when she manifested any
outward sign of Christian belief. Rebellion against a tyrannical
parent combined with anger at Valencia's New Christians were
enough to turn her into a more than willing witness and spy who
even brought a beata to the homes of her New Christian acquain-
tances on Saturdays so that she could attest to the fact that no work
was being performed there. 65
A century of inquisitorial edicts, sermons of the faith, and autos
de fe had also served to indoctrinate the Old Christian population
against any signs of Judaic observance; even a lack of zeal in fulfill-
ing Christian duties aroused suspicion. When Fernan Vazquez was
selected as a lay official of the parish church of San Nicolas, the
neglectful way in which he performed his duties was enough to
arouse the suspicion of the parish priest who considered all his
Portuguese parishioners "judfos," a benefice holder in the church
who later took it on himself to gather more information about the
New Christians of the parish, and a familiar of the Holy Office who
happened to belong to the same church. All of these men later
testified against Vazquez at his trial. 66
Old Christian servants were also dangerous. Juana Ana Farragut
worked for Cristobal Gomez during the time he played host to
Pedro Mendez Rosete and his wife. Rosete, who had been an
important tax farmer and tobacco wholesaler, refused to eat pork
while in the Gomez home and pretended to be ill when it was time
to go to mass. Ferragut eventually proved an excellent witness and
was even able to report on the couple's whereabouts after they left
her master's house. 6 '
In spite of the fact that certain New Christians were using Valencia
as a transit point on their journeys to southern France and Italy and
the undoubted presence of a small group of Portuguese merchants
like Fernan Vazquez or Francisco Brandon, the depressed economy
of seventeenth-century Valencia offered few opportunities, and the
majority of the New Christians preferred to settle in Andalucia
where they could participate in the Seville trade or in New Castile
where there were opportunities in royal finance, contracting, and
tax farming. As a result, the Valencia tribunal tried only fifteen New
The Converted Jews
233
Christians during the period 1615-1700, when other tribunals like
Toledo, Cordoba, and Galicia tried large numbers.
During the eighteenth century, the imposition of a whole series
of new taxes after 1707 and the enforcement of the royal salt and
tobacco monopolies made the kingdom considerably more attrac-
tive to New Christians who were already involved in administering
royal taxes elsewhere in Spain. 68 The first decades of the eigh-
teenth century also saw a sharp increase in the persecution of
Judaizers by the peninsular tribunals, with 820 appearing in the
sixty-four autos held between 1721 and 1727. Valencia contributed
only fifty-one cases but, following the national trend, was clearly
becoming somewhat more active. In all, the tribunal tried sixty-
seven Judaizers in the period 1701-1799, but the majority (55)
were tried between 1712 and 1733. 69
A revealing glimpse into the lives of these early eighteenth-
century New Christians is afforded by the case of Simon de
Alarcon, who was arrested by the Valencia tribunal in March 1721.
Simon came from a family of tax farmers impoverished by inquisito-
rial persecution. His father, Tomas de Valenzuela y Alarcon, who
had been reconciled with confiscation of property by the Toledo
tribunal, died when Simon was only six, leaving him with his
mother, Isabel de los Rios, who had been reconciled by the
Logrono tribunal. Bloodied but unbowed, Isabel continued to prac-
tice Judaism after her release and exhorted Simon to "live like the
son of his father." 70
Fortunately for Simon, his family was well known among the
tight-knit group of Madrid New Christian merchants, financiers,
and tax farmers whose role in royal finance appeared to be as
important under the early Bourbons as it had been under the later
Hapsburgs. As a result, Simon was able to enter the service of
several of these men, including Manuel de Olivares, an important
sugar merchant whose family had been recruited into the ranks of
the royal asentistas in the early 1640s, and Francisco de Lara,
treasurer of the royal tobacco monopoly. Through these connec-
tions, Simon was able to marry Maria de Molina, the daughter of
the administrator of the millones of Antequera. He also met Man-
uel de Andrade, another official of the tobacco administration, and
through him entered the tobacco administration himself, working
first in Ciudad Real and then in Zaragoza. He then went to Valencia
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2.34
The Converted Jews
where he made contact with Felipe de Paz, who, along with his
father, Diego, controlled the tobacco monopoly of the entire King-
dom of Valencia. From Felipe he obtained the administration of
tobacco in Segorbe and Castellon. This evidently proved quite
lucrative; when he was arrested, he had in his possession a substan-
tial amount of cash as well as jewels and silver.
Simon de Alarcon's contacts in Madrid formed a tight-knit group
of New Christian families who married among themselves or with
other families of known Judaic sympathies. Jewish ceremonies in-
cluding the Sabbath, Yom Kippur, and Shivah were routinely prac-
ticed, and members of the group spoke to one another without the
slightest reserve about their firm belief in the Jewish faith. In spite
of their efforts to present themselves as devout Catholics, the mem-
bers of the network and their families suffered grievous persecution
at the hands of the Inquisition. In a series of trials sparked by the
incautious revelations made by Maria de Tudela to another prisoner
of the Toledo tribunal in 1718, the Madrid, Murcia, Toledo, Cor-
doba, Granada, and Valencia tribunals virtually destroyed the en-
tire network of New Christian families between 1718 and 1727.
Among the victims the Valencia tribunal claimed from among these
families were Diego and Felipe de Paz, general administrators of
the royal tobacco monopoly for the Kingdom of Valencia, Sebastian
de Leon, Manuel Rodriquez de Leon, who sold tobacco for the
crown in Vinaroz and Torrente, and the members of their families.
Unfortunately for the tribunal, which had expected windfall prof-
its from its prosecution of the New Christians, the evidence sug-
gests that the Paz and their associates were able to remove most of
their funds from Spain before they could be seized. By 1724, Felipe
and several of his leading associates had been released and were
once again offering to take over the tobacco monopoly. ' 1
The discrimination and persecution suffered by the Portuguese
New Christians during the late sixteenth, seventeenth, and eigh-
teenth centuries stands in marked contrast to the substantial assimi-
lation of the Spanish conversos in the same period. During the
sixteenth century, the obstacles the conversos had to face appeared
to loom ever larger. Purity of blood statutes spread from the reli-
gious orders to Colegios Mayores and cathedral chapters, and by
the end of the century, even the Jesuits were forced to exclude
conversos in spite of their earlier tolerance. 2 Moreover, the descen-
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The Converted Jews
2.35
dants of those punished by the Inquisition were barred from hold-
ing public office, carrying arms, exercising certain professions, and
wearing certain types of clothing. In a still largely oral society,
memories were long, and the officials responsible for carrying out
the genealogical investigations designed to trap conversos who
tried to enter honorable corporations in spite of the statutes could
rely on this collective memory to trace the Jewish origins of
conversos claiming to be "pure." Investigators could also rely on
the Inquisition, whose records were an invaluable repository of
information about converso families. In 1569, for example, the Va-
lencia tribunal furnished the cabildo of the cathedral of Toledo,
which had recently (1547) adopted a purity of blood statute, with
copies of trials involving the Santangel family.' 3 The council of
canons intended to use this material as ammunition in its effort to
prevent Diego Lopez de Ayala, Hernando de Santangel's grand-
son, from obtaining a place on the cabildo. 74
In spite of the ingrained hostility of many inquisitors and offi-
cials, however, the Inquisition proved to be a major channel
through which the conversos became accepted into the mainstream
of Spanish life. This was the result not of altruism on the part of the
Holy Office (although there were inquisitors and officials who fa-
vored integration) but of necessity. Of all the honorable corpora-
tions with purity of blood statutes, the Inquisition was the most
penurious and the most politically vulnerable and was therefore not
in a position to overlook any opportunity to generate income from
relieving the disabilities that it had imposed on converso families or
of winning influential friends and allies by allowing certain con-
versos to become officials, familiares, notaries, and the like.
One of the most common revenue-raising devices used by the
Holy Office, especially during periods of acute financial distress,
was the commutation of all or part of a sentence or even the com-
plete rehabilitation of an individual from the social disabilities that
he might have incurred as a result of the condemnation of an ances-
tor. In 1520, for example, the Suprema asked the tribunal of Barce-
lona to estimate how much it could earn by commuting the peniten-
tial garments of all persons presently wearing them in view of "la
mucha necesidad" in which the tribunal found itself. ' 5 In that same
year, the Suprema ordered a special payment of 150 gold ducats to
be made to the inquisitors and officials of the Valencia tribunal to
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The Converted Jews
come in part from fees for commutations of habits and prison sen-
tences. In 1531, the Suprema ordered the complete rehabilitation
of Onofre Dura and his family. Dura, a wealthy silversmith from
Gandfa, paid well for the right to hold honorable offices, carry
arms, and wear cloth of gold and silver in spite of the condemnation
of his father, mother, and grandparents. ' 6 By the early seventeenth
century, the Holy Office had largely abandoned any pretense at
enforcement of personal disabilities except as a revenue-raising
device. In the instructions issued to Inquisitor Ambrosio Roche for
his visitations to Gandfa, Denia, and Alcira in 1632, he was specifi-
cally told to confine himself to levying fines on the descendants of
reconciled or relaxed persons who were holding honorable offices
or wearing prohibited clothing, since it was no longer the custom to
11
impose public penance or exile.
One of the principal ways in which the Inquisition was supposed
to perpetuate the disgrace of those it had punished was by preserv-
ing sanbenitos along with suitable inscriptions in the churches.
When these had deteriorated, they were replaced by sheets of
linen inscribed with the name, crime, and punishment of the indi-
vidual. In the Instructions of 1561 and again in 1569, the Suprema
charged inquisitors on visitation with the duty of making sure that
all the appropriate sanbenitos were in place and hanging new ones
when necessary. ' 8
In spite of the hard line taken in these instructions and royal
support for exhibiting the sanbenitos, there is considerable evi-
dence to suggest that, in practice, the policy was difficult to carry
out. Fully realizing the grief and distress that public exhibition of
the penitential garments would cause to the families of the victim,
some inquisitors were opposed to displaying them. Hernando de
Loazes, who was inquisitor in Valencia in 1541, was so affected by
the pleas of victims' relatives that he had not replaced a single
sanbenito during his term of office and then refused to cooperate
with the tribunal when it wanted to renew those in the cathedral
after he became archbishop of Valencia.
In other cases, it was opposition from some powerful individual
that prevented the sanbenitos from being displayed. In 1644, for
example, the Suprema asked the tribunal to account for the fact
that not a single sanbenito was hung in the collegiate church of
Gandfa even though records indicated that thirty-four individuals
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The Converted Jews
237
from that town had been reconciled or relaxed. In reply, the tribu-
nal related that the inquisitor who visited Gandia in 1606 was told
that the Duke of Gandia had vetoed placing the sanbenitos in the
church. A diligent search of the tribunal's premises then led to the
discovery of Gandia's sanbenitos, which had evidently been in stor-
age since the auto de fe when they were first used. By curious
oversight, however, Inquisitor Pedro de Herrera y Guzman failed
to take them when he left on visitations to Gandia later that year.
The record ends with the information that the duke went out of his
way to welcome Herrera y Guzman when he arrived, but it is
legitimate to wonder whether his welcome would have been so
warm if the inquisitor had not been quite so forgetful. 80
Influential conversos were also in a position to do something
about the sanbenitos they detested. In 1613, Valencia's inquisitors
wrote the Suprema to report that Dr. Guardiola, a judge on the
Audiencia, had removed several of the linen sheets that were used
to record the names of victims from the front of his chapel in the
cathedral. He did this without even notifying the tribunal, but he
was so influential that the inquisitors confined themselves to asking
one of the secretaries to go to the church and "nonchalantly" ex-
plore it to find out where the sheets had been placed. Doubtless,
the Guardiola family had long felt the affront of having these obnox-
ious yellow sheets directly in front of their chapel, especially since
thev recorded the names of several of their ancestors. By the earlv
seventeenth century, they felt strong enough to act, and the tribu-
nal was so politically weak that it could not stop them. 81
The image of an inquisitorial secretary skulking through the
cathedral to locate sanbenitos removed by order of a converso is
an indication of just how far the prestige of the Holy Office had
declined since the palmy days of the early sixteenth century.
Clearly, the tribunal faced strong and growing opposition to its
efforts to perpetuate the infamy of its victims through maintaining
sanbenitos. In the face of this opposition, some inquisitors, like
Pedro de Herrera y Guzman, abandoned them entirely, while
others, like Hernando de Loazes, had never supported the use of
the sanbenitos in the first place. In spite of the Suprema's insistent
demands for enforcement of the regulations regarding the sanbe-
nitos, therefore, the tribunal's zeal for them flagged noticeably,
and by the mid-seventeenth century, a device that had proved so
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The Converted Jews
effective in maintaining the conversos as a class apart was falling
into desuetude. 82
But it was through successfully overcoming the barriers posed
by the Inquisition's own purity of blood statute and genealogical
investigations that certain wealthy and influential converso families
were able to obscure their origins, gain respectability, and inte-
grate themselves more fully into Spanish society. The process by
which members of these families were admitted, albeit grudgingly,
to the corps of unpaid officials really began in earnest during the
early years of the seventeenth century when the Holy Office en-
countered growing opposition from Audiencias and royal councils
and the Suprema was struggling to find ways of rebuilding its politi-
cal influence at court.
An excellent example of how persistence, influence, and the
gradual accumulation of positions in honorable corporations could
eventually carry an individual from a "tainted" family into the ranks
of the familiares is provided by the case of Vicente Valterra, eldest
son and heir to the Count of Villanueva. Vicente's saga began in
spring 1627 when he applied to the Suprema for admittance as a
familiar of the Valencia tribunal in spite of being single and there-
fore formally ineligible to serve. The Suprema granted his request
and ordered him to be admitted provided that he met the criteria
for purity of blood demanded for entrance to the corps. 83 The
Suprema's letter drew an immediate protest from the secretaries
who were chiefly responsible for verifying the lineage of applicants
by checking the tribunal's secret archive. On his mother's side,
Vicente was descended from the Santangels, one of the most fa-
mous converso families in the Crown of Aragon. The public outcry
that the recent admission of his two cousins, Juan Qanoguera and
Vicente Sorell, as familiares had caused made the secretaries still
more determined to resist opening the door even wider. 84 The
Suprema then requested copies of all cases involving the Santan-
gels and documents establishing Valterra's connection with that
family. After reviewing this material carefully, the Suprema in-
structed the tribunal not to admit Vicente and to suspend any
genealogical investigation. 85
The Suprema's letter of August 23 would seem to have ended the
case, but just a few days later, it returned to the charge, asking for
new copies of all relevant documents and inquiring disingenuously if
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239
the tribunal had already admitted Valterra by virtue of its original
letter of May 11 dispensing of the requirement that he be married. 86
The cause of the Suprema's strange about-face on the issue was the
growing respectability and political influence of the family of the
counts of Villanueva. Notwithstanding the failure of Valterra's appli-
cation to enter the corps of familiares, other members of the family
with the same relationship to the Santangels were making progress
in their efforts to enter other honorable corporations. The event that
appears to have triggered the Suprema's decision to reopen Val-
terra's case was the admittance of his first cousin, Jaime Millan, to
the Order of Santiago, Spain's most prestigious corporate body. 87 As
Valterra pointedly reminded the Suprema, he came of a family both
numerous and influential whose members occupied important posi-
tions and were related by marriage to many of the greatest aristo-
cratic houses in Spain. 88 By May 11, 1629, his demand for a
familiatura had acquired enormous momentum. Not only had two
other cousins, Luis and Remigio Sorell, been admitted to the Order
of Calatrava but the family could now boast ten actos positivos (eight
from the Military Orders), so that by the royal pragmatica of 1623,
Valterra could be admitted without even going through a genealogi-
cal investigation. 89
A family with so many of its members in the prestigious Military
Orders and an individual with such great, and growing, landed
possessions (Valterra had recently added Canet to his list of vil-
lages) could no longer be ignored lest he become a powerful en-
emy. The feelings of Valencia's secretaries now meant nothing to
the Suprema, which summarily ordered them to commence Val-
terra's genealogical investigation in its letter of October 17, 1629. 90
Finally, more than three years after he had first applied, Valterra
became a member of the corps. The following year, in a now-
familiar pattern of using acceptance into one honorable corporation
as a springboard to another, he applied to enter the Order of
Calatrava. By this time, the Council of the Military Orders was no
longer following the pragmatica of 1623, and he was aware that
representatives of that council would be sent to Valencia to inter-
view the tribunal's secretaries about his lineage. The danger was
that Valencia's disgruntled secretaries would balk at testifying and
thus delay the entire investigation. But now Valterra had gained
the upper hand, and in a letter conspicuous for its aggressive tone,
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The Converted Jews
he demanded that the Suprema secretly issue them a formal au-
thorization to testify in his favor and even "compel" them to do so if
that became necessary. Needless to say, the Suprema, which had
clearly supported Valterra's application in the first place, went
along with his demand and issued its authorization on September
26, 1630. 91
Much the same strategy was used by the next generation of this
ambitious family. In 1647, the Suprema approved the application of
Francisco Perez de los Cobos to be a familiar of the Murcia tribu-
nal. By this time, Luis Sorell had become count of Albalat,
Valterra's two sons were familiares, and Francisco Perez de los
Cobos was himself a knight of the Military Order of Santiago. Sheer
persistence had opened Spain's honorable corporations to this
converso family, and the Suprema's order that no one from it was to
be admitted in the future without specific permission must be
viewed as little more than a pretense of upholding standards that
had long ceased to be observed. 92
An even more significant case, and one that illustrates a growing
division within the Holy Office itself about the value of the purity of
blood statutes, was that of Tomas Ginart y March, who applied to
be an official in August 1699. 93 Ginart y March was descended from
the March, Palau, Malet, and Almenara, four of the most notorious
families of Judaizers in late-fifteenth- and early sixteenth-century
Valencia. Between them, these families had a total of 65 members
punished by the Holy Office, including 34 relaxed in effigy or in
person. 94 The converso origins of the Almenara family, in particu-
lar, were so well known in Valencia that as recently as July 27, 1697,
the Suprema had stated categorically that no descendant of that
family could even be considered by the tribunal. 95
In spite of this prohibition, the Suprema was evidently prepared
to allow the application to proceed and ordered the tribunal's secre-
taries to carry out the customary search through the secret archive.
Predictably, the secretaries turned up a considerable amount of
evidence against Ginart y March's family and were especially con-
cerned to point out that his great grandfather, Francisco March,
had married into the Almenara family, "one of those most fre-
quently mentioned in the secret archive." 96
During the next three years, a series of hearings were held
which appeared to further damage Ginart y March's case. Further
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The Converted Jews
241
investigation by fiscal Vicente del Olmo turned up evidence that
the genealogy that he had originally presented was fraudulent and
that the March family had attempted to obfuscate its connection
with the Almenaras by inserting counterfeit documents in the
notarial records of the corte de gobernacion. 9 '
By the end of May 1704, when Valencia's two inquisitors sat
down to render judgment, the case against Ginart y March ap-
peared overwhelming, and, after restating all the negative evi-
dence, Inquisitor Diego Munoz Baquerizo concluded by saying
that considering Ginart y March would "greatly dishonor this tribu-
nal." But all along, the inquisitors had been divided on the case.
Munoz Baquerizo's colleague, Juan de la Torre y Guerau, had previ-
ously sought to aid Ginart y March by refusing to close the case in
spite of the accumulation of negative evidence, and he now
emerged as an open supporter. In his written opinion, he dismissed
the witnesses against Ginart y March as "few and inconstant" and
argued rather implausibly that the older notarial records should be
accepted in spite of their glaring deficiencies. Since the inquisitors
were now split, the tribunal had no option but to follow Torre y
Guerau's recommendation and send the case on to the Suprema for
its consideration. 98 Evidently, this was exactly what the Suprema
had been waiting for. On June 25, it bent toward Ginart y March,
favoring him by authorizing Inquisitor Torre y Guerau to act alone
in rendering a final verdict. 99 Since Torre y Guerau's views were
already known to the Suprema, it could have surprised no one
when he rendered a favorable opinion, and on July 9, 1704, the
Suprema authorized Ginart y March's admission as an official of the
100
Valencia tribunal.
The counts of Villanueva were too important for either the
Suprema or the tribunal to ignore. The large number of actos
positives that the family had accumulated, especially from the pres-
tigious Military Orders, and its growing wealth and influence made
it politically unwise to exclude Vicente Valterra from the corps of
familiares. The same cannot be said of the March family. Even
though Tomas Ginart y March's grandfather, Jacinto March de
Velasco, had been a jurat and represented Valencia city at the
Cortes, the family could not lay claim to such distinction at the time
of Tomas's application. His father had been a mere ciutada, and he
himself spoke frequently of his own modest circumstances. Judging
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The Converted Jews
by this case, the official barriers to the assimilation of the conversos
had diminished appreciably. It is not difficult to see in the attitude
of Juan de la Torre y Guerau or in that of the Suprema itself a
growing acceptance of assimilation within the Inquisition itself. 101
After all, it was an inquisitor, probably Juan Roco Campofrio, who
joined in the debate over the purity of blood statutes during the
reign of Philip IV and condemned them as a major cause of social
division, corruption, and litigation. 102 By the end of the century,
even the once taboo Almenara family had become acceptable, and
Tomas Almenara, a prominent city councillor in Enguera, was per-
mitted to enter the corps of familiares in spite of the prosecuting
attorney's objection that the family was "seriously tainted" with
Jewish blood. 103
By the middle of the eighteenth century, the last wave of perse-
cution was over, and the inquisitorial tribunals saw few Judaizers.
Between 1792 and 1820, the last years of its activity, the Valencia
tribunal only dealt with six cases, and some of these were of Jews
from Gibraltar who came requesting baptism and religious instruc-
tion. 104
Nevertheless, in spite of the virtual disappearance of Judaizing
and the complete absence of actual Jewish communities, anti-
Semitism remained strong in Spanish society, and for this the Inqui-
sition must bear much of the blame. Within the Inquisition itself,
the tendency to accept the conversos did little to allay the suspicion
and fear of Jews that underlay the first wave of persecution. At the
time of the allied invasion of Valencia in 1705-1707, for example,
the tribunal was extremely concerned about the presence of Jewish
contractors among the allied forces because it feared that they
would try to bring Hebrew books into the city. 105
For some officials, the Jew remained the incarnation of evil. In a
letter to the Suprema dated Novemer 19, 1643, Fray Juan Ponce, a
calificador and former Holy Office commissioner in Oran, warned
of the imminent arrival of several Jews from that city. The group
included Jacob Cansino who was known to Fray Ponce from his
days in Oran as a "powerful magician" who could mix up powders
and herbal concoctions that bent others to his will even if they had
only the slightest contact with them. Fray Ponce assured the
Suprema that Cansino intended to bring these magic potions with
him to Spain along with some anti-Catholic propaganda of his own
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243
manufacture. Saloman Zaporta, another of these Jews, was coming
to Madrid to sell slaves. Fray Ponce had no real objection to this so
long as Zaporta could be counted on to leave Spain promptly after
his business had been concluded. There could be no guarantee of
this, however, and the spectacle of Zaporta living at court in a
Judaic manner, eating unleavened bread, slaughtering in a kosher
style, "mocking our religion and offering prayers for our destruc-
tion," was too horrible to contemplate. A worried Suprema re-
sponded by ordering the Valencia tribunal to send back any of these
1 06
Jews who landed without specific royal license.
For such men as Fray Ponce, the Jew was necessarily evil, neces-
sarily an enemy of the Catholic faith. For the popular masses,
generations of autos de fe and inquisitorial edicts had associated the
Jew with everything dangerous, foreign, and unorthodox. This
thinking, which was kept alive by the tattered remnants of sanbe-
nitos that could still be seen in many churches, remained an impor-
tant element in the Inquisition's continued popularity in spite of
the fact that it had itself provided many converso families with the
passport to full integration into Old Christian society.
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The Moriscos
Until the period just after the conquest of Granada, Valencia's
mudejares continued to practice Islam under the protection of the
treaties that had been signed when the kingdom was incorporated
into the Aragonese monarchy. These treaties guaranteed full reli-
gious and cultural freedom to the conquered population, but, from
a legal standpoint, this was mere privilege conceded by the crown
and revocable with cause at any time. 1
For a considerable period after the forced conversion of Castile's
mudejares in 1502, the political autonomy and legal privileges en-
joyed by the Crown of Aragon prevented the Aragonese mudejares
from sharing their fate. At the Cortes of Monzon in 1510, Ferdi-
nand swore that he would make no effort to force their conversion,
and Charles V felt obliged to take a similar oath on his accession as
king of Aragon in 15 18. 2 Royal legislation to the contrary, however,
the mudejares of the Kingdom of Valencia had always lived in a
changing and insecure environment marked by constant pressure
from the growing Christian population. This pressure from below
had been primarily responsible for driving the mudejares from the
fertile huerta to the dry farming and mountainous regions in the
interior of the kingdom where they remained until the expulsion. 3
The "expulsions" of the fourteenth century also had the effect of
removing or greatly reducing the number of mudejares in the vicin-
ity of the larger towns, which were now controlled by the Old
Christians, but this partial segregation of the population of the
kingdom did little to reduce the antagonism between the two com-
munities. To the evident differences in religion, dress, and customs
244
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The Moriscos
245
was added the new economic role of the mudejares as the servile
tenant farmers of the hated Valencian noblity. 4 As a result, the
fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries were punctuated by ugly
incidents such as the massacre of Valencia's Islamic community in
1455- 5
The outbreak of the Germama revolution in spring 1521 sounded
the death knell for the existence of Valencia's mudejares. The de-
feat of a viceregal army, partially composed of mudejares, at the
battle of Gandfa on July 25, 1521, led to the sack and forced conver-
sion of the mudejar communities of Gandia, Oliva, Jativa, Villa-
longa, Guadalest, Penaguila, and Polop. Finally, in March 1522,
Germama forces under el Encubierto, the last and most radical of
the Germama leaders, sacked the mudejar communities of Albe-
rique and Alcocer. 6
With the death of Vicent Peris on March 4, 1522, and the surren-
der of Jativa and Alcira at the beginning of December, the Germa-
mas were defeated, but the partial forced conversion of Valencia's
mudejares during the revolt left the crown and the church in a
difficult and ambiguous situation. In Granada and Castile, conver-
sion had been universal, as all Moors who did not wish to convert
had been allowed to leave. In Valencia, however, conversion had
been partial and hasty so that it was impossible to know for sure
which mudejares had been converted and whether the sacrament
itself had been administered properly. ' At the same time, the ques-
tion was raised as to the validity of the conversion itself. It was not so
much the forced nature of the conversion that concerned theolo-
gians and other contemporary observers but the fact that it had been
administered by rebels to a loyal population protected by Charles's
oath to permit them to practice Islam without interference. It
should be noted, however, that even though the church had long
accepted the indelible nature of baptism, almost regardless of the
circumstances under which it was administered, some influential
individuals in Spain continued to express their doubts or at least saw
the forced conversion of the Valencian mudejares as a reason for
lenient treatment. 9 For their part, the Moriscos, who had no particu-
lar reason to love the faith into which they had been inducted, had
returned to their former practices, while the Valencia tribunal, un-
der the leadership of Inquisitor Juan de Churruca, had accepted
their conversion as valid and had begun to prosecute backsliders. 10
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The Moriscos
Even though Charles had already asked Pope Clement VII to
release him from his oath to allow the mudejares to freely practice
their religion, he accepted Inquisitor-General Manrique's sugges-
tion that the entire situation be considered by a special junta made
up of members of the leading royal councils with the addition of
some jurists and theologians. To provide the junta with informa-
tion, Manrique created a commission led by Inquisitor Churruca,
and then his successor, Andres Palacio, to investigate the circum-
stances under which the Moors were baptized and how they had
lived since their baptism took place. 11
Given the attitude of Valencia's inquisitors to the conversions,
there could be little hope of an impartial investigation, so it is not
surprising that the commission's report laid stress on the care with
which the officiating priests questioned the converts about their
real desires and performed the rites of baptism. With the report
placed before it, the junta deliberated from February 19 to June
1525 and concluded by saying that the Moriscos must remain Chris-
tian regardless of their real feelings in the matter. 13 This verdict
simply confirmed the policy that Charles had already decided to
follow, and on April 4, he decreed that all the baptized mudejares
should be considered Christians. Immediately thereafter, a commis-
sion was established to tour the kingdom to notify the Moriscos of
the royal decree and of a thirty-day period of grace during which
apostates could return to Christianity without prejudice. 14
Having thrown the prestige of royal government behind the
forced conversions, it no longer seemed possible to tolerate the
continued worship of Islam among the not inconsiderable number
of Valencian mudejares who had escaped the baptismal water of the
Germania. After obtaining a papal brief from Clement VII which
relieved him of his oath to respect the Islamic beliefs of his mudejar
subjects, Charles issued an edict on September 13, 1525, which
informed the remaining Moors that no one of a different religion
could remain in the kingdom except as a slave. This was followed
on October 20, 1525, by an edict ordering all the remaining Moors
of Valencia to accept baptism or leave Spain before December 8,
1525. This decision did not receive universal approbation either
then or later. On April 3, 1530, Fray Rafael Moner, a Dominican
friar and a popular preacher in Valencia, was forced to publicly
retract statements critical of the forced conversion. 16
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The Moriscos
247
Of course, Charles V and his advisers were well aware of the
fact that the 70,000 to 80,000 Moriscos created by their policy of
forced conversion were Christian in name only and that they
could not be expected to meet the demands of their new religion
without a period of transition. Even before the decree of expul-
sion was issued, Charles had written to Germaine de Foix, gover-
nor of Valencia, asking her to see to it that the converts were
instructed properly in Christianity since he knew that there were
few priests where they lived. 1 ' This awareness also explains the
outcome of a series of negotiations involving representatives of the
Valencian Moriscos. In return for the substantial servicio of 40,000
ducats, Charles agreed that the Inquisition was not to exercise
jurisdiction over them for a period of forty years and allowed them
to conserve their traditional dress and use Arabic for a period of
ten years. 18
Concern by the royal government and the church over the reli-
gious condition of the Moriscos also led to a number of measures
designed to make them into genuine converts. For one thing, a
network of local rectories was established. To supplement the activ-
ity of the rectors who were responsible for the religious instruction
and religious practices of their flock, several great missionary cam-
paigns were undertaken before 1609. The earliest of these began in
March 1526 just months after the edict of conversion and involved
several missionaries including the bishop of Gaudix, Gaspar Dava-
los. Later campaigns involved the controversial Arabic-speaking
Franciscan Bartolome de los Angeles (1543), the bishop of Tortosa
(1567), and groups of Franciscan and Jesuit preachers (1587). 19 The
last missionary effort, begun at the instigation of the pope in 1606,
was only abandoned with the expulsion itself. 20
Certain members of Valencia's ecclesiastical hierarchy also inter-
ested themselves in the religious education of the Moriscos. In
1566, Archbishop Martin de Ayala published a catechism designed
especially for a literate Morisco audience with its Spanish text and
Arabic translation on alternate lines. 21 Archbishop Juan de Ribera,
who succeeded Ayala later in the century, had a very ambivalent
attitude toward the Moriscos but nevertheless threw himself into
frantic missionary activity and republished Ayala's text in 1599. 22
Until the late 1560s, moreover, the crown and even the Inquisi-
tion sought to enlist the aid, or at least ensure the neutrality, of
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The Moriscos
the Morisco elite. In the late 1520s, for example, such men as
Hazentala, alcadi of Vail de Chelva, and Abdala Abenamir, an
influential citizen of Benaguacil, received substantial sums from
the crown for not opposing the conversion effort. The Valencia
tribunal also enlisted a certain number of leading Moriscos as
familiares, in order, as fiscal Luis Ferrer explained in a letter to
the Suprema, "to have them ready to assist us in dangerous parts
of the district." 23 The tribunal had these Morisco familiares until at
least 1568, although they were coining under increasing suspicion
as relations between the tribunal and the Moriscos worsened. 24
This group of familiares included members of the Abenamir family
of Benaguacil. 25
As we shall see, these efforts at genuine conversion and assimila-
tion were tenuous and inadequate, but there is evidence to suggest
that they achieved some success and that the prospects of assimila-
tion were not as bleak and hopeless as certain contemporary observ-
ers and certain modern historians would have us believe." The fact
is that the Moriscos of Valencia, like their counterparts in Castile,
lived in a society dominated by Hispano-Christian culture, lan-
guage, and religion, and in spite of the doctrine of taqiyya em-
braced by Islamic theologians, ordinary Moriscos inevitably came
to accept a Hispano-Christian frame of reference even if they con-
tinued to resist or reject most aspects of Christianity itself. If assimi-
lation ultimately failed, it was as much due to official paranoia about
the military threat represented by the Morisco "fifth column" and
the massive rejection of the Moriscos by virtually every segment of
Christian society as it was to the obduracy of the Moriscos them-
selves. 27 As far as the Valencia tribunal was concerned, its basic
attitude toward the Moriscos was one of hostility tempered by
greed and self-interest. Even though the tribunal had been an early
proponent of expulsion, by the end of the sixteenth century, the
income it received from Morisco censos, fines, and subsidies and
the docility of most of the Moriscos it brought to trial caused it to
accept them as a useful "client" group. Unlike Juan de Ribera, the
archbishop of Valencia who wrote that he would rather subsist on
"bread alone" than tolerate the presence of Morisco heretics among
his flock, the Inquisition had become aware that large numbers of
Valencia's Moriscos could no longer be considered Moslem in the
strict sense.
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The Moriscos
In spite of the insistence of certain modern historians that the
Moriscos preserved the use of some form of Arabic right down to
the expulsion, the evidence suggests that large numbers of Moris-
cos could understand and speak Castilian or Valencian even if they
continued to use Arabic among themselves. 28 This, at least, was the
conclusion of the junta of Madrid, which had been called into
session by Philip II to consider the Morisco problem. Addressing
itself specifically to the question of the language that should be
used in giving religious instruction to the Moriscos of Valencia, the
members of the junta agreed unanimously that this could be done
in Castilian or Valencian and need not be done in Arabic as some
had proposed, since "generally all the new converts know, or at
least understand them." The same panel commented that Moorish-
style dress was no longer being used extensively and that the
Morisco men were dressing "in the same style as the natives of the
Kingdom of Valencia. " 29 Unlike some other committees that were
formed to consider the Morisco situation, this 1587 junta was unusu-
ally well informed and included at least two members with long
personal experience of Valencian affairs, Juan de £uniga, who had
served as inquisitor of Valencia from 1574 to 1579, and Dr. Sapena,
the regent of the Council of Aragon and a Valencian judge from a
respected old Valencian family. 30
Even those Moriscos who came from regions where Arabic was
still spoken and understood had lost the ability to understand the
literary Arabic in which religious texts were written. An example of
this would be the Valencian Morisco who stated that he could read
and speak Arabic "but understood very little or nothing of the
Koran. " 31 The direct result of the decline of literary Arabic was the
emergence of aljamia literature with texts written in Castilian but
using Arabic characters. The use of aljamia certainly cannot be
considered positive for the preservation of traditional Arabic cul-
ture, as many of the aljamia texts presented bastardized or highly
abbreviated versions of the Arabic originals. 32
The decline of Arabic among the Moriscos did not stop with the
emergence of aljamia, however, since many of the religious and
polemical works written by Morisco intellectuals for their fellow
exiles in North Africa were in Castilian. 33 The de facto Arabic illiter-
acy among the refugees was given its clearest recognition by Mo-
hammed Rubio, a cultivated and altruistic refugee from Aragon
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The Moriscos
who financed the translation of a series of religious and polemical
works from the original Arabic into Castilian. 34 These works were
designed for the Morisco refugees of Tunis, where there was a large
contingent of Moriscos from Valencia. 35
Along with the decline in the use of Arabic among the Moriscos
went an inevitable deterioration in the practice of Islam itself. This
decay was recognized as early as 1568 by a memorialist who wrote
that the Moriscos had long since given up "being Moors openly"
and described them as a "peaceable and hapless people." 36 Under
intense pressure from the church and the Inquisition, the Moriscos
were forced to abandon certain external signs of Islamic belief such
as the obligation to say five daily prayers. 3 Even more disturbing
for the long-term survival of formal Islamic worship among the
Valencian Moriscos was the impoverishment and alteration of tradi-
tional forms of critically important ceremonies such as those con-
nected with birth, marriage, and burials. In 1583, at the Suprema's
request, the tribunal presented a detailed description of the burial
rites practiced by local Moriscos and concluded by noting that
many of these were not of a traditional Islamic kind but "ceremo-
nies that they have introduced among themselves." 38
Analysis of the religious practices of Moriscos brought to trial by
the Valencia tribunal further reinforces this impression of a de-
cayed and watered-down version of Islam that was embraced more
out of custom or a desire to differentiate oneself from a hostile Old
Christian community than because it was a live and vital faith.
Fully 81.5 percent of the Moriscos tried were accused of practicing
just a few of the most elementary Islamic observances, primarily
Ramadan, Guadoc, and the Cala. A late description of their prac-
tices drawn up by the Inquisition in 1602 lists only two of these
(Ramadan and Cala) among the five "commandments" that suppos-
edly distinguished them from Old Christians. These five items are
in marked contrast to the much larger list of main offenses drawn
up by the tribunal at an earlier period. In evidence drawn from
the trial records, circumcision appears to have been quite fre-
quent, but ceremonies like ritual baths, common at an earlier pe-
riod, were entirely forgotten, and only 1.7 percent participated in
the ritual washing of the dead. Overt expression of pride in being
Moslem was rare: only 1.2 percent declared their desire to "live
and die as Moors," and only 1.1 percent were accused of openly
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The Moriscos
praising Mohammed. Of course, it would be foolish to assert that
all of the Moriscos of Valencia were ripe for conversion around the
time of the expulsion, but the evidence suggests that large num-
bers of them were in a phase of religious transition.
Furthermore, in many instances, a Morisco's ignorance of the
basic prayers and rituals of Christianity was equaled or exceeded by
his ignorance of Islam. Many of the Moriscos who carried Islamic
religious writings on their persons or had Islamic religious books in
their possession were not only entirely illiterate but had an ex-
tremely low level of religious participation and knowledge. Pedro
Alamin, who was arrested for carrying a paper containing extracts
from the Koran, declared that he had picked up the paper in the
road and did not know what it contained since "he cannot read. " He
had occasionally gone to mass but had never confessed and did not
know any of the basic Christian prayers. Apart from having been
circumcised, there is no evidence that he had actively participated
in any Islamic rite. He was sentenced along with three other men
accused of carrving Islamic religious writings as amulets and
charms. 40
Some Moriscos did experiment with Catholicism and Catholic
practices, although such experiments did not always have happy
consequences. Marco Lardillo, a young Morisco peasant from
Carlet, for example, joined one of the confraternities and flagel-
lated himself one Holy Friday. He was arrested after being heard to
curse the "evil sect" that harbored such practices. 41 It is also signifi-
cant that 2.8 percent of the Moriscos tried by the tribunal from
1554 professed a strong attachment to Roman Catholicism.
Scattered evidence of a certain amount of sincere Catholicism
among the Moriscos even comes from around the time of the expul-
sion. The Valencia tribunal itself was forced to write the Suprema
for instructions regarding a certain number of Morisco women who
had come to the Holy Office voluntarily before the expulsion was
announced and who wished to live in a special house established by
Archbishop Ribera where they could "carry out their desire to live
as Christians." 42
In this same document, the tribunal referred to the cases of
those Moriscos who might now come forward to declare a sincere
desire to convert. Alonso de Medallan, a Morisco from Quesa, was
one such individual. After having fought in the brief rebellion that
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The Moriscos
followed the promulgation of the edict, he came to the tribunal of
his own accord "to confess his sins and ask for penance and
»43
mercy.
Even more significant, perhaps, for the potential success of the
conversion effort over the long term was the way in which Valen-
cia's Moriscos were beginning to learn basic Christian prayers and
rituals under the pressure of indoctrination by village priests. By
the early seventeenth century, even among the Moriscos tried by
the Holy Office, it was becoming difficult to find those who did not
perform basic Christian observances (mass, confession) or recite
basic Christian prayers (Our Father) and the articles of faith. 44
Paradoxically, even some of the religious doubts raised by
Moriscos about Catholicism were more reflective of an Old Chris-
tian popular perspective than an Islamic one. In the Koran, the
Virgin Mary is spoken of with great respect as the "excellent and
devout lady" and the Virgin Birth is fully accepted. As a conse-
quence, whatever their differences with Christians on other points
of dogma, Morisco intellectuals fully supported this concept. It was
exactly the opposite with the Morisco popular masses who consis-
tently expressed the same doubts about Virgin Birth as their Old
Christian counterparts. 45
Moriscos and Old Christians also frequently expressed similar
attitudes toward indulgences, even using the same scatological lan-
guage when referring to them. Marco Antonio Font, an Old Chris-
tian alguacil, was deprived of his office and exiled after he offered to
"wipe his ass" with the indulgences that a Crusade commissioner
was selling in his village. At the same auto, Angela Adori, a Morisco
living near Cocentaina, was punished for responding "bulls of my
asshole" when she was urged to purchase them along with other
Moriscos of the village, and Francisco Tartalico termed indulgences
"not glory but shit." 46
The efforts of an occasional well-meaning missionary or conscien-
tious bishop notwithstanding, the conversion and social integration
of the Moriscos depended on a long-term commitment to integra-
tion by church and society. Sadly, such a commitment was never
made, and by the time Spain's political and religious leaders be-
came aware of the seriousness of the problem in the 1570s and
1580s, prejudice against the Moriscos had become so ingrained that
the task had become impossible.
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253
Of all the missed opportunities that punctuated relations be-
tween Moriscos and Old Christians in the sixteenth century, per-
haps the most significant was the failure to establish an adequate
network of parish clergy who could provide religious services and
instruction on a day-to-day basis. The need to establish such a
network was not even recognized until 1535 when the bishop of
Ciudad Rodrigo, Antonio Ramirez de Haro, toured the kingdom
and set up 120 rectories in the villages with the largest population
of Moriscos.
Almost from the moment of its inception, this system was widely
regarded as grossly inadequate and corrupt. For one thing, even
though the system had grown somewhat by the 1580s, it was still
too small to adequately serve the Morisco population. In the Arch-
diocese of Valencia alone, only slightly more than one-half of the
Morisco villages had rectories. 48 The worst problem with the recto-
ries, however, was not the size of the network but the virtual
impossibility of recruiting clergy of sufficient quality and commit-
ment to staff those that had been established. Each rector received
only 30 lliures annually, and this amount, which was inadequate to
begin with, suffered a serious reduction in purchasing power in the
face of rapidly rising prices.
Apart from the enormous difficulty of finding individuals to staff
the rectories, the inadequate endowment meant that rectors were
compelled to supplement their income by forcing their Morisco
parishioners to pay exorbitant fees for religious ceremonies or mak-
ing them work without wages in their fields. 4 For other rectors,
the only solution to their financial woes was to seek other employ-
ment even though this meant a high level of absenteeism. Of
course, the Moriscos were constantly complaining about their rec-
tors, denouncing them for their eagerness to levy fines for the
slightest transgression while caring little for the salvation of their
Morisco flock. 50
But some rectors were so corrupt that they were unwilling to
enforce even external religious conformity. While making a visita-
tion to the Sagunto district north of the capital, Inquisitor Alonso
Jimenez de Reynoso received testimony from an Old Christian
living in the predominantly Morisco village of Gilet indicating that
the rector sold local Moriscos licenses permitting them to slaughter
animals in accordance with Islamic ritual, permitted Islamic-style
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The Moriscos
marriage ceremonies, and allowed the Moriscos to work on Corpus
Christi and other Catholic holidays. 51 And some rectors, while not
personally corrupt, were so hostile toward their Morisco flock that
they did little more than alienate them. 52
Recognition of the critical need to reform the Valencian rectories
began in the mid- 1560s when the junta of Madrid, which met
under the leadership of Inquisitor-General Fernando de Valdes,
proposed sending commissioners through the kingdom with pow-
ers to compel absentee rectors to serve in their posts. 53 The heart of
any genuine reform effort, however, would depend on increasing
the income attached to rectories while sparing the Moriscos addi-
tional financial burdens. Since the ecclesiastical tithes (diezmos) of
most Morisco villages were owned by great ecclesiastical institu-
tions or were in private hands, Philip EE's first thought was to tax
these revenues since they were originally intended to support local
churches. Pius V declined Philip's request to tax Valencia's tithe
holders, however, and accurately forecast the years of difficulty that
the king and other reformers would have in finding money for the
rectories when he commented that the tithe holders' cooperation
would be extremely difficult to enlist "even for such pious work." 54
Finally, at a junta held in 1573-74 under the leadership of Arch-
bishop Juan de Ribera, he and the other religious leaders of the
kingdom agreed to provide funds from the revenues of the church
to found new rectories and raise their stipends to 100 lliures. 55 The
drastic failure of this program demonstrated conclusively that be-
low the level of a few enlightened or conscientious prelates and
political leaders, the Valencian church as a whole was not prepared
to commit itself to the conversion effort, especially if that commit-
ment entailed reduced income for canons, benefice holders, or
monastic institutions.
In spite of his ambivalence about the Moriscos, Archbishop
Ribera attempted to promote the conversion effort by starting a
special fund. This money was then invested and the income used to
support rectors in the archdiocese, endow a special school for
Morisco children, and provide religious instruction. Unfortunately,
none of the other institutions or individuals (who were assessed for
the new program) was willing to contribute. Instead of following
Ribera's example, ecclesiastical institutions and private individuals
petitioned for relief from the king, and cathedral chapters and
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The Moriscos
255
monastic institutions sent representatives to Rome to protest
against any effort to tax their income. 56
In spite of Ribera's conscientious support, therefore, it appears
that little was accomplished in the way of reforming and restructur-
ing the system of rectories. This was admitted by the count of
Chinchon in a debate on the Morisco situation held in the Council
of State shortly before the expulsion. 5 ' The drastic failure to estab-
lish an effective network of rural rectories and the sporadic and
perfunctory nature of the religious instruction offered to the Moris-
cos on a day-to-day basis could not be overcome by the missionary
campaigns of a few well-meaning individuals. As a consequence,
the process of conversion remained painfully slow, and the majority
of Valencia's Moriscos remained outside the Christian camp until
the time of the expulsion.
Quite apart from the inadequacy of the conversion effort, the
ability of Islam to survive in the undoubtedly hostile climate of
Christian Valencia suggests that its structure had hidden strengths
that enabled it to resist the pressures placed on it. One vital ele-
ment in this structure was the continued existence of dedicated
Islamic teachers (alfaquis) who not only offered religious instruction
but even acted as judges in private disputes. 58 Some of these men
traveled around the kingdom giving lessons in Islamic rituals in
private homes. At the auto de fe that was held on September 5,
1604, Gonzalo Placuela was punished for opening his home to two
Islamic teachers who taught religious ceremonies to a large number
of local Moriscos. The teachers were equipped with several Islamic
religious works and required their students to demonstrate the
ceremonies that they had been taught so they could be sure that
they could perform them properly.
Another factor that made the task of conversion difficult was the
nature of the Morisco community itself. In spite of the fact that
there were many villages with a mixed Old Christian-Morisco popu-
lation, the Moriscos remained very close knit, with marriage
among first cousins very common. As a result, everyone in the
community knew instantly when one individual had cooperated
with Christian authority in some obvious way like testifying before
the Holy Office. Retribution could be swift and deadly in such
cases. In 1605, Antonio Roche, a familiar in Carlet, came before the
tribunal to testify concerning the sudden disappearance of Luis
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Pastoret, a Morisco of the village who was hated by his Morisco
neighbors for having celebrated several Catholic religious festivals
with the Old Christians of the village and testifying against them
before the Inquisition. 59
Until very late in the century, moreover, those Moriscos who
wished to maintain an Islamic life-style could count on a very pow-
erful ally — their lords. The most famous case of complicity between
a powerful noble and his Morisco vassals was that of Sancho de
Cardona, admiral of Aragon, who was punished by the Valencia
tribunal in 1570 for a variety of offenses, including giving the
Moriscos of Adzaneta permission to operate a mosque, allowing
Moriscos to pass through his territory on their way to North Africa,
and encouraging his vassals to resist efforts to convert them. 6 The
duke of Segorbe appears to have followed a very similar policy on
his estates in the Vail de Uxo, where he allowed an Islamic school
to operate freely. Fray Jose Cebrian, who testified about his experi-
ences in the Vail de Uxo in 1563, recalled that the duke's Morisco
vassals were very happy with their lord and that one of them com-
mented, "Here we have such a wonderful senor; we live as Moors
and no one dares to say anything to us." 61 So confident were the
Moriscos in the protection afforded to them by the nobility that
Pedro Aman, who escaped from the Inquisition in 1573, wrote to
his friends in Onda encouraging them to resist conversion on the
grounds that the nobles would soon intervene to stop the Inquisi-
tion from persecuting them. 62
Of course, with a few exceptions like the admiral, who was also
accused of not confessing or taking communion, the nobles were as
devout as anyone else in sixteenth-century Valencia. 63 Their sup-
port for the religious practices of their Morisco vassals, therefore,
was not based on any enlightened respect for religious freedom but
on the pecuniary advantages they derived from it. The Duke of
Segorbe, for example, regularly received a portion of the estate of
his deceased Morisco vassals since it was the Islamic custom to set
aside part of the estate for the lord. 64 The Moriscos of Cortes paid
their senor a special tax in return for which he allowed them to
practice Islamic customs freely and even personally attended their
ceremonies and weddings. 65
While Morisco obduracy and the support they received from the
nobility presented formidable obstacles to the integration of the
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Moriscos into Valencian society, it was the political and religious
atmosphere of the last half of the sixteenth century that really
determined their fate. Such events as the rise of the Huguenot
movement in France in the late 1550s and the discovery in 1557-58
of groups of Protestant sympathizers in Seville and Valladolid, the
Dutch Revolt of 1566, and the second revolt of the Alpujarras in
Granada (1568-1570) dramatically increased the level of mistrust
and suspicion directed against any group of apparent nonconform-
ists. 66 Furthermore, in the perfervid imaginations of the staunchly
orthodox and narrow-minded group that came to power during
those years, it appeared likely that Spain's growing list of internal
and external enemies would not act in isolation but would join
forces to oppose her. Since Valencia's Moriscos were a readily iden-
tifiable dissident group, it became all too easy for official circles to
see the hand of the French Huguenots or the Ottoman Turks be-
hind every rumor of Morisco resistance. Thus, in 1587, the
Suprema solemnly warned the tribunal to be on its guard against a
rising by Valencia's Moriscos in concert with the Moriscos of Ara-
gon and the Huguenot prince of Beam merely because a rumor had
reached Madrid that the Aragonese Moriscos were purchasing arms
and had dealings with the Huguenots. Lacking any direct evi-
dence, the Suprema simply assumed that the Valencian Moriscos
were involved in the supposed plot because of their close proximity
to and frequent communication with their Aragonese cousins.
Ordinary Valencians probably thought seldom, if at all, about
collusion between the French Huguenots and local Moriscos. They
were far more concerned with the corsair attacks that had ravaged
and partially depopulated the coast and killed and kidnapped even
Christians living far from the sea. By the last quarter of the six-
teenth century, estimates of the number of Christian captives in
Algiers alone were as high as 25,000, and the authorities seemed
powerless to prevent the raids. 69
It was commonly believed that local Moriscos aided and abetted
the corsairs. While the fears of Morisco complicity with the corsairs
may have been exaggerated, especially as most of them lived far
from the coast, they were not entirely unfounded. In October
1583, fifteen Moriscos of Almen'a were executed for having assisted
Algerian corsairs in an attack on Chilches. 70
Unquestionably, some Moriscos helped the pirates directly by
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The Moriscos
furnishing guides or military assistance, but a more important part
of this collaboration was that many Valencian Moriscos emigrated to
North Africa and later returned as corsairs themselves. Abdella
Alcaxet, a native of the village of Bellreguard near Gandfa, was
captured by a squadron of Spanish galleys patrolling the Valencian
coast and brought to the tribunal in September 1576. Under ques-
tioning, Alcaxet testified that he had left Spain some twenty years
earlier with a group of Moriscos from Oliva and served the king of
Algiers in two military campaigns. Later, he turned to piracy and
made seven corsair expeditions of his own, seizing several Spanish
vessels and either forcing the crews to become galley slaves or
selling them in Algiers. 71 Some renegade Moriscos even returned
to attack the villages from which they had fled. In 1595, during an
attack on Teulada, the corsairs killed Antonio Valles and captured
his wife and children. In commenting on this raid, the viceroy of
Valencia remarked that the raiders could not have gotten so far
inland had it not been for the help of two Moriscos of the village,
enemies of Valles who had fled to Algiers some years earlier. 72
Official paranoia combined with popular hatred ended by poison-
ing the atmosphere and shattering the hopes of those few clerics
and statesmen who still believed in the possibility of conversion. 73
In official circles, even at the level of the prestigious Council of
State itself, extreme solutions to the Morisco problem were being
proposed, including such things as mass enslavement of all males
ages 15 to 60 or the castration of young men over a certain age. 74
Rejection of the Moriscos on a popular level can be seen in the
proliferation of guild ordinances prohibiting Moriscos from becom-
ing apprentices. 75 Morisco physicians, like the Jewish or converso
physicians of a century earlier, were being charged with poisoning
and maiming their Old Christian patients, and there was a growing
demand that Moriscos be excluded from medical schools. 76 This
popular hostility resulted in violent attacks on the Moriscos as they
streamed toward the ports of embarkation during fall 1609. 77
During the years immediately following the forced conversion of
Valencia's Moriscos, and especially during the tenure of Inquisitor-
General Alonso de Manrique, the Inquisition's official policy ap-
peared to reflect the attitudes of moderation and limited toleration
that were shared by the emperor and leading members of his ad-
ministration. The inquisitor-general played a leading role in the
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series of negotiations carried on from 1525 with twelve representa-
tives of the Valencian Moriscos which resulted in an agreement
containing a rather ambiguous clause granting them for the next
forty years the same protection from inquisitorial jurisdiction that
had been granted to the Moriscos of Granada at the time of their
conversion. The document also promised toleration, for a limited
period, of Moorish dress, the use of Arabic, the maintenance of
separate cemeteries, and even a subsidy for the now-displaced
Islamic priesthood.
This moderate approach appeared to be shared by at least a few of
Valencia's inquisitors even into the late 1560s. In his remarkable
report to the Suprema on the results of his visitation to the Segorbe
region in 1568, Inquisitor Juan de Rojas freely criticized the absen-
teeism of so many local rectors and the greed of the nobility who
collected the ecclesiastical rents that should have gone to maintain
the churches and levied exorbitant dues and tribute on their Morisco
vassals. He was particularly incensed at a recently concluded agree-
ment between the bishops of Segorbe and Tortosa to exclude all the
Moriscos of their diocese from attending mass on the grounds that
they all lived as heretics and were therefore excommunicated. This,
of course, was exactly contrary to the policy of conversion and attrac-
tion then favored in official circles, and Rojas demanded that the
bishop's order be rescinded immediately. 79
During the middle years of the sixteenth century, Gregorio de
Miranda, who had served on the Valencia tribunal from 1548,
played an influential role in the evolution of policy toward the
Moriscos. After replacing Antonio Ramirez de Haro, bishop of
Segovia, as special commissioner to the Moriscos in 1551, Miranda
carried out an extensive visitation to the heavily Morisco areas of
the district and became quite popular with Morisco leaders such as
the Abenamir family of Benaguacil. 80 In the late 1550s and early
1560s, Miranda served on several special commissions on the
Morisco problem that were established by order of Philip II and
was reappointed as special commissioner in 1566. 81
Miranda's policy toward the Moriscos is perhaps best outlined in
his summary of the deliberations of the 1561 junta, whose conclu-
sions strongly reflected his views as outlined in several other memo-
randa. He favored a broad attack on Islamic religious ceremonies
and the religious leaders who sustained them as well as a campaign
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The Moriscos
to disarm the Moriscos so as to weaken their resistance. He also
favored attracting the Morisco elite by appointing some men of
influence as familiares. To carry out a thorough reform of the entire
conversion effort, he proposed that a number of special commission-
ers should be selected to travel through the kingdom. These com-
missioners would also be empowered to look into abuses ranging
from the rampant absenteeism by local rectors to the unauthorized
diversion of the revenues of the former mosques into the hands of
the nobility which were hampering the conversion effort. 82
These ideas, as embodied in the resolutions of the junta of Ma-
drid which met at the end of 1564, might have opened a new and
more promising phase in the relations between the Morisco com-
munity and the state. 3 They did lead to the reappointment of
Miranda as commissioner and to his selection of a number of
Morisco leaders as familiares, including several members of the
influential Abenamir family. What is questionable, however, is the
degree to which someone like Miranda represented mainstream
views within the Inquisition, much less in society as a whole. Of
course, the evidence suggests that Miranda himself hoped to profit
from his commission by collecting fines and had appointed a special
treasurer for them. When he learned of this, Philip II ordered him
to desist on the grounds that this would alienate the Moriscos and
undermine the entire purpose of the commission. 84
Another point of view, which was diametrically opposed to that
of Miranda and other moderates, was expressed by Inquisitors Pe-
dro de £arate, Francisco de Arganda, and Juan de Llano de Valdes
in their reply to a memorial that had been submitted to Philip II by
Jeronimo Corella of the Council of Aragon. Corella, who was a
moderate on the Morisco issue, called for another, more intensive
conversion campaign and contended that the relative failure of the
conversion effort thus far was the result of a lack of resources rather
than the impossibility of the task. Taking a rather broad hint from
the Suprema, which had sent them the memorial for their com-
ments on the result of so many years of "using the Moriscos with
softness and moderation," the three inquisitors rejected the entire
notion of conversion and called for more intense persecution includ-
ing capital punishment for first offenders. 85 Even though the mod-
eration with which the Valencia tribunal carried out its judicial
responsibilities during the period belied the violent tone of the
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261
memorial, the official position taken by the tribunal on this occa-
sion could only add strength to those demanding a drastic solution
to the Morisco problem.
Certainly the tribunals' actions with regard to the Moriscos were
more reflective of ambiguity and greed than either the positive
attitude and optimism so often expressed by Gregorio de Miranda
or the outright hostility of Llano de Valdes. In 1528, Inquisitor-
General Manrique modified the (already somewhat ambiguous) pro-
visions of the 1526 agreement to allow the Inquisition a virtually
free hand in the persecution of Moriscos on the grounds that they
were continuing to practice Islam. 6 For its part, the Valencia tribu-
nal had largely ignored the 1526 agreement and brought small
numbers of Moriscos to trial almost every year from 1526 to 1540.
Complaints by the Valencian nobility led to a virtual cessation of
inquisitorial persecution between 1541 and 1543. 88 The period
1544-1546 saw the resumption of activity, with 165 cases tried in
those years. Pope Paul Ill's brief of August 2, 1546, however, had
the effect of virtually nullifying inquisitorial authority since it al-
lowed confessors to be appointed who would be empowered to
absolve Moriscos for crimes against the faith and relieve them and
their descendants from all disabilities. 89 This brief, combined with
a provision of the Valencian Cortes of Monzon of 1547 calling for
"postponement" of proceedings against the Moriscos, led to a sharp
decline in the tribunal's activity. 90 From 1554 to 1557, for example,
only six Moriscos were tried, while at the auto de fe held on March
14, 1557, the forty-nine Moriscos who appeared were natives of
Aragon and Catalonia who had moved to the district and were
therefore not covered in the Cortes resolution of 1547. 91
Behind the scenes, however, the tribunal was preparing to re-
cover its lost authority by gathering evidence against nobles who
encouraged their Morisco vassals to practice Islam and by sending
letters to the Suprema describing the Moriscos' Islamic life-style. 92
In the 1560s, the tribunal unleashed a new wave of persecution.
This time, however, its activity was rather more selective: it concen-
trated its attention on destroying the Morisco community's reli-
gious and political leaders. This approach was very much in line
with the program of conversion/repression as set forth at the Cortes
of 1563-64 and was specifically endorsed by the Suprema in 1565. 93
In pursuit of this objective, inquisitors on visitation, like Juan de
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The Moriscos
Rojas in 1568, carefully drew up lists of leading Moriscos who were
to be prosecuted as soon as possible after the conclusion of the most
recent period of grace. 94 Morisco political leaders such as Vicente
Cortes, who had come to Valencia as a special representative of the
Morisco community, or Alfonso Bastante and Jaime Bolaix, who led
the Moriscos of Vail de Uxo in an angry confrontation with the
Bishop of Tortosa in May 1568, were also prosecuted. 95
On July 1, 1567, after a consultation with the Suprema, the
Valencia tribunal issued an order to arrest Cosme, Juan, and
Hernando Abenamir, probably the most important and widely re-
spected members of the Morisco political elite. In spite of Gregorio
de Miranda's campaign to win over the Abenamirs, a campaign that
resulted in making Cosme Abenamir a familiar, his colleagues on
the tribunal had been gathering evidence against the family since
March 1556. Testimony in the case reveals Cosine's religious posi-
tion as somewhat ambiguous. In spite of being a strong and vocal
defender of Islam, even asserting that it was superior to Catholi-
cism in a conversation with Gaspar Coscolla, an Old Christian mer-
chant living in Benaguacil, Cosme testified that he had been mar-
ried according to the rites of the church and recited the Our Father
and Ave Maria during his first interrogation. On this occasion,
Cosme was able to purchase a pardon from Inquisitor-General Di-
ego de Espinosa for the substantial sum of 7,000 ducats, and he and
his brothers were allowed to return to their homes. But their cases
were only suspended, and even the Inquisitor-General's pardon
could not save Cosme from being rearrested in December 1577. 96
At the auto de fe of 1568, it was the turn of Islamic religious
teachers. After Valencia's inquisitors angrily rejected a suggestion
from the Suprema that it might be wiser to read out the alfaquis'
sentences at a private ceremony to avoid offending the Moriscos,
ten leading alfaquis appeared among the forty-nine Moriscos sen-
tenced at the auto. 97
The inability of the Inquisition to support its campaign against
the Moriscos by confiscating their property would sooner or later
have forced a halt in this intense activity given the tribunal's ex-
treme financial penury during the middle years of the century.
Confiscation of Morisco property, however, had been prohibited by
a royal order issued at the Cortes of Monzon of 1533 which pro-
vided that the property of a Morisco condemned for heresy should
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pass to his Catholic heirs and protected any rights that his serior
had in the property. At the auto de fe of July 7, 1566, the tribunal
simply ignored this law and proceeded to confiscate and sell the
property of the Moriscos who were reconciled. This brought an
instant protest from the estates of the kingdom, which sent two
ambassadors to court. 98 Assured of the Suprema's full support for
its actions, the tribunal did the same thing with the property of
those reconciled at the auto of 1568. Realizing that new protests
would be entirely unavailing unless the tribunal was granted some
form of financial compensation, the Cortes this time offered to
provide a subsidy of 1,000 Valencian lliures." Even though this
offer was rejected, it did lead to a complex series of negotiations
among the viceroy, representatives of the Morisco community, and
the tribunal, which resulted in the agreement of October 12, 1571.
This agreement, which was accepted with a great show of reluc-
tance by the tribunal, meant that the Moriscos agreed to tax them-
selves to support the Inquisition. In return for this subsidy, which
amounted to 2,500 lliures annually, the tribunal agreed not to con-
fiscate Morisco property in the villages included under the agree-
ment and to limit its fines to a maximum of 10 ducats. These fines
were to be expended only on supporting or embellishing the rec-
tory in the Morisco victim's home village or to pay the costs of
feeding poor prisoners. During the negotiations for this agreement,
the tribunal had also committed itself to restoring the property that
it had seized illegally. Once the agreement was concluded, how-
ever, the tribunal ignored its ameliorating clauses. The property
that had been confiscated and sold was never returned to its own-
ers, and the 10 ducat fines that were routinely levied after 1571
were simply incorporated into the tribunal's regular income instead
100
of being used for pious works or the relief of poor prisoners.
During the 1570s and early 1580s, the paranoia that was begin-
ning to grip government circles spread to the Valencia tribunal,
making it supersensitive to any rumors of collusion between local
Moriscos and Spain's internal or external enemies. The second
revolt of the Alpujarras (1568-1570) stirred fears of a simultaneous
rising by the Moriscos of Aragon and Valencia, while the arrival of
Moriscos from Granada after their defeat was regarded as highly
dangerous by all of the crown's representatives in the kingdom. 101
In 1578, several Moriscos were accused of having received in
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The Moriscos
their homes two emissaries of the king of Algiers, who had arrived
with letters for the Moriscos of Aragon and Valencia. 1 The obses-
sion with Morisco conspiracies, however, left the tribunal vulnera-
ble to manipulation by unscrupulous individuals who were well
aware that to denounce someone for being in contact with Turks or
North Africans or French Huguenots virtually guaranteed his arrest
regardless of how flimsy the evidence really was. In 1581, the
tribunal's watchfulness appeared to have paid off in a big way with
the discovery of a plot involving leading Moriscos from Valencia
and Aragon. This seemed to be nothing less than the long-awaited
grand conspiracy involving a rising by the Aragonese and Valencia
Moriscos in concert with all of Spain's enemies, and for several
years thereafter, the tribunal was busily engaged in arresting and
trying the plotters. In this instance, zeal seems to have been
stronger than discretion, and it was not until 1584, when the tribu-
nal received testimony from Lorenzo Polo, then at the peak of his
career as an informer (see below) to the effect that the so-called plot
was a complete fabrication that prosecution was halted. Since
Polo's testimony had proven to be so reliable in the past and since it
was supported by no less than twenty-four other witnesses, Gil
Perez and Alonso Conejo, the chief "discoverers" of the alleged
plot, were arrested and convicted of perjury. 1 3
During the first half of the 1570s, the Valencia tribunal increased
only slightly the level of anti-Morisco activity that had been attained
during the 1560s. But by the last half of the decade, the figures
reveal a rising trend of activity that was to continue right through the
mid-i590s. 104 In part, of course, this increased activity reflects na-
tional political trends and the tendency to regard any Moriscos, no
matter how assimilated, as a potential danger to Spanish security.
As far as the Valencia tribunal was concerned, this national trend
was greatly reinforced by the spectacular revelations of Lorenzo
Polo. Polo was the scion of one of the wealthiest and most distin-
guished Morisco families in Teruel. His family, along with several
interrelated Morisco families living on the same two streets of the
city, had converted to Roman Catholicism voluntarily in 1501 and
were well known for an ostentatious display of Catholic orthodoxy.
They were so well accepted as Christians that they had been able to
intermarry freely with Old Christians, enter the priesthood, join
confraternities, and carry arms — even in coastal districts, at a time
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when Moriscos who carried arms openly were regarded with great
suspicion and subject to arrest. In 1575, when the Moriscos of Ara-
gon were disarmed, Polo's father and other leading members of
these families successfully petitioned the crown for the restoration of
their weapons on the grounds that they should be considered Old
Christians. 105 This secure and comfortable world came to a sudden
and shattering end on May 2, 1578, the day that Polo walked into the
headquarters of the Inquisition and laid a series of amazing allega-
tions before the startled inquisitors. According to him, he and his
entire family as well as all the other families living in that part of the
city were secret Mohammedans and had been so ever since their
voluntary conversion many years before. During the next several
years, up to the mid- 1580s, Polo and certain other members of
Teruel's Morisco community testified against their erstwhile friends,
and the tribunal was able to shatter what was arguably the most
tight-knit group of Islamicizing Moriscos in the kingdom.
For the inquisitors of the Valencia tribunal, the revelation that the
same Morisco families that Inquisitor Juan de Rojas had once lauded
for their "good and Christian lives" were secretly practicing Islam
must have been profoundly shocking. During the early 1580s, the
tone of inquisitors' letters about the Morisco situation becomes
harsher, less compromising, and less hopeful about the possibility of
conversion. It was in 1581, as dozens of Teruel's Moriscos were being
brought to trial, that Valencia's Inquisitor Alonso de Reinoso first
suggested the idea of expulsion in a letter to the Suprema. The
external conformity and inner apostasy of the Moriscos of Teruel also
figured in the violently anti- Morisco tract written by Martin de
Salvatierra in 1587. Salvatierra, who had been inquisitor of Valencia
in the early 1570s, singled out the "wickedness and ill-will" demon-
strated by the Teruel Moriscos as a way of showing the futility of any
further conversion efforts and justifying such extreme measures as
castration of young males and expulsion. 108
In what seems almost to have been a reaction to the sharp in-
crease in corsair activity against the Valencia coast after the
Hispano-Turkish truce of 1580 (raids on Calpe and Chilches in 1583
and Altea, Polop, Moraira, and Callosa in 1584) and the Teruel
affair, the Valencia tribunal greatly intensified its persecution of
Moriscos. 109 Between 1585 and 1595, the tribunal punished a total
of 1,063 — more than in any comparable period either before or
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The Moriscos
since. There was a drop almost to the level of the late 1570s in the
period 1595-1599 (162 cases) and then a resumption of a level of
activity similar to that of the mid- 1580s through the period of the
expulsion and beyond. 110
On a national level, the controversy over the ultimate fate of the
Moriscos continued, but by the first years of the seventeenth cen-
tury, the idea of expulsion was gaining more and more adherents.
At a meeting of the Council of State on January 30, 1608, a majority
of the members spoke as though the decision to expel the Moriscos
of Valencia had already been taken, and even those members who
seemed to oppose it could offer but feeble resistance. 111
At the Council of State session of April 4, 1609, the expulsion of
Valencia's Moriscos was finally approved in light of the fact that the
success of truce negotiations between Spain and the United Prov-
inces had removed concern about foreign military interference and
freed Spanish resources for the operation. 112 The decree of expul-
sion itself faithfully reflects the views of hardliners like Juan de
Ribera or the mayordomo, Gomez Davila, with its acceptance of
the collective responsibility of the Moriscos for plotting with
Spain's enemies and the complete failure of conversion. 113 In mak-
ing a special point of the need to "placate" God who had been so
grievously offended by the Moriscos, moreover, the royal decree
seems to reflect the fears of divine punishment of Spain for tolerat-
ing known heretics which was so often expressed in letters and
memorials around the turn of the century. 114
As far as the Valencia tribunal itself was concerned, the decree of
expulsion seemed to come as something of a shock. Even though
three of its inquisitors had been among the earliest proponents of
expulsion, later memorials from the tribunal or those closely associ-
ated with it had emphasized the need to force genuine conversion.
In a letter written to the king in 1583, Valencia's inquisitors boasted
that they had eliminated at least one major obstacle to the conver-
sion effort by executing or imprisoning all the leading Islamic reli-
gious teachers. 115 In spite of its outward show of dissatisfaction with
the Moriscos, the tribunal was profiting from the Morisco presence
both through the subsidy provided in the Concordia of 1571 and
from the 10 ducat fines that it routinely levied and pocketed. The
tribunal's willingness to accept and profit from the Moriscos is
clearly demonstrated by the fact that, like many Valencian nobles
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The Moriscos
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and ecclesiastical institutions, it made loans to Morisco villages, one
as late as June 20, 1609, two and one-half months after the Council of
State had decided on the expulsion. 116 Such loans actually helped
Moriscos to expand into primarily Old Christian districts. 117
The tribunal's attitude was further demonstrated by Inquisitor
licentiate Bartolome Sanchez during the deliberations of the ecclesi-
astical junta that was organized to consider the Morisco problem in
November 1608. As reported by Fray Antonio Sobrino, a calificador
who strongly supported renewed conversion efforts, Sanchez voted
with the majority in rejecting the idea that the Moriscos were all
incurable heretics and in favoring their inclusion — whether forced
or voluntary — in the rites of the church. But what probably
shows the tribunal's acceptance of the Morisco presence more than
anything else was the June 1606 memorial that was sent to the
Suprema by Nicolas del Rio, one of the tribunal's secretaries. This
memorial, which could not have been sent without the explicit
approval of the inquisitors, called for a dramatic increase in the
arrest and trial of Moriscos, including those six hundred individuals
already noted in the Inquisition's files with only one witness against
them who were therefore not normally subject to persecution.
These additional prisoners, and others brought in through the modi-
fication or suspension of other procedural safeguards, would then
be heavily fined to provide funds for a new prison specially de-
signed for Moriscos. Not only would this prison be more commodi-
ous than the old one but it would be equipped with a large chapel
presided over by a well-trained chaplain who would provide them
with religious instruction. Del Rfo's conception of this prison was
that it should lead to the rehabilitation and not merely the punish-
ment of its inmates. Instructed by the chaplain, watched over by a
staff of warders, those prisoners who demonstrated proficiency in
their religious observances could hope for a reduction in their sen-
tences and eventual freedom. 119
For its part, the Suprema received this suggestion favorably. In
response to proposals made by the tribunal, it began commuting
the sentences of a number of wealthy Moriscos then serving in the
galleys in return for a substantial money payment. By January 30,
1609, three months before the Council of State resolution, construc-
tion of the new model prison was well under way, and the Suprema
was in the process of selling more commutations so that it could be
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The Moriscos
completed. Del Rio's proposal and the fact that the Valencia
tribunal had dropped its earlier insistence on expulsion indicate a
significant and growing division among the Moriscos of the district
during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Insight
into this split may be gleaned from comparing data about the par-
ticulars of trials with information about sentencing. Broadly speak-
ing, this evidence reveals that the Moriscos brought to trial by the
tribunal fell into two main groups. The first, and largest, compris-
ing 52.2 percent of the accused in the sample, were those who
demonstrated a willingness to cooperate with the Holy Office ei-
ther by coming in to denounce themselves voluntarily or by confess-
ing at one of the early hearings during the trial. Their cooperation
was rewarded with relatively light punishment. Fully 72.9 percent
of this group received sentences of reconciliation accompanied by
fines (11%) or, more frequently, religious instruction (25.9%). 121 By
the 1580s, it appears that many Moriscos had come to accept the
Holy Office as a relatively benign institution where they could
confess their sins and expect to receive lenient treatment. For its
part, the tribunal relied on the Moriscos for a good part of its
revenues while coming to accept them as a not entirely irredeem-
able group whose practice of Islam was gradually fading.
In marked contrast to this cooperative or docile group were the
"resisters," persons against whom there was substantial evidence
but who refused to admit anything. It was against this group,
comprising about 40 percent of the accused, that the tribunal
turned the full force of its persecution and laid down its heaviest
sentences. Of these negativos, 23 percent were sentenced to gal-
ley service, 17 of them to eight years to life, while 7 were relaxed.
The existence of this sharp dichotomy among the Moriscos tried
by the Valencia tribunal reveals that the Moriscos were no longer
a monolithic group, while the tribunal's pedagogy of punishment
could not have failed to further isolate the large but vulnerable
group of die-hards.
For the first few years after the expulsion, the tribunal main-
tained the intensity of its anti-Morisco activity, punishing no less
than 258 Moriscos between 1610 and 1614. 122 This activity was
sustained by the fact that not all the Moriscos had actually left
Valencia, while others returned either as pirates or because they
found living conditions in North Africa intolerable.
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The Moriscos
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In the first place, there were those Moriscos who resisted the
expulsion order. In October 1610, two widely separate rebellions
broke out, one in the Muela de Cortes valley region in the hills above
the Jucar and the other in the coastal region around Guadalest. In
the course of these risings, the Moriscos murdered priests and de-
stroyed or desecrated churches, thus making themselves liable to
inquisitorial persecution. 123 In addition to this group of rebels, sev-
eral thousand Morisco children had remained behind after their
parents had left. 124 Since many of these children had been taken into
the homes of Valencian Old Christians, the government allowed
them to remain in the kingdom, even though it made strenuous
efforts to locate and count them. The tribunal, for its part, was kept
busy hearing the confessions of these poor creatures who were
brought to the Holy Office by their new masters.
Disappointing the hopes of those who felt that the expulsion
would deprive the North African corsairs of critical assistance and
therefore lessen the effectiveness of attacks on Valencia's ravaged
coasts, the period 1610-1619 saw a dramatic increase in corsair
activity and a sharp upswing in the number of captives seized. 125
Inevitably, military countermeasures netted a certain number of
prisoners, and among these were to be found former Valencian
Moriscos who served the corsair captains as soldiers, sailors, and
guides. 126 According to a royal order addressed to the viceroy mar-
quis of Caracena in February 1615, the Holy Office was to have
jurisdiction over such persons even though they had been arrested
by secular authorities for their crimes. 12 '
A typical case of this kind was that of Amet Moro. A native of
Benillup, Moro had gone to Algiers at the time of the expulsion,
where he lived for three years. During that time, he turned corsair
and served on several corsair boats engaged in raiding Spanish
shipping. He was eventually captured and made a slave in Valencia
city. At the outset he pretended, with some success, to be a Moor
but was finally brought before the Holy Office after he was cap-
tured, along with several other slaves, while trying to escape. In his
testimony before the tribunal, he admitted his Valencian birth and
baptism but showed clear signs of repentance and a desire to re-
ceive instruction in Roman Catholicism. Seemingly unimpressed
by this, the tribunal handed down the relatively severe sentence of
perpetual imprisonment with the first three years to be spent in
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The Moriscos
galley service. 128 The harshness of this and other sentences that the
tribunal was handing down in such cases earned it a rebuke from
the Suprema in the following year. 129
After the mid-i620S, the number of Moriscos tried by the Valen-
cia tribunal begins to decline sharply until, by the 1640s, they came
to represent a tiny percentage of its overall activity. 130 During the
eighteenth century, even this very low level of activity had been
further reduced, and the Moriscos who had provided the tribunal
with 73.2 percent of its victims between 1560 and 1614 only ac-
counted for thirteen cases between 1700 and 1820. 131
As A. Dommguez Ortiz and Bernard Vincent have already ob-
served, historical circumstances had deprived the Moriscos of the
elaborate social hierarchy so typical of early modern society. 132 For-
mation of a Morisco aristocracy, complete with large landed estates
and ties of vassalage, was made virtually impossible by the fact that,
with some exceptions, the bulk of the old Islamic leadership had
fled. Even someone like Cosme de Abenamir, the leader of a widely
respected family, was still a vassal of the Duke of Segorbe and was
forced to resign his familiar's commission at the duke's command. 1 3
A hierarchy of religious leaders also failed to develop, in part
because in Islam itself the priesthood was not a well-defined group
and in part because such Islamic priests and religious teachers as
there were had to operate in secret. 134 Indeed, there is some evi-
dence to suggest that Islamic religious teachers — the alfaquis and
tagarinos that were the subject of so much inquisitorial
persecution — came from the very lowest segment of the Morisco
population. 135 A combination of Old Christian hostility and discrimi-
nation and social pressure from the Morisco community itself made
conditions unfavorable for the development of a new class of Morisco
Catholic priests.
Creation of a class of professionals also proved to be quite difficult.
The ordinances of professional organizations regularly discriminated
against Morisco notaries, while Morisco physicians were viewed
with envy and distrust by their Old Christian colleagues and perse-
cuted by the Inquisition. 136 The biased attitude of Old Christian
professional groups rather than any inherent lack of ability, there-
fore, explains the tiny percentage of professionals (0.4%) among the
Moriscos tried by the Holy Office. 13 ' This is one of the lowest per-
centages of professionals of any group tried by the Inquisition. 138
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The Moriscos
271
Strong Old Christian hostility could not prevent the Moriscos
from becoming merchants; Vicente and Juan Baya Mallux, for exam-
ple, formed a mercantile company in 1571 and prospered trading in
silk, wool, sugar, and cattle. 139 Morisco muleteers also played a
critical role in carrying goods from one region to another. So impor-
tant were the Moriscos to the trade of the important inland town of
Cocentaina that the city fathers complained that with the expul-
sion, "the greater part" of long-distance trade had come to a halt. 140
But given the paucity of well-established commercial routes in this
still rudimentary society, muleteers were often merchants them-
selves. 141 Among the Morisco victims of the Holy Office in Valen-
cia, 8.8 percent were merchants, and of these, more than half
belonged to that class of petty shopkeepers and itinerant traders
who played such an essential role in the Valencian economy. 142
Drawing on their tradition of fine woodworking and metalwork-
ing, and sustained by the need for self-sufficiency in the isolated
villages where most of them lived, the Moriscos frequently engaged
in crafts. 143 This is reflected in the occupational structure of those
tried by the Holy Office: some 19.2 percent were artisans, includ-
ing shoemakers (in spite of the opposition of Valencia's shoemakers'
guild), basketmakers, butchers, metalworkers, and stonemasons.
The overwhelming majority of the Moriscos tried by the Valencia
tribunal, some 64.9 percent, gained their livelihood from agricul-
ture. Although most of these peasants were quite poor, in many
cases farming tiny plots, others were moderately well off. 144 Recent
studies of landholding in several Valencian towns with large
Morisco populations have revealed glaring inequalities, with the
top 10 percent holding 38 to 50 percent of the land. 145 Among this
small elite were to be found moneylenders and peasants with a
variety of interests; for example, Gaspar Mois had holdings that
included olive oil mills, olive groves, mulberry trees, and wheat
fields. 146 It was from among this group that the tribunal could hope
to make substantial financial gains either through confiscation of
their property when they lived in villages not covered by the Con-
cordia of 1571 or, more commonly, by allowing them to buy their
way out of galley service or other heavy sentences for substantial
sums of money.
In Islam, as in Judaism, many key religious rituals were per-
formed primarily in the home and closely linked to family life. As a
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The Moriscos
result, in both cases, women formed a relatively high percentage of
those tried by the Holy Office. 147
The figures on marital status reinforce the impression of the
Moriscos of Valencia as a settled and relatively stable population of
agricultural workers and peasants. More than 66 percent of the
Moriscos whose marital status is stated in the records were married
at the time of their arrest, while another 20 percent were widows or
widowers. In spite of the mass flight of dozens or even hundreds of
Moriscos from certain villages, therefore, their strong family orien-
tation would appear to support Nicolas del Rfo's view of them as
fearing nothing more than being forced to "leave their land and
homes. " Interestingly, del Rio used his perception of the Moriscos'
attachment to home and land not as a justification for expulsion but
to support his proposal, which was designed to rehabilitate a signifi-
cantly large number of Morisco offenders. 148
Nevertheless, in spite of the obvious economic value of such a
stable and productive population and the lack of any real threat of
rebellion, social and political pressure for expulsion had become
overwhelming by the first years of the seventeenth century. In this
case, the proximate cause was not the actual (frequently moderate)
outcome of inquisitorial activity but its inevitable social by-products:
racism and discrimination. It was the spectacle of so many Moriscos
being paraded before the eyes of the Old Christian population at the
frequent autos de fe that did so much to artificially maintain the
separateness of a community already moving toward assimilation. Of
course, inquisitors like Bartolome Sanchez knew that most of their
victims were accused of trifling offenses, but the tribunal had taken
an official position on the expulsion issue in the early 1580s, and the
inquisitors of the early seventeenth century were neither strong
enough nor independent enough to challenge the harsh and uncom-
promising mood that had taken hold in Spanish ruling circles and
ended by sealing the fate of a community that had lived in Spain for
hundreds of years. Carried out with brutal efficiency, the expulsion
of the Moriscos represents the greatest achievement of Lerma's
undistinguished regime. But, like so many of the other accomplish-
ments of the imperial age, its results were deeply disappointing,
weakening instead of strengthening the Spanish monarchy, under-
mining the Valencian economy, and lending further support to the
black legend of Spanish intolerance.
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V/7
Illuminism, Erasmianism, and
Protestantism: The Problem of
Religious Dissent
In spite of the attention that Spanish Protestantism has received
over the centuries, scholars have been skeptical about its real or
potential impact on Spanish society. This view was perhaps best
expressed by Lea who declared that it was unlikely that the small
number of Spanish Protestants could make a "permanent impres-
sion on the profound and unreasoning religious convictions of Spain
in the sixteenth century. " He and others have also rightly empha-
sized the benefits that accrued to the Inquisition from its discovery
of Protestant "cells" in Valladolid and Seville and the spectacular
autos de fe of the late 1550s and early 1560s. Given the small
number of actual native Protestants punished at these and other
proceedings, it might seem almost as though the Inquisition had
grossly exaggerated the importance of the threat so as to reverse its
flagging fortunes and render itself indispensable to the monarchy.
Of course, it would be foolish to deny that the Inquisition reaped
substantial political and financial benefits from its persecution of
Protestants, but, in my view, it would be equally foolish to underesti-
mate the gravity of religious dissent and disaffection among the Old
Christian population. In many regions, popular Christianity was
neither "profound" nor "unreasoning"; it simply did not exist. 2 In
other areas, even in places like the Archdiocese of Toledo with its
large number of parish clergy, less than 40 percent of those the
273
274
Illuminism, Erasmianism, and Protestantism
Inquisition interrogated before 1550 could recite the basic prayers. 3
In Valencia, the tribunal found that only 8. 7 percent of those tried for
common blasphemy from 1554 to 1820 even mentioned the name of
Jesus in their curses. 4
Ignorance of the basic tenets of Christianity could prove to be as
much of a barrier to the spread of religious heterodoxy as it was to
official efforts to cathechize the population. What really concerned
the church and the Inquisition, however, was the widespread
doubt about or outright rejection of important Catholic dogmas and
a pervasive anticlericalism expressed in everything from the pica-
resque novel to a statement by Lorenzo Sanchez, himself a notary
of the Inquisition, who once declared that "tithes are ours, and the
clergy are our servants." 5
The Inquisition punished such statements under two general
and overlapping headings: blasphemy and propositions. In their
most serious form, both of these categories were designed to trap
individuals who had made statements contrary to Catholic dogma
and tending to a denial of faith. 6 In practice, the really serious
forms of these offenses were not the blasphemous swearing that
often accompanied games of cards or dice or the proposition, which
represented the widely held belief that fornication between single
people was no sin, but those statements that implied hostility to the
church and rejection of its teachings. In Valencia, 50.3 percent of
those punished for blasphemy between 1554 and 1820 were con-
victed for cursing and denying God and the saints. More significant
of the widespread rejection of the position that the church claimed
for itself was the fact that fully 24.2 percent of those convicted for
propositions expressed doubts about the church's authority in mat-
ters of faith.
Although blasphemy was theoretically a less serious charge than
propositions, there were at least some among the mass of ordinary
people (mainly artisans and peasants) charged with this offense
whose statements and actions betrayed a profound religious mal-
aise. Cristobal Ballester was one such person. This cavalier, the
nephew of the governor of the estates of the admiral of Aragon, was
a restless individual who moved incessantly around the district and
lived separated from his wife. Convicted of blasphemy for the usual
profanity, his refusal to go to confession, attend mass, or observe
fast days reveal him as another one of the many Old Christians
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Illuminism, Erasmianism, and Protestantism
275
whose ambivalent attitudes about Roman Catholicism were a cause
of increasing concern to the church in the turbulent 1560s. ' Even
more alarming from the standpoint of the church was that some
people's blasphemy took the form of mocking church observances.
Almost 13 percent of those convicted of blasphemy were accused of
such mockery, which consisted primarily of satirical references to
church ceremonies or the sale of indulgences but occasionally be-
came sacrilegious. In 1665, Francisco Dalmau was accused of ridi-
culing Holy Week and habitually taking over the pulpit just before
mass began to deliver an absurd and mocking sermon. 8
But the ignorance, indifference, or downright hostility that char-
acterized popular attitudes toward Catholicism all over Spain was
counteracted, at least in part, by a broad-scale effort at religious
reform and renewal that affected both monastic and secular clergy
and involved pious laymen as well. 9 Within the monastic orders,
this reform movement had a double thrust: institutional and individ-
ual. On an institutional level, the reformers wished to return to the
simplicity and poverty prescribed in the primitive rule of the order.
Closely linked with this, they offered each monk a new form of
spirituality with strongly mystical overtones. This recogimiento ten-
dency, as it came to be called, was an interiorized form of Christian-
ity by which each individual sought to achieve union with God by
searching within himself and following a course of methodical men-
tal prayer.
By the beginning of the sixteenth century, this tendency was
becoming popularized by such authors as Garcia de Cisneros in his
Excercitatorio de la vida espiritual (1500) and by groups of laymen
and clergy who were strongly influenced by the works of the Catho-
lic mystics which were becoming available in Castilian transla-
tion. 10 These groups frequently formed around a beata, a woman
who had adopted a religious life without necessarily joining an
order and who was regarded as having exceptional spiritual gifts. 11
This Illuminist movement, as it came to be called, eschewed the
long and complicated spiritual exercises followed by the members
of religious orders and promised that everyone who spontaneously
accepted the enlightenment of the Holy Spirit could achieve a
supreme and immediate union with God. 12 The egalitarianism and
religious fervor of the Illuminists was an important source of reli-
gious renewal among the laity during the first decades of the six-
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llluminism, Erasmianism, and Protestantism
teenth century, and Illuminist preachers under the leadership of
Juan Lopez de Celain (who was executed as a Lutheran in 1530)
were even recruited by the admiral of Castile, Fadrique Ennquez,
for an abortive campaign to evangelize his estates. 13
The problem with llluminism, however, as with all forms of
mysticism, was that in upholding mental prayer, meditation, and
direct communication with God as the most exalted form of religios-
ity, the Illuminists tended to downplay the importance of obedi-
ence, church observances, and good works. 14 The relationship of
sexually frustrated priests and monks with the female beatas also
posed the danger of sexual license, especially since llluminism, in
its most extreme form of Dejamiento, held that nothing could be
sinful if it came from God. In Dejamiento, the believer combined a
complete abandonment to the will of God with a doctrine of the
impeccability of those whose souls were closest to God. The belief
in impeccability led devotees to engage in daring sexual experimen-
tation, which they not only believed was pleasing in the sight of
God but would also aid them in achieving spiritual perfection.
Moreover, beatas like Isabel de la Cruz posed special problems of
their own. As women leading sexually mixed groups that frequently
included male priests, they upset the traditional concept of a male-
dominated church. 15 At the same time, the powers that they
claimed for themselves frequently extended to setting aside church
precepts (such as fast days), on the grounds that they were irrele-
vant or unnecessary for their devotees. This amounted to a substitu-
tion of private judgment for the rule of authority and could almost
be construed as setting up a rival to the established church. Finally,
apart from these doctrines that could more or less be accommo-
dated within church tradition, there was another element to
llluminism that drew the special ire of theologians. Like all Spanish
mysticism, it was hostile to scholastic theology, which, in its late-
fifteenth-century form, seemed to provide little more than a field
for abstract and involved theological disputes without reference to
. . 16
scripture.
In light of all of this and the fact that many of the early sixteenth-
century Illuminists were converted Jews, the Inquisition began tak-
ing an interest in the movement. 17 The tribunals where Illuminist
activity was most concentrated began making arrests in the mid-
1520s, and, in a series of trials lasting until the late 1530s, the leading
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277
representatives of the early Illuminist movement were punished.
In September 1525, the Inquisition also issued the first of its condem-
nations of Illuminist doctrine, which resulted in part from a visita-
tion to Illuminist-infected zones of the Archdiocese of Toledo by a
special inquisitorial commission appointed by Inquisitor-General
Manrique. 19 This did not end the movement, however, and there
were several more waves of Illuminist activity that attracted the
attention of the Inquisition in Extremadura (1570-1582), upper
Andalusia (1575—1590), Seville (1622-1630), and Valencia (1668-
1675). Even after the major foci of the Illuminist movement had
been destroyed, the tribunals continued dealing with isolated cases
down to the end of the eighteenth century. 20
The Valencia tribunal's experience with llluminism was minimal
in the sixteenth century as Valencia was far from the major centers
of Illuminist activity in New and Old Castile. In January 1538, the
tribunal punished Esperanza Martorella, called "the beata" for as-
serting, among other things, that she had frequent conversations
with the angels, that God had given her the power to live without
eating just like certain saints, and that she would receive the bless-
ing of God, the Son, and the Holy Spirit whatever her sins and
transgressions. While it is true that the tribunal classified this case
as "Illusiones," Martorella's ideas and attitudes appear to fit com-
fortably into one or another of the lists of Illuminist propositions
condemned by the Holy Office. 21 Certainly, her claim to be able to
live without eating indicates that she believed herself to be in
possession of a special state of spiritual perfection. She even testi-
fied that while she was in the inquisitorial prison awaiting trial,
God had informed her that she would emerge from the ordeal
"without shame." 22
My analysis of the relaciones de causas and cases during the
seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries yields thirty-
nine cases, with the last one in 1818. 23 These were not very fre-
quent occurrences, however, averaging little more than one every
ten years from the mid- 1620s to the late 1660s, when the pace of
prosecution definitely increases.
It was in spring 1668 that the Valencia tribunal, for the first and
last time in its history, stumbled on a group of Illuminists similar to
those discovered by the Toledo tribunal in the 1520s or the Llerena
and Cordoba tribunals in the late sixteenth century. This group was
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llluminism, Erasmianism, and Protestantism
made up of eight individuals who formed around a young (25)
married woman named Gertrudis Tosca, whom they all regarded as
their "spiritual mistress." 24 Like other beatas who played an impor-
tant role in Illuminist groups, Tosca laid claim to great spiritual
power. She said that she knew the mind of God and could tell if a
deceased soul had mounted to heaven. At one point, she even
declared that God had made her into another God on earth. 25 Like
the early sixteenth-century practitioners of Dejamiento, she in-
formed her followers that they should surrender themselves com-
pletely to the will of God even in matters normally considered
sinful. 26
Her disciples, including three priests, Remigio Choza, Jose
Navarro, and Dr. Jose Torres, a benefice holder in the parish church
of San Juan del Mercado, "worshiped her as a saint" and believed she
was "especially illuminated with the Holy Spirit" and was "impecca-
ble and confirmed in Grace. " 27 This belief in Tosca's impeccability
combined with the extravagant worship that the disciples accorded
her, which included frequent kissing on the hands, mouth, and
breast, led naturally to carnal excesses. All three priests became her
lovers, sometimes performing the sex act openly in front of or even
in the same bed as the female disciples. They justified this conduct to
themselves and others as a way of advancing to perfection. Once
when Luisa Choza, Remigio Choza's sister, was sleeping in the same
bed with Tosca, the priest entered the room, undressed, and pro-
ceeded to have sexual relations with her. When Luisa reproached
him about this, he answered that these carnal acts had been ordained
by God and "were perfection, not sin." 28 Jose Torres, who admitted
having intercourse with Tosca on thirty occasions, two of them in the
communion chapel of the parish church of San Miguel, even claimed
that each time they consummated the sexual act, a soul would be
released from purgatory. 29
Tosca's exalted conception of her own spiritual powers also led
her to take on an almost priestly role among her devotees. She was
obsessed with the desire to administer communion in her own
home and did administer a form of communion to Torres. She also
partially supported herself on alms given to her by her followers;
she assured them that giving her the alms that they would normally
have given at mass was exactly the same as giving them to the priest
in church. 30
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Illuminism, Erasmianism, and Protestantism
279
The little group finally broke up because Tosca failed to justify
her claim to possess extraordinary spiritual powers. The end came
when Angela Sinisterra, one of her most recent devotees, decided
to test her abilities by bringing her a blind man to cure. At first
reluctant, Tosca attempted to bring about a cure and failed. This, in
turn, led to a grave spiritual crisis for her, and shortly thereafter,
she and some of her followers approached one of the tribunal's
calificadores, who presented their confessions to the tribunal.
Spontaneous confession combined with a remarkable reluctance
by both the inquisitors and their consultor to use the words "here-
tic" or "Illuminist" when referring to the accused were responsible
for the relative leniency with which they were treated. Except for
Josefa Clement, who was admonished and given spiritual penalties,
the cases of all the women in the group were suspended. 32
The priests were treated with greater severity, although the final
sentences were more a reflection of the Suprema's harsher attitude
than the relative leniency advocated by the tribunal and its con-
sultor. In the case of Torres, for example, the Suprema added exile,
confiscation of property, and loss of ecclesiastical benefice to the
abjuration and reclusion prescribed by the tribunal. 33
So ended the Valencia tribunal's most important brush with
Illuminism. One can only surmise that its failure to use the term
"Alumbrado" in connection with these cases reflects a reluctance to
make a martyr out of someone who had a popular reputation for
extraordinary spiritual grace and virtue. The disastrous case of Pa-
dre Simon had taught the tribunal the virtues of discretion and the
limits of its power over popular religious figures. 34 This impression
of caution by the tribunal is supported by its reluctance to actually
arrest the accused once their initial confession had been received
and by its insistence on reading their sentences in private rather
than holding a dramatic auto de fe.
The edict of September 23, 1525, which condemned forty-eight
propositions stemming from the beliefs of the "alumbrados, dejados
o perfectos," and the trials of leading Castilian Illuminists during
the mid- 1520s and 1530s placed the Spanish reform movement on
the horns of a cruel dilemma. The Illuminists and other reformers
could throw in their lot with the Lutheran movement and abandon
the Roman Catholic church altogether or they could resign them-
selves to accepting the Spanish Catholic church with all of its imper-
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Illuminism, Erasmianism, and Protestantism
fections. Like the Italian spirituali, although for different reasons,
neither of these alternatives was feasible. 36 For one thing, apart
from a few Spaniards who had witnessed the dramatic events at the
Diet of Worms and a few hardy German or Flemish merchants who
talked about it during their journeys through the Iberian penin-
sula, Lutheranism was virtually unknown in Spain. Furthermore,
an Illuminist-Lutheran alignment was also made more difficult by
significant doctrinal differences, notably, over justification and the
role of Christ. By the 1520s, however, the Spanish reformers
could no longer entirely accept conventional church practices or
reconcile themselves with the institutional church.
A middle way, which could allow them to pursue their goals
within the Catholic Church while affording them some protection
from the Inquisition, was indicated by the favor shown to the works
of Erasmus in official circles during the 1520s and 1530s. That this
should be the case was more the result of a favorable (if temporary)
conjuncture in imperial foreign policy than the fact that certain
court officials were pro-Erasmian during this period.
As a consequence, for approximately twenty-two years, there
was a tacit agreement between Erasmus's position on the need to
reform radically and restructure the Catholic Church and the orien-
tation of imperial policy. In concrete terms, the result was that
influential courtiers and high-ranking administrators openly fa-
vored Erasmus, supported the translation of his works into Span-
ish, and extended their protection to intellectuals with a pro-
Erasmian point of view. Since one of these high-ranking officials
was Inquisitor-General Manrique himself, those who identified
themselves with Erasmianism could even hope to enjoy a measure
of protection against inquisitorial persecution. It was under Manri-
que that the Inquisition was given specific responsibility for curb-
ing the already mounting chorus of criticism of Erasmus in Spain.
Manrique also presided over the theologians' commission that was
convened on June 27, 1527, to debate the orthodoxy of Erasmus's
work. Six weeks later, Manrique dismissed the commission because
of an outbreak of plague in Valladolid, although some have sug-
gested that he wanted to avoid a negative verdict. 39 Regardless of
Manrique's intentions, it never reconvened, and the result was to
perpetuate the status quo in which Erasmus's works were allowed
to circulate freely. 40
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llluminism, Erasmianism, and Protestantism
But the official support that Erasmus enjoyed and the protection
that such support afforded had unintended and unforeseen effects
on the native Spanish reform movement. The fact is that Erasmus's
stress on mental prayer and his tendency to downplay the impor-
tance of formalized religious observances radicalized the Spanish
reformers and moved some of them considerably closer to a Protes-
tant or proto-Protestant position.
The impact of these Erasmian ideas on the intellectual and reli-
gious climate of Valencia in the 1530s was reflected in the trial of
Miguel de Mezquita whose strong antipapal views found support in
Erasmus's Sileni Alcibiadis, which had been translated by Valen-
cian Bernardo Perez de Chinchon and published in 1529. 41 Under
interrogation, he admitted to owning copies of the Enquiridion and
the Colloquies. The influence of the latter work on his religious
practices can be seen in his manner of confessing every day in
private. This "confession to Christ" prescribed by Erasmus in his
Colloquium senile gave rise to an interesting exchange between
Mezquita and his judges who tried to trick him into declaring that
private confession alone was sufficient. A few years earlier, the
Cordoba tribunal had tortured Diego de Uceda for admitting that
he believed that the most important form of confession was private,
but Mezquita insisted that oral confession before a priest was neces-
sary at least once a year. This seemed to be enough for the inquisi-
tors, who ordered him released. 42
Official protection, the support of powerful nobles like the mar-
quis of Villena in Castile or the duke of Calabria in Valencia and,
above all, the favorable conjuncture in imperial policy were suffi-
cient to protect the Erasmians of the 1520s and the 1530s from
severe punishment even if they were brought to trial by the Inquisi-
tion. 43 The shift in imperial policy toward the German Lutherans
which took place after the failure of the Regensburg conference and
the hardening of papal attitudes under Julius III and especially
Paul IV Caraffa (1555-1559) heralded a change in the way that the
Spanish Inquisition would deal with religious tendencies that ap-
peared compatible with Lutheranism. Already from the early
1540s, the Inquisition began to intensify its censorship activity. 44 In
1551, the Spanish Inquisition published its first index of prohibited
books. This catalog was based on the University of Louvain Index of
1546 but added those works that the Inquisition had prohibited by
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edict as well as a whole series of general prohibitions on specific
categories of books, which greatly increased its impact. 45 The death
of Inquisitor-General Francisco Garcia de Loaysa on April 22,
1546, and the selection of Fernando de Valdes to replace him
brought to the Inquisition's highest office a man who had an almost
visceral hatred of all forms of spirituality. 46 It was Valdes, with the
help of his spiritual counselor, Melchor Cano, who presided over
the destruction of the "Protestant" cells of Seville and Valladolid in
1558-1560 and unleashed the wave of persecution that included
many native "Protestants" during the mid-i56os. 4/
It can scarcely be doubted that in most of these cases, the Inquisi-
tion was dealing not with true Protestants but with the evangelical
and reformist strain in Spanish Catholicism. It is also undeniably
true that Valdes exaggerated the threat and used it to solidify his
own position and that of the institution he served. Nevertheless,
the evolution of Spanish reformers from the first generation of the
1520s to the second generation of the 1540s and 1550s had moved
them toward a doctrine of justification by the will of Christ in which
works were seen to flow from and depend on faith. 48 Of course, this
was not exactly justification by faith alone, but it was close enough
to cause the Inquisition and the authorities serious and legitimate
concern.
Related in time and substance to the inquisitorial crackdowns in
Seville and Valladolid was the Valencia tribunal's persecution of the
little group of Erasmians that formed around the Valencian noble,
Gaspar de Centelles y Moncada. Centelles was the scion of a distin-
guished Valencian family that was linked by marriage to the counts
of Gagliano. His grandfather, Pedro Sanchez de Centelles-Calata-
yud, was the first lord of Pedralba. 49 His humanistic intellectual
concerns and evangelical religious orientation were nurtured at the
imperial court during the mid- 1530s. 50 After returning to Valencia
sometime in the late 1540s, Centelles served as one of the four
oidors de compte for the noble estate at the Cortes of Monzon of
1542. Ten years later, after quarreling with the fifth duke of Gandfa,
he became deeply involved in the violent feud that pitted the
Pardo de la Casta against the Figuerola and involved such leading
noble families as the Borja and the Aragon-Sicilia. As a conse-
quence, Centelles was exiled to his estates by express order of
Philip II. 51
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With plenty of time on his hands now that he was no longer
involved in Valencian politics, Centelles returned to the intellec-
tual concerns of his youth and became the center of a small group of
humanists who carried on a vigorous correspondence and occasion-
ally visited the palace in Pedralba to debate the religious issues of
the day. The group included Miguel Perez, a student who was
reconciled in 1567, Pedro Luis Verga, reconciled in 1567 and re-
laxed in 1572, Dr. Sigismundo Arquer, a former fiscal of the Coun-
cil of Aragon in Sardinia who was relaxed by order of the Toledo
tribunal in 1571, and Jeronimo Conques, who was condemned to
abjure de vehementi in 1564.
The tenor of this group's religious views can be best understood
from the extensive correspondence between Arquer and Centelles
and conversations held in Pedralba itself. In a series of letters
written between 1548 and 1557, Arquer stressed the critical impor-
tance of Scripture as the basis for any true Christianity and praised
those who became the "lambs of Christ without needing anyone to
expound the gospel to them." Arquer also stated his belief that the
faithful would have to rely utterly on God for their salvation since
they were too weak to observe His law. It is little wonder that the
theologians who reviewed these letters for the Toledo tribunal
agreed that these propositions were strongly reminiscent of Lu-
theran ideas regarding works, observances, and spirituality. La-
ter, when Arquer stayed in Pedralba as a guest of Centelles, he
became involved in a conversation with Jeronimo Conques concern-
ing the Eucharist in which he specifically denied any change in the
substance of the bread and wine.
Conques, a benefice holder in Valencia's cathedral, was certainly
more moderate than Arquer and claimed at his trial that he had
rejected his view of the Eucharist. Instead of sharing Arquer's
almost Lutheran position, Conques approached the church from an
Erasmian standpoint. In his correspondence with Centelles, he
deplored the way in which the ceremonies of the church were
neither "meritorious nor useful" when carried out by those whose
only desire was to make an outward show of piety. Claiming to be
disgusted by the vulgarity and ignorance of certain local preachers,
he intended to write a treatise on preaching based on Erasmus's
Ecclesiastes. 54
In 1571, after a long trial during which he proved himself a
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stubborn and resourceful antagonist, Arquer was executed by order
of the Toledo tribunal. As for Conques, even though his theological
position cannot be characterized as any more than moderate re-
formism, he, like Seville's Dr. Constantino some years earlier, had
the misfortune to be part of a wider struggle involving the Inquisi-
tion and the canons of the local cathedral chapter. By his own
admission, Conques had been one of those responsible for ejecting
Inquisitor Francisco Ramirez from the seat that Valencia's inquisi-
tors had occupied in the choir. 05
Wounded but still dangerous, the tribunal found a way of aveng-
ing itself on the overbearing canons by punishing and humiliating
one of their number who had made himself vulnerable because of
his correspondence with Centelles. It is not difficult to imagine the
inquisitors smiling inwardly as they sentenced Conques to two
years of reclusion in the monastery of Nuestra Senora de Socorro
outside the walls of the city. There, this detester of mindless devo-
tions who had once helped Centelles wean Francisco Fenollet away
from mechanically reciting his rosary was forced to say three parts
of the rosary of Our Lady each day, amounting to 15 Our Fathers
and 150 Ave Marias, and this avid correspondent could neither
write nor receive letters without the express permission of the
inquisitors. 56
In December 1562, Centelles himself was arrested by the Valen-
cia tribunal, which had been gathering information about the Pe-
dralba group since the spring and was particularly eager to prosecute
him because of the potential windfall it would receive in confiscating
his estate. 5 ' After a prolonged period of depression during which he
lived for seven months without opening the blinds that covered the
windows of his cell, he recovered and took an aggressive tone with
the theologians who came to convert him. Finally, when his defense
attorney asked him to sign a statement in which he specifically recog-
nized the Roman Catholic church as the only church of God, he
refused and was condemned as a heretic at the auto de fe of Septem-
ber 17, 1564. 58
According to the account that was sent to the Suprema by Inquisi-
tor Bernardino de Aguilera shortly after the auto de fe, Centelles was
at first adamant in his refusal to listen to any of the friars who were
trying to get him to repent and publicly embrace Catholicism. But
when the sentence was read out, he appeared to have been stricken
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Illuminism, Erasmianism, and Protestantism
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by remorse and fell on his knees begging forgiveness of God and the
assembled multitude and declaring that "burning was nothing to
what he really deserved" because of his crimes and the bad example
he had given. A few moments later, however, after he had been led
back to the city hall, he appeared to have repented of his earlier
weakness. Tearing off the cross that the friars had placed around his
neck, he threw it to the ground and cursed "those who had made him
worship idols." At the end of the ordeal, just before he was to be
garroted, Centelles confessed and appeared to have repented of his
earlier defiance, but when confronted once again with the demand
for a confession of faith in the Catholic church, some observers said
that he had refused to swear; others said he had. 59 On that ambigu-
ous note ended the Valencia tribunal's most serious encounter with
native Spanish Protestantism.
For the remainder of the century, the tribunal dealt with a few
small and insignificant groups of native Valencians whose religious
views were extreme enough for the tribunal to class them as "Lu-
therans." As it had from the mid- 1520s, the tribunal confronted real
Protestantism in the sense of conscious belief in and practice of
Lutheranism and Calvinism largely in the shape of foreigners liv-
ing, working, fighting, or traveling in the district.
An analysis of the sociological data drawn from the case summa-
ries reveals that the overwhelming majority of those charged with
"Lutheranism" were not only of foreign origin but were a typically
transient population that put down few roots in Valencian society.
One of the most revealing indications of this is a remarkable prepon-
derance of young men and an almost total absence of individuals
over 40 years old. More than 74 percent of those whose ages are
known were between 20 and 30 years old, while only 10.5 percent
were over 50. The impression of a young and rather transient group
is reinforced by the data on marital status, which reveals that 82.6
percent were single at the time of their arrest. The offense was also
overwhelmingly male, with only 2. 1 percent of the cases involving
women. Occupational data also serve to confirm this general pic-
ture. Only 4.3 percent were peasants, while 22.5 percent were
artisans and fully 54.3 percent soldiers either from invading forces
like the Allied armies during the War of the Spanish Succession or
from the Spanish regiments themselves, which were filled with
foreign recruits, especially during the eighteenth century.
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Among the very first cases of Lutheranism tried by the tribunal
was that of a German merchant named Blay who was associated
with one of the companies of German merchants who were active
in Valencia during the first half of the sixteenth century. Although
Blay made no secret of his sympathy for Martin Luther and his
ideas, there is little evidence to suggest that he was a Lutheran in
any formal sense or that he had had any direct contact with the
incipient Lutheran church in his native land. He seems to have
approved of Luther mainly when he opposed clerical celibacy on
the grounds that if priests or monks were of such weak character
that they could not be without a woman, it would be better for
them to marry than live in mortal sin. He also claimed (mistakenly)
that Luther had declared that persons should come to confession
voluntarily. Apart from this, the fragmentary record of the case
reveals nothing about any belief in justification by faith, hostility to
the ecclesiastical hierarchy or the pope, or any of the other core
doctrines of Lutheranism. After a brief trial, Blay was sentenced to
perpetual imprisonment and confiscation of his property. 60
Germany also gave to the Valencia tribunal one of its most curious
cases, involving John Heinrich Horstmann, a well-educated reli-
gious charlatan. Baptized a Catholic and given a good Catholic educa-
tion by the Jesuits, Horstmann decided at around age 25 to leave his
native Borgenstreich and wander Europe, supporting himself by
teaching languages. Finding that this alone was insufficient, he soon
discovered that he could profit from the rivalry between Protestant
and Catholic by feigning conversion. In Protestant lands, he pre-
tended to be a recent convert or a Catholic ready for conversion,
while in Catholic countries, he became a Lutheran who wished to be
baptized into the Holy Catholic Church. His excellent education
and dignified bearing won him the support of powerful patrons in
many places who were not only willing to sponsor his "conversion"
but gave him small sums of money and even allowed him to tutor
their children. In Perusia, for example, he lived in the home of the
local inquisitor and received a purse of 30 escudos from the city. By
the age of 89, when he was arrested by the Valencia tribunal, he had
supported himself this way for more than fifty years and admitted to
having been baptized on twenty-one separate occasions. He had
even gone so far as to have himself circumcised in Amsterdam and
practiced Judaism there for eight months while being supported by
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the Jewish community. Finally, in 1746, he returned to Spain, which
he had visited twenty years earlier, and was baptized at Cadiz, Gra-
nada, Cordoba, and Valencia, where he lived for a time in the arch-
bishop's palace. Horstmann's spectacular career finally came to an
end when the Valencia tribunal arrested him on June 23, 1752, after
receiving a letter from the Seville tribunal describing him and his
activities. After his arrest, Horstmann told his story fully and with-
out showing any remorse. He claimed to have always been a devout
Catholic and only pretended to be a Protestant in order to get money
and tutoring jobs. By February 1752, however, he was seriously ill,
and as death approached, this religious chameleon and mountebank
showed his true allegiance by refusing confession and the last rites of
the church. When one of the priests who had gathered in his cell
asked the by now mute prisoner to indicate whether he wanted to
die as a Calvinist by squeezing his hand, Horstmann gripped it so
hard that the priest had to call for assistance to loosen it. Immedi-
ately after his death on February 28, Horstmann was buried in a box
of quicklime in the courtyard of the Inquisitor's palace, and at an
auto de fe held on August 26, 1753, he was burnt in effigy by express
order of the Suprema. 61
Of much greater concern to the tribunal than the far-off German
Lutherans were the French Protestants, especially after the Hugue-
not movement began to gain strength in southwestern France in
the mid- 1560s. The opportunities provided by Valencia's expanding
economy provided a powerful lure for French immigrants, and
modern estimates of the number of Frenchmen in the kingdom
range as high as 30,000 for the period around 1600. 62 Certainly, the
dangers of Protestant subversion appeared greater wherever the
French settled in considerable numbers, especially in the northern
part of the inquisitorial district. In 1574, the tribunal favored plac-
ing an additional commissioner in Morella because of the large
number of French immigrants in that region. 63 In 1566, Sebastian
Gutierrez, who had stumbled across what appeared to be an entire
Huguenot conventicle among the French living in Teruel, declared
that the "very air" was infested with heresy in many places and that
if the French were not watched carefullv, the "infection would
spread from Catalonia and Aragon to the rest of Spain. " M
Apart from the fact that there were Huguenots among the
French immigrants, there was also the ever-present danger of book
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llluminism, Erasmianism, and Protestantism
smuggling from France. In 1567, for example, Cardinal Granvelle
wrote to warn that the Huguenots were hoping to provoke disorder
in Spain by sending quantities of subversive books. In June 1568,
the Suprema wrote provincial tribunals to take extra precautions
because of an alleged plot by the Huguenots to smuggle Protestant
books into Spain utilizing compartments ingeniously fitted into
wine casks. 65
Given this degree of apprehension, which was no doubt height-
ened by fear of Spain's traditional enemy, the actual threat posed
by the French immigrants seems to be weak. Certainly, an analysis
of the cases of Frenchmen tried for Lutheranism by the Valencia
tribunal reveals some who were strongly in the Protestant camp
and had a good understanding of Protestant beliefs. The vast major-
ity, however, occupied a kind of religious gray area, neither Catho-
lic nor Protestant, frequently filled with anxiety about their reli-
gious position and willing, sometimes even eager, to reconcile
themselves with the religion of their adopted country.
One of the very few French immigrants who can be said to have
been a firm Protestant was Mateo Alari, who was sentenced to
death at the auto de fe of April 19, 1587. Alari, who rejected
confession, papal authority, indulgences, and the worship of saints,
resisted all of the many efforts to convert him and declared that he
intended to live and die as a Lutheran. 66
In contrast, the case of Jeronimo Martorell, who was executed
for the same offense in 1583, appears to be that of a person with a
weak religious affiliation who was trapped by an unfortunate family
situation. Martorell, who was a linen weaver, had left his native
village some thirteen years earlier and served as an apprentice in
Catalonia before setting up his own shop in Villafames. According
to testimonv by a number of defense witnesses, he lived as a Catho-
lie while in Villafames, attending mass regularly, performing pious
works, and going to confession. Unfortunately for him, the two
young apprentices that he hired were Frenchmen who had been
exposed to one degree or another to the Huguenot movement.
Goaded by his apprentices who boasted of their disdain for Catholi-
cism, Martorell began opening expressing Protestant or heretical
views in conversation with them. The situation was further compli-
cated by the fact that both young men were suitors for his daugh-
ter's hand. Since Martorell did not wish either of the men to be his
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son-in-law, he alienated both of them and lost his daughter anyway:
she eloped with Guillen Mateu, who was going to be the chief
witness against her father. When Mateu and Juan Philippe, the
other apprentice, were arrested by the tribunal, they had no com-
punction about denouncing their former master as a Protestant.
Driven by a fear of torture, Martorell then confessed to the
charges, only to partially revoke his confession a few days later.
With this revocation, of course, his case became considerably more
serious, and the charge of being a "feigned, counterfeit penitent"
was added to the rest. In spite of the fact that the testimony of the
two apprentices had been at least partially invalidated by defense
witnesses who testified that they were the accused's mortal ene-
mies, Martorell's revoked confession had sealed his fate. Like so
many others, he was the victim of ignorance about the inner work-
ings of the Holy Office. 6 '
Cut off from actively practicing their religion and exposed to the
rich and splendid ceremonial of the Spanish Catholic church,
French Huguenots settled in Valencia found themselves drifting
back to the religion into which many of them had been baptized. In
the case of Juan Casanyosas, who had rebelled against his strict
Catholic father and claimed to have been a Huguenot from age ten,
the reversion to Catholicism took the form of growing doubts about
Protestant beliefs such as the futility of prayers to the saints. Accord-
ing to Casanyosas's account, he had begun to waver in his beliefs
after he had heard sermons that "touched his soul" while living in
Valencia. It is curious to note that Casanyosas made no attempt to
conceal his Protestant views while in the secret prison. In fact, he
behaved in such a way as to almost invite punishment by arguing
points of religion with Jeronimo Biosco, a priest who shared his cell,
and by singing Lutheran songs so loudly that they could be heard by
the other prisoners. The impression of a person seeking a kind of
expiatory punishment is borne out by his rapid and complete confes-
sion and his refusal to present any formal defense. 68
In other instances, conversion to Catholicism was a much more
open and conscious process in which the individual's confession at
the bar of the Holy Office was an act of final and complete rejection
of a Protestant past. David de Cabanes, a French journeyman who
came to the Inquisition of his own accord in 1612, had been
brought up as a Huguenot by his parents. After coming to Valencia
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lUuminism, Erasmianism, and Protestantism
in 1606, Cabanes served several masters, all of whom taught him
the rudiments of Catholicism. He attended mass and went to con-
fession but never felt comfortable enough to mention his Huguenot
past. For Cabanes, spontaneous confession before the Inquisition
was evidently a way of removing the guilt that he felt and more
firmly establishing his new religious identity. 69
From the perspective of the Valencia tribunal, therefore, it ap-
pears that the authorities' fear of religious subversion coming from
the large group of French immigrants in the kingdom was largely
unfounded. Dedicated Protestants with a sophisticated understand-
ing of Protestant theology were rare among them, while the tug of
Spanish Catholicism was strong even for someone like Martorell.
Doubtless, some Frenchmen were able to communicate their reli-
gious ideas to Spaniards and others smuggled in prohibited books,
but the impact that they could have on the native population was
minimal because of their own internal divisions, isolation, and lack
of strong commitment to the Protestant cause.
By the end of the sixteenth century, the decline in Protestant
conversion efforts and the relative stability of European religiopo-
litical frontiers led to the emergence of a new policy with regard to
foreign Protestants. This policy, which was to be followed with
several interruptions until the final years of the Inquisition, in-
volved tolerating their presence so long as they gave no offense to
the Catholic religion. At the same time, Protestantism continued to
be one of the Inquisition's principal enemies, so that vigilance
remained high to prevent even the possibility of religious subver-
sion. Moreover, at various times during the next two centuries of its
history, the Inquisition helped the cause of Roman Catholicism by
becoming a kind of conversion bureau for foreign Protestants, espe-
cially from places where Catholicism had retained its strength as a
religious alternative.
This policy really began in 1597 when the Suprema issued an
administrative order to all tribunals instructing them that merchants
or sailors arriving from Hamburg or other German ports should not
be molested because of their religion unless they had offended Ro-
man Catholicism in Spain itself. Even if this had occurred, only the
property of the individual who actually committed the offense was to
be seized and not, as hitherto, the entire cargo of a vessel. 70
When peace was made with England in 1604, one of the provi-
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Uluminism, Erasmianism, and Protestantism
291
sions of the treaty provided that King James's subjects would enjoy
the same toleration as that extended to the Germans some years
before/ 1 While in Spain, they were not to be prosecuted for an
offense against Catholicism committed previously. They were not
to be forced to enter churches, but if they did so, they were ex-
pected to show the same reverence to the Holy Sacrament as any-
one in the congregation. If they encountered a religious proces-
sion, they were either expected to kneel out of respect for the Holy
Sacrament or avoid seeing it by entering a doorway or going up
another street. 2
Even before it had officially transmitted the relevant articles of
the peace treaty to the provincial tribunals, the Suprema laid down
the policy that was to be followed toward those English or Scottish
Protestants who wished to convert. Those coming forward voluntar-
ily could be heard by commissioners at the ports who would interro-
gate them as to their religious practices and refer them to the
tribunal. After reviewing this testimony, the tribunal had two op-
tions: if the individual had had sufficient religious instruction or
had once practiced Catholicism, he could be reconciled in the
audience chamber and given spiritual penalties; if instruction was
considered incomplete, they were to be absolved ad cautelam and
remanded for religious instruction.' 3 In 1609, when the twelve-
year truce was signed with the United Provinces, the Dutch re-
ceived the same privileges previously accorded to the English and
Scots.
Of course, such toleration, limited though it was, ran counter to
the deepest social values of a society that had long prided itself on
its fanatical opposition to any form of religious heterodoxy. Valen-
cia's Archbishop Juan de Ribera expressed this attitude very well
when he protested the 1604 peace treaty on the grounds that mak-
ing peace with infidels is prohibited by divine law, while the evil
example of the English Protestants openly practicing their religion
might provoke heresy among the faithful.
For its part, the Suprema lost little time in introducing arbitrary
and illegal modifications to the treaty provisions. In 1612, it as-
serted a distinction between transient and resident foreigners. Resi-
dent householders were expected to practice Catholicism and were
subject to the Inquisition in matters of faith. In May 1620, the
Suprema insisted that no foreigner living in the port towns could
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292
Illuminism, Erasmianism, and Protestantism
maintain an inn and cautioned the tribunal that close watch should
be kept on such persons so that "the plague of heresy" would not be
j 76
revived.
With the renewal of hostilities between Spain and Holland
(1621) and England (1624), the privileges contained in the earlier
treaties became null and void, and the Inquisition once more took
up the persecution of English and Dutch Protestants found in
Spain. Even after peace was restored with those countries, the
Suprema insisted that port commissioners and other officials fur-
nish periodic reports of the activities of resident Protestants, includ-
ing their religious practices, where they lived, and who they re-
11
ceived in their lodgings.
On occasion, the hostility and ill-will fostered by years of conflict
would burst forth in ways that made it difficult for Spain to disen-
gage itself from the struggle with the Protestant powers. Given
Spain's military weakness in the late 1640s and 1650s, the Treaty of
Munster of October 24, 1648, by which Spain made peace with
Holland in return for recognizing her as a sovereign state, was vital
if she expected to continue the war against France with any degree
of success. Serious violations of the treaty, one of whose provisions
promised that Dutch subjects should not be molested on account of
their religion unless they caused scandal, might have strengthened
the anti-Spanish party in Amsterdam and brought the Dutch back
into the war. Nevertheless, Philip IV's weak government found it
extremely difficult to get the Inquisition to respect the provisions of
the treaty. One of the most glaring examples of the Inquisition's
disregard for Spain's international obligations during this period is
provided by the Valencia tribunal's arrest of Paul Jerome Estagema
in 1651. Estagema, a native of Hoorn, was evidently closely con-
nected with the Dutch peace party as two of its leading members,
the Dutch ambassador to Spain and the Dutch plenipotentiary at
the Munster peace conference, repeatedly petitioned the king for
his release. After consulting with the Council of State, Philip
meekly wrote to the tribunal to request that the case be resolved as
quickly as possible paying due attention to the provisions of the
peace treaty. This letter was ignored, and it was only in mid-
December, after further petitions by the ambassador, that the
Suprema ordered the tribunal to terminate the case and report the
sentence, which caused the tribunal no great concern since the trial
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lUuminism, Erasmianism, and Protestantism
293
had already been concluded on September 7. ' 8 In general, how-
ever, the majority of the ninety-one Protestants seen by the tribu-
nal in the seventeenth century were soldiers. These were drawn
from among foreigners in Spanish service, such as a German merce-
nary quartered with his regiment in Gandfa who presented himself
before the commissioner there in 1664. 79
In the eighteenth century, 87 of the 148 foreign Protestants seen
by the tribunal were soldiers. The situation was a little different from
the previous century, however, because the Protestant conversions
began with the arrival of Allied forces in late 1705. At first, the
tribunal was filled with apprehension and issued several decrees
forbidding fraternization with the Allied army. In the end, these
fears were exaggerated; Archduke Charles, who resided in Valencia
from September 30, 1706, to March 7, 1707, sought to gain popular-
ity through a fervent display of piety and regular church atten-
dance. 80 As a result, Protestant influence on the native population
was nil, while the Inquisition reaped a harvest of conversions.
Given the fact that no significant Protestant movement arose on
Spanish soil, it is no surprise that modern historians of sixteenth-
century Spain have been extremely skeptical of the depth and sever-
ity of the Protestant threat to Spanish Catholicism. Nevertheless,
the alarm voiced by contemporary observers like Charles V must be
placed within a contemporary context and not dismissed simply
because we have the benefit of hindsight. The Seville and Valladolid
conventicles were not merely "isolated pockets" but emerged from a
society that had been well prepared to receive Protestant ideas by
the native Illuminist movement and by the Erasmianism that be-
came so widespread in intellectual circles during the 1520s and
1530s. At least potentially linked with these movements, especially
with their stress on greater egalitarianism in religion, was popular
anticlericalism and the rejection of certain Catholic dogmas by the
popular masses. Since Spain, like the rest of Catholic Europe during
the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, harbored powerful
forces critical of the Catholic church as then constituted, the failure
of Protestantism was not because it was essentially alien to the Span-
ish or Latin mentality. Instead, that failure was the result, above all,
of prompt and effective action by the Inquisition.
The Inquisition's efforts to neutralize this threat included the
selective repression of native sympathizers and potential sympathiz-
294
lUuminism, Erasmianism, and Protestantism
ers and the identification of "Lutheranism" with Judaism and Islam,
which were already detested by the majority of the Old Christian
population. This was done, above all, through the regular readings
of the Edict of Faith in the cathedrals and churches of Spain where
the Inquisition's version of Protestantism was given its place just
after a description of the Judaic and Islamic heresies. 81 All three of
these "sects" were presented in opposition to "Christianity," which
was made synonymous with "what is believed and upheld by our
Holy Mother the Roman Catholic Church." 82 The success of this
strategy of "inoculation" may be seen from the testimony of Gaspar
Coscolla, an Old Christian merchant, regarding a conversation he
had had with a member of the Morisco Abenamir family concerning
the relative merits of Catholicism and Islam. When the Morisco
expressed astonishment that Coscolla could still maintain the su-
premacy of Catholicism when he "knew the truth" about Islam,
Coscolla replied that for him "Mohammad was just like Martin
Luther." 83
In confronting the challenge of Protestantism, therefore, the
Inquisition had to deal with a difficult and complex problem. In the
Spain of the 1520s and 1530s, with the Comunero Revolution of
Castile and the Germama of Valencia a very recent memory and
with a growing wave of criticism of the Catholic Church an every-
day reality among all classes, the chances for religiopolitical subver-
sion were good. The failure of the incipient Spanish Protestant
movement was the result of the Inquisition's success in applying its
triple strategy of selective repression, inoculation, and absorption.
The defeat of Spanish Protestantism, moreover, served to enhance
the authority and prestige of the Inquisition both at home and
abroad. Within Spain, the Inquisition had proven its worth to a
nervous royal government that now moved to place the tribunal's
finances on a permanent basis. Abroad, the growing reputation of
the Spanish Inquisition as a bulwark of Catholicism made it the first
resort of foreign Protestants who wished to join the Catholic church
while resident in Spain.
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V///
The Inquisition in the
Post-Tridentine Era
Within the vast reform movement that swept over Europe between
1450 and 1650, the Council of Trent (1545—1563) occupied a very
special place. On the one hand, by setting forth a statement of
orthodox Catholic belief on such key issues as justification, it repre-
sented the final collapse of any hope of reconciling the Catholic and
Protestant religious positions. 1 On the other hand, it was responsi-
ble for establishing the guidelines for a broad program of church
reform that drew its inspiration from Erasmus, Johann Geiler of
Kaisersberg, and Savonarola, among others, and was supported at
the council by such figures as Cardinals Pole and Morone and Juan
Bernal Diaz de Luco, bishop of Galahorra. 2
As outlined by the council and implemented by the church, the
Tridentine reform attempted to change both popular religious cul-
ture and the role of the priesthood itself. Within the context of this
movement, the Inquisition played an important if ancillary role
alongside bishops, provincial councils and synods, parish priests,
and even laymen like Philip II who made the council's decrees the
law of the land on July 12, 1564. 3 The Inquisition's alignment with
the effort to implement the Tridentine decrees determined much of
its activity right down to the time of its abolition in the early nine-
teenth century and shifted its focus away from the ethnic minorities
and religious heretics who had taken up most of its attention in the
first period of its history and toward the mass of the Old Christian
population whose religious orthodoxy was never seriously in doubt.
295
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Inquisition in the Post-Tridentine Era
Blasphemy was certainly one area of inquisitorial activity that
greatly increased as a result of the Tridentine concern with reassert-
ing the separation between the sacred and profane. 4 Of course,
blasphemy defined as expletives showing disrespect for the sacred
had long been punishable under secular law. In 1462, Henry IV
prescribed severe penalties for this offense, including scourging
and cutting out the tongue, while Ferdinand and Isabella, in their
laws of 1492 and 1502, detailed a whole list of commonly used
expletives for which penalties were provided, ranging from a brief
period of imprisonment for first offenders to piercing the tongue for
the third offense. 5 In 1532, Charles V reflected the concern of
secular jurisprudence with offenses against public morality by urg-
ing his corregidores to show special zeal in the punishment of
blasphemy, usury, concubinage, and other "public sins." The eccle-
siastical courts also claimed jurisdiction over blasphemy, and at the
Council of Seville of 1512, the bishops imposed fines and imprison-
ment on clerics and laymen convicted of this offense before their
tribunals.
Given all this legislation and the established role of secular and
ecclesiastical courts in the repression of this offense, it is logical
that the Inquisition would show some reluctance to become in-
volved in such a well-worked area of judicial activity The tradition
of the medieval Inquisition as expressed by Eymerich limited in-
quisitorial jurisdiction only to those expressions that smacked of
heresy, such as a statement implying doubt about God's omnipo-
tence or an expletive calling the Virgin Mary a "whore," which
implied disrespect for the Virgin Birth. These expletives, which
were termed "heretical blasphemy," were seen as distinct from
those that in no way denied the articles of the faith and should
therefore be judged by other tribunals. 8 Internal legislation by the
Suprema also reflected this tradition, and as late as 1547, it insisted
that a whole series of expressions commonly uttered in the heat of
anger or frustration such as "I renounce God" or "May it spite God"
fell outside inquisitorial jurisdiction. 9
Apparently, the cautious approach adopted by the Suprema was
not followed by the regional tribunals. Complaints voiced by dele-
gates to both the Aragonese and Castilian Cortes in 1510, 1530, and
1534 indicated that inquisitors were routinely imprisoning ortho-
dox persons for words uttered in the heat of passion or frustration. 10
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Inquisition in the Post-Tridentine Era
297
Nevertheless, given the amount of competition and the small profit
that could be wrung out of such cases, the Inquisition had little
interest in them, and they comprised a very small part of its overall
activity. The Valencia tribunal only tried six individuals for blas-
phemy before 1530. 11 It was only after 1560, when the Inquisition
was enlisted in the struggle to remodel popular culture and enforce
respect for the sacred, that its activity in this area began to in-
crease. Between 1540 and 1614, the tribunal heard 227 cases, with
29 in 1587 alone. 12
Analysis of the social origins of those accused of blasphemy be-
fore the Valencia tribunal leaves no doubt that this offense was
committed by individuals from every social group. The nobility was
represented by 2.3 percent of the accused, while 65.2 percent
came from the popular classes including artisans, peasants, sol-
diers, and servants. The offense was also overwhelmingly male:
men comprised more than 91 percent of the offenders.
In spite of the well-established principle that the Inquisition's
jurisdiction over blasphemy extended only to statements of a hereti-
cal nature, the vast majority cited in the cases were expletives in
common use to which no heretical intention could be imputed.
Over 50 percent of the cases involved statements renouncing God
or the saints, usually in a moment of rage and frustration. A typical
case was that of Jeronimo Merin, an illiterate velvet worker who
came to the tribunal in 1612 to denounce himself for having re-
nounced God and his saints after losing his ball during a game of
pelota. The Inquisition recognized the comparative mildness of
such expletives and their insignificance from a religious standpoint
by treating the accused with comparative leniency. Only six indi-
viduals were tortured in the course of their trials, and only 3.5
percent were sentenced de vehementi.
Blasphemers also received the mildest punishments of any
group of offenders appearing before the bar of the Holy Office.
Only 1.3 percent were sentenced to death and 7.9 percent given
terms of galley service. Almost half (48%) of the cases ended in
suspension, and almost 31 percent were merely admonished in the
audience chamber and sent on their way.
Offenders who received the severest sentences were usually
found guilty of uttering expletives of a more serious nature. In the
case of Miguel Ferrer, who was sentenced to spend ten years in the
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Inquisition in the Post-Tridentine Era
galleys on May 3, 1647, the more common expressions were com-
bined with violent ones like "Christ the cuckold" and "the Virgin
Mary was a whore and Saint Christopher her pimp." In addition,
Ferrer was a repeat offender (he had been convicted of a similar
offense in 1643) and a prisoner of the crown. Interestingly, the
Suprema went along with the harsh sentence handed down by the
tribunal but downgraded its recommendation of a de vehementi
abjuration to abjuration de levi, clearly recognizing that even such
violent expletives as those uttered by Ferrer had little religious
significance. 14
One important indicator of the Inquisition's success in remold-
ing popular attitudes is the number of people who were coming
forward by the seventeenth century to denounce themselves or
their friends for expletives that they would never have paid the
slightest attention to a generation earlier. In the Spain of the seven-
teenth century, every man (and woman) became his own inquisitor,
having been taught through the Inquisition's "pedagogy of fear" to
scrutinize his own words and actions and those of his neighbors for
any sign of nonconformity. So it was that when Maria de la Bresa, a
tailor's wife from Valencia, heard Catalina Rico, her neighbor, de-
clare bitterly that "God laughs at her misery," she came directly to
the tribunal to report her. 15 An entire society had now learned to
move in lockstep with the demands of the baroque cultural, reli-
gious, and political monolith. 16
A second major objective of both Catholic and Protestant reform-
ers was to impose an ethic of decency, modesty, and self-control
onto the moral life of the laity. 17 The concern for public morality is
what prompted the repression of concubinage by the Inquisition as
well as the secular courts. Typical of this sort of case was the Valen-
cia tribunal's prosecution of Nicolas Flores, a familiar of the Holy
Office and a wealthy labrador of Las Useras, for living openly with a
married woman of the village. Evidently, Flores was an incorrigible
offender who had been tried for the same offense on three previous
occasions and had scandalized the entire village by his conduct.
The rather mild punishment handed down by the tribunal in his
case — a 30 lliure fine and ten days of spiritual exercises in a local
monastery — could hardly have had much impact on such a personal-
ity. 18 Interestingly, the Inquisition's sentence in this case appears to
have been considerably milder than that handed down by the Coun-
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Inquisition in the Post-Tridentine Era
299
cil of the Military Orders in a similar case that it tried in 1700. In
this instance, a notary of the village of Almonacid was accused of
having sexual relations with a series of married women. The council
sentenced him to four years of exile from the village. 19
Closely related to the effort to reform popular morality was the
inquisitorial campaign against the proposition that simple fornica-
tion was not a mortal sin. Eymerich's Directorium is silent on this
subject, and it appears that the Inquisition did not even begin to
deal with cases of this kind until 1559-60. By the cartas acordadas
of November 20, 1573, and November 20, 1574, the Suprema or-
dered the local tribunals to treat simple fornication as if it were a
heresy and include it in the Edict of Faith. 20 On December 14 of
that year, the Valencia tribunal, on orders from the Suprema, pub-
lished a special edict declaring that it was heretical to assert that
simple fornication was not a mortal sin. 1 From the mid- 1550s,
inquisitorial prosecution of these cases began to increase markedly,
and from 1554 to 1820, over 25 percent of the Valencia tribunal's
cases of propositions involved simple fornication. 22
Bigamy was another sphere of activity that was closely related to
the Inquisition's role as enforcer of post-Tridentine sexual morality.
From the twelfth century, the church had declared marriage a
sacrament that could be enjoyed only once during the lifetime of
both partners while the other partner is still alive. 23 Since neither
priest nor witnesses were required to be at the ceremony, however,
church authorities could exercise little control over marriage and
there were frequent clandestine marriages of a bigamous character.
In response to this lamentable state of affairs, the church fathers at
the Council of Trent reinforced the sacrament of marriage by stipu-
lating that banns had to be published three separate times before
the ceremony and that it would be valid only if performed before a
priest and two or three witnesses. The marriage would then have to
be recorded in the parish register.
It was against this background that the Inquisition began to
increase its activity in this area. As early as 1563, the tribunal wrote
the Suprema to demand a crackdown on bigamists because of their
disrespect for the sacrament. 25 Doubtless, the Inquisition was
called on to play the major role in the repression of bigamy be-
cause, as an empirewide institution with a well-developed tradition
of exchanging information among the several tribunals, it was best
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Inquisition in the Post-Tridentine Era
suited to enforce the law, especially since the offense frequently
involved movement from one region to another. The jurisdiction of
the ecclesiastical courts over all marital cases was given proper
recognition by providing that after the conclusion of inquisitorial
proceedings, the ordinary would decide which of the women was
actually married to the accused. 26
An example of cooperation among the several inquisitorial tribu-
nals is provided by the case of Miguel Romero, a Valencian who
had emigrated to the New World and settled in Havana. The case
was instigated by the Cartagena tribunal, which had received infor-
mation leading it to believe that Romero had been married forty
years earlier in the village of El Grao just outside Valencia city. In
response to the Cartagena tribunal's request for information, the
Valencia tribunal sent a Holy Office notary to El Grao to investi-
gate. The notary was successful in finding Josefa Maria Dfas,
Romero's first wife, as well as the original marriage record, which
had been noted in the parish register. After a copy of this informa-
tion was forwarded to America, Romero was arrested and sen-
tenced to four years in an African presidio.
Bigamists coining before the Valencia tribunal were overwhelm-
ingly male (85.5%) and largely young (79% were age 40 or less).
Analysis of status and occupational categories reveals bigamy to be
an offense that involved all classes, from cavaliers (7.6%) to beggars
(2. 1%), but with a heavy concentration among those whose occupa-
tions either required them to have a high degree of mobility or
permitted them to pick up employment almost anywhere. It should
not, therefore, be surprising to learn that almost 11 percent of
bigamists were soldiers or that artisans comprised almost 42 per-
cent of the accused.
Penalties handed down by the tribunal were relatively mild.
First of all, in spite of the fact that the Inquisition's claim to jurisdic-
tion was based on the idea that the bigamist had impiously abused
the sacrament of matrimony, all of those accused before the Valen-
cia tribunal were only judged "lightly suspect" of heresy, which
clearly indicates how little concern there really was with the reli-
gious implications of the offense. The harshest penalties handed
down were periods of galley service (23%), but no one received the
ten-year term prescribed in Philip U s ordinance of 1566. 29
It is undeniable that there were a goodly number of scoundrels
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Inquisition in the Post-Tridentine Era
301
and frauds who used multiple marriages as a way of gaining a
livelihood or improving their position. One of the bigamists who
appeared in the Valladolid auto de fe of October 4, 1579, admitted
to having married fifteen times in the space of ten years and then
disappearing with whatever property he could obtain. 30 In the case
of Pedro Perez de Novella, who was brought to trial by the Valencia
tribunal, the motivation for his second marriage was clearly the
hope of social and professional advancement. His first wife was the
daughter of a labrador, and he was the son of a notary. After living
with his first wife for nine years, Perez de Novella deserted her and
his two children and went to Castellon de la Plana, where he
pretended his wife had died, and married Antonia Amiguet, the
daughter of the local alguacil mayor. Since the office was venal and
Antonia was the alguacil's only child, she brought this office with
her in her dowry. At her father's death, which occurred shortly
after the marriage, Perez de Novella took his place as alguacil
mayor, thereby fulfilling his long-standing goal of occupying an
honorable position, an ambition that his first wife's lowly origins
would have made nearly impossible in the status-conscious eigh-
teenth century. 31
The relative leniency of the Inquisition with regard to cases of
bigamy and the way it made every allowance for extenuating cir-
cumstances may have amounted to tacit recognition by the Holy
Office of the cost in human terms of the church's attitude toward
marriage. The indissolubility of the marriage bond simply made it
impossible for people to resolve problems of infidelity or incompati-
bility except through illicit means such as contracting a second
marriage. Juan Bastit, a French stonecutter, was forced by the lack
of economic opportunity in his home province to journey to Spain
to seek employment. On returning from one of these journeys, he
found that his wife had had an illegitimate child by a man who had
once had an affair with her mother. Disgusted by his wife's behav-
ior, Bastit took the road to Spain once more and eventually settled
in Rubielos, where there appears to have been a small colony of
French artisans. He was able to persuade two of these men to swear
that his first wife had died so that he could marry a local girl. 32
Parental control over marriages and arranged marriages was an-
other fertile source of dissatisfaction and marital instability. Maria la
Jaqueta, the illegitimate daughter of a high-ranking benefice holder
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Inquisition in the Post-Tridentine Era
in the town of Tours, was forced by her mother to marry one Pierre
Verdier whom she described as a "drunkard and misogynist." He
treated her so badly that she fled in the company of a young French-
man who then forced her to marry him by threatening to place her
in a bordello if she refused. Destitute and entirely dependent on
her paramour, Maria had little choice but to agree, even though she
was well aware that she was breaking the rules of the church.
Unfortunately for Maria, the village where the pair settled con-
tained a small group of French immigrants, several of whom had
known her previously. Denounced to the tribunal, she was con-
victed of bigamy and sentenced to 100 lashes. It is difficult not to
have a certain compassion for this 23-year-old girl who had so little
control over her own life and who was the victim, successively, of
mother, husband, lover, and Inquisition. 33
Apart from heresy itself, sodomy and bestiality were the crimes
that inspired the greatest repugnance in the hearts of princes,
jurists, and legislators during the entire early modern period.
These were the crimes "committed against the natural order," the
"abominable sin," the crime that was so disgusting that it was
"horrid even to pronounce it aloud" according to a public prosecu-
tor who was responsible for a sodomy case in 1740. 34 Harsh penal-
ties were prescribed for both crimes in civil legislation. In the
medieval Partidas, both were punishable by death, while in their
edicts of August 22 and 27, 1497, the Catholic Kings declared that
those found guilty of such crimes were to be burned alive in the
place where the crime had been committed. The criminal code of
Valencia also contained ferocious penalties mandating death by
fire for those over twenty years of age and scourging and galleys
for minors. 35
Evidently, the early Inquisition had demonstrated a certain inter-
est in these offenses, but by its decree of October 18, 1509, the
Suprema ordered the Castilian tribunals to leave them in the hands
of the secular and ecclesiastical courts. In Aragon, however, popu-
lar hostility toward sodomites as expressed in the Valencian rioting
of 1519 and the presumed connection between sodomy and the
Islamic minority resulted in a request to Pope Clement VII for a
brief placing it under inquisitorial jurisdiction. 36
The papal brief was issued on February 24, 1524, but the Ara-
gonese tribunals seem to have made little use of their new powers
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303
until after 1560, when the Inquisition began its campaign in sup-
port of post-Tridentine sexual morality and Christian marriage. 37 In
Valencia, the tribunal appears to have been virtually inactive
against sodomy before 1570. 38 From 1571 to 1700, however, there
were 283 cases of sodomy and bestiality and another 226 between
1701 and 1820. 39
In this as in other areas of its growing jurisdiction, local inquisi-
tors rather than the Suprema took the lead. As early as March 1554,
Valencia's inquisitors wrote to request permission to proceed ag-
gressively against sodomites. In 1572, the tribunal wrote that it had
eight men in prison awaiting trial on charges of sodomy and that
many more could be indicted "if the public could be assured that
the Holy Office had jurisdiction over such cases." 40 Just a few
months later, on January 28, 1573, the tribunal wrote again, this
time to ask that the Suprema allow it to place the offense in the
Edict of Faith. 41 In the following year, the Suprema bowed to this
pressure and permitted the Aragonese tribunals to include sodomy
in the edict. 42
In spite of its special powers, the tribunal had difficulty asserting
its jurisdiction over certain offenders, particularly those whose posi-
tion allowed them to enjoy the protection of their own "fuero." In
1572, we find the Suprema ordering the tribunal to refuse to surren-
der the Minim Friar Pedro Picasso to the provincial of his order
who was demanding custody, and between 1571 and 1573, the
tribunal struggled to assert its jurisdiction over Pedro Luis Gal-
ceran de Borja, the grand-master of the Order of Montesa. 43 In
these cases and many others, the Inquisition was successful in
defending its jurisdiction, but we must assume that other courts
did continue to hear a certain percentage of the sodomy cases.
In spite of its inclusion in the Edict of Faith, inquisitorial proce-
dures in these cases belie any connection between sodomy and
heresy. The original papal brief had specified that local law was to
be followed, and, in 1572, the Suprema refused to consider a re-
quest by the tribunal that would have allowed it to treat such cases
as procesos de fe. 44 As a result, in accordance with Valencian crimi-
nal procedure, the names of witnesses were not kept secret and
there was even open confrontation between witnesses and the ac-
cused. During his long trial, Melchor Armengol was permitted to
draw up special lists of questions to be put to the two chief wit-
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nesses against him and was allowed to confront them in open court
where he was able to reveal certain discrepancies in matters of
detail through cross-examination. 45 Sometimes the use of ordinary
judicial procedures with the right of cross-examination would be of
considerable help to an accused. In the case of Fray Manuel San-
chez del Castellar y Arbustan, who was accused of sodomy before
the Valencia tribunal in 1681, cross-examination revealed that the
accusation was little more than an elaborate plot hatched by other
friars jealous of his position in the order. 46
The Suprema also took a considerable interest in these cases,
probably because they frequently involved harsh punishment of Old
Christians and insisted that proper judicial procedures be followed.
In 1624, for example, the Suprema sharply rebuked the tribunal for
the sodomy cases included in the relaciones de causas of the previous
year because the accusations were poorly substantiated.
Statistical analysis of the data taken from the relaciones de causas
reveals that both sodomy and bestiality were crimes committed
largely by unmarried young men. Some 98.7 percent of those ac-
cused of sodomy were males, although five women were accused of
lesbianism. The figures for bestiality yield remarkably similar re-
sults, with 98.9 percent of the accused being males. The age profile
of the two groups was also quite similar: 74.9 percent of the sodom-
ites and 77 percent of those accused of bestiality were under 40
years of age. These two crimes also exhibit the highest percentage
of unmarried offenders of any dealt with by the tribunal — 70.2 and
90 percent, respectively.
Analysis of the information abut occupation and status, how-
ever, reveals some sharp differences in the sociology of those
accused of these crimes. Sodomites were widely distributed
across the occupation/status range, with small groups of cavaliers
and ciutadans (2.9%), professionals and merchants (5.5%), and
clergy (18.9%). In contrast, persons of higher social status are
almost entirely absent among those accused of bestiality: there
was a complete absence of knights and ciutadans and only one
cleric. For both offenses, the largest proportion of offenders were
artisans and peasants, but while the percentage of artisans was
remarkably similar (27.5% for sodomites and 30.6% for bestiality),
the percentage of peasants (34.6%) was much higher for bestiality
than it was for sodomy (10%), reflecting the rural nature of that
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305
crime. As one would expect, both offenses had a high percentage
of accused from marginal groups or occupations where there was a
high degree of mobility and consequently little opportunity to
develop a settled family life. Thus, both offenses have similar
percentages of slaves and vagrants, 7.0 and 10.2 percent and 7.0
and 6. 1 percent, respectively.
Without doubt, the most politically powerful individual ever ar-
rested on charges of sodomy by the Valencia tribunal was Pedro Luis
Galceran de Borja. Not only was the grand-master the son of the
third duke of Gandfa and related to most of the leading nobles of the
kingdom but he was also the leader of one of the most powerful and
violent of the aristocratic "bandos" that had so disrupted Valencian
society during the 1550s. 4 Arrested in 1571 on testimony from sev-
eral of the order's commanders, he was given exceptional treatment
and permitted to run the affairs of the order from comfortable apart-
ments that had been set aside for him. 49 Ignoring Borja's persistent
refusal to recognize the Inquisition's jurisdiction and the consider-
able political pressure that was brought to bear by members of his
family, the tribunal and the Suprema pressed the case. 50 Direct
evidence was provided by three of his servants, one of whom,
Gaspar Granulles, had fled to Rome where a warrant was issued for
his arrest in November 1572. 51 Given the strong political influence
being exerted on the accused's behalf, especially by Archbishop
Ribera, and the fact that Martin de Castro, the principal witness
against him, revoked his testimony, a split verdict on the tribunal is
not surprising. 52 The Suprema chose to accept the view of hard-liner
Juan de Rojas who had voted for a heavy fine and four years of exile,
although it modified exile to ten years of reclusion in the castle of
Montesa and a fine of 6,000 ducats. 03 Even this sentence could
hardly have been expected in such a case but for the fact that the
Valencian nobility, in general, had become somewhat discredited in
the eyes of the king because of their support of the religion and
customs of their Morisco vassals and that many of them had been, or
were about to be, punished by the Inquisition. 54 In the end, of
course, the crown's need for the political support of the Borja family
outweighed its desire to punish sodomites, and, in 1591, Borja was
absolved and rehabilitated politically by being granted the post of
viceroy of Catalonia. 55
If political influence and social prominence saved Borja from the
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harsh punishment that many a lesser man had to suffer for similar
offenses, the lack of such influence may well have condemned
Melchor Armengol to harsher punishment than he might have oth-
erwise received. Armengol was rector of Bot, located in the Sierra
de Montenegrelo in the extreme northern part of the district. Un-
like many other parish priests, he was scrupulous in carrying out
his duties; but, since the income from his benefice was barely
sufficient to meet expenses, Armengol was eager to take advantage
of any opportunity to increase it by asserting control over church
property and acting to farm the ecclesiastical tithe. His efforts to do
this, however, made him a number of enemies among the village
elite, including his former sacristan and the leader of the village
council, Juan Altadill. Armengol also alienated his parishioners by
evicting mothers with young children from church if their infants
cried during services. Furthermore, this remote region, like other
parts of the sprawling inquisitorial district, was afflicted with seri-
ous clan rivalries and banditry. Armengol had close ties with one of
the bandit leaders, while his enemies were linked to the leader of
the opposing group. In spite of his general unpopularity, however,
he employed the son and nephew of two of his principal enemies as
servants and sodomized them and another boy in his bedroom in
the rectory, in a hut outside of the village, and in a lodging house in
the city of Tortosa.
These activities, which apparently went on for some time, eventu-
ally became known to one of Armengol's bitterest enemies, Juan
(^abater, the rector of neighboring Gandesa, with whom Armengol
had significant disagreements and a pending lawsuit. Seeking to
destroy his enemy, (^abater denounced Armengol before Jeronimo
Terca, canon of Tortosa cathedral and the Holy Office commissioner
for the region. After receiving this initial testimony, Terca was told to
follow up his investigations by calling in other witnesses, and within
a few weeks an impressive body of evidence had emerged concern-
ing Armengol's sexual relations with the boys, including Agustm
Villavert's assertion that he had been repeatedly raped on the rec-
tor's bed and that the sexual act had always been consummated.
In his long and brilliant defense, which included face-to-face
confrontations with the boys, Armengol was able to establish what
to a modern mind would appear to be reasonable doubt, especially
with regard to the incidents in Tortosa, chiefly by pointing out
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307
inconsistencies in prosecution testimony. However, he was unable
to shake the testimony of the third boy, Jose Prat, who declared
that Armengol had kissed him and touched his genitals, and in this
instance he was reduced to lamely asserting that Prat must have
been induced to testify by one of his enemies. In the end, the
tribunal, which was chary of offending local elites and wanted to
extend its system of familiares into the Bot region, sentenced
Armengol to be degraded from clerical orders, deprived of his
office and benefice, and given three years of galley service. 56 The
case of Melchor Armengol, like many cases of superstition and
others that we have referred to, is a good illustration of the role that
reputation and the whole context of personal relationships can play
in inspiring judicial denunciations. Although the allegations against
him were probably largely true, Armengol was himself a victim not
only of his own bad temper but of the tragic condition of many of
Valencia's country parishes where the priest was forced into pov-
erty, absenteeism, or worse because powerful village elites con-
trolled parish business and finances.
As stated above, both sodomy and bestiality were committed
primarily by unmarried men whose occupation or circumstances
made it difficult or impossible for them to live a normal family life
even if they had been disposed to do so. Typical of this group were
individuals like Ali, the black slave of the viceroy's mayordomo,
who was accused of having sexual relations with two young men,
one of whom was a part-time agricultural worker and the other a
vagrant some 15 or 16 years of age.
Another marginal individual who paid with his life for the social
prejudice against bestiality was Pedro Juan, a watchman in the
village of Montesa. There was only one witness to this act, which
occurred in broad daylight just outside the town walls in March
1621. The witness, Gracia Navarro, was out gathering herbs when
she saw Juan having sexual relations with a mule whose legs were
tied apart. She ran immediately to tell several labradores whose
farms were close, and these men apprehended Juan and held him
while they summoned the local familiar. Juan escaped but was
recaptured the following day by the familiar and one of the labra-
dores and eventually brought before the tribunal. In his defense,
Juan alleged that he drank heavily and was habitually drunk and
that he had only entered the mule's privates "a little way." His
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308 Inquisition in the Post-Tridentine Era
habitual drunkenness was partially contradicted by the testimony
of several witnesses who also declared that semen had been stream-
ing out of the mule's backside shortly after the alarm had first been
given. Even though the tribunal was able to verify Juan's claim to
be a devout Catholic, this did him little good. He was given a
sentence of death, which was carried out along with the senseless
execution of the perfectly innocent animal after the auto of July 4,
1621. 58 It is interesting to note that the verdict in this case was
unanimous and that one of the members of the tribunal at this time
was Inquisitor Alonso de Salazar y Frfas, the savior of the witches of
Navarre and Guipuzcoa a decade earlier. It would be many genera-
tions before the enlightened attitude that Inquisitor Salazar y Frias
showed in the case of the witches would be extended to those
convicted of bestiality.
Curiously, the working legal definition of the sin/crime of sod-
omy that was used by both the secular courts and the Inquisition
included certain forms of "unnatural" sexual relations between men
and women. As late as 1780, Antonio Gomez included any form of
sexual relations that made use of any artificial methods in his defini-
tion of sodomy, and on November 29, 1644, a man was burnt to
death in Madrid after having been accused by his wife of having
anal intercourse. 59
The Valencia tribunal also tried a certain number of persons
(5.6% of sodomy cases) for this offense, which was termed "imper-
fect sodomy" by the canonists. 60 Use of confessors to force their
penitents to bring cases of solicitation before the Holy Office was
evidently extended to instances of anal sex as well, and the late
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries saw an increasing num-
ber of women coming to the tribunal to denounce their husbands
and lovers. Evidently, some of these relationships were extremely
unhappy, so the Holy Office in this instance provided an outlet for
the frustrations and anger of women who had been battered emo-
tionally, physically, and sexually by their partners. Isabel Juan
Ramirez, for example, who came to the Holy Office on February 6,
1609, on the advice of her confessor, testified that her husband, a
baker, had attempted anal sex with her on numerous occasions and
beat her when she refused. 61 Some women were unable to avoid
engaging in this form of sex in spite of being aware of its illicit
nature. Esperanza Agut, the wife of a labrador from the village of
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309
Artana, came to testify that her husband had forced her to have anal
sex with him even though she begged him not to because she knew
it was a grave sin. 62
The majority of the sodomy cases tried by the Valencia tribunal
involved a relatively small number of sexual acts with few part-
ners. In fact, the tragic case of Juan Ximenez, who became de-
spondent after his arrest on sodomy charges and committed suicide
in his cell, involved repeated homosexual acts committed over a
ten-year period with just one partner. 64 About 20 percent of the
cases involved multiple sexual acts committed with numerous part-
ners. One of the most remarkable cases of this kind involved
Jesualdo Felizes, the brother-in-law of the count of Albalat. Felizes
not only forced a succession of servant boys to have sexual relations
with him but also paid for sex with the boy musicians of the chapel
of San Andres and sodomized his two nephews on twenty-two sepa-
rate occasions. Felizes would usually act as the aggressor in these
trysts, but sometimes, as with Domingo Meris, the lovers "sod-
omized each other mutually." Evidently, Felizes's family, consisting
of his mother, Jeronima Arazil, and brother, Fray Vicente Felizes,
were quite complaisant about his sexual preferences. On one occa-
sion, Fray Vicente even persuaded the mother of one of Felizes's
boy servants to coax her son to return to the house after he had fled
these sexual advances. Felizes habitually slept in the same room as
his mother, along with one of his boy lovers. He even went so far as
to perform his sexual acts in her bed and in one instance scourged
one of his lovers there after sodomizing him. Felizes was eventually
denounced to the Holy Office by Dr. Juan Val, rector of the Colegio
de San Jorge in Valencia, who had heard rumors about his activities
while on a visit to Meliana where the family resided after it left
Valencia.
The fact that Jesualdo Felizes could carry on his extraordinary
sexual career for more than a decade without ever being de-
nounced to the Holy Office is only partially attributable to his high
social standing. Of course, his rank made his servant lovers unwill-
ing to denounce him as they probably felt it would be futile. As Jose
Bermudez, who had been sodomized by Felizes twice a day for
seven years, put it when asked why he had not denounced his
master, "What good would that have done, he would only have
beaten me." But Felizes was also able to exploit the existence in
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Valencia of networks of young homosexuals and the apparent accep-
tance among young men, even in this land with a tradition of
lynching sodomites, of a certain amount of homosexual behavior
among friends. Certainly his sexual relations with the hoy musi-
cians of San Andres, several of whom admitted during his trial that
they had sexual relations with one another, attest to the existence of
such groups. 65 In 1796, just eleven years after Felizes was sen-
tenced, we learn of another such group from the spontaneous con-
fession of Benito Campany. The previous year, Campany, who was
an art student, went with several of his friends to the harvest at
Jativa. After buying a watermelon for refreshment, they all climbed
up on a pile of hay and proceeded to pull off their pants and
sodomize each other in turn. The casual and spontaneous nature of
this episode and the youth of those involved, ranging from 8 to 16
years of age, indicates that we are not dealing with a group with
definite sexual preferences but rather with boys who accepted ho-
mosexual activity as part of their relationship with one another
regardless of their ultimate sexual choices. 66
The attitude of many inquisitorial officials toward sodomy and
bestiality was best summed up by Dr. Perez, the tribunal's prose-
cuting attorney in the case of the master of Montesa, who de-
manded the death sentence on the grounds that failure to punish
such a "heinous" crime would bring divine retribution in the form
of "famine, plague and earthquakes." 6 ' In reality, as the sentence of
the master himself was to indicate, the punishments handed down
by the Inquisition for sodomy and bestiality were considerably
milder than the violent antagonism expressed by its prosecuting
attorney would seem to imply. According to a memorial analyzing
the tribunal's policy toward these offenders presented to the
Suprema in 1687, the harsh laws of the Valencian criminal code had
been followed in many cases until 1628, when the tribunal exe-
cuted its last sodomite. Since the memorial speaks of "the lack of
conclusive proof " in certain of these cases, it is safe to assume that
one reason for this apparent leniency was the Suprema's strictures
on the inadequacy of proof in certain cases that had been presented
to it some years earlier. The suspicion that the Suprema was
behind this change of heart by the tribunal is confirmed later in the
memorial when the inquisitors comment on the case of Carlos
Charmarino, a sailor whose sentence of death by burning and confis-
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cation of property by the tribunal was reduced by the Suprema to
200 lashes and ten years of galley service. By 1656, the Suprema's
more lenient policy was beginning to make itself felt on the tribu-
nal. In the case of Juan Antonio Jirado, the consulta de fe divided
with several votes for the death penalty, but Inquisitor Antonio de
Ayala Verganza and the ordinary of the Archbishop opted for 200
lashes and ten years of galley service "because in similar cases
sentences had been reduced by the Council." As it turned out,
Inquisitor Ayala Verganza had interpreted the Suprema's mood
correctly, as it sentenced Jirado to only five years of galley service
followed by eight years of exile. Finally, the authors of the memo-
rial, Inquisitors Jimenez Navarro and Francisco Espadana, com-
mented on their own policy in sentencing certain slaves whose
cases had presented themselves that year. Following the "lenient
policy ordered by your Eminences for these many years," they
said, it had been decided to punish them with scourging and order
their master to sell them outside the kingdom rather than sentence
them to death or a term of galley service. 69
Analysis of sentences handed down for sodomy and bestiality
appears to substantiate the impression of leniency conveyed in the
1687 memorial. Contrary to Valencian criminal law, only 6.7 per-
cent of sodomites and 5.8 percent of those convicted of bestiality
were given death sentences, and confiscation was mandated in only
1.7 percent and 1. 1 percent of these cases, respectively. Instead, as
indicated in the memorial, a high percentage of sentences for these
offenses involved galley service (13.8% and 19.7%), scourging
(14.1% and 24.4%), and exile (18.8% and 32.5%). But there were
many even milder punishments like reclusion in monasteries for
clerical sodomites or fines. Interestingly, especially given the seri-
ousness with which these offenses were treated in the criminal
code, the percentage of suspensions was extremely high: some 63.2
percent of sodomizers and 44 percent of cases of bestiality. This was
especially true in the eighteenth century when the high percentage
of suspensions merely confirms the long-term trend toward le-
niency in these cases that was the subject of the 1687 memorial. 70
The moderation with which the Inquisition treated those ac-
cused of sodomy and bestiality seems all the more remarkable
considering the profound social prejudice against such offenders.
But the law, as E. P. Thompson has pointed out, must be seen both
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as "particular rules and sanctions which stand in a definite and
active relationship (often a field of conflict) to social norms" and "in
terms of its own logic, rules and procedures."' 1 Like the judges of
the Paris Parlement with regard to another class of offenders
equally abhorred by popular opinion, witches and sorcerers, the
members of the Suprema were concerned to protect the integrity
of the procedures and legal traditions that gave expression to in-
quisitorial law and prevent lesser tribunals from abusing them. 72
Like their counterparts in Paris, the members of the Suprema
became more and more concerned about the procedural irregulari-
ties and difficulties of proof that characterized such cases as time
went on. This concern led them not only to insist on more effective
procedural guarantees but to a pattern of reducing the sentences
that local inquisitorial tribunals in imitation of local law had handed
down in these cases. A new "style" or tradition was in the process of
formation, and, within a few years, the local tribunals, whose
judges were after all dependent on the Suprema for preferment,
adopted it as their own. In its leniency toward sodomites, as in
many other respects, the Inquisition was more enlightened than
the secular courts, which were still handing down death sentences
for sodomy and bestiality in the middle of the seventeenth century.
Before 1750, however, the secular courts with jurisdiction over
these offenses had adopted the style of the Inquisition, and centu-
ries of violent persecution and brutal punishment for homosexual-
ity were drawing to a close. ' 3
An even more striking example of the Spanish Inquisition's
progressive approach to an offense that was treated with great
severity elsewhere is provided by its treatment of those accused of
sorcery. The Spanish Inquisition's cautious and moderate attitude
stands in sharp contrast to the witch hysteria that gripped much of
northern Europe, and it is all the more remarkable because its
jurisdiction over crimes involving sorcery depended on the medi-
eval scholastic definition of all forms of magic as demonic and
heretical. ' 4 In spite of this, most Spanish inquisitors were able to
resist popular pressure for harsh and summary punishment of
persons popularly reputed as witches and refrain from systemati-
cally imposing learned notions of diabolism (with which they were
quite familiar from their knowledge of works like the Malleus
Maleficarum) on the popular magical traditions that provided the
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313
raw material for the trials. In the end, what counted for the
Spanish Inquisition was not the formal scholastic notion of pacts
with the devil and apostasy from the faith but the concept that the
church's monopoly on supernatural remedies was being under-
mined and its rituals and prayers misused by magicians. 75 This
approach, which emphasized the post-Tridentine effort to enforce
respect for the sacred rather than a desire to extirpate a dangerous
new cult of devil-worshiping heretics, provided the basis for in-
quisitorial activity in this field and prevented Spain from becom-
ing the scene of the massive witch persecutions that caused so
much suffering in the rest of Europe.
In a country where the traditions of scholasticism dominated
intellectual life throughout the early modern period, the Spanish
Inquisition's attitude toward sorcery could hardly have been the
result of an "enlightened" rationalist negation of the power of the
devil or the ability of witches to harm men and animals with his
assistance. In fact, fifteenth-century Spain saw the publication of
some of Europe's earliest witchcraft treatises, and as late as 1631, in
a work that was warmly approved by Dr. Baltasar de Cisneros,
calificador of the Zaragoza tribunal, Gaspar Navarro fully accepts
the reality of the Sabbath, diabolical pacts, and maleficia and called
for the exemplary punishment of witches. 76 The scholastic link be-
tween sorcery, diabolism, and heresy also received support from
Inquisitors like Arnaldo Alvertm, who in 1535 proclaimed himself a
firm believer in all the horrors that witches were accused of. In
fact, Dr. Alonso Becerra and licentiate Juan del Valle, who voted
death sentences for the witches condemned at the famous auto de
fe of November 7, 1610, in Logrono, represented a respectable
minority view in a tribunal that had never explicitly denied the
reality of witchcraft. 78
In matters of judicial procedure, what really counted, however,
was the climate of opinion on the Suprema itself. In 1562, Inquisitor-
General Manrique convened a junta of judicial experts (including
future Inquisitor-General Valdes) and theologians to discuss the is-
sues raised by an outbreak of witch persecution in Navarre. ' 9 As a
result of the discussions held by the members of this assembly, the
Suprema issued a series of instructions that set the tone for the
Spanish Inquisition's future attitude toward witchcraft. Essentially,
these instructions instituted procedural safeguards that made it im-
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possible for Spain to experience the massive witchcraft persecutions
soon to become common in much of the rest of Europe. 80
That the Valencia tribunal followed the majority of Spain's provin-
cial tribunals in adopting a moderate policy toward the kinds of
sorcery cases that could easily have resulted in accusations of de-
monizing and triggered witch panics elsewhere in Europe is illus-
trated by several sixteenth- and seventeenth-century cases. Vicenta
Malpel, a fourteen-year-old servant girl who had become widely
known in Valencia for her visions of the Virgin xMary and the infant
Jesus as well as her ability to predict the future and find missing or
stolen objects, also claimed that the devil visited her in the shape of a
"gentleman" dressed in black silk. Arrested by the Holy Office after
she had been denounced by five witnesses, she admitted the
charges, but the consulta voted for torture because she was "sus-
pected of a pact with the devil. " After being brought to the torture
chamber (but not actually tortured), she confessed that the devil had
appeared to her the first time after she had received a brutal beating
from her mistress and told her that if she wanted to secure better
treatment, achieve fame, and become known as a saint, she should
pretend that she had visions of holy figures and that when people
came to question her about them he would tell her what to say. She
also testified that she had had sexual relations with the devil on
numerous occasions during the last two years even though she had
remained a virgin. Although Vicenta denied that she had surren-
dered her soul to the devil or signed any agreements with him, it
would have been quite easy for her interrogators to have gotten her
to admit diabolical pacts and virtually any other form of diabolism
had they been so inclined, since she was a highly suggestible person
who was described as frequently contradicting herself during her
testimony. Evidently, there was no disposition to do this, and this
adolescent, whose resemblance to the child witches of Germany or
Salem must strike anyone familiar with the history of witchcraft, was
merely sentenced to appear in the following auto de fe with the
insignia of an invoker of the devil, public shame, and a period of
reclusion in a monastery to be determined by the tribunal. 81
Isabel Patris was another individual who would certainly have
been given the death penalty if her trial had been held before a
tribunal in northern Europe. Patris, who evidently practiced both
amatory and curative magic, sometimes in direct competition with
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315
local physicians and exorcists, was widely reputed to be a witch and
was accused of killing many persons with her evil spells, especially
those who refused her alms. In spite of this local reputation and
several specific accusations of maleficia, including the death of a
woman shortly after Patris had visited her, the tribunal resisted any
temptation to turn a case of popular magic into diabolism and
instead sentenced Isabel to abjuration in the audience chamber and
eight years exile from the district. 82
In another case in which the tribunal might easily have crossed
the line from amatory magic to diabolism, the sentence was harsher
but probably because of the sacrilegious activities that emerged
from the testimony rather than any fear that it had encountered a
member of a real witch cult. Teresa Agustf, who admitted having
made a pact with the devil and removed her cross and rosary for
fifteen days so as to find out if her lover was coming to see her, had
also been heard to threaten her lover with retribution after he left
her "even if she had to give her soul to the devil." After his death,
which occurred shortly after this threat was uttered, Dr. Morales,
the physician who attended him, commented that his symptoms
were so irregular that they could not have come from natural causes
and must have been the result of some witchcraft. Rather omi-
nously, these charges influenced the tone of the prosecuting attor-
ney's accusation in which Agusti was charged with "passing to the
side of God's enemies" for setting aside her rosary and cross, with
"diabolical witchcraft" for casting the spell that caused her lover's
demise, and with an explicit pact with the devil. In spite of this
overheated rhetoric, which might easily have led to a charge of
diabolism, the tribunal continued to act with the moderation that
had long characterized the Inquisition's response to witchcraft accu-
sations by absolving de levi and making her appear in church wear-
ing the insignia of one convicted of superstition and imposture
(embusteria). She was sentenced to verguenza, exile from Valencia,
and four years in the women's prison where she was to have a
calificador to govern her spiritual welfare. After generations of mod-
eration, the Valencia tribunal was not going to allow itself to be
stampeded into accusations of diabolism or accepting vague and
unsubstantiated testimony about murder by magic. 83
Living before the advent of modern medicine, sanitation, orga-
nized fire brigades, and emergency services, early modern Europe-
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ans, like their ancient and medieval predecessors, were vulnerable
to a variety of diseases and misfortunes whose catastrophic conse-
quences have been prevented or limited in the highly sophisticated
European societies of today. Early modern Valencia was no excep-
tion to this rule, and a brief glance at Porcar's chronicle of the early
seventeenth century reveals a full range of catastrophic events,
including outbreaks of plague, numerous fires, severe thunder-
storms, and long periods of drought. 84 Like the primitive religions
that it replaced, Catholicism sought to help afflicted humanity by
propitiating the supernatural forces (the wrath of God) that were
believed to have caused these problems. 85 The church was com-
monly regarded as a vast repository of supernatural power and
sometimes directly encouraged this view by accepting and support-
ing certain miraculous events if they appeared to lend support to
the faith and by creating a litany of usages designed to draw down
God's blessing on the tiny struggles of everyday life. 86
Thus, it is hardly surprising that in spite of the careful attempt
made by at least some clergy to indicate that the effectiveness of
specific prayers or any other observances depended ultimately on
the will of God, it became widely accepted that, with the proper
formula and devices, man could manipulate the supernatural. It
was this belief, encouraged directly or indirectly by the church,
that provided the basis for the activity of the early modern magician
who frequently incorporated cult objects or Christian prayers in his
charms and incantations.
Since the prestige of the church itself was so heavily dependent
on its ability to mobilize supernatural forces on man's behalf, its
attitude toward popular superstitions was highly ambivalent. If
the intercession of the supernatural was sought through obser-
vances approved by the church, such as rogations or exorcism,
this could only increase devotion, especially if the believer demon-
strated a genuine trust in God and did not seek any specific
material gain. However, the post-Tridentine church's desire to
reassert respect for the sacred made it sensitive to any attempt to
invoke the supernatural for illicit or materialistic purposes, espe-
cially when officially sanctioned forms of intercession were used in
unacceptable ways. 87 This new sensitivity led to Sixtus V's bull of
1585 against magic and brought the Inquisition into the struggle
against popular superstition.
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317
The three most important kinds of superstitious error prose-
cuted by the Valencia tribunal were divination (51.8% of all cases),
love magic (25.9%), and curative magic (17.7%). Divination in-
cluded such practices as attempts to predict the future or affect the
outcome of future events. In 1604, for example, the Valencia tribu-
nal sentenced Alonso Verlango to a reprimand and two years of
exile for, among other superstitious practices, hiring a woman to
bring about the resolution of a lawsuit by performing several conju-
rations that combined the invocation of saints and demons. 88
The most common form of divination, however, was the effort to
free enchanted treasure. This form of divination provided the tribu-
nal with 34.5 percent of its cases of superstition and had become so
common in the kingdom by the early eighteenth century that the
Suprema wrote to ask that the archbishop order parish priests to
denounce it from the pulpits. 89 The time, trouble, and expense
involved in hunting for enchanted treasure frequently meant that
such "expeditions" were organized like business partnerships and
involved men with a certain amount of wealth.
One group of intrepid treasure hunters, which included such
luminaries as Melchor Gamir, a jurat of Valencia city, and Melchor
Moscardo, an official of the criminal chamber of the Audiencia,
began by purchasing a Moorish slave who enjoyed some reputation
as a magician and who promised to find them an enchanted trea-
sure. After making several fruitless attempts, the slave finally ad-
mitted that he had only made the claim to avoid work. The partners
then sold the slave but without abandoning their belief in the
possibility of liberating enchanted treasure, although it did make
them a bit more cautious about investing any more money. This
time, they simply came to an agreement with the owner of another
Moorish slave who claimed to be a master of "natural magic" which
would provide him with a share of any treasure that was discov-
ered. After this slave also failed to deliver on his promises, the
members of the group, who were well aware of the Inquisition's
attitude toward this sort of activity, felt it necessary to denounce
themselves to the Holy Office for "any trace of superstition that
might have become involved in these things." 90 Confronted with
the evidence of such practices in late-seventeenth- and early
eighteenth-century Valencia, the historian can only lament that the
energy and persistence shown by these groups in the pursuit of
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imaginary treasure could not have been turned to the creation of
real wealth in a region where enterprising businessmen were in
short supply.
At a time when the church continued to claim that prayers and
even sacraments could have curative power, the Inquisition's attack
on those practicing healing magic must be seen as a way of protect-
ing the church monopoly against unwelcome interlopers. In the
case of Anna Rodriguez, a curandera who was accused of witchcraft
by her neighbors, the tribunal entirely ignored the charge of sor-
cery and simply ordered her not to engage in any more healing. 91
Less easy to decide was the case of Bias Olaria, the parish priest of
El Castillo, who, for a fee of three sueldos, provided sick people
with special amulets and said prayers for their recovery. At his
second trial in 1651, he argued that the saints themselves had given
charms to those who had become ill through enchantment and that
"many" other priests did exactly as he was doing. This forceful and
effective argument was enough to produce dissension among the
calificadores, and the Suprema had to step in to insist that the case
be prosecuted. 2
Evidence that the campaign against magical healing was having
some impact on the practitioners themselves comes from the fact
that known healers were becoming more reluctant to perform their
functions. In 1642, it took the intervention of the governor of
Castellon de la Plana himself to persuade Juana Font to cure a
woman who claimed that she became ill after quarreling with her. 93
Love magic, which comprised more than one quarter of the
cases of superstition tried by the Valencia tribunal, was largely
carried out by women in an effort to cope with a world that had
dictated their extreme powerlessness and subjugated them to hus-
bands and lovers. In their pathetic and ineffective attempts to as-
sert some measure of control over the men in their lives or to
attract the attention and affection of the men they desired, Valen-
cia's women could draw on a rich popular tradition of incantations,
rituals, and magical concoctions and on the support of networks of
other women with similar concerns. Knowledge of magical prac-
tices and contacts with well-known practitioners of the magical arts
were shared among the women comprising these networks, but
jealousy, competition for lovers among some of the women, and
bitterness over the failure of amatory magic to produce any positive
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319
results tended to make these networks highly unstable and produc-
tive of multiple denunciations to the Holy Office. Once they were
brought before the bar of the Holy Office, their tendency to mix
Christian prayers with superstitious incantations and frequent if
perfunctory invocation of the devil left these women open to
charges of "irreverence" for the sacred, "profane observance," and
"sacrilege" even though it was agreed that formal heresy was never
94
an issue.
The case of Esperanza Badia, who was incarcerated by the Valen-
cia tribunal on November 26, 1653, provides an excellent example
of the kind of woman most likely to become involved in amatory
magic on what might almost be termed a "professional" basis as well
as the shifting and unstable personal relations that eventually re-
sulted in denunciations to the Holy Office. Orphaned at nine when
both her parents died, she was married at age thirteen to Francisco
Mayner, a bookseller who deserted her shortly after the birth of
their only daughter. Badia then moved to Valencia city where she
became a nursemaid in several homes and attracted the attention of
a prosperous labrador. It was on this individual, Andres Berenger,
that she first used amatory magic to "tie" him more closely to her
and induce him to keep his promise to marry her. In the end, the
marriage never took place, since Badfa's husband was known to be
still alive and she lacked sufficient funds for the expenses involved
in the annulment process. Poverty stricken, deserted by her lover,
and with her last hope of marriage now gone, Badia began to
supplement her meager income by practicing amatory magic (recit-
ing magical incantations, mixing up potions) as part of a network of
women much like herself. Within this group, Badia was among the
most active practitioners of love magic, frequently working for
women like Celedonia Lazero, with whom she lived for a time and
from whom she received money on three separate occasions for
mixing a magic potion that would cause her lover to return. Badia
also taught other women incantations and was herself taught by
others like Maria la Catalana, who evidently enjoyed considerable
prestige as a practitioner of amatory magic, in part because she had
once been convicted of superstition by the Inquisition. At the time
of Badfa's arrest, Maria was living in Valencia in violation of the four
years of exile to which she had been sentenced. This did little
damage to her business, however, and she kept busy casting spells,
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reciting amatory incantations, and mixing potions for a large num-
ber of clients including Esperanza Badfa herself.
In the end, this group came to grief after Badfa was denounced
by her erstwhile friend and client, Esperanza Coll, with whom she
had quarreled over a man. With Coll s testimony, of course, the
relative anonymity that had protected the network was breached,
and the tribunal reaped a rich harvest of denunciation and arrests. 95
The widespread practice of amatory magic in sixteenth- and
seventeenth-century Europe and the persecution of its practitioners
may well be two sides of the same coin. The "European marriage
pattern," which was well in place by the early sixteenth century,
entailed later marriage and was characterized by a large percentage
of women who never married. 96 The competition for any available
men must have been ferocious, and those women without dowries or
special physical attractiveness utilized every means, licit or illicit, in
the struggle. The persecution of such women by the Inquisition and
secular criminal courts of Europe may tell us more about society's
inability to assimilate the large number of women who were no
longer under masculine rule than about any new and dangerous
heresies or diabolism involved in amatory magic.
In his sermon preached at the opening of the second session of
the Council of Trent on January 7, 1546, the bishop of San Marco in
Calabria laid stress on the theme of the internal reform of the
church that was to become one of the principal objectives of
conciliar legislation. According to the bishop, the "decay in church
morality had provided the dissidents with the weapons with which
to attack us," and while few believed that the mere reform of
abuses would lead to a reconciliation with the Protestants, there
could be little doubt that a reformed church would be in a better
position to hold the line against further Protestant advances. 97 The
primary thrust of this reform, as Bishop Del Monte declared before
the session of February 8, 1547, was "the revival of the pastoral
ministry — the cure of souls." 98 The new post-Tridentine church,
unlike its medieval predecessor, was to be a parochially grounded
institution with priests thoroughly trained in theology, preaching in
accordance with Catholic dogma, administering the sacraments in a
proper and respectful manner, and setting a high moral standard
for the laity. 99
Unfortunately, as many at the council were aware, the mid-
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sixteenth-century priesthood fell far short of this clerical ideal. Ease
of access to clerical orders and the lack of any uniform theological
education led to the creation of a priesthood deficient in theology,
incapable of preaching, and prone to doctrinal error. 100 Bishops'
frequent absenteeism and their inability to exercise control over the
priests and benefice holders in their dioceses resulted in a scandal-
ous laxity of morals and an undisguised disdain for ecclesiastical
responsibilities. Of course, the fathers of the council recognized
these shortcomings and in Sessions XX and XXII passed decrees
reforming the moral lives of the clergy and establishing the principle
that clerics should be educated in theology in seminaries. But pass-
ing a series of decrees, however well intended, was not the same as
actually achieving the reform of clerical life. It would take genera-
tions to finally achieve the goal of establishing diocesan seminaries,
for example, and meanwhile there were a great many pulpits from
which indifferent, bad, or even dangerous ideas were pouring forth
each Sunday. Regardless of the decrees at Trent, episcopal authority
remained weak and many bishops continued the absenteeism that
had frustrated earlier efforts to reform the moral behavior of the
diocesan clergy. 101 The attainment of a genuinely reformed priest-
hood would take time, possibly generations, but time was what the
mid-sixteenth-century church did not have. Faced with the Protes-
tant threat and with the Protestant rejection of such critical Catholic
institutions as clerical celibacy and confession, the Catholic church
had to curb the worst abuses and doctrinal errors of the clergy even
though the institutions of genuine reform were not in place. It was
this realization of the urgency of finding at least a partial solution to
the problem of the clergy that led Pope Paul III to issue a bull
specifically prohibiting the preaching of scandalous or erroneous
propositions and Pius IV to grant the Spanish Inquisition jurisdiction
over the disrespect for the sacrament of penance implied in solicita-
tion in the confessional. 102
Given the low level of theological instruction among the clergy
and the importance of preaching as a form of propaganda, it was to
be expected that the Holy Office would find a great many preach-
ers who made foolish or theologically unsound statements from the
pulpit. 103 Of course, the excesses that the new post-Tridentine reli-
gious sensibility detected in many popular sermons were often
little more than the result of a preacher's attempts to entertain or
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captivate his flock. In other cases, however, popular sermons
revealed a depth of ignorance and misinformation that must have
been profoundly troubling to the Holy Office. An excellent exam-
ple of this is provided by the case of Dr. Gaspar Livera, a respected
benefice holder in the parish church of San Andres of Valencia
whose degree in theology seems to have been little more than a
license to preach doctrinal errors. Among the propositions that the
Holy Office was later to qualify as "heretical" and "erroneous" were
Livera's assertions that the Virgin Mary had been ordained in both
major and minor orders and that she was a true pope with the
power of the keys like Saint Peter. 105 On one occasion, Livera, who
was evidently something of a Valencian patriot, preached a sermon
in honor of Valencia's patron saint, Vicente Ferrer, in which he
asserted that since he was the most virtuous and perfect of all the
saints, he was the only one who could rightfully be called the "saint
of God. " Evidently, the tribunal and the Suprema felt that Livera's
case was serious enough to merit exceptional punishment, so that
in addition to the customary obligation to retract his errors in the
same pulpits in which they had been uttered, he was sentenced to
be perpetually deprived of the right to preach. 106
The fact that Livera was able to demonstrate at his trial that
many of the propositions that formed part of the accusation were
taken from printed sermons written by others is an indication of
just how deep seated doctrinal error was in the post-Tridentine
Valencian church. In fact, as the Valencia tribunal was to find out
for itself, the presence of a doctrinal eccentricity within the tradi-
tion of a particular ecclesiastical institution would make the leaders
of that institution close ranks around any of their number who was
brought before the Holy Office for making statements consistent
with that tradition. On December 6, 1628, Fray Jeronimo Navarro,
a prominent Jeronimite preacher, was brought before the tribunal
after having been denounced by several of his fellow monks for
propositions that he had uttered during sermons in the chapel of
the Jeronimite monastery in Gandia where he resided. Among
these were the statements that when the church beheld Christ
beaten and disfigured after the passion, it neither recognized nor
wanted him for its savior and that the fathers of the Old Testament
had a faith that was "formless, irregular and unpleasing." A search
of Navarro's papers revealed another thirty-six propositions, many
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323
of which were qualified as heretical, which were drawn from the
writings of a number of different monks of the order, including a
very well-respected master of theology since deceased. As this
meant that "false doctrine" was fairly widespread at the monastery,
the Suprema intervened to toughen the provisions of the sentence
first handed down by the tribunal, and, in addition to forcing Fray
Jeronimo to retract his statements, he was not to be permitted to
preach without the permission of the inquisitor-general. 10 '
Punishment of a monk for maintaining theological ideas that
were widespread and accepted as orthodox within the Jeronimite
Order stirred up a hornet's nest of opposition among the superiors
of the order which was quickly felt by the monks who had de-
nounced Navarro before the tribunal. Testifying before the Inquisi-
tion was a violation of the rule passed on May 24, 1612, which
prevented any monk from going before the Inquisition to denounce
a fellow monk without the express permission of his superiors. 1 A
visitation to the Gandi'a monastery by officials of the order resulted
in charges being lodged against the monks who had testified against
Navarro, and they were all removed in disgrace to other monaster-
ies. As one of the monks commented in a letter to the Suprema
some years later, not only had his own once-flourishing career in
the order been ruined by his decision to testify before the Holy
Office but, in light of the punishment that he and the others had
received from his superiors, it was extremely unlikely that any
monks would be willing to come forward in the future. 109
Within the context of the reform of the church that was set in
motion at the Council of Trent, the Spanish Inquisition's attempts
to repress the worst excesses of erroneous doctrine were appropri-
ate and laudable. The profound dissensions within monasteries and
the animosities among the religious orders whose members domi-
nated Spanish education, however, meant that the Inquisition
came to be seen as the ideal instrument for destroying personal and
intellectual enemies and punishing those whose ideas appeared to
conflict with established orthodoxy. This, combined with book cen-
sorship, contributed to the decline of Spanish institutions of higher
education, which in their heyday during the middle years of the
sixteenth century had contributed so much to European intellec-
tual life. 110
It was the tension between reformers and conservatives in the
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Franciscan monastery of San Antonio of Mora, of which he was the
superior, which brought Fray Anselmo de Gracia to the tribunal on
November 22, 1680, to denounce himself for uttering a potentially
heretical proposition. Fray Anselmo admitted that during a mo-
ment of intense frustration he had declared in the hearing of sev-
eral monks who were most strongly opposed to the reform that if
some were given crowns in heaven for their travail on earth then he
would receive several. Evidently, Fray Anselmo was afraid that his
enemies in the monastery would denounce him and distort his
words to make them seem worse than they were and had come
before the Holy Office to forestall them. 111
The strong rivalries among the orders that were based in part on
differing theological traditions were highly productive of denuncia-
tions. In November 1698, for example, Augustinian Fray Ignacio
Soso was denounced by the Oratorian, Dr. Tomas Tosca, for certain
propositions that he was planning to defend publicly to gain the
degree of doctor of theology at the University of Valencia. The case
was eventually suspended after Soso testified that the propositions
that he intended to defend were considered orthodox within the
theological traditions of the Augustinian Order and offered to for-
mally submit himself to the authority of the Holy Office. Even so,
the fact that immediately on receiving this complaint the Inquisi-
tion imperiously ordered the suspension of proceedings at the uni-
versity was a chilling example of the power that it had assumed
over Spanish academic life. 112
In the struggle between the "novatores" and the supporters of
traditional scholasticism, the traditionalists had a powerful ally in
the Inquisition. The latter, except for a brief period during the
1520s and 1530s, had never been a friend of innovation, and by the
early seventeenth century with the publication of the restrictive
index of 1583-84, it had clearly ranged itself on the side of the
traditionalists. 113 The sure knowledge that he could count on the
Inquisition's support against his intellectual opponents is what
brought Dominican Fray Pedro Juan Imperial to the tribunal to
roundly denounce the antischolasticism of certain members of the
faculty of the University of Valencia which had been made espe-
cially obvious at an oral disputation that he had recently at-
tended. 114 It was pressure from reactionaries like Fray Pedro Juan
and the ever-present threat of intervention by the Holy Office that
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325
transformed the University of Valencia from the intellectually
avant-garde institution that it was during the early and middle
years of the sixteenth century to the bastion of intransigent scholas-
ticism that it became by the end of the seventeenth century. 115
So pervasive was the atmosphere of fear and conformity in intel-
lectual circles that by the end of the seventeenth century, Spain's
theologians had become their own inquisitors and denounced them-
selves whenever they suspected that they had made a statement of
doubtful orthodoxy. In June 1691, for example, Fray Silverio
Garceran, reader in philosophy at the monastery of La Merced in
Elche, came to denounce himself for certain propositions that he
had stated during an oral examination for the post of reader in
theology. 116 Some months later, a Carmelite, Fray Jose Marti, de-
nounced himself for what he felt might have been a heretical propo-
sition that he had uttered during a sermon.
In seminaries and monastic colleges, in universities and from the
pulpit, the intellectual leaders of early modern Spain were the
secular and regular clergy. The fact that more than 30 percent of
those brought before the Valencia tribunal on charges of uttering
heretical or dangerous propositions were clerics indicates that the
Inquisition was deeply committed to creating and maintaining the
impression among this influential body of men that safety and pre-
ferment lay in treading the well-worn path of orthodoxy, however
imprecise its definitions.
The centerpiece of the Council of Trent's definition of specifi-
cally Catholic doctrine was its clear statement of the centrality of
the sacraments in the practice of Christianity. 11 At the same time,
there was an uncomfortable awareness, fed by the personal experi-
ence of many who attended the council, that under present condi-
tions, the sacraments were being administered badly and without
proper reverence. 119
One of the most glaring examples of the irreverence that con-
cerned the fathers at Trent was solicitation, by which clerics ap-
peared to demonstrate their disdain for the sanctity of the sacra-
ment of penance by attempting to seduce their penitents while
hearing their confessions. 120 The opportunities for such illicit behav-
ior were considerable given the fact that the confessional, which
provided a physical separation between priest and penitent, did
not exist before the mid-sixteenth century and was probably not
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widely used in the Kingdom of Valencia until the late eighteenth or
early nineteenth century. An edict issued by the tribunal on Novem-
ber 3, 1781, complains of the disregard of many previous orders to
employ confessionals and speaks of confessions being heard in orato-
ries and private chapels in much the same terms as a similar decree
issued 156 years earlier by the Suprema. 121
Alarm over the discovery of proto-Protestant conventicles in Se-
ville and Valladolid in the late 1550s and the critical need to reas-
sert the validity of the sacrament of penance in the face of Protes-
tant rejection led to a growing concern over solicitation in reformist
circles. Since the episcopal courts were notorious for taking a le-
nient view of this offense, Pope Pius IV, in 1561, granted the Inqui-
sition jurisdiction over the heresy implied by such obvious abuse of
the sacrament. 122 By 1563, a letter from the Suprema recorded
approvingly that several tribunals already had cases pending, al-
though it was decided provisionally not to include the offense in the
Edict of Faith. 123 In 1622, Gregory XV widened the definition of
the offense to include what was said before and after confession,
even if it had only been a sham confession. 124
In spite of papal fulminations and the repeated denunciation of
solicitation by theologians and moralists, however, auricular confes-
sion presented many dangers and temptations for both priest and
penitent. The role of the confessor as spiritual and moral adviser
encouraged a certain intimacy, while the confessor's obligation to
ask searching questions about the sexual lives of his penitents pro-
vided him with the opportunity to bring his own sexual needs and
experiences into the discussion. Since the institution of celibacy
inevitably posed a series of grave psychological problems for many
priests, such topics could easily lead to the verbalizing or acting out
of sexual frustrations. 125
For some of the women who were victims of sexual solicitation,
the experience of a confessor breaking his sacred trust was pro-
foundly shocking. Mariana Llorens, a young woman from just out-
side Valencia city, was so upset by a series of improper questions
put to her by her confessor that she felt suffocated and had to run
out of the church without even receiving absolution. This incident
disturbed her so much that it caused intermittent bouts of depres-
sion that were only relieved after she testified about the incident
before a calificador of the Holy Office four years later. 126
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327
Certain women were more than willing to listen to the indecent
language and illicit proposals of their confessors, however. Marital
relationships that were inadequate emotionally and physically left
many women unfulfilled and eager for the attentions of the priests
they saw for confession. Such a relationship promised the fulfill-
ment of sexual and emotional needs while offering a greater degree
of safety from a jealous and brutal husband than would a relation-
ship with a male friend or neighbor. Maria Palomino, who enjoyed
a series of relationships with a number of her confessors over about
a ten-year period, had a husband who frequently beat her and
forced her to have anal sex. Needless to say, Maria came before the
Holy Office only because her new confessor had refused to absolve
her until she had done so.
One of the most remarkable aspects of the Inquisition's persecu-
tion of this offense was the extreme difficulty of obtaining enough
evidence to bring an accused to trial. The gradual acceptance, by
the end of the sixteenth century, of the requirement of two indepen-
dent witnesses to initiate prosecution created a significant obstacle
and allowed some individuals to continue their profligate careers
with virtual impunity. 128 Of course, there were many reasons
women might be reluctant to come forward to present their
charges. The parish priest was a powerful individual, especially on
a village level, and had many ways of revenging himself on those
who had testified against him if the courts did not remove him from
the scene. In the case of nuns, who were entirely subordinate to
male spiritual directors, sheer ignorance played an important role
in limiting the number of denunciations. In 1750, Dr. Domingo
Campillo, special commissioner for the investigation of charges that
had been brought against Padre Esteban Hespanique, found that
even though Hespanique had been pouring filthy words and sugges-
tions into their ears for four years, his penitents in the convent of
Santa Teresa of Teruel failed to denounce him because they were
unaware of the nature of the offense. Other women, like Maria
Palomino, who was tied to a brutal and unsatisfying marriage,
would have little reason to come forward unless forced to do so.
In the last analysis, it was the reputation of the individual in his
monastery or among his parishioners that determined his fate. Pa-
dre Hespanique's practices had simply become too widely known
in the convent to escape notice. In the case of Juan Bautista Catala,
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the rector of Yatova, the eight denunciations that had been re-
ceived against him before he came to denounce himself to the
tribunal in October 1763 were as much a product of the village's
rejection of him as their priest as with his illicit sexual activity. The
evidence even suggests that his activities during and after confes-
sion were regarded with a certain tolerance until he had alienated
enough people in the community by the way he performed his
office to leave himself defenseless. Witnesses described his fre-
quent absences from his church, slipshod celebration of mass, and
misuse of funds earmarked for masses for the dead. At one point,
he was even said to have cut the communion loaf in pieces at the
altar in full view of the congregation. In another instance, he sim-
ply went too far with his sexual activity. Catala's friendship with
Miguel Lisarde remained close in spite of the fact that he had
engaged in sexual foreplay with his 21 -year-old daughter during
and after confession, made off-color remarks to her in public, and
"spent many nights" with her in the rectory. Their relationship was
destroyed when Catala's lust for Antonia Lisarde became so great
that he got her to promise that she would marry the brother of one
of his servants. This agreement, which would have allowed Catala
to enjoy her sexual favors while her complaisant husband looked
the other way, was contested by Miguel Lisarde, who went to court
and got a judgment freeing his daughter from this unwanted entan-
glement. As a result, Catala no longer visited the Lisarde house-
hold as he had frequently done before the lawsuit, and Antonia
Lisarde no longer came to confession with him and later denounced
him for solicitation. 130
A sociological analysis of solicitantes coming before the Valencia
tribunal reveals a considerable preponderance of the regular clergy
over the seculars, with the former accounting for 67.5 percent of
the accused. Furthermore, among the regulares, the various orders
of Franciscans accounted for fully 46.8 percent of the cases as op-
posed to only 6.3 percent for the Dominicans and 3.9 percent for
the Jesuits. The age profile indicates a heavy concentration of so-
licitantes (76.3%) among ages 31 to 50, when the discipline of
seminary or monastic college was over and priests and monks ac-
quired the greater freedom of movement that came with taking
charge of a rectory or preaching and confessing at several locations.
As far as punishment was concerned, since there was no actual
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329
suspicion of heresy involved in any of these cases, all accused were
sentenced to abjuration de levi. The graver corporal penalties such
as relaxation or galley service or scourging were entirely omitted
(although some monks were "disciplined" with a whip when they
arrived at the monastery chosen for their reclusion). For the regu-
lars, there was reclusion in a monastery selected by the tribunal,
deprivation of the right to confess, and sometimes deprivation of
other sacramental functions. For the seculars, there was reclusion,
deprivation of benefice, fines, disciplines, spiritual exercises, and
suspension from confessing and other spiritual functions. 131
Although Lea asserts that "the penalties inflicted were singularly
disproportionate to the gravity of the offense, " it should be borne in
mind that these were grave penalties to inflict on a priest or monk
as they involved disgrace, loss of benefice or career, and long peri-
ods of exile. 132
During the last and longest phase of its history, roughly from
1560 to 1820, the Spanish Inquisition joined the official church and
the baroque state in a gigantic effort to remodel popular culture
and the priesthood along the lines demanded by the Tridentine
reformers. But if the repression of such offenses as blasphemy and
propositions served to enforce respect for the sacred and helped rid
pulpits and classrooms of unsound theology, it also had the effect of
promoting a stultifying conformity that robbed both popular and
elite culture of their creative spontaneity. Punishment of bigamy
and solicitation may have helped to promote public respect for the
sacraments of holy matrimony and penance but did nothing to
resolve their root causes. By the late seventeenth century, even its
once-innovative position on witchcraft accusations was beginning to
appear less novel as other European judicial institutions ended or
significantly reduced witchcraft trials. Like most of the other institu-
tions of Hapsburg Spain, the Inquisition had become profoundly
conservative, willingly sacrificing genuine reform to stability and
demanding explicit acceptance of a set of obsolete intellectual con-
cepts and moral standards.
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Decline and Abolition of the
Holy Office in Valencia
On December 16, 1705, the city of Valencia was occupied by a
small force of Allied soldiers under the command of Juan Bautista
Basset y Ramos. Shortly after the Allies entered the city, most of
the nobility and royal officials fled the kingdom for the safety of
Bourbon-controlled Castile. 1 The most conspicuous exception to
this mass exodus of Valencia's traditional governing classes was her
two senior inquisitors, Juan de la Torre y Guerau and Isidro de
Balmaseda. Remaining at their posts throughout the Allied occupa-
tion, the inquisitors not only succeeded in maintaining order
within the city but were also able to keep Bourbon military and
political leaders supplied with a steady stream of intelligence. 2
When the disastrous battle of Almansa on April 25, 1707, led to
the withdrawal of Allied forces, the city was once again left de-
fenseless, and the arrival of a messenger from the advancing Bour-
bon army on May 6 led to an outbreak of rioting during which a
mob stormed the city hall and arms were distributed to the peo-
ple. At this critical moment, the tribunal, led by its indefatigable
chief, Isidro de Balmaseda, stepped into the breach. After hiding
the terrified jurats in the palace of the Inquisition where they
would be safe from the mob, Balmaseda ordered the religious
communities to organize processions to pray for the city's deliver-
ance while sending his officials to make contact with the heads of
the craft guilds and others with influence over the popular masses
to quell the rioting. After a message from the Bourbon com-
330
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Decline and Abolition of the Holy Office in Valencia
33i
mander assuring the city that it would not be put to the sack if it
surrendered was received by the auxiliary bishop, Balmaseda felt
free to allow the jurats to leave the palace so that they could
officially welcome the royalist forces, while sending several offi-
cials of the Inquisition to convince the archduke's remaining sup-
porters to lay down their arms. These delicate negotiations suc-
cessfully concluded, the city surrendered without a struggle to the
due d'Orleans. 3
In what may have been its finest hour, the tribunal had saved the
city from all the horrors and cruelty of war to which a useless
resistance would have exposed it. 4 Furthermore, during the long
months of occupation, it had emerged as the leading element of the
city's political elite, protecting and defending its weaker members
against the popular masses. Its prestige had never stood higher,
and in a marginal note scrawled on the tribunal's final report,
Inquisitor-General Vidal Marin ordered the Suprema to write the
tribunal to congratulate it for the exemplary manner in which it
"had conducted itself during that critical period." 5
After the city had surrendered, the inquisitors gave further proof
of their unqualified loyalty to the Bourbons by prosecuting those
who had collaborated with the Allied government or had shown any
sympathy for the Allied cause. This prosecution was carried on in
two ways: by virtue of the Suprema's edict of October 9, 1706,
which ordered penitents who had been urged to disobey Philip V
to denounce their confessors to the Holy Office, and by using the
tribunal against any Allied loyalist who could be shown to have
committed an offense that fell under inquisitorial jurisdiction. 6
In summer 1707, Balmaseda pressed charges against the abbot
and monks of the Cistercian monastery of Poblet and ordered the
arrest of Fray Mario Andreu, the monastery's administrator for the
villages of Quart and Aldaya who had been instrumental in keeping
them loyal to Archduke Charles. 7 At the same time, the tribunal
ordered the arrest of Fray Peregrin Gueralt of the Servite order
who had carried intelligence to the archduke's forces. 8 As a mem-
ber of the special tribunal that was established to punish those who
had served the archduke, Inquisitor Balmaseda also came into con-
flict with the archbishop and his officials who had made no secret of
their sympathy for the Allied cause even after the recovery of the
city by the Bourbons. After a confrontation with the vicar-general
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Decline and Abolition of the Holy Office in Valencia
over his treasonous correspondence with Allied generals, Balma-
seda was very nearly placed under ban of excommunication. 9
The Valencia tribunal's outstanding record of loyalty to the Bour-
bon cause in an otherwise "rebel" province did not go unrewarded.
Sometime in early June 1708, the crown granted the tribunal 3,400
lliures in revenues to be drawn from the village of Alaquas. Evi-
dently, the inquisitors must have enjoyed excellent relations with
Melchor de Macanaz, the chief Castilian minister in the conquered
province, as he moved quickly to make the revenues available to
them and earned their praise for his demonstration of "courtesy and
affection" for the Holy Office. 10 Ironically, the same inquisitorial
tribunal that Macanaz had so willingly assisted in the days of his
glory also benefited from his disgrace. After the publication of a
papal decree condemning as heretical the strong memorial of royal
perquisites that he had drawn up for the Council of Castile in
December 1713, he was banished to France. Tried in absentia by
the Holy Office, he was sentenced to perpetual exile and the loss of
all of his property. 11 Among the dividends that came to the Inquisi-
tion's treasury as a result of this case were more than 9,300 lliures
that the Valencia tribunal received between 1716 and 1723 from
property that had been awarded to Macanaz by the crown during
his sojourn in the kingdom. 12
Buoyed by the firm support of Philip V (1701-1746), the Spanish
Inquisition in general, including the Valencia tribunal, made a sig-
nificant political and financial recovery during the first decades of
the eighteenth century. In Valencia, overall activity increased dra-
matically to 1,323 cases between 1701 and 1750, as opposed to the
451 recorded between 1651 and 1700. This increase was especially
impressive if we compare it to the activity recorded during the
slack years of the majority of Charles II (from 1675), when the
tribunal only logged 113 cases.
The tribunal's excellent relationship with the crown during this
period is demonstrated by the employment of its inquisitors in a
variety of special assignments. In 1746, for example, Inquisitor Fran-
cisco Antonio Espinosa was given the responsibility for carrying out
a visitation to Corpus Christi seminary, of which King Philip V was
founder and patron. 13 Several years later, Inquisitor Fernando de
Urbino was selected by the crown to carry out a visitation to the
troubled Cistercian monastery of Valldigna. 14
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Decline and Abolition of the Holy Office in Valencia
333
The tribunal's financial condition, which had already deterio-
rated during the last years of the reign of Charles II, continued to
worsen during the War of Succession as a result of the Allied occu-
pation and the devastation caused by the Bourbon reconquest. 15 In
February 1706, the tribunal wrote the Suprema to comment that it
had been unable to collect most of its revenues for that year be-
cause of the "ruinous" condition of the local economy. 16
As the 1706 letter clearly indicated, the tribunal's financial condi-
tion depended absolutely on the general condition of the economy
and particularly on the agricultural sector. The restoration of peace
and stability under the Bourbons led to a period of significant eco-
nomic recovery beginning in about 1713. Between 1713 and 1787,
the population of the kingdom virtually doubled to about 770,000,
and, as a consequence of this increased population pressure, much
new land was put under cultivation. Overall agricultural output in-
creased significantly, while productivity was improved through a
large number of private irrigation projects. Peasant incomes in-
creased as a result of the spread of rice cultivation (in spite of official
opposition) and the increasing use of rural labor by Valencian silk
producers, and the production of raw silk more than doubled be-
tween 1740 and 1770. ll
The impact of these trends on the rural rents — on which the
fortunes of the Valencia tribunal depended — could not have been
more positive, with 300 to 400 percent increases in the tithe in
virtually all areas. 18 As a result, the tribunal's financial condition
improved dramatically, with overall revenues almost tripling be-
tween 1727 and 1797. Increases were particularly dramatic in
income sectors sensitive to improvement in agricultural rent, espe-
cially the tithe-driven income from canonries which increased
more than fourfold, and rural mortgages in which the tribunal
actually began making additional investments from the mid-
17205. 19 By the 1780s, the tribunal's obvious prosperity had em-
boldened several minor officials to petition the Suprema for an
increase in their salaries. 20
The Inquisition even expanded its jurisdiction after the publica-
tion of the bull In eminenti, which condemned Freemasonry in
Spain on October 11, 1738. 21 In 1748, Masonry was added to an
Edict of Faith for the first time and was included in edicts on a
regular basis from 1755. 22 From 1738 to the outbreak of the French
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Decline and Abolition of the Holy Office in Valencia
Revolution, the Spanish Inquisition, with strong encouragement
from the crown, kept up a desultory pursuit of masons, who were
primarily foreigners or Spanish military officers who had been initi-
ated into the Masonic order during sojourns in foreign countries.
To the Valencia tribunal belongs the unique distinction of having
received a denunciation for Masonry against Sor Maria de Santa
Escolastica, a French Ursuline living in Sagunto and the only nun
ever accused of that offense. 23
In spite of the Valencia tribunal's fervent loyalty and a general
recovery in the prestige of the Holy Office under the leadership of
Inquisitor-General Juan de Camargo (1720-1733), however, the
general trend of Bourbon policy was to emphasize royal perquisites
(regalias) and reduce the power and independence of the Holy
Office. Melchor de Macanaz's reform proposal, which was pre-
sented to the Council of Castile on November 3, 1714, went far
beyond the Junta Magna report of 1696 in advocating the conver-
sion of the Inquisition into a purely ecclesiastical tribunal and re-
stricting its censorship function by preventing it from prohibiting
any books without first submitting the case to the crown for a final
decision. 24 While some of the more daring elements in this pro-
posal were never put into effect (subordination of the Suprema to a
royal secretary or direct royal nomination of calificadores), it did
serve as the basis for royal policy toward the Holy Office during
much of the eighteenth century.
At the consulta of February 28, 1769, the fiscales of the Council
of Castile asserted that the crown had complete authority over the
Inquisition, including the right to "direct it, limit it and even sup-
press it." 25 The royal cedula of February 5, 1770, significantly weak-
ened the Inquisition's claim (never fully validated) to exclusive
cognizance of bigamy cases by formally dividing such cases among
royal courts, ecclesiastical tribunals, and the Holy Office. 26 At the
same time, the Inquisition lost jurisdiction over blasphemy and
sodomy, which went entirely to the ordinary courts. In 1784, more-
over, the Holy Office was prohibited from arresting any royal offi-
cial, titled noble, or military officer without first submitting the
particulars of the case to the crown. 27
Even more significant and far-reaching in reducing the indepen-
dence and freedom of action of the Holy Office was the royal cedula
of June 16, 1768, whose provisions were clearly inspired by the
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Decline and Abolition of the Holy Office in Valencia
335
Macanaz memorial of the early part of the century. In the future,
according to the cedula, the Holy Office was to see that "Catholic
authors" were given a chance to defend their works before they
could be condemned, while inquisitorial edicts of prohibition were
not to be published before being presented to the king for approval
through the appropriate secretaries of the Council of Justice or
Council of State. Moreover, in a clause that would have gladdened
the heart of the old fiscal had he been alive to read it, the Spanish
Inquisition was prohibited from publishing any papal bull without
first obtaining permission from the Council of State. 28
Late in the century, the Valencia tribunal experienced for itself
the Bourbon regime's willingness to intervene directly in inquisito-
rial trials even after they had been decided. In May 1790, Fray
Agustm de Cabades, a 51-year-old Mercedarian who had made a
distinguished career for himself as a professor at the university and
also served as a calificador of the Holy Office, was convicted of
solicitation. The accusation against Cabades was based on repeated
offenses with both male and female penitents going back twenty
years as well as on several spontaneous but incomplete and menda-
cious confessions. He had also blatantly abused his position with
the Holy Office by assuring one of his victims that she had fully
carried out her new confessor's requirement that she recount her
experiences with him to the Holy Office by reporting it to him
since he himself was "a part of the tribunal." Confronted by such
overwhelming evidence, the tribunal sentenced Cabades to abjure
in the chambers of the Holy Office before the twenty oldest monks
of his monastery, suspended him from his office as calificador, and
exiled him for eight years from the royal court and the city of
Valencia, with the first four years to be spent in reclusion in the
monastery of Jativa.
Even though the Valencia tribunal's sentence appears to have
been fully justified, Cabades's intellectual attainments, especially
his knowledge of foreign languages (English, French, Italian), made
him an exceptional individual. As a result, instead of reclusion in
Jativa, Cabades was permitted to travel to El Escorial on the express
order of royal first secretary Floridablanca to consult with the govern-
ment about its ambitious educational reform program. In Septem-
ber 1790, Cabades was given special permission to return to Valencia
by Inquisitor-General Agustm Rubin de Cevallos and was permitted
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Decline and Abolition of the Holy Office in Valencia
to take up his chair of theology at the University of Valencia with his
sentence of reclusion and exile entirely removed. 29
The timidity and subservience with which the Suprema and suc-
cessive inquisitors-general reacted in the face of pressure from the
Council of Castile and its aggressive prosecuting attorneys were
communicated to the provincial inquisitors through royal ordi-
nances that had the effect of greatly inhibiting their response to
denunciations. In 1746, Ferdinand VI replied to a request for finan-
cial assistance from the Suprema by rather contemptuously suggest-
ing that costs could best be controlled by not making every "willful
slander" an excuse for undertaking a formal investigation and that
even when a denunciation was signed by a known individual, a judge
did not have to be dispatched to investigate each case but that some
less expensive way ought to be found. 30 On January 1 of the following
year, another royal pronouncement was issued which declared that
before inquisitorial tribunals undertook to follow up on charges con-
tained in a denunciation, they would have to make a preliminary
investigation to determine the veracity of the charges. 31
That the crown's lukewarm support for the judicial activity of the
Holy Office succeeded in inducing an attitude of extreme caution
among Valencia's inquisitors and their agents can be seen from
several cases involving perfectly ordinary citizens. In late spring
1746, for example, Dr. Diego Forner, the commissioner of Beni-
carlo, received four separate denunciations against Patricio White
for heretical propositions. In previous years, a commissioner would
have immediately called in witnesses and carried out his own pre-
liminary investigation. That this was expected is indicated by the
sharp rebuke he received from Valencia's inquisitor, Dr. Manuel
Xaramillo de Contreras, for his slowness in doing so. The letter
from Xaramillo de Contreras was followed by another from the
tribunal's prosecuting attorney ordering Forner to carry out an
investigation so as to make sure the witnesses were not acting out of
personal animosity toward White. Several months later, White,
who had probably gotten wind of the investigation, came to see the
commissioner, confessed, and was duly reconciled. There the case
rested until the following year, when another denunciation for the
same offense reached the tribunal. This time it took until July 11,
1766, for the tribunal to respond by ordering a new investigation.
Finally, more than twenty-one years after the original denuncia-
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Decline and Abolition of the Holy Office in Valencia
337
tion, White was called to the tribunal not to be arrested and placed
in the dreaded secret prison but simply for an audiencia de cargos,
where the accused was presented with a summary of the charges
against him and invited to reply instead of being subjected to the
ignominy of arrest and trial. Four days after White presented him-
self in Valencia, he was notified of the evidence against him. In
response, he promised to behave better in the future and was
released. 32
Another inevitable result of the atmosphere in which the tribu-
nals were forced to operate during the eighteenth century was the
suspension of cases even when the evidence against the accused
was all but overwhelming. A good example of this was the case of
Salvadora Cabrera, who was accused by more than 50 witnesses of a
variety of offenses including blasphemy, irreverence toward holy
images, and superstition. In spite of the conclusive evidence
against her, the tribunal chose to suspend proceedings even after
the Suprema had written to specifically approve any action it might
have wished to take. 33
Quite apart from the negative atmosphere created by royal legis-
lation, the tribunal's wavering and unwillingness to follow through
on denunciations and actually punish offenders is hardly surprising
given the timorous attitude displayed by the Suprema in even the
most ordinary cases. Salvadora Cabrera, a poor woman with few
friends, would hardly seem like the sort of subject whose honor and
reputation would stir very much concern within exalted govern-
ment circles. In spite of this, the Suprema operated with an ex-
treme, even absurd, degree of caution. After the initial suspension
of her case in November 1773, the tribunal had set various of its
minions to report on her activities. Since these reports indicated
continual blasphemies as well as such superstitious practices as
predicting the future and pretending to work miracles, the prose-
cuting attorney demanded her arrest. Given the by now over-
whelming evidence, the fiscal won his point, and the tribunal or-
dered her detention subject to obtaining permission from the
Suprema. After receiving a summary of the case from the tribunal,
the Suprema decided, inexplicably, to submit the evidence to the
calificadores of the Corte tribunal (Madrid) for their opinion. It was
only after their judgment (which merely confirmed what had al-
ready been determined by the tribunal) had been received that the
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Decline and Abolition of the Holy Office in Valencia
Suprema dictated a sentence of a reprimand and two years of exile
from Valencia city, Mislata, and Manranara. 34 The extreme punctil-
iousness displayed by the Suprema in the case of a poor and friend-
less individual — an ideal victim — is striking to the observer with
some knowledge of the early history of the Spanish Inquisition. It is
highly unlikely that the high conviction rates and harsh sentences
of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries would have been achieved
with such an attitude. Centralization, which had now progressed to
the point that the Suprema was intervening in every phase of a
provincial tribunal's proceedings, must have undermined the self-
confidence of provincial inquisitors, making them extremely chary
of displeasing their masters in Madrid by taking any action that was
not approved in advance. For its part, the Suprema was well aware
that unusual displays of activity by provincial tribunals would be
poorly received at court and consequently was always on the side of
caution. As a result, during the last half of the eighteenth century,
the Valencia tribunal continued receiving denunciations, carrying
out investigations, and initiating prosecutions but with few con-
crete results.
If fears of the Suprema's disapproval had a chilling effect on a
provincial tribunal's operations against religious and moral offend-
ers, the Suprema's lack of support in disputes with royal courts over
its civil and criminal jurisdiction continued to have a negative impact
on its ability to protect it from decay. Perhaps the most glaring
example of the Suprema's lack of support for the Valencia tribunal's
civil jurisdiction concerned the Colegio de Villena, which had been
established in 1637 by a former physician to the Holy Office. 35 When
he founded the college, Dr. Villena received permission from the
Suprema to place it under the official protection of the inquisitors of
the Valencia tribunal who would exercise full jurisdiction over the
legal enforcement of all aspects of its constitution. In July 1739, a
dispute arose over the awarding of a college scholarship, and the
unsuccessful candidate appealed to the civil chamber of the
Audiencia, which intervened to prevent the college rector from
conferring the scholarship. The successful candidate, who happened
to be a descendant of the founder, then appealed to the tribunal's
civil chamber, and the battle was joined when the Audiencia subpoe-
naed the records in the case and demanded that the notary in charge
of the Inquisition's civil court appear before it to testify. Of course,
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Decline and Abolition of the Holy Office in Valencia
339
Valencia's inquisitors refused to allow this on the grounds that the
Audiencia had no jurisdiction in the case since the Inquisition had
always exercised control over all aspects of the college through its
civil court. When the Suprema was notified about the tribunal's
strong stand, however, it responded by urging the tribunal to drop
the matter entirely. From the Suprema's point of view, even this
humiliating form of self-effacement was preferable to challenging
the Audiencia. In fact, the Suprema even suggested that if this
matter could not be settled quietly, the tribunal should give up its
patronage entirely so as to avoid possible censure. 36
Even though Valencia's inquisitors were proud of their role as
patrons of the Colegio de Villena, it was the maintenance of the
tribunal's civil and criminal jurisdiction over the members of the
"corporation" of officials and familiares that was vital to the tribu-
nal's future as a political and social force in the kingdom. The
changed atmosphere at court, however, made it almost impossible
for the Suprema to effectively support the local tribunals in dis-
putes over the fuero.
Early in the reign of Philip V, the Suprema made its position on
these disputes perfectly clear in a carta acordada dispatched to the
provincial tribunals. According to this letter, the widespread belief
that the Inquisition was abusing its privileges stemmed entirely
from the overhasty defense of officials by the provincial tribunals
even in dubious cases. Instead of an aggressive defense of official
privilege, tribunals were enjoined to settle disputes with the royal
courts in a friendly manner, and unless there was a clear-cut case in
favor of the Holy Office, local tribunals were advised to make no
move without first consulting the Suprema. ' In another carta
acordada issued on December 22, 1747, Inquisitor-General Perez
de Prado further curtailed provincial tribunals' freedom of action in
jurisdictional disputes with the royal courts and removed their
most effective weapon by prohibiting the use of ecclesiastical cen-
sures in such cases. 38
As we have already seen in the case of the Colegio de Villena,
even when the Inquisition's jurisdiction was well established, local
tribunals could not count on support from the Suprema, so that it is
hardly surprising that the eighteenth century saw the gradual disap-
pearance of official tax exemptions and personal privileges. Perhaps
the most valuable of all the privileges enjoyed by officials of the
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Decline and Abolition of the Holy Office in Valencia
inquisitorial court was the freedom from paying royal taxes. As we
have seen above, this privilege was violated during the crisis years
of the reign of Philip IV, but it was later restored after the fall of the
count duke of Olivares. During the eighteenth century, however,
all the inquisitorial tribunals gradually lost this exemption, with the
Valencia tribunal's turn coming in 1743. 39
The same process of attrition affected exemptions from local
taxation enjoyed by familiares in different parts of the district. In
1752, for example, the Valencia tribunal received a complaint from
the familiares of Teruel to the effect that their long-standing exemp-
tion from local taxation had now been broken and that they paid
taxes like any other members of the nonprivileged orders. 40 Simi-
larly, a letter to the Suprema from the three secretaries of the
tribunal in 1785 records their loss of exemptions from sales and
property taxes levied by the city of Valencia. 41
The Valencia tribunal found out for itself just how far the
Suprema was prepared to go in enforcing the new prohibition on
the use of ecclesiastical censures when it sought to employ them to
defend the right of Gaspar Morate, a familiar of Jativa, to refuse to
serve on the village council. Such exemptions from municipal ser-
vice had been customarily granted to familiares in certain places
including Jativa, but this time, the town fathers defied the tribunal
and refused to allow Morate to withdraw his name. Frustrated in its
effort to negotiate with the town authorities, the tribunal requested
permission to employ ecclesiastical censures, but its request was
denied. The tribunal's defeat on this occasion sounded the death
knell of yet another privilege that had been enjoyed by Valencia's
familiares. 42
The privilege that appeared to have best stood the test of time
was the exemption from quartering of royal troops and officials.
Customarily, familiares were classed with caballeros and hidalgos in
the matter of quartering so that troops would be lodged with them
only as a last resort after the homes of the nonprivileged had all
been filled. Along with this important privilege came the equally
valuable one of exemption from the special (and frequently heavy)
charges levied on towns along the route of a marching regiment to
pay the costs of transporting its supplies and equipment. During
the War of Succession, of course, the frequent passage of large
bodies of soldiers through the impoverished kingdom made it im-
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Decline and Abolition of the Holy Office in Valencia
341
possible for the exemption to be observed, and a memorial to the
tribunal from the association of familiares written just after the
conclusion of the war tells of many violations by hard-pressed quar-
tering officers. 43 In August 1729, the familiares' rights suffered
another setback when the government of Philip V declared flatly
that familiares were not to be exempt from quartering royal troops
and contributing to their transportation expenses. In obedience to
this order, the Suprema ordered the tribunal to suspend the legal
proceedings it had initiated against Jativa, San Mateo, and several
other towns for violating the familiares' exemption. 44
The privilege seemed dead, but the relative calm of the reign of
Charles III led to a revival. In 1760, we are informed that the ranks
of the familiares of Jativa were always filled because they enjoyed
an exemption from quartering and from the transportation levy.
In Castellon de la Plana, familiares had been placed in an intermedi-
ate category, ahead of ordinary pecheros but not quite in the same
class as hidalgos or employees of the royal salt monopoly. In 1781,
however, the captain-general himself intervened with the city coun-
cil in support of the tribunal's contention that the familiares should
be classed with the nobles and hidalgos of the town with regard to
quartering his majesty's soldiers.
The 1780s were a relatively tranquil period for Spain, but the
outbreak of war with the French Republic in 1793 meant that large
bodies of troops would be moving toward the Spanish border. The
familiares' quartering exemption once again came under heavy pres-
sure, and it is highly likely that an 1806 circular issued by the
governor-general of Catalonia to the village of Ulldecona and other
towns in the Catalan part of the inquisitorial district sounded the
death knell of the familiares' last privilege. In this document, the
captain-general declared categorically that familiares were no longer
exempt from providing lodgings for soldiers passing through the
territory or from contributing to their expenses. That the tribunal
was now prepared to abandon the long struggle to maintain the
exemption from quartering is shown by the fact that it immediately
wrote to the familiares of the towns mentioned in the order telling
them to obey it. 46
It is to be expected that the gradual but inexorable loss of the
privileges and exemptions formerly enjoyed by officials and famil-
iares led to a decline in the number of persons applying for official
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Decline and Abolition of the Holy Office in Valencia
positions. This certainly happened in some tribunals, with the In-
quisition of Barcelona complaining of difficulties in filling official
posts as early as 1719. 47 That this gloomy picture was not the gen-
eral rule can be seen from the case of the Valencia tribunal, in
which, in spite of the loss of official privilege and the stagnation in
official salaries, vacancies continued to attract numerous excellent
candidates and in which the network of familiares diminished but
remained viable and important throughout the century.
Certainly, the conservatism of Valencian society made family
traditions of service to the Holy Office a powerful incentive for
individuals to apply for official positions. The note of family tradi-
tion was sounded very strongly by all parties during the struggle to
succeed Manuel Fernandez de Marmanillo as alguacil mayor in
1788. The candidates were Antonio Maria Adell y de Bie and Anto-
nio Esplugues de Palavecino y Gamir. The former was a cavalier
and the eldest son of the baron of Choza, whose family had held
official positions with the tribunal since 1583 when his ancestor,
Benito Sanguino, came from Castile to assume the post of receiver.
Moreover, the family had been in continuous possession of the
office of alguacil mayor from 1586 when Benito Sanguino assumed
it until 1787 when Fernandez de Marmanillo took it over. In letters
to the tribunal, both Antonio Maria and his father stressed the
importance of family tradition with the baron, who had himself
been a candidate for the position in previous years, assuring
Inquisitor-General Rubin de Cevellos of the great honor it would
be for his son to maintain the house of Sanguino's traditions of
service to the Holy Office. 48
The other candidate, Antonio Esplugues de Palavecino y Gamir,
is an example of the way in which the Valencia tribunal could still
attract new blood into official ranks during the eighteenth century.
He came from an old family of Genoese nobles whose ancestor,
Ambrosio Palavecino, had fled the Turkish invasion of one of the
Genoese-held islands in the Mediterranean (where his father was
governor) and settled in Valencia. The family's service to the tribu-
nal began with Antonio's great-grandfather, Jose Palavecino y
Esplugues, who became secretary in 1705. His son, Joaquin
Palavecino, succeeded him in 1733 and in 1757 was appointed
alguacil mayor to serve during the rather frequent absences and
illnesses of the incumbent Marmanillo. In his memorial, Antonio
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Decline and Abolition of the Holy Office in Valencia
343
Esplugues de Palavecino also stressed his desire to carry on his
family's traditions of service to the Holy Office as well as his own
urge to "affirm still more his loyalty and reverence for this tribunal
of our holy faith." 49
For men like these, who were both independently wealthy, the
inadequate salaries and bonuses that came with official rank were of
little importance. Over the years, a close relationship to the Holy
Office had helped both families achieve an enviable reputation for
purity of blood and loyalty to the Catholic faith, and both continued
to regard occupation of an official post as a valuable symbol of their
position in Valencian society.
Recruitment to the familiatura is also a useful indication of the
tribunal's ability to attract worthy candidates to apply for official
status in the eighteenth century in spite of the declining impor-
tance of special privileges and exemptions. Given the increasing
endogamy that characterized the Spanish ruling elite at all levels
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it is to be ex-
pected that the majority of Valencia's eighteenth-century familiares
would be drawn from the ranks of those with strong family tradi-
tions of service to the Holy Office. Such candidates included Joa-
quin Albuixech, a ciutada of Almusafes with some 6,000 lliures
annual income who was able to present a total of seven actos
positivos and whose father and uncle were then serving as famil-
iares of the village. 50
At the same time as it could retain the interest of families long
associated with the Holy Office, the tribunal also demonstrated an
impressive capacity to attract new blood. More than 37 percent of
my sample of those applying to enter the corps of familiares during
the century were from families who had never held any sort of
official rank. Included in this group of "new" families were solid
labradores like Agustfn Barrachina from Benimamet, who was de-
scribed by one witness as possessing the best land in the village. 51
For families such as these, like their predecessors of the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, membership in the corps of familiares
with its obvious connotations of purity of blood and fervent Catholi-
cism was the first rung in the ladder of social advancement in a
status-conscious society.
Even French merchants who in general were notorious for ignor-
ing the censorship laws and had a reputation for holding advanced
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Decline and Abolition of the Holy Office in Valencia
ideas were not at all averse to seeking membership in the corps of
familiares. Witnesses during the genealogical investigation of Pe-
dro Juan Barber, who applied in 1732, included three familiares, all
of whom were French merchants long resident in the kingdom.
One of these men, Enrique Platet, a familiar in Sagunto who had
immigrated from Lyon, was succeeded by his nephew, Juan Ber-
chere, after his death in 1773. 52
Interestingly, especially in light of the Spanish Inquisition's repu-
tation as the enemy of all forms of enlightenment, the Valencia
tribunal had litte trouble recruiting individuals who were closely
connected with or openly allied to the most advanced intellectual
circles of the period. Juan Bautista Esplugues de Palavecino, for
example, who was secretary of the Valencian society of Amigos del
Pais, which had been founded by the Count of Floridablanca in
1777, saw nothing amiss in encouraging his son Antonio to apply for
53
the position of alguacil mayor in 1788.
Even more indicative of the tribunal's ability to attract distin-
guished members of Valencia's intellectual elite were the candi-
dates who presented themselves for the position of physician to the
Holy Office in 1796. Among the candidates were two distinguished
professors of medicine at the University of Valencia, Pedro Barra-
cina and Joaquin Lambart. Dr. Barracina had been a leading partici-
pant in the reform of the medical curriculum at the university and
could boast of holding the first chair of practical medicine in
Spain. 54 Dr. Joaquin Lambart, who was eventually selected for the
post, had an even more brilliant career and was one of the leaders
of the upsurge in modern anatomical studies that made the Univer-
sity of Valencia into the leading Spanish medical school of the late
eighteenth century. It was precisely because of his superior knowl-
edge of modern anatomy that the three Valencian inquisitors unani-
mously favored him for the position. 55
Finally, two of Valencia's most distinguished intellectual leaders
were Holy Office officials. Francisco Javier Borrull, who was profes-
sor at the University of Valencia between 1774 and 1779, and Joa-
quin Lorenzo Villanueva served as commissioner and calificador of
the Valencia tribunal, respectively, and were both closely con-
nected with the brilliant circle that surrounded Perez Bayer, the
future director of the royal library, and Gregorio Mayans y Siscar,
scion of a family long associated with the Holy Office. 56 Both of
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Decline and Abolition of the Holy Office in Valencia
345
these men were elected as delegates to the Cortes of Cadiz where
they took opposite positions on the question of abolishing the Holy
Office. Borrull emerged as one of its strongest defenders and explic-
itly denied that the Cortes had the power to abolish it. 57 For his
part, Villanueva, who had once defended the Inquisition in his
famous reply to Bishop Gregoire, became one of its strongest oppo-
nents at the Cortes, where he insisted on the incompatibility of its
procedures with the rights guaranteed under the new constitution
and demanded that bishops be allowed to reassume their jurisdic-
tion over crimes against religion. 58
Regardless of the stand they later took on the abolition of the
Holy Office, the fact that the Valencia tribunal could attract such
outstanding members of what might be called the "modernizing"
sector of the intellectual elite, such as Villanueva or Lambart, is an
indication that it was not regarded as an implacable enemy of all
intellectual change. In fact, the judges of Valencia's inquisitorial
tribunal, like several eighteenth-century inquisitors-general and
members of the Suprema, were ambivalent about the advent of
liberalism. 59 On the one hand, the tribunal ordered the arrest of
one Juan Gonzalez, a cavalry captain who had been overheard
denouncing priests and monks for fattening themselves at the ex-
60
pense of the poor. On the other, the tribunal took no action after
Andres Piquer, the famous anatomist and theoretician, publicly
rejected the idea that angels could transport bodies through the air.
It also tolerated the rather daring intellectual career of Gregorio
Mayans y Siscar, whose private library contained many prohibited
books including Cipriano de Valera's Castilian Bible and works by
Voltaire and Puffendorf. 61 The fact that Mayans y Siscar could flout
the censorship laws with impunity, take a strong public stance
against the excessive privileges of the clergy, and even criticize the
Holy Office itself without suffering anything more than the tempo-
rary loss of his license to read prohibited books must be attributed
to the fact that many late-eighteenth-century inquisitors were toler-
ant of some limited forms of enlightenment. 62
The young inquisitor, Andres Ignacio Orbe, for example, was
one of Mayans y Siscar's disciples and regularly corresponded with
him during the period in which he strongly criticized the Inquisi-
tion for placing the works of Cardinal Henry Noris on the Spanish
Index. Instead of denouncing him, the inquisitor made it clear that
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Decline and Abolition of the Holy Office in Valencia
he supported his position and criticized Inquisitor-General Perez
de Prado for his role in the Noris affair. 63 Certainly, Agustfn de
Argtielles, one of the leading liberals at the Cortes of Cadiz and a
strong supporter of the move to abolish the Holy Office, had kind
words for the inquisitors of his day, whom he described as "just,
enlightened and beneficent." 64
That eighteenth-century intellectual life in Valencia developed
within the context of a quasi-tolerant Holy Office was demonstrated
by the fact that the leading figures of the Valencian cultural scene
were never bothered by the Inquisition and also by the fact that the
university library was given an inquisitorial license to purchase all
manner of prohibited books. The Inquisition's complaisance in this
area went so far that Francisco Perez Bayer was given specific
permission from the inquisitor-general to present his entire collec-
tion of prohibited books to the university library where it was to be
made available to those holding licenses. When the climate for
intellectual expression began to darken after the French Revolu-
tion, the reaction was spearheaded not by the tribunal but by
Valencia's Archbishop Francisco Fabian y Fuero, who, on May 6,
1792, ordered the university library's entire collection of prohib-
ited books to be moved to a special bookcase where they were
placed behind iron bars and concealed with a sheet of linen. Natu-
rally, since the library operated under the protection of licenses
issued by the Holy Office, the rector and librarians of the univer-
sity appealed to the tribunal and Inquisitor-General Agustm Rubin
de Cevallos, a known liberal, for protection against the overzealous
prelate. The tribunal promptly sent one of its secretaries to investi-
gate the matter and dispatched a report to Madrid, but the weak-
ened political condition of the Holy Office did not permit it to take
decisive action, and on October 23, 1793, we find the rector writing
to the inquisitor-general to complain that the books remained ex-
actly where they had been seventeen months earlier. Archbishop
Fabian y Fuero's victory over the university and Holy Office was
destined to be short-lived, however, since just a few months after
rector Blasco's despairing letter to the Inquisitor-General, the arch-
bishop was forced to flee the city disguised as a simple priest after
an acrimonious conflict with the captain-general. 6 '
This incident, perhaps more than any other, illustrates the na-
ture of the crisis that the Spanish Inquisition found itself confront-
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Decline and Abolition of the Holy Office in Valencia
347
ing by the end of the eighteenth century. Quasi-tolerance of the
intellectual tendencies of the enlightenment through a policy of
issuing licenses to read prohibited books to a select and presumably
trustworthy educated elite exasperated reactionaries like Arch-
bishop Fabian y Fuero while displeasing liberals who demanded
even greater freedom of expression. At the same time, the Inquisi-
tion's manifest and growing political weakness made it incapable of
defending even the limited freedom of expression that could be
secured through the system of licenses. Meanwhile, late in the
century, when the French Revolution had produced a grave crisis
for Spain's moderate reformism, the Holy Office was so weakened
and demoralized that it was incapable of placing effective controls
on the influx of potentially dangerous works even when called on to
do so by the crown. 68 This, in turn, opened it to charges that it was
an ineffective and anachronistic institution whose calificadores
were described by Jovellanos in a famous phrase as "a bunch of
ignorant monks who only took the job to escape from choir duty
and secure their ration of stew." 69
Nevertheless, in spite of growing frustration with the Inquisition
by both liberals and conservatives and in spite of the fact that it was
becoming the whipping boy of the European press, the Holy Office
would probably never have been abolished if it had not been for the
grave economic and fiscal crisis brought about by the Franco-
Spanish conflict of 1793-1795 and the Anglo-Spanish wars of 1796-
1802 and 1804-1808.
The Spanish monarchy attempted to meet the costs of war
through a variety of expedients including a forced loan of 4 percent
of all official salaries and the creation of the vales, interest-bearing
government notes circulating as legal tender. These notes, which
were to be redeemed through a special sinking fund established by
the government, began to depreciate rapidly, especially after the
British blockade of Cadiz in 1797 had cut off the flow of American
silver.
It was to cope with this situation that the government adopted a
policy of selling off the entailed property belonging to a number of
public institutions including hospitals, poor houses, Colegios May-
ores, and the Inquisition. 70 The royal order authorizing the sale at
public auction of the real property in the possession of the tribunals
of the Spanish Inquisition was issued on February 27, 1799, and
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Decline and Abolition of the Holy Office in Valencia
had been preceded by a series of emergency measures such as
forcing public institutions to invest their funds in censos to help pay
for the war effort/ 1 The Suprema moved quickly to put this new
policy into effect, and on March 12, 1799, it sent orders to all
provincial tribunals telling them to inventory their real property,
have it appraised, and auction it off at a price no less than two-
thirds of the appraised value. The proceeds of this auction were
then to be turned over to the provincial commissioner of the Real
Caja de Amortization. 72
During the rest of 1799 and throughout the following year, the
Valencia tribunal liquidated some of its most valuable rural proper-
ties to a variety of bidders, including Cristobal Francisco de Valdes,
Marquis of Valparaiso, who purchased a large farm in the huerta
zone near Valencia for the sum of 8,560 lliures.' 3 By February 23,
1802, the tribunal had realized some 62,584 lliures from the sale of
74
the agricultural property.
In a very real sense, the application of desamortizacion to the
tribunal was the beginning of the process that would lead inevitably
to abolition. With the sale of its real property, the tribunal was
losing irretrievably an essential part of the fiscal independence that
it had so painfully acquired in the sixteenth century.
In August 1805, moreover, the tribunal began to lose its actual
physical possessions when the Suprema demanded an inventory of
all the paintings that could be found on the premises. This inven-
tory was carried out at the behest of Manuel Godoy, the royal
favorite, who was building up a collection of fine paintings. 75 Un-
doubtedly aware of what was to come, the tribunal tried to stall by
ignoring the Suprema's request for a complete inventory and send-
ing a letter that described its holdings only in general terms, but it
76
was eventually forced to comply. ' Godoy chose the six most valu-
able of the tribunal's paintings for his collection, including four by
Jacinto Espinosa, and a doleful letter to the Suprema dated Novem-
ber 5, 1808, records that the walls of the inquisitor's own rooms had
to be partially demolished so that they could be removed and that
far from compensating the tribunal for its loss, Godoy had insisted
that the tribunal pay the cost of building special packing cases for
the paintings out of its own funds. In 1808, after Godoy 's fall from
power, his property was confiscated and ordered sold at public
auction by the new regime of Ferdinand VII. On the assumption
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Decline and Abolition of the Holy Office in Valencia 349
that its paintings would be among the items in Godoy's possession,
the tribunal wrote the Suprema to demand their return. In its
reply, the Suprema promised merely to find an "opportune mo-
ment" to reclaim the pictures, and since those described did not
form part of the general inventory that was drawn up just after the
abolition of 1820, we may be sure that on this occasion, as on so
many others, the Suprema was unable to offer effective assis-
tance. 77 In the end, this despoilment turned out to be an evil
portent of the eventual fate of the tribunal's furnishings and physi-
cal possessions compared to which the loss of a few paintings would
seem relatively minor.
The year 1808 proved as fateful for the Spanish Inquisition as it
was to be for the Spanish nation as a whole. After Charles IV
abdicated in favor of his son Ferdinand on March 19, 1808, and
then protested to Napoleon that his abdication had been coerced,
both he and Ferdinand were brought to Bayonne and induced to
renounce the Spanish crown to Napoleon. On May 2, 1808, there
occurred the famous "dos de Mayo" in which the population of
Madrid rose against the French occupation force under the com-
mand of Field Marshal Murat. Shortly thereafter, Napoleon sum-
moned his brother Joseph from Naples and awarded him the Span-
ish throne, but although acknowledged by an assembly of leading
Spaniards called at Bayonne, he was rejected by the overwhelming
majority of the population. This was the beginning of that great and
heroic but also quixotic resistance against the French that eventu-
ally resulted in their withdrawal, leaving Spain in ruins.
Throughout this early phase of the Spanish catastrophe, the atti-
tude of the Suprema was resolutely pro-French. Several members,
including its dean, were members of the Bayonne assembly, which
later constituted itself a Cortes and adopted Spain's first constitu-
tion. In it, nothing was said about abolishing the Inquisition, but it
declared that Catholicism should be the only religion in Spain and
1 . 78
her empire.
After the suppression of the May 2 rising, the Suprema made
haste to write to the provincial tribunals condemning them as an
example of insubordination and disrespect for authority and enjoin-
ing them to enlist the aid of the commissioners and familiares of
their respective districts in promoting public tranquility. This
attitude was not shared by all of the provincial tribunals, however,
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Decline and Abolition of the Holy Office in Valencia
and on August 26, 1808, the inquisitors of the Llerena tribunal
issued a manifesto condemning the Suprema's collaboration with
the French. 80
Influenced by this pressure and also by the increasing constraints
being placed on its activities by the French occupation authorities in
Madrid, the Suprema began switching sides during the following
month, and on September 28, it ordered that all provincial tribunals
pledge their support to the Junta Central, which was attempting to
coordinate national resistance to the French. 81 By the middle of the
following month, both the Suprema and the Valencia tribunal were
acting in concert with the Junta. On November 11, for example, it
relayed the Junta's order to impede the introduction of Masonic
propaganda to all provincial tribunals, and the Valencia tribunal
responded by immediately alerting all port commissioners and nota-
ries. 82 The increasing tensions between the French occupation au-
thorities in Madrid and the Suprema and the growing disloyalty of
that body to Joseph's regime may well have influenced Napoleon to
issue a decree suppressing the Inquisition on December 4, 1808. 83
Inquisitor-General Arce y Reynoso immediately resigned, while the
Junta Central, which appointed Pedro de Oviedo y Quintano, the
Bishop of Orense, to replace him, could not obtain papal approval
because communication with Pius VII had become impossible. In
August 1810, the Council of Regency ordered the Suprema to re-
sume its functions, and by the end of March 1811, the government
was considering the appointment of individuals to fill the posts of
prosecuting attorney and secretary. 84 With the Inquisition in this
anomalous but hopeful situation, the Junta now decided to convene
a national Cortes at Cadiz where it had taken refuge after Spanish
forces had been defeated in a series of engagements at the hands of
the Grande Armee.
The Cortes opened on September 24, 1810, and the issue of
whether or not to reestablish the Inquisition immediately became
the subject of acrimonious controversy in the press, giving rise to a
considerable pamphlet literature, including The Inquisition Un-
masked, which was reprinted in an English translation by William
Walton in 1816. The issue was eventually referred to the Commit-
tee on the Constitution, which concluded that the Inquisition was
incompatible with the new constitution, and on January 22, 1812,
after lengthy debate, the Cortes approved this proposition by a
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Decline and Abolition of the Holy Office in Valencia
35i
vote of 90 to 60. In effect, the Inquisition was not actually sup-
pressed but superseded by the reestablishment on January 26,
1813, of the Law of the Partidas that gave bishops and their vicars
full authority over matters of heresy. In Valencia, of course, the
tribunal had already ceased functioning after the seizure of Valencia
city by Marshal Suchet on January 8, 1812. On February 22, the
Cortes published a long decree, designed to be read out in the
pulpits of all parish churches, that justified the actions it had taken
with regard to the Holy Office. In this document, which accurately
reflected the point of view taken in The Inquisition Unmasked, the
decline of Spain and the decadence of the Catholic faith were
blamed on the abuses of the Holy Office, while reestablishment of
the bishop's traditional jurisdiction was presented as a way of better
87
protecting Catholicism and public morality.
The growth of opposition to the proceedings of the Cortes of Cadiz
was not slow to manifest itself, however, and when Ferdinand VII
returned to Spain he lost no time in pronouncing all its acts null and
void on May 4, 1814. Several months later, by the decree of July 21,
1814, Ferdinand restored the Holy Office. 88 This was followed by
the decrees of August 18 and September 3 which restored to the
various tribunals the real estate and revenues from mortgages and
prebends that had been absorbed by the treasury or had passed into
the hands of the Caja de Consolidation, with the account to be paid
from the date of the Inquisition's reestablishment. 89
With the Inquisition's financial problems seemingly about to be
resolved, the new inquisitor-general, Francisco Xavier de Meir y
Campillo, and the provincial inquisitors immediately set about put-
ting into motion the machinery of the Holy Office. Provincial tribu-
nals began recruiting new calificadores and familiares, and even
though certain tribunals appear to have had difficulties in finding
the requisite candidates, the Valencia tribunal encountered few
problems. These candidates paid substantial fees for their genea-
logical investigations as well as a special contribution to relieve the
penury of the Suprema. 90
During Lent 1815, moreover, a ferocious Edict of Faith was
published in Madrid which not only invited the faithful to de-
nounce all the traditional heresies but added to that list of forms of
modern rationalist philosophy. 91 In the same month, the Suprema
set forth a series of regulations that once again enlisted confessors
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Decline and Abolition of the Holy Office in Valencia
in the war against heresy. Confessors were ordered to refuse absolu-
tion to their penitents unless they presented a declaration of any
doctrinal errors that they might have committed. Written declara-
tions presented by such individuals would then be sent to the Holy
Office, which would have to grant permission for absolution. 92
In spite of this feverish display of activity, however, the Valencia
tribunal that was reestablished after July 1814 was a shadow of what
it had been even during the late eighteenth century. Although
luckier than some tribunals in the sense that it could move back to
its old quarters in the palace of the Inquisition, that building was in
a sad state of disrepair, and the tribunal only logged sixteen cases
for the balance of the year. On October 26, 1814, the tribunal wrote
the Suprema to the effect that a great deal of its furniture had been
removed from the palace and that it had lost all the religious orna-
ments from the oratory, making the celebration of mass impossible.
The tribunal had issued an edict calling on all those with knowledge
of the location of any of its property to come forward to aid in its
recovery and requested permission to purchase whatever it needed
to resume functioning. This the Suprema reluctantly granted but
reminded the tribunal to purchase only what was "absolutely neces-
sary," given the extreme financial penury of the Holy Office.
Evidently, the Inquisition's palace had been despoiled not only
by common vandals but also by distinguished members of Valen-
cia's ecclesiastical hierarchy. In September 1814, the tribunal re-
ported that it had given up its efforts to recover the window glass
that had been taken from the palace by officials of the archdiocese
because the glass had been cut down to size in order to be used for
the vicar-general's apartments. 93
To make matters worse, the serious economic depression that
followed the end of hostilities made the crown's promises with
regard to restoration of the Inquisition's financial position largely
illusory. 94 The financial penury of the Suprema itself during those
years was so great that it was forced to turn to the provincial tribu-
nals for assistance. In November 1814, it set at 130,896 reales the
annual contribution required from the Valencia tribunal and denied
it permission to pay out anything for salaries without specific per-
mission. 95 The tribunal must have found it impossible to meet this
demand as the Suprema reduced it to 96,000 reales annually in the
following year. 96
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Decline and Abolition of the Holy Office in Valencia
353
In 1817 and 1818, the tribunal's financial condition continued to
deteriorate. As a result of the economic crisis of the postwar period
and the sharp decline in agricultural prices from 1812-13, the
tribunal found it impossible to collect on many of its censos. 97 In
1818, the tribunal reported that it had been unable to pay salaries
for the last four months and did not have enough funds to maintain
98
its prisoners.
Quite apart from the physical and financial difficulties experi-
enced by the reestablished tribunal, sporadic demonstrations of
royal favor were not enough to prevent royal courts and officials
from continuing their guerrilla war against its jurisdiction as they
had in the eighteenth century. In April 1815, a special censorship
tribunal was established under the direction of the regent of the
Audiencia. Local customs officials immediately recognized the au-
thority of the new tribunal and refused to allow books to leave
customs even with the permission of the Inquisition's port commis-
sioner unless they had also been released by the officials of the
censorship tribunal." Shortly thereafter, the censorship tribunal
expanded its jurisdiction still further by claiming the right to clear
books exported from the kingdom. The Suprema meekly re-
sponded to this demand, which further reduced the authority of
the Holy Office, by cautioning the tribunal to maintain its accus-
tomed supervision over books entering or leaving the kingdom but
without in any way opposing the new censorship tribunal. 100
In 1816, there occurred an even more flagrant violation of the
inquisitorial fuero when the Audiencia insisted on taking cogni-
zance of a civil suit brought by the tribunal's secretary, Francisco
Cachuno, against his nephew, Jose Soriano. In defense of the well-
recognized rights of officials to bring suit in the tribunal's civil
court, it formulated a jurisdictional brief against the Audiencia and
then wrote the Suprema for permission to pursue the matter. The
Suprema, true to its usual attitude in such cases, refused permis-
sion in light of a recent decision taken by Ferdinand VII in a dis-
pute involving the Seville tribunal and the Asistente of Utrera. 101
The renewed offensive of the royal courts against the Inquisition
and the Suprema's seeming inability to offer effective support sim-
ply confirmed trends already well under way before the abolition of
1813-
At the same time, the Valencia tribunal had abandoned its
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Decline and Abolition of the Holy Office in Valencia
former quasi-tolerance of liberal thought and thrown itself whole-
heartedly into the campaign against Masonry and liberalism that
was being mounted under Ferdinand VII's reactionary govern-
ment. This strong identification with the radical right wing left the
tribunal isolated and vulnerable when the political balance of
power shifted and liberalism made a comeback after 1820.
In spite of the appointment of the reactionary Francisco Javier
Elio as captain-general of Valencia in 1814, there was virtually no
serious persecution of the leading Valencian liberals until the begin-
ning of 1817. On January 17 of that year, liberals and Masons failed
in an attempt to assassinate the captain-general and return the
kingdom to a constitutional regime. Several of the leaders of this
conspiracy were executed and others were forced to flee. For its
part, a resurgent Valencia tribunal participated in the repression by
detaining Dr. Nicolas Maria Garelli, a leading liberal and professor
of civil law at the university. Garelli, who led a "tertulia" at which
advanced liberal and constitutional ideas were freely discussed,
had played a key role in drawing up the manifesto by which the
university congratulated the Cortes of Cadiz for its suppression of
the Inquisition. 102 Obviously, there was no love lost between
Garelli and the tribunal, and on June 20, 1817, three days after the
failure of the plot, he was summoned to explain a provocative
lecture he had given on the subject of the defunct constitution of
Cadiz. 103
The mob that supported the January 17 plot had shouted its
support for the 1814 constitution and denounced the Inquisition,
which was clearly becoming identified in the public mind with
extreme antiliberalism. The Valencia tribunal, however, failed to
heed this warning and continued to closely collaborate with the
reactionary regime of Captain-General Elio. After the failure of the
Vidal conspiracy of January 1-2, 1819, repression of liberals and
Masons was further intensified. Captain-General Elio, who had
been personally involved in thwarting the plot, ordered the execu-
tion of thirteen of its leaders, while the Valencia tribunal arrested
twenty-four others who were suspected of complicity on the
grounds that they were members of Valencia's outlawed Masonic
lodge. Those arrested were some of the most important and influen-
tial liberals in the kingdom, including Ildefonso Diaz de Ribera,
Count of Almodovar, Bernardo Falco, Valencian delegate to the
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Decline and Abolition of the Holy Office in Valencia
355
ordinary Cortes of 1813-14, and Mariano Beltran de Lis, a member
of Valencia's leading family of liberals. 1 4
All of these men still languished in the prisons of the Holy Office
when on March 10, 1820, the news reached Valencia that Ferdi-
nand VII had been forced to reinstate the 1813 constitution, simul-
taneously abolishing the Holy Office on the grounds that it was
incompatible with its provisions. On the same day, a mob invaded
the precincts of the tribunal and liberated its prisoners, including
the Count of Almodovar, who was immediately made captain-
general by popular acclamation. On the following day, the Inquisi-
tion's palace was again assaulted by a mob, which carried off a large
quantity of books and papers. On March 17, the new captain-
general responded to growing popular pressure and ordered the
arrest of those most heavily compromised by their involvement
with the Elfo regime. This group included Francisco Javier Borrull,
the calificador who had defended the Inquisition so strongly at the
Cortes of Cadiz, and the four serving Valencian inquisitors, Encina,
Toranzo, Montemayor, and Royo. 105
The March 9 decree had seemingly dealt a fatal blow to the Holy
Office, and to make matters worse, it was followed on March 20 by
a royal order for inventories to be drawn up of all its remaining
property. The Bureau of Public Credit was authorized to take over
the administration of this property until its ultimate disposition
should be determined by the Cortes, which was shortly to be con-
vened. Soon thereafter, on August 9, 1820, the Cortes issued a
decree that declared that confiscated property was to be auctioned
off by the bureau. 106
In Valencia, the royal order of March 20 was reflected in the
activity of a small committee composed of Benito Artalejo, repre-
senting the intendant and the national treasury, and Jose Torres y
Machi and Teodoro Royo, principal commissioner and treasurer of
the local branch of the Bureau of Public Credit, respectively. On
May 13, this committee proceeded to the inquisitorial palace
where Artalejo formally took possession of it and immediately
turned it over to the representatives of the Bureau of Public
Credit. 107 On May 16, the committee decided to inventory the
palace's furnishings and other property. And on June 4, obviously
anticipating the Cortes' decision, it resolved to sell that property at
a series of auctions beginning on June 21, 1820. 108 While these
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35«
Decline and Abolition of the Holy Office in Valencia
auctions were continuing, the committee took a brief trip outside
the city, where on October 4 one of the tribunal's remaining farms
was formally turned over to the representatives of the bureau. 1
It would be superfluous to recount here the well-known story of
the disastrous three years of liberal rule that culminated in the
invasion of Spain by a French army led by the duke of Angouleme
in April 1823. Unlike the French invaders of the Napoleonic pe-
riod, this army was received warmly and soon had taken possession
of the entire country. After the collapse of the liberals, Ferdinand
VII was restored to his absolute power and signed a decree annul-
ling all acts since March 7, 1820. 110
This decree would seem to have automatically restored the Holy
Office. Indeed, the Valencia tribunal appears to have shown some
glimmerings of life, recording a few cases up to the beginning of
July 1824. 111 Nevertheless, whatever his initial inclinations, Ferdi-
nand became more and more fearful of formally reinstating the
Inquisition as he had done in 1814.
For one thing, there was considerable foreign pressure on him
not to reestablish the Holy Office, pressure that he was in no
position to resist because of his financial and military dependence
on the French. Even more important in the mind of an autocrat like
Ferdinand was the fact that formal reestablishment had become
part of the political program of the extreme right, a group that
tended to view Ferdinand himself with grave misgivings. No mat-
ter how reactionary he was, even Ferdinand was not willing to give
in to demands voiced in the right-wing press for the extermination
of liberals to the fourth generation. 112 Ferdinand's relative modera-
tion, in turn, led to increasing hostility between his government
and the extreme right. In the first few years of his restoration to
absolute power, there were several serious right-wing conspiracies
against him which derived their strength from the paramilitary
Guardias Realistas and secret societies, like the Angel Extermina-
dor, who openly favored Ferdinand's brother Carlos. In the face of
all this agitation, Ferdinand preferred to rely on his newly created
police force whose superintendent-general, Juan Jose Rechacho,
warned that the extreme right was planning to use a restored Inqui-
sition as a weapon to exterminate all the king's loyal supporters. 113
Ferdinand's growing fears of a revived Inquisition were re-
inforced by the activities of the Juntas de fe that were established in
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Decline and Abolition of the Holy Office in Valencia
357
certain dioceses. In Valencia, the Junta was headed by Dr. Miguel
Toranzo, one of the last inquisitors of the Valencia tribunal who had
been imprisoned by the liberals. It was Toranzo who handed down
the last death sentence for heresy in Spain. This case involved
Cayetano Ripoll, a schoolmaster from Rusafa just outside Valencia
city who had become a deist while a prisoner in France during the
Peninsular War. He was arrested on September 29, 1824, and dur-
ing the two years that his trial lasted, he repelled the repeated
attempts by theologians to convert him and maintained his convic-
tions to the end. After sentencing, he was turned over to the crimi-
nal chamber of the Audiencia and executed on July 26, 1826. 114 On
August 6, Valencia's fanatical right-wing archbishop, Simon Lopez,
wrote to Toranzo to congratulate him on his conduct of this case and
express the pious hope that it would "serve as a warning to some
while increasing the devotion of others. " 115
The Ripoll case and the activities of the Juntas de fe thoroughly
alarmed Ferdinand, and he notified the Audiencia that these tribu-
nals had no official standing whatsoever. In spite of this evidence of
royal disfavor, they continued a shadowy existence for at least one
more year, although under increasingly difficult circumstances.
Their extinction could not be long delayed, however, and on March
16, 1827, we find Inquisitor Toranzo writing to Archbishop Lopez
to tell him that he feared that the Junta's many enemies were just
waiting for an opportunity to destroy it. 116
Toranzo's fears were justified as Ferdinand's government be-
came more and more fearful of a revived Inquisition, which his
1 IT
chief of police warned would be tantamount to a rightist putsch.
The fatal blow came from a rather unexpected source, however, as
the government was able to enlist the aid of the new papal nuncio,
Monsignor Tiberi. The papacy was not at all reluctant to collaborate
in the destruction of inquisitorial jurisdiction in Spain, and in a
papal brief of October 5, 1829, Pius VIII granted the nunciatura's
tribunal of the Rota appellate jurisdiction over cases involving reli-
gious heresy. 118 This flagrant example of papal interference in Span-
ish affairs, which would have been bitterly resented only a few
decades earlier, perfectly accorded with Ferdinand's wishes, and
he confirmed the papal brief on February 6, 1830. 119
In the meantime, the property of the Holy Office had been
transferred to the collector-general of the Bureau of Espolios y
358
Decline and Abolition of the Holy Office in Valencia
Vacantes to be administered by the general-superintendent of the
property of the Inquisition. 120 In 1830, this post was held by
Valentin Zorilla, an old inquisitor. In Valencia, the administrator of
the tribunal's remaining property was Vicente Mora, who had been
receiver in 1815-16. Mora resided in a room in the palace of the
defunct tribunal, other parts of which had been rented out to a
variety of individuals, including a master carpenter and an archi-
tect. 121 Mora continued to collect income owed the tribunal from its
remaining urban and rural mortgages and rent as well as the in-
come from prebends and sent 28,000 reales to the office of the
collector-general of Espolios in 1834. 122 1° tne same year, Mora
paid out more than 30,000 reales in salaries to former officials of the
tribunal and their heirs.
By the early 1830s, therefore, the Spanish Inquisition had be-
come little more than a minor subcommittee of the treasury, admin-
istering the dwindling property of a defunct institution. It still had
power as a symbol, especially for the Carlist right, which was now
engaged in a civil war against Isabella H's regency government.
Perhaps for this reason alone, the regency decided to issue a formal
decree of abolition. This document, which was careful to point out
that Ferdinand himself had vested authority over matters of faith in
the bishops, abolished the Inquisition and confiscated its remaining
property. The final extinction of this institution, which had played
such an important role in Spanish history for hundreds of years,
took place against a background of an acrimonious debate about its
real impact on Spanish life and thought, a debate that continues
undiminished to the present day.
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Conclusion
My approach here assumes that institutions created by a specific
society and culture are so embedded in that society and culture as
to be inseparable from it. Thus, the concepts of liberalism and
toleration that emerged during the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies should not be applied uncritically to an institution that devel-
oped under certain very special late-fifteenth-century conditions.
Clearly, as I have sought to demonstrate, the image of the arbitrary,
omnipotent, and monolithic Inquisition handed down to us by an
earlier historiography is in need of substantial modification.
Invidious comparisons between the judicial procedures of Anglo-
Saxon common law courts and the Inquisition, for example, merely
serve to confuse the issue of judicial fairness, one of the most difficult
problems now facing Inquisition scholars. A complete lack of scien-
tific means for evaluating physical evidence and an often uncritical
dependence on the testimony of witnesses as well as a prosecutory
bias may well have made it impossible for those accused of crimes to
obtain a fair trial in the modern sense before any early modern
criminal tribunal. The Inquisition was little different from other
tribunals in this respect, although the secrecy of its proceedings and
the disabilities placed on the defense were significant obstacles for
anyone who wished to demonstrate his innocence.
But the law and legal institutions have their own inner dynamic,
and that is just as true in Spain as in countries with a tradition of
common law. As the resolution of the debate over the nature of the
evidence presented in witchcraft accusations was to demonstrate,
the Spanish Inquisition was perfectly capable of generating proce-
359
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360
Conclusion
dural safeguards internally and of imposing them on provincial
judges through a process of judicial review.
The Inquisition's impact on Spanish society as a whole and on
certain groups within it was ambiguous and far more complex than
historians have yet imagined. In the case of the Judeo-conversos,
for example, its ferocious persecution of Judaizers helped to main-
tain popular anti-Semitic feeling, and it was not at all averse to
exploiting that anti-Semitism in its own political or financial inter-
ests. But as I have shown above, the Valencia tribunal, at least,
provided a channel through which certain converso families could
be more fully integrated into Old Christian society. In this sense,
the tribunal reacted positively to altered public perceptions of the
conversos (if not the Portuguese New Christians) reflected in the
seventeenth-century debate on limpieza and the strong feelings of
guilt experienced by many people when they stopped to read the
captions under the sanbenitos that could still be seen in many
churches. 1
As far as the Moriscos were concerned, the tradition of "conserva-
tive dissent" from the idea that force could be legitimately used in
matters of conscience was shared by at least some of Valencia's
inquisitors. 2 This attitude may well have helped to prevent a repeti-
tion of the harsh measures taken against the converted Jews.
Around the time of the expulsion, moreover, the Valencia tribunal
seemed more than willing to accommodate the continued presence
of Moriscos in spite of its earlier stand in favor of expulsion. In this
instance, financial and bureaucratic considerations were allowed to
outweigh concern for religious heresy.
The impact of the Holy Office on wider Old Christian society is
even more difficult to assess. Here, the historian runs the risk of
making the Inquisition responsible for everything that went wrong
in Spain or trivializing its role in the name of fairness and balance.
Of course, it would be absurd to place all the blame for Spain's
drastic failure to keep pace with intellectual changes in the rest of
Europe on the action of the Holy Office. But, along with the Coun-
cil of Castile, the Inquisition did exercise a great deal of censorship
authority over intellectual production. Even more important per-
haps in determining the atmosphere in which intellectual life could
develop was the Inquisition's absolute jurisdiction over proposi-
tions. In the pulpit, at academic disputations, or in the lecture halls
Copyrighlod material
Conclusion
361
of the University of Valencia itself, the Inquisition was omnipres-
ent, to be invoked whenever a discussant strayed from the bounds
of orthodoxy. There can be little doubt that the intervention of the
tribunal on the side of the conservatives in the debate over peripa-
tetic philosophy helped to make the University of Valencia into a
bastion of Aristotelianism until well into the eighteenth century.
It is even more difficult to comprehend the impact that the
repression of offenses such as blasphemy and superstition had on
popular culture. Certainly, the public punishment of blasphemy by
such a feared and respected institution as the Holy Office could not
have failed to have an inhibiting effect on normal social intercourse,
as any blasphemous expression or remark might be reported. It
would be naive to assume, however, that the tribunal's attack on
the principal forms of superstition, love magic and curative magic,
had much impact on the unreasoning convictions of the popular
masses. Apart from the fact that the church's position on magic and
the supernatural was highly ambiguous, the social causes for these
practices remained unchanged. Furthermore, there is considerable
evidence to suggest that the very fact that a practitioner had been
punished by the Holy Office served to enhance her reputation
among potential clients. 3
It might plausibly be argued that the Inquisition's growing con-
cern over solicitation is a tribute to the feminization of the church
in general and of confession in particular. There is considerable
evidence from confessor's manuals that it was women, not men,
who heeded the call for more frequent confession and communion
voiced by such popular religious figures as Francisco de Osuna and
Tomas Carbonell. By punishing soliciting confessors, the Inquisi-
tion was responding to the deep disappointment and profound disil-
lusionment suffered by many women when they found that the
sacrament they cherished was being mocked and abused even as
they confessed. Ironically, however, public awareness of the re-
moval, reclusion, and suspension from confessing of many formerly
respected priests may well have encouraged the rising tide of anti-
clericalism that was to engulf Spain in the 1840s and 1850s. The
examples of superstition and solicitation should teach us that the
actions of the Inquisition, like those of any other judicial institu-
tion, may have unintended and unforeseen effects.
Finally, by choosing to emphasize the political evolution of the
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362
Conclusion
Valencia tribunal and the changing character and functions of its
familiares, I have sought to demonstrate that the Inquisition was far
from the monolithic institution portrayed by traditional historiogra-
phy. Established during a period of strong central government
when it was widely believed that Spain's problems would be re-
solved through the imposition of religious conformity, the Valencia
tribunal eventually had to reckon with the forces of regionalism.
Although it remained fully committed to its role as defender of the
faith, political necessity made the tribunal come to terms with the
local power elite, build and maintain a network of clients, and
accommodate itself to a position of diminished royal support. By
the middle of the sixteenth century, the heroic period of charis-
matic authority was coming to an end and the long career of the
Valencia tribunal as a regional bureaucratic institution was just
beginning.
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Notes
Introduction
1. For converso attitudes toward the Inquisition, see Haim Beinart,
Conversos on Trial: The Inquisition in Ciudad Real (Jerusalem: The Mag-
nus Press, 1981), 294-295. For the Spanish Protestant view, see Regi-
naldo Gonzalez Montano, A Discovery and Playne Declaration of Sundry
Subtill Practices of the Holy Inquisition of Spain (London: Ihon Day,
1568). For a Catholic viewpoint, see Caesare Carena, Tractatus de Officio
Santissimae Inquisitionis, et modo procedendi in causis fidie (Cremona:
Baptistam Belpierum, 1655), and D. de Simancas, De catholicis institu-
tionihus (Vallisoleti: Aegidii de Colomies, 1552).
2. Denis Diderot and Jean d'Alembert, Encyclopedic ou dictionnaire
raisonne des sciences, des arts et des metiers, 20 vols. (Neufchastel: Sam-
uel Faulche et Compagnie, 1765), 8: 775.
3. Ibid.
4. For the controversy over Llorente's work, see J. Perez Villanueva,
"La historiografia de la Inquisicion espanola," in J. Perez Villanueva and
Bartolome Escandell Bonet, eds., Historia de la Inquisicion en Espaila y
America, 4 vols. (Madrid: BAC, 1984), 1:14-16.
5. H. C. Lea, Historia de la Inquisicion espanola, 3 vols. Trans. Angel
Alcala (Madrid: Fundacion Universitaria Espanola, 1982).
6. These results were first reported in Gustav Henningsen, "El banco
de datos del Santo Oficio: Las relaciones de causas de la Inquisicion
espanola," Boletin de la Real Academia de la Historia, CLXXIV:549~57o.
7. Agostino Borromeo, "Contributo alio studio dell' Inquisizioni e dei
suoi rapporti con il potere episcopale nell' Italia spagnola del Cinque-
cento," Annuario dell' Instituto storico italiano per leta mode ma e
contemporanea, vols. 29-30, 219-276. Richard Greenleaf, The Mexican
363
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364
Notes to Pages 4-10
Inquisition of the Sixteenth Century (Albuquerque: University of New
Mexico Press, 1969); B. Escandell Bonet, "El tribunal peruano en la epoca
de Felipe II," in Perez Villanueva and Escandell Bonet, Historia de la
Inquisicion, 1:919-937-
8. See chap. 7, 401—404.
9. Ricardo Garcia Carcel, Origenes de la Inquisicion espanola (Barce-
lona: Peninsula, 1976), 137. Garcia Carcel contradicts himself in his sec-
ond volume, but his assertion that the tribunal did not have commission-
ers until 1580 is also wrong. Ricardo Garcia Carcel, Herejia y sociedad en
el siglo XVI (Barcelona: Peninsula, 1980), 137.
10. Garcia Carcel, Herejia, 17-124.
11. Robert I. Burns, S.J. The Crusader Kingdom of Valencia, 2 vols.
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 1:4-7,9.
12. The linguistic and cultural division of post-Reconquest Valencia is
discussed in Joan Fuster, Nosaltres, els Valencians (Barcelona: Ediciones
62, 1962), 30.
13. Thomas Glick, Irrigation and Society in Medieval Valencia (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 11-13.
14. J. H. Elliott, Imperial Spain (New York: The New American Li-
brary, 1966), 28-30.
15. Teresa Canet Aparisi, La audiencia valenciana en la epoca foral
moderna (Valencia: Institucio Valenciana D'Estudis I Investigacio, 1986),
66, 72.
16. James Casey, The Kingdom of Valencia in the Seventeeth Century
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 232.
17. Ibid., 225. For the medieval origins of Valencia's traditional laws,
see Fuster, Nosaltres, 44-46.
I: Between Monarchy and Kingdom
1. Juan Antonio Llorente, A Critical History of the Inquisition of
Spain from the Time of Its Establishment to the Reign of Ferdinand VII
(London: Geo. B. Wittaker, 1826; reprint ed., Williamstown, Mass.,
1967), 11.
2. Ibid., 12.
3. Llorente, A Critical History, 16-17.
4. For the migration of the Albigensian "perfecti" across the Pyrenees,
see chap. V in E. Le Roy Ladurie, Montaillou: The Promised Land of
Error (New York: George Braziller, 1978), 89-102.
5. Eymerich's Directorium inquisitorum was first published in 1503
and then republished five times in Peria's edition between 1578 and 1607.
Copyrighted material
Notes to Pages io-ij
365
Nicolas Eymerich and Francisco Peria, Le manuel des inquisiteurs, ed.
and trans. Louis Sala-Molins (Paris: Mouton, 1973), 15.
6. Tarsicio de Azcona, Isabel la Catolica (Madrid: Editorial Catolica,
1964), 378-379-
7. Albert A. Sicroff, Les controverses des statutes de purete de sang en
Espagne du XV au XVII siecle (Paris: Marcel Didier, i960), 32-36.
8. Azcona, Isabel la Catolica, 397-398.
9. Beinart, Conversos on Trial, 308-309.
10. Elliott, Imperial Spain, 30-31, 43-44; Jaime Vicens Vives, An Eco-
nomic History of Spain (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969),
308-309.
11. Henry Charles Lea, A History of the Inquisition of Spain, 4 vols.
(New York: Macmillan, 1906-07), 1:27-28.
12. Llorente, A Critical History, 17.
13. Ibid., 23.
14. Azcona, Isabel la Catolica, 392.
15. Ibid., 396.
16. Ibid., 573-574-
17. Ferdinand and Isabella were able to gain control over the monastic
reform movement during the pontificate of Alexander VI. Ibid., 591.
18. Ibid., 406.
19. Garcia Carcel, Ongenes, 44.
20. Azcona, Isabel la Catolica, 408.
21. Garcia Carcel, Ongenes, 47-48.
22. Lea, A History, 1:247-249.
23. AHN, Inquisition, September 13, 1484, leg. 533, f. 18.
24. AHN, Inquisition, June 26, 1484, leg. 533, f. 18.
25. Lea, A History, 1:248.
26. For threats made against Lieutenant-Inquisitor Baltasar Sanchez
de Oruela, see AHN, Inquisition, January 8, 1521, leg. 533, f. 3.
27. Garcia Carcel, Ongenes, 49-50.
28. Ibid., 52, 80.
29. Ibid., 50.
30. Ibid., 55.
31. AHN, Inquisition, December 8, 1497, lib. 242, ffs. 7V-8V.
32. Garcia Carcel, Ongenes, 52, 59.
33. AHN, Inquisition, November 21, 1498, lib. 242, ffs. 82-83.
34. AHN, Inquisition, March 21, 1499, lib. 252, f. 125.
35. Lea, A History, 1:243.
36. AHN, Inquisition, September 6, 1553, lib. 911, f. 76.
37. AHN, Inquisition, September 27, 1499, lib. 242, f. 152.
366
Notes to Pages 1 7-23
38. AHN, Inquisition, October 17, 1500; October 26, 1500, lib. 242,
ffs. 231, 235.
39. AHN, Inquisition, September 12, 1520, lib. 317, ffs. 105-107.
40. AHN, Inquisition, May 8, 1500, lib. 242, f. 200.
41. Lea, A History, 1:329.
42. AHN, Inquisition, lib. 100, f. i33r-v. quoted in Jose Martinez Mil-
Ian, La hacienda de la Inquisicion, 1478-1700 (Madrid: CSIC, 1984), 75.
43. Lea, A History, 1:355.
44. AHN, Inquisition, May 11, 1554, lib. 1210, ffs. 52-54. The
Suprema had followed a policy of specifically encouraging the provincial
tribunals to use this formidable weapon; see AHN, Inquisition, August 18,
1545, lib. 322, ffs. 394-395-
45. AHN, Inquisition, "agravios hechos por el Inquisidor Aguilera"
(1565-6), leg. 1790, exp. 2, f. 90V. This important visitation really began
on June 12, 1566, when Jeronimo Manrique presented his powers to the
tribunal. Most of the evidence against the officials and inquisitors was
presented to Manrique and not, as implied by Garcia Carcel, Herejia,
136-137, to his successor, Soto Salazar. AHN, Inquisition, June 12, 1566,
leg. 1790, exp. 2, nf. Garcia Carcel seems unaware of this first phase of the
visitation.
46. AHN, Inquisition, "Memorial de los agravios que pretenden los
oficiales reales de Su Magestad en esta ciudad y reino de Valencia se hazen
por los Reverendos Inquisidores de dicha ciudad y reino a la juridicion y
preheminencias que la dicha Real Magestad tiene," May 18, 1567, leg.
1790, exp. 2, cap. 26.
47. Eymerich and Pena, he manuel, 88-90.
48. Lea, A History, 1:353.
49. AHN, Inquisition, January 11-28, 1528, leg. 533#2, f. 13.
50. Archivo del Reino de Valencia, February 10, 1525, Generalidad,
lib. 1950, ffs. 19-103, quoted in Garcia Carcel, Origenes, 111.
51. Casey, The Kingdom, 179.
52. AHN, Inquisition, Decembers, 1565, leg. 503#i, nf.
53. AHN, Inquisition, (1556) procesos criminales, leg. 1781, exp. 1.
54. AHN, Inquisition, July 10, 1568, lib. 1210, f. 10. For the violation
of the 1568 Concordia, see July 31, 1573, lib. 970, f. 429. For merchants
who collaborated in this traffic, see the hearings held by the tribunal:
AHN, Inquisition, July 29, 1573, lib. 960, ffs. 434-435, 454. Garcia
Carcel's assertion that the Valencia tribunal did not have commissioners
until 1580 is patently untrue since the proceedings against the commis-
sioner of Teruel date from 1573. Garcia Carcel, Herejia, 134.
55. AHN, Inquisition, August 28, 1514, lib. 960, f. 64. This sweeping
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Notes to Pages 23-32
367
exemption was extended to the officials of all tribunals in 1568, Martinez
Millan, La hacienda, 189.
56. Garcia Carcel, Herejia, 139; AHN, Inquisition, August 5, 1570, lib.
960, f. 16.
57. AHN, Inquisition, May 11, 1554, lib. 1210, f. 54.
58. AHN, Inquisition, July 10, 1586, lib. 1210, f. 58.
59. AHN, Inquisition, July 15, 1575, lib. 960, f. 43V.
60. AHN, Inquisition, July 9, 1575, lib. 960, f. 37.
61. For the special fuero enjoyed by the members of the Order of
Montesa, see BNM, December 16, 1593, MSS 2731, f. 18.
62. Lea, A History, 1:429.
63. AHN, Inquisition, Instrucciones de 1498, lib. 1210, f. 1431.
64. AHN, Inquisition, February 26, 1551, lib. 911, f. 18.
65. AHN, Inquisition, July 10, 1568, lib. 1210, f. 62.
66. AHN, Inquisition, July 10, 1568, lib. 1210, f. 60.
67. AHN, Inquisition, June 9, 1589, lib. 960, f. 28.
68. AHN, Inquisition, "Memorial de los agravios," May 18, 1567, leg.
1790, exp. 2, cap. 26.
69. AHN, Inquisition, January 7, 1564, leg. 5i9#2, f. 23.
70. AHN, Inquisition, February 19, 1565, leg. 503#i, nf.
71. AHN, Inquisition, "Memorial de los agravios," May 18, 1567, leg.
1790, exp. 2, cap. 31.
72. AHN, Inquisition, December 27, 1561, lib. 911, f. 230.
73. AHN, Inquisition, August 1, 1579, lib. 960, f. 581.
74. AHN, Inquisition, September 18, 1555, lib. 911, f. 154.
75. AHN, Inquisition, February 26, 1551, lib. 911, f. 18.
76. AHN, Inquisition, May 15, 1545, lib. 1210, ffs. 815-816.
77. AHN, Inquisition, December 25, 1552, lib. 911, f. 23.
78. AHN, Inquisition, March 23, 1553, lib. 960, ffs. 2-2V.
79. AHN, Inquisition, April 12, 1553, lib. 960, f. 614.
80. Garcia Carcel, Herejia, 251.
81. AHN, Inquisition, July 29, 1553, lib. 960, nf.; August 4, 1553, lib.
911, ffs. 79-79V. Sensing the new attitude at Court, the Suprema ordered
the tribunal not to proceed against the viceroy. AHN, Inquisition, August
5, 1553, lib. 911, ffs. 8o-8ov.
82. AHN, Inquisition, May 11, 1554, lib. 1210, f. 53.
83. AHN, Inquisition, May 11, 1554, lib. 1210, f. 54.
84. AHN, Inquisition, July 12, 1560, lib. 911, f. 353.
85. AHN, Inquisition, July 10, 1568, lib. 1210, ffs. 58-60, 62, 63.
86. AHN, Inquisition, April 21, 1567, leg. 503#i, nf.
87. AHN, Inquisition, July 10, 1568, lib. 1210, f. 61.
368
Notes to Pages 32-40
88. AHN, Inquisition, Octobers, 1583; January 13, 1584; February 8,
1610, leg. 505#i, ffs. 16, 26, 108.
89. AHN, Inquisition, July 10, 1568, lib. 1210, ffs. 58, 60, 65.
90. AHN, Inquisition, November 14, 1560, lib. 497, f. 95.
91. AHN, Inquisition, February 21, 1568, lib. 911, f. 842.
92. AHN, Inquisition, February 9, 22, 1563, leg. 503#i, ffs. 46V, 65.
93. AHN, Inquisition, August 27, 1582, lib. 960, ffs. 18-23, 2 7-
94. AHN, Inquisition, February 3, 1595, lib. 960, f. 241.
95. Lea, A History, 2:279.
96. AHN, Inquisition, July 1, 1592; August 26, 1592, leg. 505, ffs.
327-328, 331; July 20, 1592, lib. 960, f. 283.
97. Jover was released on bail at the tribunal's request, but the
Audiencia evidently had no intention of cooperating with the tribunal on
this case since he was promptly rearrested and returned to the royal
prison. AHN, Inquisition, (1598), procesos criminals, leg. 1780, f. 6.
98. AHN, Inquisition, March 10, 1608, lib. 919, ffs. 550-553. The
Suprema eventually ordered Sans to resign his post with the Audiencia.
AHN, Inquisition, September 18, 1608, lib. 919, f. 575.
99. AHN, Inquisition, April 10, 1589, lib. 916, f. 730.
100. AHN, Inquisition, March 8, 1553, lib. 960, f. 8V-9.
101. AHN, Inquisition, March 23, 1553, lib. 960, f. 624.
102. AHN, Inquisition, March 9, 1627, lib. 922, ffs. 825-826; also see
January 23, 1569, lib. 912, ffs. 103- 103V, for the tribunal's complaints
about the stubborn attitude of the Audiencia and its refusal to attempt to
settle disputes amicably.
103. AHN, Inquisition, April 20, 1569, leg. 503#i, nf.; August 28,
1570, leg. 503#i, nf.
104. AHN, Inquisition, August 1, 1579, lib. 960, ffs. 589-590.
105. AHN, Inquisition, October 6, 1619, lib. 960, f. 587.
106. Sebastian Garcia Martinez, "Bandolerismo, Pirateria, y control de
moriscos en Valencia durante el reinado de Felipe II," Estudis I (1972): 142.
107. Ibid., 142.
108. AHN, Inquisition, October 20, 1597, lib. 917, f. 918.
109. J. Porcar, Cosas evanguadas en la ciutat y regne de Valencia,
transcriber V. Castaneda Alcover (Madrid: Cuerpo Facultativo de Ar-
chiveros, Bibliotecarios y Arqueologos, 1934), 162-163.
110. Garcia Martinez, "Bandolerismo," 129.
111. AHN, Inquisition, December 2, 1601, lib. 960, ffs. 272-273.
112. AHN, Inquisition, January 30, 1603, lib. 960, f. 258.
113. AHN, Inquisition, July 23, 1603, lib. 960, f. 262.
114. AHN, Inquisition, September 3, 1621, leg. 8o4#2, ffs. 174-176.
115. AHN, Inquisition, April 26, 1613, leg. 5o8#2, f. 406.
Copyrighted material
Notes to Pages 40-46
369
116. BNM, December 27, 1633, MSS 844, ffs. 7- 7V.
117. AHN, Inquisition, August 11, 1600, lib. 918, ffs. 264-265.
118. AHN, Inquisition, August 14-18, 1600, lib. 918, ffs. 240-240V.
119. AHN, Inquisition, August 17, 1600, lib. 918, ffs. 238-238V.
120. The viceroy, marquis of Caracena, resorted to similar tactics in the
case of familiar Pedro Linares. AHN, Inquisition, April 10, 1610, leg.
8o3#i, ffs. 632-664.
121. AHN, Inquisition, August 21, 1600, lib. 918, ffs. 266-266V. Also
see AHN, Inquisition, January 19, 1627, lib. 920, ffs. 589-589V, for the
tribunal's complaints about Viceroy Enrique de Avila y Guzman, marquis
de Povar, and the way he favored the Audiencia and attacked the tribunal's
jurisdiction over familiares in violation of the "spirit of the concordia. "
122. Porcar, Cosas evanguadas, 120.
123. AHN, Inquisition, August 21, 1600, lib. 918, f. 266.
124. Lea, A History, 3:74.
125. Garcia Carcel, Herejia, 40.
126. AHN, Inquisition, January 8, 1576, lib. 960, ffs. 230-232.
127. AHN, Inquisition, April 28, 1573, leg. 503#i, nf; April 30, 1573,
lib. 913, ffs. 42-45. Ribera was so peeved at the tribunal that he refused to
attend the auto de fe of May 3, 1573.
128. AHN, Inquisition, October 21, 1566, leg. 503#i, nf.
129. AHN, Inquisition, December 21, 1568, lib. 912, f. 8v.
130. AHN, Inquisition, June 15, 1568, lib. 912,, ffs. 112-1 13V.
131. AHN, Inquisition, June 21, 1568, lib. 912, f. 114.
132. For the details of these negotiations, see chap 2.
133. For the tribunal's relations with Archbishop Navarra, see Garcia
Carcel, Herejia, 41.
134. AHN, Inquisition, December 11, 1561, leg. 503#i, nf.
135. AHN, Inquisition, December 27, 1561, lib. 911, ffs. 229-230. For
a confusing and incomplete account of this incident based on only partial
knowledge of the documentation, see Garcia Carcel, Herejia, 41. Garcia
Carcel clearly fails to appreciate or even comment on the importance of
this event in the history of the tribunal.
136. AHN, Inquisition, December 24, 1561, leg. 324, ffs. 15V-16.
137. AHN, Inquisition, January 2, 1562, leg. 503#i, f. 13.
138. AHN, Inquisition, Decembers, 1565, leg. 503#i, nf. The inquisi-
tors had already taken refuge in the parish church of San Andres where
they had a chapel. AHN, Inquisition, December 5, 1565, leg. 1787, f. 2.
139. For a brief discussion of these "old taxes," see Casey, The King-
dom, 156. For the jurats' efforts to make the tribunal's officials pay the
sises, see AHN, Inquisition, June 2, 1576, lib. 960, f. 62.
140. Casey, The Kingdom, 167, 170-171.
370
Notes to Pages 46-5,3
141. AHN, Inquisition, September 17, 1591, lib. 970, ffs. 330-331,
342V. Earlier in his term, Viceroy Moncada had had a bitter argument
with the tribunal over the windows from which the inquisitors would
watch the Corpus procession. AHN, Inquisition, June 16, 1582, lib. 916,
ffs. 302-302 v.
142. AMV, Manuels de Cornells y establiments, September 18, 20,
1591, lib. A-118, nf.
143. AHN, Inquisition, September 17, 1591, lib. 960, f. 342V.
144. AHN, Inquisition, September 23, 1591, lib. 90, ffs. 365-367V.
145. AHN, Inquisition, September 26, 1592, lib. 960, f. 379.
146. Garcia Martinez, "Bandolerismo," 153. As S. N. Eisenstadt has
noted, center-periphery relations in the traditional monarchies were char-
acterized by continuity and interpenetration whereby the institutions of
the "center successfully permeated the periphery in an attempt to mobi-
lize support for the policies of the center while relatively autonomous
forces of the periphery have continually impinged on the center." S. N.
Eisenstadt, "Varieties of Political Development: The Theoretical Chal-
lenge," in S. N. Eisenstadt, Building States and Nations, L41-752 (Bev-
erly Hills: Sage, 1973), 56.
147. AHN, Inquisition, October 10, 1592, leg. 505#i, f. 339.
148. AHN, Inquisition, October 22, 1592, lib. 917, f. 367.
149. AHN, Inquisition, January 25, 1592, lib. 960, ffs. 359-361.
150. Porcar, Cosas evanguadas, 57.
151. AMV, Manuels de consells y establiments, June 11, 1603, lib.
A-30, nf.
152. AHN, Inquisition, July 6, 1603, lib. 960, f. 283.
153. AHN, Inquisition, May 16, 1609, lib. 960, ffs. 400-404.
154. AHN, Inquisition, March 23, 1553, lib. 960, ffs. 2-2V.
155. AHN, Inquisition, June 18, 1603, lib. 960, f. 295. It was Gaspar
Daqui who acted as city council notary during the 1603 crisis. AMV,
Manuels de consells y establiments, June 13, 1603, lib. A- 130, nf.
156. AHN, Inquisition, December 11, 1561, leg. 503#i, ffs. 7-8V.
157. AHN, Inquisition, July 20, 1573, lib. 913, ffs. 3-4V.
158. AHN, Inquisition, April 1, 1619, leg. 1784^, f. 42.
159. AHN, Inquisition, May 19, 1612, leg. 8o4#2, nf.
160. AHN, Inquisition, April 1, 1619, leg. i784#i, f. 42V.
161. Porcar, Cosas evanguadas, 128.
162. Ibid., 129.
163. Ibid., 159.
164. Ibid., 196.
165. AHN, Inquisition, April 1, 1619, leg. 1784^ , f. 53V.
166. Porcar, Cosas evanguadas, 179, 184.
Copyrighted material
Notes to Pages 54-60
37i
167. AHN, Inquisition, June 13, 1614, leg. 5o6#i, f. 410.
168. Porcar, Cosas evanguadas, 189.
169. Ibid., 210.
170. AHN, Inquisition, July 12, 1618, leg. 5o6#2, f. 1797. Rome was
already signaling its displeasure with the cult. AHN, Inquisition, April 28,
1618, leg. 5o6#2, f. 158.
171. Porcar, Cosas evanguadas, 309-312.
172. AHN, Inquisition, April 1, 1619, leg. i784#i, f. 37V. Also see
Cabezas's letter attacking the cult: AHN, Inquisition, February 16, 1619,
leg. 5o6#2, ffs. 70, 70V.
173. Porcar, Cosas evanguadas, 213.
174. AHN, Inquisition, May 27, 1619, leg. 5o6#2, f. 304.
175. AHN, Inquisition, June 12, 1619, leg. 5o6#2, f. 314.
176. AHN, Inquisition, July 22, 1619, leg. 5o6#2, f. 328.
177. AHN, Inquisition, August 28, 1619, leg. 5o6#2, f. 350.
178. AHN, Inquisition, March 9, 1620, leg. 5o6#2, f. 422.
179. AHN, Inquisition, June 26, 1634, leg. 507#i, f. 286.
180. AHN, Inquisition, September 3, 1621, leg. 8o4#2, ffs. 179-180.
Also see the case of familiar Alejandro Portell who was turned over to the
tribunal after being arrested on criminal charges by agents of the
Audiencia: September 15, 1705, leg. 503#3, exp. 7.
181. AHN, Inquisition, March 29, 1661, leg. 503#2, exp. 5, ffs. 131-
13 IV.
182. AHN, Inquisition, December 22, 1659, leg. 503#2, exp. 5, ffs.
93-95-
183. Garcia Carcel, Herejia, 65; AHN, Inquisition, December 9, 1571,
leg. 503#i, nf.
184. Lea, A History, 4:356; Porcar, Cosas evanguadas, 310-311.
II: Judicial Procedures and Financial Structure
1. Lea, A History, 2:457-458; Garcia Carcel, Origenes, 180, notes
that the period of grace in Valencia could be as long as six months.
2. Garcia Carcel, Origenes, 180.
3. Ibid., 180.
4. Henry Kamen, Inquisition and Society in Spain in the Sixteenth and
Seventeenth Centuries (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), 162.
The edicts of grace were experimented with later in the sixteenth century
as part of royal policy toward the Moriscos; Lea, A History, 3:340.
5. Lea, A History, 2:92-93.
6. Ibid., 94-96.
7. AHN, Inquisition, Decembers, !5^9, lib- 9 J 6, ffs. 670-671.
372
Notes to Pages 60-68
8. Michel Foucault, Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison (Paris:
Gallimard, 1975), 62.
9. AHN, Inquisition, March 16, 1642, leg. 210, ffs. 311-313.
10. AHN, Inquisition, (1506), leg. 597#i, exp. 8.
11. AHN, Inquisition, September 23, 1568, leg. 8o2#i, nf.
12. Lea, A History, 2:93-94.
13. AHN, Inquisition, April 17, 1654, leg. 523#i, f. 7.
14. AHN, Inquisition, January 20, 1570, leg. 5i8#i, f. 9.
15. Lea, A History, 1:238.
16. AHN, Inquisition, October 18, 1517, lib. 497, ffs. 55-56.
17. AHN, Inquisition, July 31, 1560, leg. 1792, nf.
18. AHN, Inquisition, May 18, 1590, lib. 917, f. 61.
19. Alonso de Villadiego y Montoya, Instruccion politico, y prdctica
judicial (Madrid: B. Cano, 1788), 87.
20. AHN, Inquisition, leg. 5o8#2, nf., "memoria de las personas
testificadas por Francisco Caffor."
21. AHN, Inquisition, November 20, 1582, lib. 915, f. 376.
22. AHN, Inquisition, January 9, 13, 1687, leg. 8o3#i, ffs. 237V-238V.
23. AHN, Inquisition, November 22, 1680, leg. 8o4#2, nf.
24. AHN, Inquisition, March 4, 1790, leg. 562#i, f 6.
25. AHN, Inquisition, December 17, 1764, leg. 562#2, f. 8.
26. AHN, Inquisition, January 24, 1612, leg. 8o4#2, f. 235V.
27. AHN, Inquisition, November 4, 1678, leg. 8oo#i, nf.
28. AHN, Inquisition, November 8, 1691, leg. 8o3#2, nf.
29. AHN, Inquisition, April 8, 1671, leg. 8oo#i, nf.
30. John H. Langbein, Prosecuting Crime in the Renaissance (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), 135-136.
31. Ibid., 130-132.
32. Ibid., 137.
33. Eymerich and Pena, Le manuel, 47.
34. Ibid., 48.
35. Virgilio Pinto Crespo, Inquisicion y control ideologico en la Espafia
del siglo XVI (Madrid: Taurus, 1983), 242.
36. Eymerich and Pena, Le manuel, 214-215.
37. AHN, Inquisition, May 30, 1565, leg. 503#i, nf.
38. AHN, Inquisition, August 3, 1566, leg. 1790, exp. 2, nf., charge
#88.
39. AHN, Inquisition, (1566), leg. 1790, exp. 2, nf. "el lie. Bernardino
de Aguilera Inquisidor de Valencia respondiendo a los cargos y capitulos
que el lie. D. Jeronimo Manrique me ha puesto."
40. Langbein, Prosecuting Crime, 181.
41. Foucault, Surveiller, 46.
Copy righted material
Notes to Pages 68-73
373
42. Lea, A History, 2:548-550. For a detailed defense of the need to
conceal the names of witnesses, see AHN, Inquisition, October 8, 1528,
lib. 320, ffs. 98V-99.
43. Villadiego y Montoya, Instruction politica, 64.
44. BNM, MSS 718, ffs. 84-86.
45. Garcia Carcel, Origines, 183. For the acquisition of property that
later became the inquisitorial compound, see ARV, Clew, "Instruments
pertenecientes a la compra de casas en que se fabrica el real palacio de la
Inquisition," lib. 1404. Garcia Carcel, Herejia, 204.
46. AHN, Inquisition, February 2, 1542, leg. 536#i, f. 3.
47. AHN, Inquisition, October 12, 1564, leg. 530#i, f. 8.
48. For complaints about the "ruinous state" of the prison, see AHN,
Inquisition, August 16, 1563, leg. 503, f. 57V. The letter that may have
prompted the Inquisitor-General's investigation came from Alcalde Be-
nito Sanguino; AHN, Inquisition, January 22, 1582, lib. 915, ffs. 147-
147V Garcia Carcel, Herejia, 205-206.
49. AHN, Inquisition, March 11, 1583, lib. 915, ffs. 488-488V.
50. AHN, Inquisition, March 19, 1582, lib. 915, ffs. 331-334; Garcia
Carcel, Herejia, 206-207, reproduces only one-half of the map drawn by
the visitor which he mistakenly calls the "plan proposed, " when as the text
of the accompanying letter makes quite clear, it was a map of the Inquisi-
tion compound as it then existed.
51. Lea, A History, 2:513.
52. AHN, Inquisition, May 26, 1528, leg. 1790, exp. 1, ffs. jv, 12V.
53. AHN, Inquisition, June 18, 1566, leg. 1790, exp. 2, f. 34.
54. AHN, Inquisition, lib. 918, f. 728, quoted in Garcia Carcel,
Herejia, 204-205.
55. AHN, Inquisition, July 4, 1575, lib. 913, f. 495.
56. Tomas Cerdan de Tallada, Visita de la carcel y de los presos (Valen-
cia: Pedro de Huete, 1574); Lea, A History, 2:534.
57. AHN, Inquisition, July 18, 1566, leg. 1790, exp. 2, ffs. 158V-165.
58. Garcia Carcel, Ongenes, 183.
59. AHN, Inquisition, December 12, 1623, leg. 507#i, ffs. 195-196.
60. AHN, Inquisition, March 27, 1564, leg. 5i9#i, f. 2. More than 20
percent of the accused confessed either during these early hearings or just
after the accusation was presented.
61. Eymerich and Peria, Le manuel, 123.
62. AHN, Inquisition, January 24, 1659, leg. 5i8#2, f. 14.
63. AHN, Inquisition, June 18, 1565, leg. 53o#i, f. 8.
64. Lea, A History, 2:479.
65. Langbein, Prosecuting Crime, 147-148.
66. Lea, A History, 2:563-564.
374
Notes to Pages 74-79
67. AHN, Inquisition, October 26, 1537, leg. 536#3.
68. Lea, A History, 3:42.
69. Ibid., 3:4.
70. Ibid., 2:545-546.
71. See the cases of Vezquey "Moro" in AHN, Inquisition, November
13, 1508, leg. 548#i, exp. 25; Esperanza Madrit, June 12, 1495, leg.
55i#3, exp. 38; and Francisco Bairi, January 31, 1537, leg. 549#i, exp. 9.
72. BNM, "Instrucciones de Torquemada" (1484), MSS 935, f. 6v.
73. AHN, Inquisition, August 22, 1573, leg. 559#3, f. 11.
74. AHN, Inquisition, October 8, 1576, leg. 548#i, f. 1.
75. AHN, Inquisition, January 4, 1521, leg. 559#2, f. 12.
76. Lea, A History, 2:538. Spanish jurisprudence in general tended in
the direction of increasing the number of crimes in which the testimony of
less desirable witnesses could be accepted. Tomas y Valiente, El derecho
penal de la monarquia absolute Madrid: Tecnos, 1969. 176-177.
77. Lea, A History, 2:543.
78. AHN, Inquisition, January 4, 1521, leg. 559#i, f. 12.
79. H. J. Berman, a noted authority on Roman law goes so far as to
refer to "a virtual presumption of guilt" in criminal cases. Harold J. Ber-
man, Law and Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983),
610, n. 35.
80. See Langbein, Prosecuting Crime, 235-236, for the denial of de-
fense counsel in France. AHN, Inquisition, October 8, 1528, lib. 320, ffs.
98V-99V.
81. Lea, A History, 3:71-72.
82. AHN, Inquisition, December 23, 1654, leg. 523#i, f. 7.
83. Lea, A History, 3:74~75-
84. Langbein, Prosecuting Crime, 157. See Foucault, Surveiller, 41,
for a description of the elaborate "arithmetic" of proofs.
85. Eymerich and Pefia, Le manuel, 209.
86. Kamen, Inquisition and Society, 174-175. For complaints about
the indiscriminate use of torture in the secular courts, see Tomas y
Valiente, El derecho penal, 153-154.
87. Torture was administered to 693 persons, or 19.4 percent, in the
period after 1540. The relative leniency of the Valencia tribunal would
seem to belie the impression given by Lea, who at one point asserts that
"the regular practice was to repeat the torture." Lea, A History, 3:28-29.
My figure is considerably lower than that given by Garcia Carcel, Herejia,
199, but it is based on a much larger number of cases extended over a
longer period.
88. Lea, A History, 2:562; Langbein, Prosecuting Crime, 157. On the
Valencia tribunal, about 30 percent were convicted with only one witness.
Copyrighted material
Notes to Pages 79-86
375
89. Foucault, Surveiller, 42-43.
90. Garcia Carcel, Origines, 174.
91. From 1554 to 1820, the Valencia tribunal suspended 58 percent of
its cases. In contrast, from 1530 to 1609, it suspended only 9 percent.
Garcia Carcel, Herejia, 212.
92. Kamen, Inquisition and Society, 186.
93. Exile was imposed in 8.4 percent of the cases from 1554 to 1820.
94. AHN, Inquisition, January 18, 1567, leg. 503#i.
95. Some form of religious instruction was imposed on 8.3 percent of
the cases. Reclusion affected 1.3 percent of the tribunal's victims.
96. AHN, Inquisition, December 17, 1764, leg. 562#2, f. 8.
97. The scourging was imposed on 7.3 percent of cases.
98. Lea, AHistory, 3:138. Public shaming affected 0.8 percent of cases.
99. Ibid., 142. Altogether, the Valencia tribunal imposed galley ser-
vice on 8.2 percent of its victims, with slightly less than half (3.9%) being
given the three-year minimum.
100. Tomas y Valiente, El derecho penal, 252.
101. Lea, A History, 3:143.
102. AHN, Inquisition, (1593), leg. 505#2, f. 121.
103. Francisco Tomas y Valiente, "Las carceles y sistema penitenciario
bajo los borbones," Historia 16, 7 (October 1978): 74. The tribunal sen-
tenced a little over one-tenth of its victims to forced labor.
104. Lea, A History, 3:151.
105. AHN, Inquisition, June 21, 1566, leg. 1790, exp. 2, f. 48.
106. Eymerich and Pena, he manuel, 207-208; Garcia Carcel, Herejia,
203.
107. Lea, A History, 3:162-166.
108. Lea, A History, 3:172-179.
109. Tomas y Valiente, El derecho penal, 394.
110. Lea, A History, 3:183-185.
111. Ibid., 195-199-
112. Garcia Carcel, Origines, 191.
113. Ibid., 174.
114. These figures came from my own calculations.
115. AHN, Inquisition, May 24, 1699, leg. 5io#i, ffs. 136-137.
116. Lea, A History, 3:209-210.
117. See Foucault, Surveiller, 51-58, for a brilliant discussion of the
political role of public executions under the Old Regime.
118. Garcia Carcel, Origines, 191-192.
119. Ibid., 167, Garcia Carcel, Herejia, 206. Jaime Contreras and Gus-
tav Henningsen, "Forty-four Thousand Cases of the Spanish Inquisition
(1540-1700)," in Gustav Henningsen and John Tedeschi, eds. , The Inquisi-
376
Notes to Pages 88-gi
Hon in Early Modern Europe (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press,
1986), 118-119.
120. AHN, Inquisition, May 12, 1512, lib. 960, f. 122.
121. Lea, A History, 2:180.
122. AHN, Inquisition, June 4, 1557, lib. 911, f. 237.
123. Lea, A History, 2:185.
124. AHN, Inquisition, May 2, 1562; November 21, 1562; December
2, 1562, leg. 503#i, ffs. 27, 41V.
125. AHN, Inquisition, August 17, September 16, 1572, leg. 503#i.
126. Lea, A History, 2:181. The 1566 visitation resulted in a number of
charges of judicial irregularities being lodged against the two inquisitors.
AHN, Inquisition, August 3, 1566, leg. 1790, exp. 2, f. 151. For Philip li s
respect for the law and judicial system, see Geoffrey Parker, Philip II
(London: Hutchinson, 1979), 58-60.
127. Lea, A History, 2:181.
128. AHN, Inquisition, April 30, 1568, leg. 503#i, nf.
129. AHN, Inquisition, August 2, 1625, leg. 507#i, f. 498.
130. Villadiego y Montoya, Instruccion politico., 66.
131. Robert Mandrou, Magistrats et sorciers en France au XVII siecle
(Paris: Plon, 1968), 345.
132. Gustav Henningsen, "El 'banco do datos' del Santo Oficio: Las
relaciones de causas de la Inquisicion espanola," Boletin de la Real Acade-
mia de la Historia, 174 (1977): 564.
133. AHN, Inquisition, November 23, 1632, leg. 5o8#2, f. 233.
134. Works such as Simancas, De catholicis institutionibus, were ex-
tremely influential. Lea, A History, 2:476. Also see Mario L. Oncaria
Torres, "El corpus jundico de la Inquisicion espanola" in Perez Villa-
nueva, La Inquisicion espanola, 912-916.
135. AHN, Inquisition, "Memoria de las causas despachadas en la inqui-
sition de Valencia en los afios de 1647 y 1648 y lo resuelto a ellas por el
Illmo. Serior Obispo de Palencia Inquisidor-General y Seriores del
Consejo de Su Magestad," leg. 5og#3, ffs. 243-244. The Suprema re-
viewed 3.7 percent of the sentences handed down by the tribunal, mitigat-
ing the penalty in 1.5 percent and increasing it in 0.6 percent.
136. AHN, Inquisition, June 17, 1658, leg. 5io#3, ffs. 49-50.
137. AHN, Inquisition, February 3, 1683, lib. 932, f. 226.
138. See Chap. VIII. Valencian law prescribed automatic death sen-
tences for sodomites; Cerdan de Tallada, Visita, 197-198.
139. Garcia Carcel, Origines, 135.
140. Martinez Millan, La hacienda, 277-278, notes that salaries paid to
inquisitors rose from 60,000 maravedis in 1498 to 250,000 in 1603 and for
Copyrighted material
Notes to Pages 91-96
377
fiscales, from 30,000 to 170,000 in the same period. Salaries always com-
prised the largest part of the tribunal's budget.
141. AHN, Inquisition, (1553), lib. 911, ffs. 102-103.
142. Lea, A History, 2:210. The third inquisitor was removed after
1677. Martinez Millan, La hacienda, 258.
143. Llorente, A Critical History, 24.
144. AHN, Inquisition, January 12, 1561, lib. 324, f. 2v.
145. Lea, A History, 2:453.
146. Ibid., 453-454; AHN, Inquisition, September 10, 1569, lib. 497,
f. 11 IV.
147. AHN, Inquisition, November 6, 1623, leg. 507#i, f. 165.
148. Lea, A History, 2:193.
149. AHN, Inquisition, August 3, 1520, lib. 317, f. 66v; April 10, 1671,
lib. 498, ffs. 190V-191.
150. AHN, Inquisition, September 19, 1806; November 14, 1806; Feb-
ruary 28, 1807; April 15, 1807, leg. 5i7#i, ffs. 20, 24, 34, 39.
151. AHN, Inquisition, August 3, 1606, lib. 332, ff. gv-io.
152. Lea, A History, 2:455.
153. AHN, Inquisition, September 16, 1801, leg. 5i7#i, f. 89. Of
course, Polop was given more time; December 15, 1801, leg. 5i7#i, f.
97-
154. AHN, Inquisition, October 6, 1498, lib. 242, nf.
155. In 1499, the original provision of September 10, 1495, was re-
newed and extended to those who had not originally come forward; AHN,
Inquisition, April 25, 1499, lib. 242, nf.
156. AHN, Inquisition, April 25, 1499, lib. 242.
157. Garcia Carcel, Origines, 144.
158. Burns, The Crusader Kingdom, 1:124.
159. AHN, Inquisition, October 14, 1575, lib. 497, ffs. 166V-178.
160. AHN, Inquisition, June 11, 1531; April 24, 1533, leg. 8oo#i, ffs.
1-2. Lea, A History, 2:330.
161. Garcia Carcel, Origines, 154-157.
162. Garcia Carcel, Herejia, 159, 162.
163. AHN, Inquisition, April 19, 1570, lib. 497, f. 156V.
164. AHN, Inquisition, May 23, 1556, lib. 911, f. 188.
165. AHN, Inquisition, August 23, 1556, lib. 911, ffs. 203-205.
166. AHN, Inquisition, June 8, 1562, lib. 911, ffs. 497-500.
167. AHN, Inquisition, June 9, 1562, leg. 503#i, nf.
168. In his letter detailing the properties in Centelles's estate, the
receiver noted the "mucha necesidad" in which the tribunal found itself at
that time. AHN, Inquisition, July 4, 1566, leg. 503#i, exp. 1, nf.
378
Notes to Pages Q6-103
169. Garcia Carcel, Origines, 159-160.
170. Martinez Millan, La hacienda, 94-95.
171. Ibid., 316.
172. Ibid., 103, 106-107.
173. AHN, Inquisition, November 6, 1556, leg. 503#i, nf. For the
tribunal's struggles to take over benefices in Gandia and Mora, see AHN,
Inquisition, February 28, 1567, and May 12, 1570, leg. 503#i.
174. AHN, Inquisition, February 9, March 3, 1563, leg. 503#i, ffs.
47V, 48V.
175. Henry Kamen, "Confiscations in the Economy of the Spanish In-
quisition," Economic History Review 17 (1965): 514-517.
176. AHN, Inquisition, July 7, 1588, lib. 916, ffs. 638-639.
177. See Chap. VI, below, for the tribunal's shifting attitude toward the
Moriscos.
178. AHN, Inquisition, October 26, 1615, leg. 5o6#i, ffs. 507-510.
179. Garcia Carcel, Herejia, 147.
180. AHN, Inquisition, June 27, 1615; July 1, 1615, leg. 506, lib. 88,
nf., ffs. 478-479. Quoted in Martinez Millan, La hacienda, 293-297. The
Suprema also sent aid to the tribunal in the form of an emergency grant of
2,000 ducats to help cover salary payments.
181. Garcia Carcel, Herejia, 175. The original royal order dates from
May 30, 1623. By March 5, 1624, the tribunal had received 5,211 lliures
in principal from the duke, and the Suprema ordered it immediately
reinvested in the new censals situated in the city of Valencia. AHN,
Inquisition, March 5, 1624, leg. 507#i, f. 277.
182. Martinez Millan, La hacienda, 369-370.
183. Ibid., 370.
184. AHN, Inquisition, February 23, 1706, leg. 2308, nf.
Ill: Inquisitors and Officials
1. Julio Caro Baroja, El Senor Inquisidor y otras vidas por oficio
(Madrid: Alianza, 1968), 18.
2. Lea, A History, 2:233-237.
3. Caro Baroja, El Senor, 16.
4. Richard L. Kagan, Students and Society in Early Modern Spain
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 90. For a more de-
tailed study of this reform, see Stephen Haliczer, The Comuneros of
Castile: The Forging of a Revolution, 14-75-1521 (Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1981), 207-220.
5. See chap. 1 for the attitude of the Audiencia and jurats.
Copyrighted material
Notes to Pages 103- log
379
6. For the importance of the post, see Casey, The Kingdom, 169.
7. AHN, Inquisition, 1592, leg. 1336, exp. 5.
8. Bernardo Boyl was married to Melchor Figuerola's daughter, Lu-
ciana, and applied for a familiatura in 1612; AHN, Inquisition, 1612, leg.
6232, exp. 7. In 1634, Boyl and Gaspar Figuerola appear as signatories to
a petition signed by all the familiares of Valencia city and its immediate
environs; AHN, Inquisition, May 13, 1634, leg. i788#i, exp. 5.
9. AHN, Inquisition, 1620, leg. 1257, exp. 1.
10. AHN, Inquisition, April 18, 1715, leg. 503#3, exp. 7, ff. 209V-210.
11. Ibid.
12. AHN, Inquisition, 1637, leg. 1188, exp. 7.
13. For the difficulties of the Inquisition in Teruel, see chap. 1.
14. AHN, Inquisition, 1753, leg. 1288, exp. 27.
15. AHN, Inquisition, 1755, leg. 1236, exp. 22. In this genealogy, it
was noted that "el Inquisitor-General le ha confiado los principales
negocios de la mitra."
16. Kamen, Inquisition and Society, 61.
17. AHN, Inquisition, 1592, leg. 1242, exp. 12.
18. Antonio Dommguez Ortiz, Sociedad y estado en el siglo XVIII
espanol (Barcelona: Ariel, 1976), 403.
19. Ibid., 403-404.
20. Ibid., 413-414.
21. AHN, Inquisition, 1780, leg. 1324, exp. 16.
22. Annie Molinie-Bertrand, "Les Hidalgos dans le royaume de Cas-
tille a la fin du XVIe siecle: Approche cartographique," Revue d'histoire
economique et sociale, t. 52, no. 1 (1974), 66-68.
23. Janine Fayard, Les Membres du conseil de Castille a lepoque mo-
derne (Geneva: Droz, 1979), 342-343.
24. Richard L. Kagan, Lawsuits and Litigants in Castile, 1500-1700
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), 120.
25. Antonio Dommguez Ortiz, Las clases privilegiadas en la Espaiia
del Antiguo Regimen (Madrid: Ediciones Istmo, 1973), 75.
26. Ibid., 72.
27. Ibid., 78.
28. J. H. Elliott, The Count-Duke of Olivares (New Haven: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 1986), 184; Dommguez Ortiz, Las clases, 82.
29. Dommguez Ortiz, Sociedad y Estado, 349-350, for a discussion of
the wholesale creation of titulos by the Bourbons.
30. AHN, Inquisition, 1597, leg. 1429, exp. 8.
31. AHN, Inquisition, 1597, leg. 1542, exp. 26, leg. 1549, exp. 26.
32. Marie Claude Gerbet, La noblesse dans le royaume de Castille
(Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1979), 137-138.
3 8o
Notes to Pages 109-2 13
33. L. P. Wright, "The Military Orders in Sixteenth and Seventeenth
Century Spanish Society," Past and Present 43 (1969), 45, 51, 52.
34. Ibid., 55.
35. AHN, Inquisition, 1743, leg. 1503, exp. 13.
36. AHN, Inquisition, 1601, leg. 1372, exp. 10; Ernesto Schafer, El
Consejo Real y Supremo de las Indias, 2 vols. (Seville: Universidad de
Sevilla, 1935- 1947), 1:359.
37. AHN, Inquisition, 1575, leg. 1572, exp. 1. For a description of
Seville's judicial system, see Francisco Morales Padron, La ciudad del
quinientos: Historia de Sevilla III (Seville: Universidad de Sevilla, 1977),
226-231.
38. AHN, Inquisition, 1589, leg. 1370, exp. 22.
39. For this distinguished family, see above.
40. See the discussion of this term in Henry Kamen, European Society:
1500-iyoo (London: Hutchinson, 1984), 120-124.
41. AHN, Inquisition, 1627, leg. 1415, exp. 8.
42. Kamen, European Society, 125.
43. See Elliott, The Count-Duke, 298, for the opposition to Olivares's
proposal to modify the purity of blood statutes and reward those with a
distinguished career in trade.
44. Langbein, 206.
45. Diego de Simancas, De catholicis institutionibus (Valladolid, 1552),
quoted in Caro Baroja, El senor Inquisidor, 20.
46. Kagan, Students and Society, 97.
47. AHN, Inquisition, "Relacion de los individuos de cada tribunal de
la Inquisicion," 1666, lib. 1323.
48. Kagan, Students and Society, 197.
49. Ibid., 98.
50. Ibid., 220-222.
51. AHN, Inquisition, "Relacion de los individuos," lib. 1323, ffs. 24,
89-90. Some individuals simply could not afford the expense and time
necessary to obtain advanced degrees. An extreme but perhaps not so
unusual instance is that of Cordoba's inquisitor, Pedro de Villaviciencia
Ferrer, who spent a total of 26 years at the University of Salamanca, 7 of
which were at the Colegio Mayor de Cuenca. In contrast, licentiate Anto-
nio de Ayala y Verganza, who had served on the Valencia tribunal some
years earlier, took his graduate degree at the University of Avila in just
one year. "Relacion de los individuos," ffs. 64-65, 24.
52. Kagan, Students and Society, 66, 109.
53. For the foundation of San Bartolome, see Kagan, Students and
Society, 66. None of the inquisitors of 1666 had attended San Bartolome.
54. Kagan, Students and Society, 136.
Copyrighted material
Notes to Pages 114-118
381
55. Fayard, Les membres, 60.
56. For a breakdown of cases being heard by the Valladolid chancil-
lena, see Kagan, Lawsuits and Litigants, 110—111. For a description of
the matters that came before the Council of Castile, see Fayard, Les
membres, 14-18.
57. Ibid., 74, 78.
58. Ibid., 80.
59. Ibid., 61. Fayard points out that acceptance of such posts declined
from the reign of Philip IV when graduates would rather remain in resi-
dence at the university than accept a position they considered unworthy
of them.
60. Antonio Dommguez Ortiz, "Regalismo y relaciones iglesia estado
en el siglo XVII," in Historia de la Iglesia en Espana, 5 vols., ed. Ricardo
Garcia- Villoslada (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1979), 4:96-
97-
61. AHN, Inquisition, "Relacion de los individuos," 1666, lib. 1323, ffs.
18-19.
62. R. Olaechea, Anotaciones sobre la inmunidad, 299, as cited in
Teofanes Egido, "El regalismo y las relaciones Iglesia-Estado en el siglo
XVIII," in Garcia- Villoslada, Historia, 4:134.
63. Dommguez Ortiz, "Regalismo," 103.
64. Ibid., 100.
65. The condemnation and exile of the royal advocate general, Melchor
de Macanaz, for his violently regalist Pedimento fiscal is a case in point.
See chap. 9.
66. Out of 249, there were only two councillors of the Indies who were
former inquisitors. One of these was a former inquisitor of Valencia, Pedro
Gutierrez Flores. Schafer, El consejo, 1:353-366.
67. Examples of this among the inquisitors of Valencia include Fran-
cisco Alarcon Covarrubias, Bishop of Ciudad Rodrigo; Pedro Cifontes de
Loarte, Bishop of Avila; and Fernando de Loazes, later bishop of Tarra-
gona and Valencia.
68. Kagan, Students and Society, 80, points out that priests hold-
ing university degrees dominated benefices after the early sixteenth
century.
69. Lea, A History, 2:416-418.
70. AHN, Inquisition, "Relacion de los individuos," lib. 1323, f. 23. For
the income of the Inquisitor-General around the same time, see Lea, A
History, 2:196.
71. AHN, Inquisition, "Relacion de los individuos," lib. 1323, f. 23.
72. Marcel Couturier, Recherches sur les structures sociales de Cha-
teaudun (Paris: SEVPEN, 1969), 138-142, 228.
Notes to Pages ng-128
73. AHN, Inquisition, 1650, leg. 1342, f. 2. Both of Ochagavia's grand-
fathers as well as his father and brother served as familiares.
74. AHN, Inquisition, 1642, leg. 1189, f. 5, lib. 1323, "Relation de los
individuos," ffs. 23-24.
75. Fayard, Les membres, 266.
76. AHN, Inquisition, 1713, leg. 1570, f. 23; Fayard, Les membres,
245-
77. Wright, "The Military Orders," 52; Dominguez Ortiz, Las clases,
23-
78. Ibid., 23-24.
79. Wright, "The Military Orders," 61.
80. See chap. 5.
81. For an excellent edition of this work complete with revealing
notes, see Sebastian de Horozco, Cancionero, ed. Jack Weiner (Berne:
Herbert Lang, 1976).
82. Jack Weiner, "Sobre el linaje de los Horozco," Actas del primer
congreso internacional sobre la picaresca (Madrid: Fundacion Univer-
sitaria Espanola, 1975), 793.
83. Ibid., 799.
84. Ibid., 797.
85. Ibid.; AHN, Inquisition, 1624, leg. 1431, f. 18.
86. Weiner, "Sobre el linaje," 794-795.
87. AHN, Inquisition, 1616-20, leg. 1515, f. 2.
88. Weiner, "Sobre el linaje," 803.
89. For the financial difficulties of the members of the Council of
Castile in the seventeenth century, see Fayard, Les membres, 426-427.
90. Lea, A History, 2:223-233.
91. AHN, Inquisition, March 12, 1600, lib. 918, f. 173.
92. Azcona, Isabel la Catolica, 324-326, 333-336, 346.
93. AHN, Inquisition, November 15, 1504, lib. 1210, ff. 1431-1432.
94. AHN, Inquisition, March 12, 1600, lib. 918, ffs. 173-174.
95. AHN, Inquisition, May 25, 1610, lib. 497, f. 284.
96. AHN, Inquisition, November, 20, 1484, lib. 1210, f. 1405.
97. AHN, Inquisition, 1560, leg. 1790, exp. 2, f. iov.
98. Some of the early provincial inquisitors and Inquisitor-General
Jimenez de Cisneros were associated with the rather puritanical monastic
reform movement. Azcona, Isabel la Catolica, 396, 594.
99. AHN, Inquisition, September 28; October 2, 1566, leg. 1790,
exp. 2. Inquisitor Bernardino de Aguilera was praised for his fairness by
witnesses during the visitation of 1566.
100. AHN, Inquisition, May 29, 1528, leg. 1790, exp. 1, ffs. 28, 31.
101. Aguilera's health problems were probably the product of over-
Copyrighted material
Notes to Pages 128-135
383
work since his colleague, Gregorio de Miranda, had a nervous disorder
and was absent for long periods.
102. AHN, Inquisition, October 3, 1566, leg. 1790, exp. 2.
103. AHN, Inquisition, August 3, 1566, leg. 1790, exp. 2, list of
charges against licentiate Bernardino de Aguilera, charge #5.
104. AHN, Inquisition, April 24, 1566, leg. 1790, exp. 2, additional
charges against licentiate Bernardino de Aguilera, charge #11.
105. See chap. 1.
106. AHN, Inquisition, September 6, 1566, leg. 1790, exp. 2, nf.
107. AHN, Inquisition, August 30, 1566, leg. 1790, exp. 2, nf.
108. AHN, Inquisition, "Agravios hechos por el inquisidor Aguilera
ansi a la cuidad y reino de Valencia como a los particulares de dicha ciudad
reino y districto," April 8, 1566, leg. 1790, exp. 2, nf.
109. AHN, Inquisition, December 5, 1565, leg. 1790, exp. 2, nf.
110. AHN, Inquisition, June 27, 1566, leg. 1790, exp. 2, f. 120V.
111. AHN, Inquisition, June 30, 1566, leg. 1790, exp. 2, f. 125.
112. AHN, Inquisition, July 10, 1568, leg. 1210. Items included in the
Concordia that appear to have been derived from accusations lodged
against Aguilera during the visitation of 1566 include #6 and #51, which
modified the use of ecclesiastical censures and provided mechanisms for
resolving jurisdictional conflicts without employing them, #11, which
prohibited artisans from placing the Inquisition's shield over their doors,
and #24, which denied the newly created commissioners the right to
issue export licenses.
113. AHN, Inquisition, 1648, leg. 1487, exp. 3.
1 14. For the details of the recovery of Catalonia, see Elliott, Imperial
Spain, 349. For Chacon y Narvaez's early career and his success with the
Valencian estates, see AHN, Inquisition, November 27, 1666, lib. 1323,
f- 50.
115. For the career of licentiate Alonso de Salazar Frias, see AHN,
Inquisition, leg. 2220, exp. 21b. Salazar Frias played a key role in the
Basque witchcraft trials of the early seventeenth century. Gustav Hen-
ningsen, The Witches' Advocate: Basque Witchcraft and the Spanish
Inquisition (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1980). In 1619, he was
sent to the Valencia tribunal to restore morale after the Padre Simon
affair.
116. AHN, Inquisition, December 23, 1653, leg. i784#2, f.
117. AHN, Inquisition, July 28, 1653, leg. 1784#2, f. 3.
118. AHN, Inquisition, January 20, 1653, leg. 1784#2, f. 4.
119. AHN, Inquisition, January 20, 1653, leg. 1784#2, f. 11.
120. AHN, Inquisition, January 20, 1653, leg. 17&4#2, ff. 27-28.
121. AHN, Inquisition, December 23, 1653, leg. i784#2, f. 229.
3*4
Notes to Pages 136-145
122. AHN, Inquisition, November 27, 1666, lib. 1323, f. 59.
123. Magali Safatti, Spanish Bureaucratic Patrimonialism in America
(Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California,
1966), 38.
124. Even though Roche was born in Macaranbros, a village in the
archbishopric of Toledo, he was descended from a distinguished Valencian
family that was firmly entrenched in Valencia's municipal oligarchy. AHN,
Inquisition, 1601, leg. 1372, exp. 6.
125. AHN, Inquisition, January 9, 1620, leg. 3707#i, ffs. 87V-88.
126. AHN, Inquisition, March 9, 1620, leg. 3707#i, f. 92V.
127. AHN, Inquisition, July 16, 1620, lib. 923, f. 114.
128. See below.
129. AHN, Inquisition, October 24, 1628, lib. 922, f. 937.
130. AHN, Inquisition, November 26, 1630, leg. 2317, nf.
131. AHN, Inquisition, July 19, 1636, leg. 5og#i, f. 121.
132. AHN, Inquisition, September 30, 1636, leg. 509#i, ffs. 15-15V.
133. AHN, Inquisition, September 30, 1636, leg. 509#i, ffs. 14-14V.
134. AHN, Inquisition, February 8, 1636, lib. 926, f. 614.
135. AHN, Inquisition, January 11, 1638, lib. 926, ffs. 286-287.
136. AHN, Inquisition, May 11, 1627, lib. 922, f. 845.
137. AHN, Inquisition, January 28, 1631, lib. 923, ffs. 22-23.
138. AHN, Inquisition, January 13, 1638, leg. 509#i, f. 321.
139. AHN, Inquisition, April 3, 1639, leg. i788#2, exp. 8.
140. AHN, Inquisition, September 2, 1636, leg. 509#i, f. 130; Septem-
ber 30, 1636, leg. 509#i, ffs. 7-7V. The prisoners had keys to their cells
and an outside door was left open for them to enter and leave as they
wished.
141. AHN, Inquisition, August 12, 1659, leg. 503#2, ffs. 76-77.
142. For the details of Roche's will, see ARV, Clero, September 6,
1647, lib. 11217, ffs- 1_ 5-
143. AHN, Inquisition, 1636, leg. 1506, exp. 9.
144. AHN, Inquisition, 1652, leg. 1265, exp. 2.
145. AHN, Inquisition, 1733, leg. 1284, exp. 1, f. 5.
146. AHN, Inquisition, October 25, 1529, leg. i7go#i, f. 47V.
147. AHN, Inquisition, lib. 1210, f. 1412.
148. AHN, Inquisition, April 29, 1558, lib. 911, ffs. 261, 269-270.
149. AHN, Inquisition, March 28, 1554, lib. 911, f. 126; September 27,
1556, f. 176V.
150. See Lea's incomplete account of the family; Lea, A History, 2:221.
151. Apparently this was not difficult for someone with basic skills,
especially when many books of written formularies existed to help the
uninitiated. One of these books, which may well have been available to
Copyrighted material
Notes to Pages 245-153
3«5
Juan del Olmo was Bartolome de Albornoz, Arte de los contratos (Valen-
cia, 1573), reference in Kagan, Lawsuits and Litigants in Castile, 140.
152. AHN, Inquisition, September 30, 1636, leg. i784#2, f. 19. Jose
Vicente del Olmo, Relation historica del Auto de fe que se celebro en
Madrid: Este ano de 1680 (Madrid: Roque Rico de Miranda, 1680).
153. AHN, Inquisition, August 14, 1696, lib. 933, nf.
154. AHN, Inquisition, 1750, leg. 2317, nf.
155. AHN, Inquisition, 1719, leg. i28i#i, exp. 1.
156. AHN, Inquisition, June 26, 1659, leg. 503#2, f. 74.
157. The Suprema clearly anticipated that Palomares would have to be
given the opportunity to perform "algunas informaciones de limpieza" in
its letter of appointment. AHN, Inquisition, December 2, 1623, leg.
507#2, f. 16. Regarding Palomares's finances, see AHN, Inquisition, No-
vember 9, 1627, lib. 922, f. 723V.
158. AHN, Inquisition, September 28, 1627, lib. 922, f. 724.
159. AHN, Inquisition, September 30, 1636, leg. 5og#i, f. 14V.
160. AHN, Inquisition, September 30, 1636, leg. i784#2, f. nv.
161. AHN, Inquisition, September 30, 1636, leg. i784#2, f. 12.
162. AHN, Inquisition, November 18, 1636, leg. 5og#i, nf.
163. AHN, Inquisition, Sept. 30, 1636, leg. i784#2, f. 2.
164. AHN, Inquisition, April 20, March 10, 1638, ffs. 219, 238.
165. Lea, A History, 2:189.
166. AHN, Inquisition, November 27, 1687, lib. 498, f. 211. This carta
acordada prohibiting the notarios from carrying out genealogical investiga-
tions confirms those of August 21, 1606, and April 8, 1624.
167. I. A. A. Thompson, War and Government in Habsburg Spain,
1560-1620 (London: Athlone Press, 1976), 200, 275.
168. AHN, Inquisition, January 23, 1638, lib. 926, f. 353.
IV: Familiares and Unsalaried Officials
1. Lea, A History, 2:273.
2. Jaime Contreras, El Santo Ojicio de la Inquisition de Galicia,
1560-iyoo (Madrid: Akal, 1982), 67.
3. Ibid., 86.
4. AHN, Inquisition, April 22, 1630, lib. 923, ffs. 405-406.
5. AHN, Inquisition, February 26, 1551, lib. 911, f. 18.
6. Lea, A History, 2:276.
7. AHN, Inquisition, April 14, 1551, lib. 911, f. 6.
8. Lea, A History, 2:276-277.
9. AHN, Inquisition, June 13, 1552, leg. 503#2, f. 45.
10. AHN, Inquisition, July 29, 1552, leg. 503#2, f. 57.
3 86
Notes to Pages 153-161
11. See chap. 1, 27.
12. AHN, Inquisition, July 10, 1568, lib. 1210, ffs. 56, 58.
13. Garcia Carcel, Herejia, 147.
14. AHN, Inquisition, "Libre dels familiares del sanctoffici del any
1575", leg. 628#i, exp. 1
15. AHN, Inquisition, June 1603, lib. 960, f. 211.
16. Numbers of familiares for the district have been arrived at by combin-
ing the list of 1602 with the names of familiares drawn from genealogies.
17. Garcia Carcel, Herejia, 149.
18. AHN, Inquisition, March 4, 1597, leg. 505#2, ffs. 89-90V.
19. AHN, Inquisition, December 24, 1619, leg. 502#i; February 26,
1623, nf.
20. AHN, Inquisition, June 14, 1661, leg. 5o 3 #2, exp. 5, ffs. 137- 137V;
October 1, 1697, leg. 23o6#i, nf.
21. For the number in 1748 and 1806, see J. Martinez Millan, "La
burocracia del Santo Oficio en Valencia durante el siglo XVIII," Mis-
celanea Comillas, XL, no. 77 (1982), 155. Numbers were beginning to
recover as early as 1720; AHN, Inquisition, June 18, 1720, leg. 503#3,
exp. 7, ff. 350-356.
22. For an early reference to the appointment of an excessive number
of notaries, see AHN, Inquisition, October 22, 1610, leg. 498, f. 286. In
1720, there were 60 serving notaries and only 5 commissioners. AHN,
Inquisition, June 18, 1720, leg. 503#3, exp. 7, ff. 356-356V.
23. Contreras, El Santo Oficio, 72.
24. For references to the economy of Morella, see Casey, The King-
dom, 65, 75-76.
25. Ibid., 58.
26. See Casey, The Kingdom, esp. chaps. 1 and 3.
27. Ibid. , table 5, 38-39, 40.
28. AHN, Inquisition, August 18, 1560, leg. 1792, nf. In 1560, the
town was reputed to have over 40 familiares, but it could boast no more
than 16 for the entire seventeenth century.
29. AHN, Inquisition, 1601-1602, leg. 8o6#i, nf.
30. AHN, Inquisition, March 27, 1553, lib. 960, ffs. 5~6v.
31. AHN, Inquisition, 1588, leg. 1781, exp. 7.
32. AHN, Inquisition, 1590, lib. 960, f. 52V.
33. Contreras, El Santo Oficio, 77, notes the opposition of many Gali-
cian lords to the establishment of familiares on their estates. This potential
opposition may have been one of the reasons the tribunal of Valencia
fought so hard to evade the provisions of the Concordia of 1568 which
stipulated the appointment of "ordinary persons" without titles or power.
AHN, Inquisition, July 10, 1568, lib. 1210, f. 56.
Copy righted material
Notes to Pages i6i-i6g
387
34. Lea, A History, 2:279.
35. The tribunal promised to obey this provision of the Concordia in a
letter to the Suprema: AHN, Inquisition, December 7, 1568, lib. 960, f.
45. Of course, it had no intention of abiding by this.
36. For a reference to the procedures used in an early genealogical
investigation, see AHN, Inquisition, November 20, 1551, lib. 911, f. 26;
also see AHN, Inquisition, July 29, 1566, leg. 1790, exp. 2, ffs. 142V- 143.
37. AHN, Inquisition, January 20, 1567, lib. 911, f. 803. Also see the
testimony of licentiate Felix de Olmedo: AHN, Inquisition, July 29, 1566,
leg. 1790, exp. 2, ffs. 142V- 143.
38. AHN, Inquisition, July 10, 1568, lib. 1210, ffs. 58-59.
39. AHN, Inquisition, December 24, 1568, leg. 503#i, nf.; December
23, 1568, lib. 912, f. 8.
40. AHN, Inquisition, May 7, 1569, leg. 503#i, nf. ; May 10, 1569, lib.
916, f. 62; August 2, 1571, leg. 503#i, nf.
41. Lea, AHN, A History, 2:301.
42. AHN, Inquisition, January 30, 1591, leg. 505#i, f. 358.
43. AHN, Inquisition, October 22, 1630, lib. 923, ffs. 694-695.
44. AHN, Inquisition, September 12, 1607, leg. 608, exp. 12.
45. AHN, Inquisition, February 3, 1591, lib. 917, f. 247.
46. AHN, Inquisition, March 2, 1663, leg. 634#i.
47. On December 2, 1653, commissioner Miguel Giner explained his
failure to interview more than three witnesses over 60 years of age during
a genealogical investigation in Burriana by reporting that the village had
suffered so badly from the epidemic of 1648 that those were the only
elderly persons left in the village. AHN, Inquisition, December 2, 1653,
leg. 6ig#i, exp. 2.
48. AHN, Inquisition, Septembers, 1614, leg. 6o9#i, exp. 3.
49. AHN, Inquisition, March 15, 1620, leg. 6i4#i, exp. 5.
50. Sicroff, Purete de sang, 203.
51. AHN, Inquisition, November 28, 1726, leg. 6o3#i, exp. 5.
52. AHN, Inquisition, September 2, 1761, leg. 6oi#i, exp. 5.
Abadia's application was helped by the fact that his wife, Mariana Mulet,
came from a family with a long tradition of membership in the corps of
familiares.
53. AHN, Inquisition, January 14, 1743, leg. 6o3#i, exp. 2.
54. AHN, Inquisition, November 24, 1612, leg. 6o4#i, exp. 3.
55. AHN, Inquisition, November 10, 1639, leg. 654#i, exp. 6.
56. Felipe Gaspar Capero and his wife, Jeronima Capero, were cous-
ins; therefore, Felipe was related to the suspect Vidal family of his
mother-in-law. AHN, Inquisition, August 13, 1603, leg. 633#i, exp. 1.
Also see July 18, 1675, leg. 633#i, exp. 3, for Nicolas Capero notary;
3«8
Notes to Pages 170-177
December 7, 1680, leg. 633#i, exp. 2, licentiate Juan Bautista Capero,
notary of Traiguera.
57. AHN, Inquisition, March 3, 1649, leg. 6o5#i, exp. 18; January 10,
1596, leg. 633#3, exp. 19.
58. AHN, Inquisition, February 23, 1639, leg. 642#i, exp. 2.
59. AHN, Inquisition, October 11, 1698, leg. 637#i, exp. 6.
60. AHN, Inquisition, March 5, 1740, leg. 6,53#i, exp. 6.
61. AHN, Inquisition, September 15, 1615, leg. 653#2, exp. 8.
62. AHN, Inquisition, November 12, 1766, leg. 653#i, exp. 7.
63. AHN, Inquisition, March 16, 1682, leg. 627#i, exp. 5. Felix
Breva's uncle, Dr. Jose Breva, had served as commissioner in Castellon,
then as calificador, and finally as calificador of the Suprema. AHN, Inquisi-
tion, September 20, 1773, leg. 627#i, exp. 6.
64. AHN, Inquisition, June 2, 1769, leg. 627#3, exp. 3.
65. AHN, Inquisition, September 16, 1645, leg. 6i3#2, exp. 17.
66. AHN, Inquisition, October 18, 1575, lib. 497, f. 178.
67. AHN, Inquisition, October 6, 1590, lib. 916, CPs. 16, 18; September
2, 1761, leg. 6oi#i, exp. 5.
68. Bennassar, L'Inquisition espagnole, XV-XVI (Paris: Hatchette,
1979), 98.
69. Garcia Carcel, Herejia, 150.
70. Garcia Carcel, Las Germamas, 164-169.
71. For Charles V's policy of conciliating Castile's urban elite, which
had played a leading role in the Comunero Revolution, see Haliczer, The
Comuneros, 223-227.
72. Ibid., 222.
73. AHN, Inquisition, July 15-16, 1566, leg. 1790, exp. 2, ffs. 842-885.
74. AHN, Inquisition, May 9, 1604, lib. 497, f. 255.
75. AHN, Inquisition, January 2, 1668, leg. 6i9#i, exp. 4.
76. AHN, Inquisition, May 12, 1643, leg. 652#2, exp. 10.
77. AHN, Inquisition, May 26, 1528, leg. 1790, f. 9. Garcia Carcel,
Origenes, 97.
78. The figures are drawn from Gandia in 1725. Casey, The Kingdom,
43-
79. AHN, Inquisition, May 8, 1600, leg. 505, f. 231.
80. AHN, Inquisition, August 28, 1587, lib. 916, ffs. 437-438.
81. AHN, Inquisition, March 4, 1590, lib. 960, ffs. 58-60.
82. AHN, Inquisition, August 25, 1607, lib. 918, ffs. 812-814.
83. AHN, Inquisition, January 27, 1660, leg. 503#2, exp. 5, ffs. 103-
105.
84. AHN, Inquisition, October 11, 1698, leg. 637, exp. 6.
85. AHN, Inquisition, June 6, 1639, leg. 633#i, exp. 3.
Copy righted material
Notes to Pages 177-183
389
86. AHN, Inquisition, November 10, 1723, leg. 623#2, exp. 3.
87. AHN, Inquisition, August 25, 1607, lib. 918, ffs. 812, 813.
88. Casey, The Kingdom, 102-105.
89. AHN, Inquisition, August 12, 1624, leg. 63o#i, exp. 1.
90. Casey, The Kingdom, 45.
91. Ibid., 167-169.
92. AHN, Inquisition, September 26, 1585; November 8, 1632; July
8, 1628, leg. 6i6#3, exps. 17-19.
93. Contreras, El Santo Oficio, 12.
94. AHN, Inquisition, March 29, 1653, leg. 6i4#i, exp. 4.
95. AHN, Inquisition, April 16, 1761, leg. 6o4#3, exp. 13.
96. AHN, Inquisition, October 16, 1767, leg. 624#i, exp. 5.
97. AHN, Inquisition, March 13, 1590, leg. 633#i, exp. 8.
98. AHN, Inquisition, September 4, 1631, leg. 633#2, exp. 12.
99. AHN, Inquisition, March 2, 1648; April 12, 1658, leg. 655#i,
exps. 6, 7.
100. AHN, Inquisition, March 10, 1752, leg. 655#2, exp. 9; leg.
655#i, exp. 5.
101. AMV, Insaculacion, 1661, Tomo 4, f. 32.
102. AMV, Insaculacion, 1686, Tomo 6, f. 171.
103. AMV, Insaculacion, 1686, Tomo 6, f. 171.
104. Casey, The Kingdom, 46.
105. AHN, Inquisition, 1610, leg. i783#2, exp. 11.
106. AHN, Inquisition, Septembers, ^39, leg. 6o8#i, exp. 6.
107. AHN, Inquisition, September 26, 1596, lib. 960, f. 241. The pre-
carious nature of mercantile wealth in the kingdom made the tribunal
insist on enrolling only the best established merchants; March 16, 1660,
leg. 503#2, ff. iiov-111.
108. Contreras, El Santo Oficio, 125-126.
109. It was not unusual for an applicant to boast that he lived off the
income from the agricultural land he rented out. AHN, Inquisition, Sep-
tember 15, 1641, leg. 645#i, exp. 14. Others were more adventurous.
Miguel Barbera, who was described as possessing the best agricultural
land in the village of Adzaneta, also engaged in the manufacture of wax.
AHN, Inquisition, October 23, 1780, leg. 6i6#i, exp. 5.
110. AHN, Inquisition, March 9, 1754, leg. 6i4#i, exp. 6.
111. AHN, Inquisition, November 20, 1771, leg. 6og#i, exp. 5.
112. AHN, Inquisition, July 12, 1782, leg. 6o3#i, exp. 1.
113. AHN, Inquisition, November 14, 1575, leg. 6i7#3, exp. 16.
114. The Suprema permitted an important part of the investigation of
Miguel Dalp to be waived because his son was serving as a familiar. AHN,
Inquisition, June 28, 1616, leg. 503#i, nf.
39«
Notes to Pages 283-190
115. AHN, Inquisition, November 8, 1632, leg. 6i6#3, exp. 18.
116. AHN, Inquisition, September 28, 1640, leg. 620#2, exp. 11.
117. AHN, Inquisition, November 12, 1717, leg. 6o2#2, exp. 12.
118. When they married, Miguel Feliu and Jacinta Gavila were related
to a total of thirteen familiares. AHN, Inquisition, December 3, 1648;
January 10, 1658, leg. 655#i, exps. 6, 7.
119. AHN, Inquisition, June 4, 1641, leg. 623#2, exp. 7.
120. AHN, Inquisition, March 29, 1653, leg. 6i4#i, exp. 4.
121. AHN, Inquisition, January 11, 1655, leg. 625#i, exp. 2.
122. AHN, Inquisition, January 19, 1690, leg. 640#i, exp. 7.
123. AHN, Inquisition, May 17, 1747, leg. 6i7#i, exp. 5.
124. AHN, Inquisition, September 13, 1633, leg. 644#i, exp. 19.
125. Contreras, El Santo Oficio, 104-106.
126. AHN, Inquisition, September 5, 1583, lib. 915, ffs. 448-448V.
127. Enrique Cock, Relation del viaje hecho por Felipe II en 1595 a
Zaragoza, Barcelona, y Valencia, eds. A. Morel-Fatio and A. Rodriguez
Villa (Madrid: 1876), 208. When Philip II visited Valencia in 1585, En-
rique Cock reported that everyone had to house members of the royal
guard "except those who belonged to the Holy Office." Cock, Viage, 208.
128. AHN, Inquisition, July 27, 1638, leg. 5og#i, nf.
129. AHN, Inquisition, July 27, 1640, leg. 509#i, nf.
130. AHN, Inquisition, July 10, 1658, lib. 1210, f. 64.
131. Lea, A History, 1:378.
132. AHN, Inquisition, October 17, 1626, lib. 922, f. 372.
133. AHN, Inquisition, July 5, 1639, lib. 498, f. 54.
134. Lea, A History, 1:378.
135. Contreras, El Santo Oficio, 139. This was confirmed later in the
century: AHN, Inquisition, January 12, 1668, lib. 498, f. 186.
136. Kagan, Lawsuits and Litigants, 29-30.
137. BNM, December 16, 1593, MSS. 2731, fss. 18-19.
138. See the tribunal's decision against the Count of Benavente in the
criminal case that he brought against Pedro Polo, one of the familiares from
his village of Villamarchante. Polo was absolved of the obviously trumped
up charges. AHN, Inquisition, December 23, 1760, leg. 232o#i, nf.
139. AHN, Inquisition, October 12, 1576, leg. 1781, exp. 2.
140. AHN, Inquisition, "procesos criminales," leg. i78i#i, exp. 9.
141. AHN, Inquisition, February 26, 1551, lib. 911, f. 18.
142. Lea, A History, 1:446.
143. AHN, Inquisition, July 28, 1632, leg. 5o8#2, ffs. 171-174.
144. Lea, A History, 1:447-448.
145. Kamen, "Public Authority," 661, 665, 667-669.
146. Ibid., 679.
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Notes to Pages igo-ig8
39i
147. Ibid., 660-663.
148. AHN, Inquisition, July 28, 1632, "Memoria de algunos perdones
hechos por el Marquis de los Velez," leg. iy88#2, exp. 24.
149. Kamen, "Public Authority," 680.
150. AHN, Inquisition, July 14, 1631, lib. 923, ffs. 75-76.
151. AHN, Inquisition, March 2, 1633, leg. 5o8#2, f. 282.
152. AHN, Inquisition, July 28, 1632, leg. 1788#2, exp. 24, ffs. 15-16.
The Audiencia and the viceroy had been authorized to commute penalties
(including the death penalty) to monetary payments in several cedulas:
Canet Aparisi, La Audiencia, 99.
153. AHN, Inquisition, June 20, 1628, lib. 922, f. 909.
154. AHN, Inquisition, October 31, 1628, lib. 922, f. 910.
155. AHN, Inquisition, July 28, 1632, leg. i788#2, exp. 24, f. 3V.
156. Lea, A History, 1:448.
157. Ibid., 2:273.
158. Kamen, Inquisition and Society, 148.
159. AHN, Inquisition, September 1, 1589, lib. 916, f. 713.
160. AHN, Inquisition, April 17, 1566; July 25, 1567; May 31, 1567,
lib. 911, ffs. 666, 705, 764.
161. AHN, Inquisition, January 21, 1603, leg. 8o4#2, f. 4.
162. AHN, Inquisition, June 27, 1672, leg. 8o2#2, f. 55.
163. AHN, Inquisition, May 29, 1672, leg. 8o2#2, f. 16.
164. Contreras, El Santo Oficio, 75-76.
165. AHN, Inquisition, February 6, 1606, leg. 8o3#i, ffs. 303-304.
166. Carlo Ginzburg, "The Dovecoate Has Opened Its Eyes: Popular
Conspiracy in Seventeenth-Century Italy," in Gustav Henningsen and
John Tedeschi, eds. The Inquisition in Early Modern Europe: Studies on
Sources and Methods (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1986),
190.
167. Ibid.
168. Kamen, Inquisition and Society, 148.
169. AHN, Inquisition, February 8, 1575, lib. 913, f. 439.
170. AHN, Inquisition, January 14, 1566, lib. 911, ffs. 657-660.
171. AHN, Inquisition, June 27, 1566, leg. 1790, f. 29.
172. AHN, Inquisition, March 29, 1553, lib. 960, ffs. 6-6v.
173. AHN, Inquisition, November 12, 1610, lib. 960, ffs. 257-258.
174. AHN, Inquisition, October 24, 1642, leg. 8o3#i, nf.
175. See chap. 1.
176. For an account of a typical genealogical investigation, see "dere-
chos de las informaciones de Jaime Fos y Anna Capella," AHN, Inquisi-
tion, April 1, 1632, leg. 662#i, exp. 8. In this investigation, which cost
1,006 reales, Fos paid 44 reales to the fabrica de Sevilla.
392
Notes to Pages ig8-2o6
177. AHN, Inquisition, December 9, 1631, lib. 923, f. 148.
178. AHN, Inquisition, June 3, 1637, leg. 5og#i, f. 228.
179. Lea, A History, 2:282.
180. This fee was 60 reales during the early seventeenth century, and it
was collected by the tribunal's secretaries as part of the applicant's de-
posit. At times, the confraternity's receiver had great difficulty in obtain-
ing these funds from the secretaries. AHN, Inquisition, March 13, 1618,
leg. 509#2, f. 149.
181. Lea, A History, 2:283.
182. AHN, Inquisition, 1749, leg. i746#i.
183. AHN, Inquisition, May 28, 1630, leg. 5o8#i, ffs. 270-271V; July
30, 1630, f. 302.
184. AHN, Inquisition, "Data y descargo dado por el Dr. Salvador
Sales, depositario de pretendientes de familiares del Santo Oficio de la
Inquisition de Valencia de lo que pago por cuenta de la cofradfa de famil-
iares desde enero de 1701 hasta ultimos de diciembre," leg. 4667#i, ffs.
14-15.
185. AHN, Inquisition, July 24, 1645, leg. 5og#2, f. 323.
186. AHN, Inquisition, April 25, 1632, leg. 8o7#2, nf.
187. AHN, Inquisition, April 25, 1632, leg. 8o7#2, nf.
188. AHN, Inquisition, April 1, 1632, leg. 8o7#i, nf.
189. AHN, Inquisition, April 14-18, 1632, leg. 8o7#2, nf.
190. AHN, Inquisition, April 22, 1632; June 14, 1645, leg. 8o7#2, nf.
191. AHN, Inquisition, May 2, 1649, leg. 8o7#2, nf.
192. AHN, Inquisition, April 22, 1632, leg. 8o7#2.
193. AHN, Inquisition, April 26, 1632, leg. 8o7#2, nf.
194. The 1649 visitation, for example, only yielded six denunciations or
confessions, three of which were sent to the Zaragoza tribunal since the
accused lived in that district, and only one resulted in prosecution by the
Valencia tribunal.
195. AHN, Inquisition, February 19, 1565, leg. 503#i, nf.
196. AHN, Inquisition, May 4, 1774, leg. 640#2, exp. 11.
197. AHN, Inquisition, July 10, 1568, lib. 1210, f. 61.
198. This figure is drawn from a sample of 72 individuals who carried
out genealogical investigations and whose ecclesiastical status was given in
the document.
199. AHN, Inquisition, March 5, 1794, leg. 2388, nf.
200. This evidence is derived from a sample of 106 notaries whose
ecclesiastical office is mentioned in genealogical investigations. The tribu-
nal had the services of 50 notaries in the early 1740s, but by 1798, this had
been reduced to 11. Martinez Millan, "La burocracia," 153.
201. AHN, Inquisition, June 25, 26, 1672, leg. 8o2#2, f. 48.
Copyrighted material
Notes to Pages 206-211
393
202. AHN, Inquisition, April 2, 1570, leg. 557#7-
203. AHN, Inquisition, February 1, 1649, leg. 52g#2, f. 5.
204. AHN, Inquisition, March 2, 1613, leg. 559#i, f. 7.
205. AHN, Inquisition, June 5, 1616, leg. 653#i.
206. AHN, Inquisition, March 11, 1647, leg. 63i#i, exp. 4.
207. AHN, Inquisition, May 13, 1752, leg. 6c>5#2, exp. 17.
208. Kamen, Inquisition and Society, 61, 254. For an example of the
popularity of the Holy Office among seventeenth-century intellectuals,
see Luis Diez de Aux, Compendio de la fiestas que ha celebrado la Impe-
rial ciudad de Zaragoza (Zaragoza: Ivan de Lanuja y Quartanet, 1619),
81-82.
V: The Converted Jews: From Persecution to Assimilation
1. Garcia Carcel, Origenes, 195. For the expansion of Jewish commu-
nities in medieval Valencia, see Robert I. Burns, Muslims, Christians and
Jews in the Crusader Kingdom of Valencia (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1984), 137-138. For the Jews of medieval Valencia, see
Leopoldo Piles Ros, "La juderia de Alcira (notas para su estudio)," Sefarad
XX (i960): 363-767; "La juderia de Burriana: Apuntes para su estudio,"
Sefarad XII (1952): 105-124; and "Los judios en la Valencia del siglo XV:
El pago de deudas," Sefarad VII (1947): 151-156.
2. Philippe Wolff, "The 1391 Pogrom in Spain: Social Crisis or Not,"
Past and Present 50 (Feb. 1971): 9-10.
3. Ibid., 18.
4. Azcona, Isabel la Catolica, 371.
5. Francisco Marquez Villanueva, "Conversos y cargos concejiles en el
siglo XV," Revista de Archivos, Museos y Bibliotecas 63 (1957): 505.
6. Angus Mackay, "Popular Movements and Pogroms in Fifteenth-
Century Castile," Past and Present 55 (May 1972): 59-60. In Valencia, as
in Castile, social pressure on the Jews appears to have decreased during
the fifteenth century. Piles Ros, "Los judios en la Valencia," 152, 154.
7. "Sentencia-Estatuto de Pero Sarmiento," June 5, 1449, quoted in
Eloy Benito Ruano, Toledo en el siglo XV (Madrid: CSIC, 1961), 191-
196.
8. Andres Bernaldes, Historia de los Reyes Catolicos, 599 et seq.,
cited by Haim Beinart, Conversos on Trial, 21.
9. Vatican Archives, Reg. Vat. 394, 410 Nicolas V, September 24,
1449, quoted in Benito Ruano, Toledo, 198.
10. Alonso de Oropesa, Lumen ad revelationem gentium, cited in Al-
bert Sicroff, Les controverses des statutes de purete de sang, 72.
11. Beinart, Conversos, 23.
394
Notes to Pages 211-21Q
12. Benzion Netanyahu, The Marranos of Spain from the Late XVth to
the Early XVIth Century (New York: American Academy for Jewish Re-
search, 1966), 3.
13. Julio Caro Baroja, Los Judws en la Espana moderna y contempo-
rdnea, 3 vols. (Madrid: Arion, 1962), 1:298.
14. AHN, Inquisition, August 1, 1487, leg. 534#i, exp. 6.
15. AHN, Inquisition, January 24, i486, leg. 535#i, exp. 13.
16. Ordering meat from Jewish butchers was extremely common
among Teruel's devout converso community. See the case of Manuel de
Puixmija: AHN, Inquisition, January 11, i486, leg. 542#2, exp. 39.
17. AHN, Inquisition, February 10, 1489, leg. 539#3, exp. 16.
18. Beinart, Conversos, 286-293, 297.
19. AHN, Inquisition, January 20, i486, leg. 535#i, exp. 14.
20. AHN, Inquisition, July 7, 1490; August 17, 1496, leg. 543, exp. 11.
21. AHN, Inquisition, May 29, 1518, leg. 534#i, exp. 10.
22. See Chap. VIII for oaths sworn by the Old Christians charged with
blasphemy.
23. AHN, Inquisition, June 8, 1519, leg. 559#3, exp. 12.
24. AHN, Inquisition, September 24, 1520, leg. 535#i, exp. 5.
25. Archivo General de Simancas, Patronato Real, March 31, 1492,
leg. 28, f. 6. Quoted in Luis Suarez Fernandez, Documentos acerca de la
expulsion de los judios (Valladolid: CSIC, 1964), 391-395. As I have
argued elsewhere, see Stephen Haliczer, "The Castilian Urban Patriciate
and the Jewish Expulsions of 1480-92," The American Historical Review
78 (February 1973): 49. The ideas expressed in the decree reflect the
view of Jewish iniquity expressed in the writings of certain converso
intellectuals rather than the reality of converso/Jewish social relations.
Certainly, the portrait of Spain's Jews as eager to make converts among
Christians is not in accord with Jewish traditions, while the outright
hostility expressed toward the conversos (who would have been the only
logical object of such a campaign) by Jewish rabbis and other Jewish
observers during the fifteenth century makes it highly unlikely that it
would have been seriously contemplated. Netanyahu, The Marranos,
135-201.
26. AHN, Inquisition, January 20, 1488, leg. 536#2, exp. 19.
27. AHN, Inquisition, August 22, i486, leg. 534#i, exp. 2.
28. AHN, Inquisition, September 3, 1485, leg. 542#2, exp. 40; May
10, 1485, leg. 535#i, exp. 4; August 9, 10, 1485, leg. 542#2, exp. 25.
29. AHN, Inquisition, April 23, 1485, leg. 542#2, exp. 25.
30. Netanyahu, The Marranos, 175.
31. AHN, Inquisition, August 22, 1504, leg. 542#i, exp. 7.
32. AHN, Inquisition, October 9, 1501, leg. 542#i, exp. 15.
Copy righted material
Notes to Pages 220-225
395
33. See the testimony of Francisca Janaloyas, AHN, Inquisition, May
10, 1485, leg. i35#i, exp. 14.
34. AHN, Inquisition, July 22, 1485, leg. 542#2, exp. 39.
35. AHN, Inquisition, September 15, 1493, leg. 8oi#2, exp. 4, ff.
312-314.
36. In Pedro Besant's case, the man noticed that he refused to eat any
meat they purchased from Christian butchers and insisted on slaughtering
chickens himself. AHN, Inquisition, February 26, i486, leg. 535#i, exp.
14.
37. AHN, Inquisition, January 11, i486, leg. 542#2, exp. 39.
38. AHN, Inquisition, January 25, 1492, leg. 540#i, exp. 6.
39. AHN, Inquisition, May 11, 1519, leg. 539#3, exp. 14.
40. AHN, Inquisition, May 19, 1519, leg. 539#3, exp. 14.
41. AHN, Inquisition, November 16, 1503; September 19, 1505, leg.
542#i, exp. 7. For a listing of additional trials involving these families,
see Garcia Carcel, Origines, 17% 301. Garcia Carcel is, of course, un-
aware of the way in which these trials first developed.
42. Garcia Carcel, Ortgenes, 167, 171-174. The analysis of the social
composition of Judaizers after 1540 comes from my own material.
43. Beinart, Conversos on Trial, 12-13.
44. This "demonizing" process was a product of mid-century and may
be seen in the text of Sentencia-Estatuto as well as in satires like the
apocryphal correspondence between Yussuf, head of the Jewish commu-
nity in Constantinople, and Chamorro, head of that in Toledo. Beinart,
Conversos on Trial, 7-8. For the link between demonic practices and
religious heresy made by the medieval church, see Norman Cohn, Eu-
rope's Inner Demons (New York: New American Library, 1977), 16-59.
45. Eymerich and Peria, he manuel, 138-139; Beinart, Conversos on
Trial, 13.
46. AHN, Inquisition, May 10, 1491, leg. 5g8#2, nf.
47. See Chap. II for a discussion of the period of grace.
48. Garcia Carcel, Origines, 180. In all too many cases, trials stemmed
from trifling omissions in the original confession. The major charges lev-
ied against Jofre Belcayre, for example, were that he had not mentioned
the names of all the persons who had participated in celebrating Judaic
ceremonies with him and that he had once, some forty years earlier,
discussed leaving Spain for Naples where he proposed to live as a Jew. For
this, he was sentenced to die at the stake. AHN, Inquisition, August 26,
1516, leg. 539#i.
49. AHN, Inquisition, 1506, leg. 597#i, exp. 8, ffs. 28-40.
50. Juan Anton, one of these immigrants, had converted in Naples
some years earlier and now lived in Teruel. Ibid., f. 56. In several cases,
396
Notes to Pages 226-234
the individuals listed on the census were later tried and penanced by the
Holy Office. Garcia Carcel, Origenes, 256, 300.
51. AHN, Inquisition, May 28, 1528, leg. 1790, exp. 1, ff. 15, 18-19.
52. AHN, Inquisition, May 28, 1528; June 21, 1528, leg. i79o#i, ffs.
17, 3 8 -39-
53. AHN, Inquisition, May 29, 1528, leg. i790#i, f. 27.
54. AHN, Inquisition, February 18, 1540, leg. 542#i, exp. 26.
55. This according to the testimony of Ausias Cardona, a familiar of the
Holy Office who had known Almenara for twenty-five years.
56. Direct evidence that Munibrega actually made that statement
comes from the testimony of Nuncio Bartolome de Brezianos.
57. AHN, Inquisition, February 25, 1542, leg. 534#2, exp. 12. The
admiral's intervention in favor of the conversos is recorded in his trial
record. AHN, Inquisition, January 30, 1569, leg. 55o#i, exp. 4, ff. 328-
332.
58. AHN, Inquisition, October 16, 1543; May 12, 1544, leg. 542#i,
exp. 26.
59. Lea, A History, 3:433.
60. AHN, Inquisition, November 27, 1551, lib. 911, ffs. 6-6v.
61. James Boyajian, Portuguese Bankers at the Court of Spain (New
Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1983), 2-3.
62. Ibid., 8, 11.
63. Vicente da Costa Mattos, Discursio contra los Judios, Fr. Diego
Gavilan Vega, trans. (Madrid: Viuda Melchor Alegre, 1680). The first
Spanish edition was in 1633.
64. AHN, Inquisition, April 15, 1586, lib. 916, f. 516.
65. AHN, Inquisition, May 16, 1586, leg. 539#i, exp. 5.
66. AHN, Inquisition, June 16, 1586, leg. 539#i, exp. 5.
67. AHN, Inquisition, March 24, 1638, leg. 8o4#2, ffs. 464-466.
68. For tax reform in the kingdom, see Henry Kamen, The War of
Succession in Spain 1700-15 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969),
323-327.
69. Lea, A History, 3:309. For a complete list of New Christians tried
in Valencia between 1718 and 1726, see AHN, Inquisition, leg. 503#2,
exp. 6.
70. Isabel de los Rfos was tried twice by the Holy Office. The first time,
she was sentenced to reconciliation and perpetual imprisonment by the
Logrono tribunal, and the second time, the Valencia tribunal handed
down the death sentence. AHN, Inquisition, May 2, 1693; February 24,
1723, leg. 543#2, exp. 10.
71. For the testimony of Maria de Tudela, see AHN, Inquisition, 1718-
19, leg. i6o#2, exp. 11. For the trials of the leading Valencia tobacco
Copy righted material
Notes to Pages 234-240
397
monopolists and their families, see AHN, Inquisition, leg. 3725#3, exps.
196, 197, 198, 199, 202, 214, 221. For the coordination of the efforts of
several tribunals on these cases, see AHN, Inquisition, May 16, 1719, leg.
503#3, exp. 7, ffs. 317V-318; September 19, 1719, ffs. 329-330. The
tribunal discussed its disappointment with the meager financial results of
the case against Felipe de Paz in AHN, Inquisition, June 30, 1722; June
22, 1723, leg. 5i3#3, ffs. 398-399, 417-418V. The author would like to
thank Rafael de Leca Garcia for pointing out some of this material.
72. Sicroff, Les controverses, 88-93, 270-281.
73. Ibid., 93.
74. AHN, Inquisition, October 13, 1569, lib. 912, ffs. 150-150V.
75. AHN, Inquisition, August, 3, 1520, lib. 317, f. 68v.
76. AHN, Inquisition, February 6, 1531, lib. 320, f. 386.
77. AHN, Inquisition, June 20, 1682, leg. 8o7#i, nf.
78. Lea, A History, 3:169.
79. AHN, Inquisition, November 8, 1567, leg. 503#i, nf.
80. AHN, Inquisition, March 8, 21, 1644, leg. 8o7#i, ffs. 5-6.
81. AHN, Inquisition, June 18, 1613, lib. 919, ffs. 848-849.
82. For the Suprema's insistence on maintaining the sanbenitos, see
Lea, A History, 3:170.
83. AHN, Inquisition, May 11, 1627, lib. 922, f. 845; see also above.
84. AHN, Inquisition, June 22, 1627, lib. 922, f. 842.
85. AHN, Inquisition, August 23, 1628. This is contained in the tribu-
nal's letter of September 12, 1628, lib. 922, ffs. 882-882V. This letter gives
the text of the Suprema's letter of August 31, 1628.
86. AHN, Inquisition, August 31, 1628, lib. 922, f. 865.
87. This had occurred on January 28, 1628, according to an official
document issued by Gregorio de Tapia, secretary of the Council of the
Military Orders. AHN, Inquisition, August 30, 1628, lib. 922, f. 857.
88. AHN, Inquisition, May 12, 1628, lib. 922, ffs. 858-859.
89. The actos positivos were affirmative decisions made by authorized
institutions, including the Inquisition and the Council of the Military
Orders, regarding the purity of blood of an applicant. Three were enough
for a family to be considered of pure blood so that a family member
presenting that number of actos would not have to undergo a formal
genealogical investigation when he applied for a position covered by the
"purity" statutes. Lea, A History, 2:306-308. Vicente boasted of his fam-
ily's accumulation of actos positivos in AHN, Inquisition, May 11, 1629,
lib. 922, f. 844.
90. AHN, Inquisition, October 17, 1629, leg. 5o8#i, f. 176.
91. AHN, Inquisition, September 26, 1630, leg. 5o8#i, ff. 347-348.
92. AHN, Inquisition, October 10, 1647, leg. 509#3, f. 97.
398
Notes to Pages 240-245
93. AHN, Inquisition, August 11, 1699, leg. i36i#i, nf.
94. AHN, Inquisition, July 12, 1700, leg. i36i#i, ffs. 75-76.
95. This letter was brought into evidence by the fiscal as one of many
reasons for rejecting Tomas Ginart y March's application. AHN, Inquisi-
tion, June 6, 1701, leg. i36i#i, ff. 225-226.
96. AHN, Inquisition, January 26, 1700, leg. i36i#i, nf.
97. This according to expert testimony furnished by the court archi-
vist. AHN, Inquisition, March 4, 1704, leg. i36i#i, f. 361.
98. AHN, Inquisition, May 31, 1704, leg. i36i#i, ffs. 394-398.
99. AHN, Inquisition, June 25, 1704, leg. i36i#i, f. 400.
100. AHN, Inquisition, July 9, 1704, leg. i36i#i, ff. 401-402.
101. AHN, Inquisition, September 7, 1700, leg. i36i#i, f. 24.
102. Sicroff, Les controverses , 212-216.
103. AHN, Inquisition, October 23, 1777, leg. 6o7#i, exp. 1. That
conversos from less influential families could still be rejected is proven by
the case of Mateo Cebrian: AHN, Inquisition, June 21, 1718, leg. 503#3,
exp. 7, f. 300.
104. AHN, Inquisition, September 14, 1792, leg. 542, exp. 34; May 6,
1815, leg. 535, exp. 12.
105. AHN, Inquisition, May 31, 1707, leg. 2308, nf.
106. AHN, Inquisition, November 20, 1643, leg. 5o-9#2, ffs. 224-226.
Jacob Cansino, who was official interpreter for the Spanish crown in Oran,
actually made several trips to Madrid and dedicated a book to the Count
Duke of Olivares. Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, From Spanish Court to Ital-
ian Ghetto (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), 167-168.
VI: The Moriscos
1. Robert Burns includes a detailed analysis of the treaties signed with
Eslida and Alfandech in Robert I. Burns, Muslims, Christians and Jews,
60-79.
2. Henry Charles Lea, The Moriscos of Spain: Their Conversion and
Expulsion (Philadelphia: Lea Brothers and Co., 1901), reprint ed. (New
York: Greenwood Press, 1966), 58.
3. Henri Lapeyre, La Geographic de I'Espagne morisque (Paris:
SEVPEN, 1959), 27-28.
4. Tulio Halperin Donghi notes that in 1565, only several hundred of
the more than 20,000 Morisco families were tenants of the realengo: Tulio
Halperin Donghi, Un conflicto nacional: Moriscos y cristianos viejos en
Valencia (Valencia: Institucion Alfonso el Magnanimo, 1980), 58.
5. Ibid., 138. Even before the period of the Germamas, certain Old
Christians were taking it on themselves to bully Valencia's mudejares into
Copy righted material
Notes to Pages 245-248
399
conversion. This campaign was supported by the tribunal. AHN, Inquisi-
tion, November 13, 1508, leg. 548#i, exp. 25.
6. A description of the conversion in Jativa is given in testimony in the
case of Jeronimo Catala who declared that the Agermanats threatened to
sack the Moorish quarter and massacre its inhabitants. AHN, Inquisition,
December 9, 1524, leg. 55o#i, exp. 10. Also see Ricardo Garcia Carcel
and E. Ciscar Pallares, Moriscos i agermanats (Valencia: L'Estel, 1974),
122-125; Antonio Dominguez Ortiz and Bernard Vincent, Historia de los
Moriscos: Vida y tragedia de una minoria (Madrid: Revista de Occidente,
1978), 23.
7. Lea, The Moriscos, 69.
8. Ibid., 70.
9. AGS, Estado, January 30, 1589, leg. 212, as quoted in P. Boronat y
Barrachina, Los Moriscos espanoles y su expulsion (Valencia: Francisco
Vives y Mora, 1901), 2:460-461.
10. Lea, The Moriscos, 68.
11. AHN, Inquisition, September 14, 1532, lib. 319, f. 123.
12. Lea, The Moriscos, 75-76.
13. Ibid., 78.
14. AHN, Inquisition, April 22, 1525, lib. 319, 180; Lea, The Moriscos, 79.
15. Ibid., 87.
16. AHN, Inquisition, April 3, 1530, leg. 558#2, exp. 15.
17. Lea, The Moriscos, 86.
18. Dominguez Ortiz and Vincent, Historia, 24; AHN, Inquisition,
January 6, 1526, lib. 319, f. 261V.
19. Dominguez Ortiz and Vincent, Historia, 96.
20. Ibid., 96-97.
21. Louis Cardaillac, Moriscos y cristianos: Un enfrentamiento po-
lemico, trans. Mercedes Garcia Arenal (Madrid: Fondo de Cultura Eco-
nomica, 1979), 45.
22. Ibid., 47.
23. AHN, Inquisition, July 5, 1560, leg. 1792, nf.
24. AHN, Inquisition, May 25, 1568, lib. 911, f. 964.
25. AHN, Inquisition, Decembers, 1567, leg. 548#i, exp. 2.
26. Cardaillac quotes approvingly the comment made by the pro-
foundly anti-Morisco archbishop of Valencia, Juan de Ribera, to the effect
that all of the expelled Moriscos were "infidels." Cardaillac, Moriscos, 94.
But see the case of Baltasar de Alaque, a leading Morisco religious
teacher, who was strongly impelled toward genuine conversion to Chris-
tianity by a missionary campaign. AHN, Inquisition, testimony of Juan
Pastor, rector of Yatova, March 13, 1573, leg. 548#i, exp. 7.
27. Andrew Hess, "The Moriscos: An Ottoman Fifth Column in
400
Notes to Pages 249-252
Sixteenth-Century Spain," The American Historical Review 74 (October
1968).
28. In a recent work that sums up current scholarship on the linguistic
history of Valencia before 1609, Maria del Carmen Barcelo Torres con-
cludes that the region was characterized by a duality in the use of Arabic
and Catalan until the end of the sixteenth century. Maria del Carmen
Barcelo Torres, Minorias isldmicas en el pais valenciano: Historic y dia-
lecto (Valencia: Universidad de Valencia, 1984), 151.
29. AHN, Inquisition, August 28, 1587, leg. 1791, nf.
30. Jaime Bleda, the violently anti-Morisco and anti-Semitic memo-
rialist of the early seventeenth century, speaks bitterly of those who "de-
fended" the Moriscos at court and in the universities. Jaime Bleda,
Coronica de los moros de Espana (Valencia: Felipe Mey, 1618), 884-886.
31. Cardaillac, Moriscos y cristianos, 148.
32. Ibid., 147-148.
33. Cardaillac, Moriscos y cristianos, 193, admits that "if the aljamiada
manuscripts are the sign of cultural degradation, those written in Castilian
testify to a certain assimilation."
34. Ibid., 186-187.
35. Dominguez Ortiz and Vincent, Historia, 240.
36. AHN, Inquisition, May 23, 1568, leg. 1791, nf.
37. Dominguez Ortiz and Vincent, Historia, 135.
38. AHN, Inquisition, September 22, 1573, lib. 915, ff. 415-415V.
39. Garcia Carcel, Origines, 220; Heregia, 223.
40. AHN, Inquisition, October 15, 1584; March 23, 1586, leg. 548#i,
exp. 8. Also see the case of Pedro Crespi, the nearly blind and illiterate
Morisco who carried an amulet with Islamic religious writings in the hope
that it would help restore his eyesight. AHN, Inquisition, January 10,
1583, leg. 550#2, exp. 18.
41. AHN, Inquisition, June 30, 1602, leg. 939, f. 167. In 1603, the
bishop of Segorbe wrote to the Holy See boasting of the 300 Moriscos who
regularly attended mass and received the sacraments in his diocese.
Barcelo Torres, Minorias isldmicas, 144.
42. Boronat y Barrachina, Los moriscos, 2:555.
43. AHN, Inquisition, March 8, 1612, leg. 8o3#i, nf.
44. See the increased level of religious knowledge and observance be-
tween the two trials of Miguel Aquem (1592, 1602). AHN, Inquisition,
November 15, 1591; May 29, 1602, leg. 548#2, exps. 17, 18. The assimila-
tion of Christian practices is astonishing even in an obdurate Morisco like
Juan Cavero who lived in the strongly Islamic Vail de Uxo. He went to
mass regularly, confessed, and knew all the basic prayers. AHN, Inquisi-
tion, September 25, 1590, leg. 549#2.
Copy righted material
Notes to Pages 252-257
401
45. Cardaillac, Moriscos y cristianos, 244-249. I am aware that Cardail-
lac asserts (248) that the Moriscos of Valencia had different and more
traditional views, but there is evidence to the contrary in trial records.
See AHN, Inquisition, November 8, 1604, leg. 548#i, exp. 10.
46. AHN, Inquisition, September 5, 1604, lib. 938, ffs. 219, 229V, 235.
47. Dommguez Ortiz and Vincent, Historia, 95.
48. AGS, Estado, December 4, 1581, leg. 212, as quoted in Boronat y
Barrachina, Los moriscos, 1:292.
49. Dommguez Ortiz and Vincent, Historia, 95.
50. Archivo del Real Colegio de Corpus Christi, 1595, Asignatura I, 7,
8, as quoted in Boronat y Barrachina, Los moriscos, 2:713-714.
51. AHN, Inquisition, March 7, 1582, leg. 8o6#2. The testimony was
especially reliable since it came from a local Old Christian hidalgo and was
later confirmed by a Morisco villager, Jaime Gibet.
52. See Aznar de Cardona's response to a Morisco s question about
confession. Pedro Aznar de Cardona, Expulsion justificada de los moriscos
de Espana (Huesca: Pedro Cabarte, 1612), ffs. 50V, 51.
53. AHN, Inquisition, December 12, 1564, leg. 1790.
54. AHN, Inquisition, March 16, 1558, lib. 911, ffs. 974-976V.
55. Boronat y Barrachina, Los moriscos, 1:285-286.
56. The crown eventually acceded and forgave them their contribu-
tions to the fund. BNM, 1601-1604, sig. ff. 9, as quoted in Boronat y
Barrachina, Los moriscos, 2:431-243.
57. In the discussion that preceded his vote, the count conceded that
"even now they have not even begun the rectories." AGS, Estado, n.d., as
quoted in Boronat y Barrachina, Los Moriscos, 2:466. For a different and
far more optimistic view of the rectories that was not shared by any other
observer, see Bleda, Coronica, 887.
58. AHN, Inquisition, May 23, 1565, leg. 548#i, exp. 2; Septembers,
1605, lib. 938, ffs. 236-237.
59. AHN, Inquisition, October 27, 1605, leg. 8o3#i, ffs. 279-280.
60. AHN, Inquisition, February 28, 1569, leg. 55o#i, exp. 4. Of
course, the admiral benefited financially from his tolerant policies.
Moriscos who went through his territories paid 1 to 3 ducats for a pass.
See the testimony of Miguel Zaragoza: March 7, 1542, f. 332V.
61. AHN, Inquisition, March 15, 1563, lib. 911, f. 515.
62. AHN, Inquisition, May 5, 1573, leg. 548#i, exp. 12.
63. Mercedes Garcfa-Arenal, Los moriscos (Madrid: Editora Nacional,
1975), 155-
64. AHN, Inquisition, July 7, 1553, lib. 911, f. 516.
65. AHN, Inquisition, April 22, 1575, lib. 913, ffs. 459-460.
66. Damian Fonseca's warning that any state with a population divided
402
Notes to Pages 257-261
along religious lines ran a grave risk of destruction was typical of this
highly negative attitude. Damian Fonseca, Justa expulsion tie los moriscos
de Espana (Rome: Jacomo Mascardo, 1612), 170.
67. AHN, Inquisition, September 5, 1587, leg. 505, nf. These fears
were fed by the alarming reports of redemptionist friars like Juan de Rojas
who warned in 1576 that Valencia's Moriscos would rise at the first oppor-
tunity: AHN, Inquisition, March 31, 1576, leg. 548#i, exp. 1.
68. Ellen G. Friedman, Spanish Captives in North Africa in the Early
Modern Age (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983), 12. Bleda,
Coronica, 890.
69. Friedman, Spanish Captives, 38-42, 191.
70. Ibid., 11.
71. AHN, Inquisition, November 4, 1576, leg. 548#i, exp. 1.
72. Friedman, Spanish Captives, 12.
73. Ibid., 7.
74. AGS, Estado, February 2, 1599, leg. 165, as quoted in Boronat y
Barrachina, Los moriscos, 1:388-389.
75. Dominguez Ortiz and Vincent, Historia, 116-117.
76. Garcia- Arenal, Los moriscos, 220-221.
77. Bleda discusses the hatred expressed by the militia forces that had
been mobilized to combat the Morisco rebellion that broke out just after
the expulsion order became known. The Moriscos who surrendered had
to be brought to the coast under escort by regular troops, Jaime Bleda,
Defenso fidei in causa neophytorum, sive Morischorum, as Appendix,
Breve relacion de la expulsion de los moriscos de Valencia (Valentiae:
Ioannem Chrusostomum Garriz, 1610), 592-594.
78. AGS, Inquisition, July 17, 1528, lib. 15, f. 468, quoted in Boronat y
Barrachina, Los moriscos, 1:423-428.
79. AHN, Inquisition, July 7, 1568, lib. 911, ffs. 926-931.
80. AGS, Estado, February 16, 1565, leg. 329, quoted in Boronat y
Barrachina, Los moriscos, 1:534-535.
81. Miranda is referred to as commissioner in Philip's letter of Febru-
ary 19, 1566. AHN, Inquisition, February 19, 1566, leg. 1791, nf.
82. Ibid. , 525-526.
83. Ibid., 532-540.
84. AHN, Inquisition, February 19, 1566, leg. 1791, nf.
85. AHN, Inquisition, February 26, 1583, leg. 1791, nf.
86. Garcia Carcel, Herejia, 27-28.
87. Lea, The Moriscos, 98.
88. AHN, Inquisition, March 2, 1532, lib. 321, ffs. 34-34V.
89. Lea, The Moriscos, 99.
90. Garcia Carcel, Herejia, 53.
Notes to Pages 261 -265
403
91. AHN, Inquisition, March 14, 1557, lib. 911, ffs. 245-248.
92. Garcia-Arenal, Los moriscos, 135. For the tribunal's demand that
its jurisdiction be fully restored on the grounds that the Moriscos "live like
Moors," see AHN, Inquisition, February 9, 1563, leg. 503#i, f. 47V.
93. Garcia Carcel, Herejia, 57, 60.
94. AHN, Inquisition, July 6, 1568, lib. 911, f. 929V.
95. AHN, Inquisition, July 6, 1568, lib. 911, ffs. 909-909V; June 25,
1568, leg. 549#i, exps. 7, 11.
96. AHN, Inquisition, January 12, 1568; December 24, 1577, leg.
548#i, exp. 2.
97. AHN, Inquisition, March 4, 1568, lib. 911, f. 886; Garcia Carcel,
Herejia, 79.
98. AHN, Inquisition, April 8, 1566, leg. 1791, exp. 2, nf.
99. AHN, Inquisition, June 23, 1568, leg. 503#i, nf.
100. For the Concordia between the Moriscos and the tribunal, see
AHN, Inquisition, October 12, 1571, lib. 917, ffs. 808-813. For a detailed
discussion of the Inquisition's obligations under the agreement and the
frank admission by Valencia's inquisitors that the tribunal had always kept
any money it earned from fines, see AHN, Inquisition, July 14, 1595, lib.
917, ffs. 770-773.
101. Garcia Carcel, Herejia, 81-83, 98-99; Dominguez Ortiz and Vin-
cent, Historia, 56.
102. Garcia Carcel, Herejia, 99.
103. Ibid., 99-102. For the tribunal's initially positive view of Polo's
evidence against the alleged plot, see AHN, Inquisition, April 19, 1587,
lib. 937, ffs. 1-3. Garcia Carcel, Herejia, 102, seems rather confused as
to the real outcome of this case, but the heavy punishment given at the
auto de fe of April 19, 1587 (200 lashes and perpetual galley service), and
the details of the sentence against the two men makes it clear that the
tribunal had concluded that the entire plot was a fabrication and that the
men had perjured themselves. AHN, Inquisition, April 19, 1587, lib.
937, ffs. 1-3.
104. Jaime Contreras, "Las causas de fe en la Inquisicion espariola
(1500-1700): Analisis de una estadfstica," unpublished report presented at
the Simposium Interdisciplinario de la Inquisicion Medieval y Moderna
(Copenhagen, 1978), 37.
105. Information about the life-style of these families comes from hear-
ings held before the royal captain of the city and community of Teruel.
The royal order to investigate the truth of their claim that they should be
considered Old Christians is in AHN, Inquisition, September 21, 1575,
lib. 916, ffs. 224-225. Also see October 13, 1575, lib. 916, ffs. 226-227,
228, 229, 230-232V.
4«4
Notes to Pages 26s-26g
106. See the trial of Diego de Arcos, AHN, Inquisition, March 23,
1582, leg. 549#i, exp. 4, and Francisco Lopez Royz, November 26, 1581,
leg. 552#2, exp. 20.
107. AHN, Inquisition, May 22, 1581, lib. 913, ffs. 121-121V, 139.
Garcia Carcel, Herejia, 104, implies wrongly that this suggestion was first
put forward in 1582.
108. AHN, Inquisition, July 30, 1587, leg. 1791, nf. Also see Boronat y
Barrachina, Los moriscos, 1:625, 630. Garcia Carcel, Herejia, cites only
Boronat's summary of this document and not the document itself.
109. Friedman, Spanish Captives, 6-7.
110. Contreras, "Las causas de fe," 37.
111. AGS, Estado, January 30, 1608, leg. 212, as quoted in Boronat y
Barrachina, Los moriscos, 2:457-474.
112. Boronat y Barrachina, Los moriscos, 2:150-151; Garcia Carcel,
Herejia, 124.
113. Bleda, Defensio fidei, 597-601, prints the expulsion decree.
114. For the revelation told to the Valencia!) noble, Juan Boil de
Arenos, by his confessor, Fray Luis Bertran, in an effort to get him to ask
the king to expel the Moriscos, see Fonseca, Justa expulsion, 163. For
heavenly attempts to warn Spain of impending doom if the Moriscos were
allowed to remain, see ibid., 166-169.
115. Halperin Donghi, Un conflicto, 183.
116. Archivo General Central, Inquisicion de Valencia, leg. 604, as
quoted in Boronat y Barrachina, Los moriscos, 2:657-665.
117. Garcia Carcel, Herejia, 92.
118. Archivo del Real Colegio de Corpus Christi, January 31, 1608,
Sig. I, 7, 8, 63, as quoted in Boronat y Barrachina, Los moriscos, 2:142-
143; Garcia Carcel, Herejia, 123.
119. AHN, Inquisition, June 13, 1606, lib. 918, ffs. 761-768. Garcia
Carcel, Herejia, 122, discusses this memorial but glosses over this aspect
of the proposal.
120. AHN, Inquisition, January 30, 1609, lib. 933, ffs. 127- 127V. Also
see the tribunal's letter suggesting several cases of Moriscos who had been
condemned to the galleys for release in a payment that could be used
"para que se pudiese fabricar la casa y carcel de la penitencia." AHN,
Inquisition, lib. 935, ffs. 125-126. Also see AHN, Inquisition, August 21,
1608, lib. 332, ff. 184-185, for additional commutations.
121. These statistics are based on 1,681 Moriscos tried by the tribunal
from 1580 to 1615.
122. Contreras, "Las causas de fe," 37.
123. AHN, Inquisition, March 7, 1615, leg. 506, f. 460. For a detailed
account of these rebellions, see Bleda, Defenso fidei, 590-591.
Copyrighted material
Notes to Pages 26Q-271
405
124. Lapeyre, La geographie, 64, 66.
125. Friedman, Spanish Captives, 210-221.
126. Ibid., 24; AHN, Inquisition, October 16, 1612, lib. 919, ff. 514-
514V; March 26, 1613, leg. 553#2, exp. 18; October 30, 1624, leg. 548#2,
exp. 21.
127. AHN, Inquisition, February 3, 1615, leg. 5o6#i, f. 454.
128. AHN, Inquisition, October 29, 1624, leg. 548#i, exp. 21.
129. AHN, Inquisition, August 27, 1625, leg. 507#i, f. 514.
130. Between 1615 and 1700, there were 204 cases, but they were
heavily concentrated in the first years after the expulsion. Contreras, "Las
causas de fe," 37.
131. The figures on the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are my
own.
132. Dommguez Ortiz and Vincent, Historia, 109.
133. AHN, Inquisition, January 26, 1568, leg. 548#i, exp. 2, f. 30V.
134. Dommguez Ortiz and Vincent, Historia, 109. The so-called
alfaquis (Islamic religious teachers) were usually just private individuals
with some religious learning. AHN, Inquisition, October 22, 1591, leg.
55o#2, exp. 20.
135. AHN, Inquisition, October, 1965; January 6, 1566, lib. 911, ff.
598, 603.
136. Dommguez Ortiz and Vincent, Historia, 121-124. See the case of
the famous Morisco physician, Jeronimo Pachet, who was tried in 1567
and 1580 and deprived of the right to practice medicine in his second
sentence: AHN, Inquisition, October 23, 1580, lib. 936, ff. 275V, 276.
Also see the case of Gaspar Capdal, the brilliant young Morisco physician
(24) who was deprived of the right to practice medicine: AHN, Inquisi-
tion, January 7, 1607, leg. 549#2, exp. 19.
137. This conclusion is based on the 677 Moriscos tried by the Holy
Office whose occupations are stated in the relaciones de causas.
138. For example, 4.3 percent of those tried for Protestantism were
professionals.
139. Casey, The Kingdom, 84.
140. Ibid., 33.
141. Dommguez Ortiz and Vincent, Historia, 120.
142. Halperin Donghi cautions us not to exaggerate the wealth and
importance of these petty traders. Halperin Donghi, Un conflicto, 73-
75-
143. Casey, The Kingdom, 40, points out that 3 percent of the landless
Moriscos of Jativa had workshops.
144. Casey, The Kingdom, 43-44, compares the farms held by Moriscos
with the requirements of the Old Christian settlers after the expulsion.
406
Notes to Pages 271-276
145. Ibid. , 38-39; Halperin Donghi, Un conflicto, 86.
146. AHN, Inquisition, July 1, 1596, lib. 917, ffs. 1007-1010. Also see
the inventory of the possessions of Beatriz Gamir, AHN, Inquisition,
September 5, 1583, leg. 55i#2, exp. 19.
147. Women comprised 28.5 percent of the Morisco offenders and a
remarkably similar 30 percent of the Judaizers. This is a very high percent-
age compared to such "male" offenses as propositions, where they only
made up 6. 1 percent of the offenders.
148. AHN, Inquisition, June 13, 1606, lib. 918, f. 766.
VII: Illuminism, Erasmianism, and Protestantism:
The Problem of Religious Dissent
1. Lea, A History, 3:411.
2. Kamen, Inquisition and Society, 198-199.
3. Ibid., 203.
4. Garcia Carcel, Herejia, 343, mentions this in general terms. The
statistic comes from my own survey of the relaciones de causas. More than
89 percent of the accused were Old Christians.
5. Kamen, Inquisition and Society, 202. J. Martinez de Bujanda, "Lit-
erature y Inquisicion en Espana en el siglo XVI," in Joaquin Perez
Villanueva, ed., La Inquisicion espanola: Nueva vision, nuevos horizontes
(Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno, 1980), 587, discusses the anticlerical humor in
Lazarillo de Tormes which remained even after it had been expurgated by
order of the Holy Office.
6. Lea, A History, 4:139, 328.
7. AHN, Inquisition, September 17, 1564, leg. 5i9#i, exp. 2.
8. Kamen, Inquisition and Society, 202.
9. For an account of the official support for the reform of the clergy,
see Azcona, Isabel la Catolica, 469-484, 565-608.
10. Antonio Marquez, Los alumbrados: Origines y filosofia (Madrid:
Taurus, 1972), 127-136.
11. Lea, A History, 4:6-7.
12. Marquez, Los alumbrados, 125-126. Melquiades Andres Martin,
"Pensamiento teologico y viviencia religiosa en la reforma espanola," in
Jose Luis Gonzalez Novalm, ed., Historia de la Iglesia, 3, pt. 2:346-350.
13. Marcel Bataillon, Erasmo y Espana, trans. Antonio Alatorre, 2d ed.
(Madrid: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1979), 183-184.
14. Lea, A History, 4:3.
15. Ibid., 9.
16. Andres Martin, "Pensamiento teologico," 279-282.
17. Bataillon, Erasmo, 180-182.
Copyrighted material
Notes to Pages 277-280
407
18. Marquez, Los alumbrados, 64-69; Lea, A History, 4:7-14.
19. Marquez, Los alumbrados, 25.
20. For the Illuminists of Extremadura, see Alvaro Huerga, Historia de
los alumbrados, 2 vols. (Madrid: Fundacion Universitaria Espanola,
1978). For later manifestations, see Lea, A History, 4:41-42.
21. Huerga, Historia, 1:382.
22. AHN, Inquisition, January 14, 1538, leg. 533#i, exp. 5.
23. Contreras, "Las causas de fe," 28, 50, fails to list any Aluinbrado
cases for the tribunal for the period 1560-1700. While it is true that most
of the cases I place under this heading were not called Aluinbrado by the
tribunal, I have preferred to read the record and classify them in accor-
dance with the generally accepted definitions of Illuminism. The case of
Fray Vicente Oriente was definitely called Aluinbrado. AHN, Inquisition,
June 22, 1649, leg. 52g#2, exp. 5.
24. These were the words of one of her chief devotees, Remigio Choza,
the vicar of the parish church of San Miguel in Valencia city. AHN, Inquisi-
tion, April 8, 1669, lib. 944, f. 54V.
25. AHN, Inquisition, June 9, 1672, lib. 944, f. 48V.
26. Ibid., f. 44.
27. Ibid., April 8, 1669 (Choza), f. 36; June 9, 1672 (Torres), f. 46.
28. Ibid., July 10, 1668, f. 36.
29. Ibid., June 9, 1672, f. 46.
30. Ibid. , June 9, 1672, f. 48V.
31. Ibid., January 14, 1669, f. 66.
32. AHN, Inquisition, February 18, 1675, lib. 944, f. 64.
33. For the trials and sentences of the priests, see AHN, Inquisition,
February 13, 1675, lib. 944, f. 52V; August 26, 1676, leg. 52g#2, exp. 3,
and March 27, 1675, leg. 52g#2, exp. 4. Jose Navarro went mad in his cell
and died in Valencia's general hospital without regaining his sanity; Choza
died in the general hospital of Alicante while still serving his sentence.
34. See chap. 1.
35. Josefa Clement was not imprisoned until July 19, 1674, even
though testimony against her had been received as early as May 8, 1668,
and her general confession on June 9, 1668.
36. For a discussion of the spirituals see Dermont Fenlon, Heresy and
Obedience in Tridentine Italy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1972)-
37. Marquez, Los alumbrados, 172-175.
38. This bull merely reinforced earlier papal support even though it
was far from the full protection hoped for by Erasmians like Alfonso de
Valdes. Bataillon, Erasmo, 264.
39. Ibid., 262-263.
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4o8
Notes to Pages 2S0-289
40. Ibid., 265.
41. Ibid., 309-310.
42. AHN, Inquisition, January 19, 1536, leg. 53i#i, exp. 38. Mezquita
was only held for a total of ten days. He was released on January 29, 1529.
43. Bataillon, Erasmo, 975-981.
44. Pinto Crespo, Inquisition y control, 155-156.
45. Ibid., 157.
46. Bataillon, Erasmo, 702.
47. Jean-Pierre Dedieu, "Le modele religieuse: Le refus de la Reforme
et le controle de la pensee," in B. Bennassar, ed., L'Inquisition espagnole,
279-281.
48. These were essentially the views of Dr. Constantino, one of the
leading Erasmians of Seville. Bataillon, Erasmo, 536.
49. Gonzalez Martinez, "Bandolerismo," 85.
50. Bataillon, Erasmo, 607, 728.
51. Gonzalez Martinez, "Bandolerismo," 86-87. AHN, Inquisition, De-
cember 9, 1562, leg. 503#i, exp. 1, f. 43V.
52. AHN, Inquisition, Letter from Arquer, October 22, 1551, leg.
io9#i, exp. 1, ffs. 89-91V.
53. AHN, Inquisition, March 20, 1573, leg. iog#i, exp. 1, nf.
54. Bataillon, Erasmo, 730-731.
55. For this incident, see chap. 1.
56. Bataillon, Erasmo, 732. For the sentence itself, see Manuel Ardit
Lucas, La Inquisicio al pais Valencia (Valencia: Sanchis i Cardona, 1970),
73-
57. AHN, Inquisition, May 2, 1562, leg. 503#i, exp. 1, f. 26. For the
tribunal's complaint about its poverty, see June 9, 1562, ffs. 29-30.
58. Lea, A History, 3:453. Garcia Carcel, Herejia, 336, asserts mistak-
enly that the trial lasted "scarcely a year" when it actually took more than
17 months.
59. AHN, Inquisition, September 22, 1564, leg. 503#i, exp. 1, nf.
60. AHN, Inquisition, 1526, leg. 8oo#3, exp. 11.
61. AHN, Inquisition, June 23, 1751, leg. 530#2, exp. 15; Lea, A
History, 3:477-479.
62. Abel Poitrineau, "La inmigracion francesa en el reino de Valencia,"
Moneda y Credito 137 (June 1976): 106-107, 112-113.
63. AHN, Inquisition, November 6, 1574, lib. 913, f. 232.
64. AHN, Inquisition, April 17, 1566, lib. 911, ffs. 666-666v.
65. AHN, Inquisition, June 19, 1568, lib. 497, ffs. 105-106.
66. AHN, Inquisition, April 19, 1587, lib. 937, ffs. 42V-43V.
67. AHN, Inquisition, September 9, 1583, leg. 53i#i, exp. 6.
68. AHN, Inquisition, October 12, 1564, leg. 530#i, exp. 8.
Copyrightad material
Notes to Pages 290-298
409
69. AHN, Inquisition, June 26, 1612, leg. 8n#2, f. 283. For a similar
case, see AHN, Inquisition, August 1, 1634, leg. 8o3#i, ffs. 32-33.
70. AHN, Inquisition, May 17, 1597, leg. 505#2, f. 104; Lea, A His-
tory, 3:463.
71. Lea, A History, 3:464.
72. AHN, Inquisition, October 8, 1605, lib. 497, ffs. 264-265.
73. AHN, Inquisition, April 22, 1605, lib. 497, ffs. 265-266.
74. Lea, A History, 3:465.
75. BNM, June 10, 1609; MSS. 287, f. 13; Lea, A History, 3:465.
76. AHN, Inquisition, May 19, 1620, ffs. 309V-310V.
77. AHN, Inquisition, October 24, 1647, lib. 497, ffs. 113V-114.
78. AHN, Inquisition, September 15, December 16, 1651, leg. 503#3,
ffs. 413, 414; Lea, A History, 3:469.
79. AHN, Inquisition, October 27, 1664, leg. 55i#i, f. 278.
80. Kamen, The War of Succession, 292.
81. Dedeiu, "Le modele," 291.
82. Ibid., 289.
83. AHN, Inquisition, May 23, 1565, leg. 548#i, exp. 2.
VIII: The Inquisition in the Post-Tridentine Era
1. Hubert Jedin, A History of the Council of Trent, 2 vols. (New York:
B. Herder, 1961), 2:10, 29.
2. Jedin, A History, 2:331.
3. Peter Burke, Popular Culture in Early Modern Europe (London:
Temple Smith, 1978), 220—221. For a discussion of the relative role of
reforming bishops and the Inquisition in imposing Tridentine reforms in
Cuenca, see Sara Nalle, Religion and Reform in a Spanish Diocese: Cuenca,
1645-1650 (Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 1983), 54.
4. Burke, Popular Culture, 211-212.
5. Lea, A History, 4:328.
6. Tomas y Valiente, El derecho penal, 224.
7. Lea, A History, 4:329.
8. Eymerich and Pena, Le manuel, 63-64.
9. Lea, A History, 4:33!~33 2 -
10. Ibid., 4:329-330.
11. Garcia Carcel, Origenes, 204.
12. Garcia Carcel, Herejia, 343. The overall figures are my own, as
Contreras fails to differentiate between blasphemy and propositions.
13. AHN, Inquisition, January 14, 1612, leg. 8o4#2, f. 235V.
14. AHN, Inquisition, May 3, 1647, lib. 941, ffs. 295-298.
15. AHN, Inquisition, July 23, 1643, leg. 8o3#i, nf.
4io
Notes to Pages 2g8~so3
16. Antonio Maravall, La Cultura del Barroco: Andlisis de una
estructura historica (Barcelona: Ariel, 1975), 138-139.
17. Burke, Popular Culture, 212-213.
18. AHN, Inquisition, December 14, 1742, leg. 522#6.
19. AHN, Consejos, December 20, 1701, leg. 4759, as quoted in Tomas
y Valiente, El derecho penal, 424-426.
20. Jean Pierre Dedieu, "Le modele sexual: La defense du manage
chretien," in Bennassar, L Inquisition espagnole, 326-327.
21. AHN, Inquisition, December 14, 1474, lib. 713, f. 335.
22. For the tribunals of Toledo and Logrono, see Dedieu, "Le modele. "
The figures on Valencia are my own.
23. Lea, A History, 4:316.
24. Dedieu, "Le modele sexuel," 315-316.
25. AHN, Inquisition, September 15, 1563, leg. 503, f. 58.
26. AHN, Inquisition, July 7, 1567, leg. 5i8#i, exp. 11.
27. AHN, Inquisition, October 1, 1746, leg. 5i8#2, exp. 21.
28. Lea, A History, 4:319.
29. Dedieu, "Le modele sexuel," 319.
30. Lea, A History, 4:322-323.
31. AHN, Inquisition, December 11, 1765, leg. 5i8#2, exp. 15.
32. AHN, Inquisition, October 26, 1569, leg. 5i8#i, exp. 9.
33. AHN, Inquisition, September 17, 1564, leg. 5i8#i, exp. 13.
34. Tomas y Valiente, El derecho penal, 226-227.
35. Bartolome Bennassar, "Le modele sexuel: L'Inquisition d'Aragon et
le repression des peches 'abominables,' " in Bennassar, L'Inquisition
espagnole, 342; AHN, Inquisition, September 30, 1687, lib. 932, f. 337V;
Cerdan de Tallada, Visita, 198.
36. Lea, A History, 4:363. Garcia Carcel, Herejia, 288, seems unaware
that Clement VII's Brief of February 24, 1524, gave jurisdiction over
sodomy only to the tribunals of Aragon.
37. Bennassar, "Le modele," 346-347.
38. Garcia Carcel, Origenes, 211.
39. Garcia Carcel, Herejia, 288, follows Contreras when he asserts that
the tribunal tried 379 cases of sodomy and bestiality between 1540 and
1700, but these figures are unreliable because Contreras lumped these
offenses with several others so that the figure of 379 must include many
offenses unconnected with the "crimes against nature." Contreras, "Las
causas de fe," 18. Rafael Carrasco, Inquisicion y represion sexual en Valen-
cia (Barcelona: Laertes, 1985), 38, counts 347 cases between 1566 and
1775, 259 of which referred to male homosexuality, but Carrasco is not
aware of the existence of ARV, Clero, leg. 161, and has therefore left out
many eighteenth-century cases.
Copyrighted material
Notes to Pages 303-310
411
40. AHN, Inquisition, November 7, 1572, leg. 503#i, nf.
41. AHN, Inquisition, January 28, 1573, leg. 503#i, nf.
42. Lea, A History, 4:371.
43. AHN, Inquisition, January 2, 1572, leg. 503#i, nf.; Lea, A His-
tory, 4:370; AHN, Inquisition, December 12, 1573, lib. 913, f. 163.
44. AHN, Inquisition, November 7, 1572, leg. 503#i.
45. AHN, Inquisition, August 22, 1616, leg. 559#i, exp. 7.
46. Lea, A History, 4:369.
47. AHN, Inquisition, November 14, 1624, leg. 507#i, f. 392.
48. Garcia Martinez, 86-87.
49. AHN, Inquisition, April 23, 1573, leg. 503#i, nf. The tribunal
warned the Suprema in this letter that Francisco Tallada and Miguel
Centelles were in extreme personal danger as a result of their testimony.
50. AHN, Inquisition, June 18, 1573, leg. 503#i, nf; February 21,
1575, leg. 503#i, nf.
51. AHN, Inquisition, November 20, 1572, leg. 503#i, nf.
52. AHN, Inquisition, October 14, 1574, leg. 503, nf.
53. AHN, Inquisition, November 18, 1575, lib. 913, ffs. 571, 575.
54. AHN, Inquisition, April 23, 1571, leg. 503#i, nf., for a list of ten
leading Valencian nobles already punished or under suspicion for aiding
their Morisco vassals.
55. Garcia Carcel, Herejia, 293. In his brief comment on this case,
Garcia Carcel makes no mention of the original sentence, which was
noted in Lea, A History, 4:370, and leaves the mistaken impression that
he was not punished at all.
56. AHN, Inquisition, July 19, 1613-August 22, 1616, leg. 559#i, exp.
7-
57. AHN, Inquisition, August 9, 1581, leg. 559#i, exp. 2.
58. AHN, Inquisition, March 25, 1621, leg. 5i8#i, exp. 5.
59. Tomas y Valiente, El derecho penal, 229.
60. Carrasco, Inquisicion y represion, 31.
61. AHN, Inquisition, February 9, 1609, leg. 8o3#i, f. 429V.
62. AHN, Inquisition, July 24, 1666, leg. 8o2#i, f. 346.
63. Carrasco, Inquisicion y represion, 120-121.
64. AHN, Inquisition, April 23, 1574, leg. 559#3, exp. 16.
65. AHN, Inquisition, May 15, 1758, leg. 56o#i, exp. 7; Carrasco,
Inquisicion y represion, 25, discusses this case.
66. AHN, Inquisition, May 16, 1796, leg. 56o#i, exp. 3. A similar
easy-going attitude toward homosexuality may be seen in Bouchard's Con-
fessions written in the seventeenth century which contains an account of
casual homosexuality among schoolmates at a Jesuit academy. Aldous Hux-
ley, The Devils of Loudun (New York: Harper, 1952), 10. All this is a far
412
Notes to Pages 310-317
cry from the "massive societal rejection" of homosexual behavior seen
among the popular classes by Carrasco, Inquisition y represion, 22.
67. AHN, Inquisition, February 5, 1573, lib. 913, ffs. 13-14.
68. See above.
69. AHN, Inquisition, September 30, 1687, lib. 932,, ffs. 337-338.
Carrasco, Inquisition y represion, 63-65, presents ten cases in which the
Suprema intervened to alter sentences. In some cases, the Suprema made
the penalty somewhat harsher, but it never imposed the death penalty
and, in three cases, reduced it to galley service.
70. Carrasco, Inquisition y represion, 69, has a considerably higher
figure for those relaxed for sodomy, but the additional cases I draw from
the eighteenth century tend to reduce the percentage of executions and
other heavier penalties.
71. E. P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origins of the Black Act
(New York: Pantheon, 1975), 260.
72. Alfred Soman, "Les Proces de Sorcellerie au Parlement de Paris
(1565-1640)," Annates ESC (July-August 1977): 810-811.
73. Tomas y Valiente, El derecho penal, 230-231.
74. H. C. Erik Midlefort, Witch-hunting in Southwestern Germany
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), 18.
75. Mary O'Neil, "Magical Healing, Love Magic, and the Inquisition in
Late-Sixteenth-Century Modena," in Stephen Haliczer, ed., Inquisition
and Society in Early Modern Europe (London: Croom-Helm, 1986), 91.
76. Gaspar Navarro, Tribunal de superstition ladina (Huesca: Pedro
Bluson, 1631), 1631, ffs. 52-55V. Navarro cites the Malleus Maleficarium
quite frequently; see ffs. 56V-57, 61-62.
77. Lea, A History, 4:217.
78. Henningsen, The Witches' Advocate, 176.
79. Lea, A History, 4:212-213.
80. Henningsen, The Witches' Advocate, 371-373.
81. AHN, Inquisition, June 19, 1588, lib. 937, ffs. 74-75V. For the
child witches of Germany, see Midlefort, Witch-hunting, 144-145, 159,
179-
82. AHN, Inquisition, December 15, 1642, lib. 941, ffs. 209-210.
83. AHN, Inquisition, March 14, 1640, January 9, 1648, lib. 941, ffs.
324V-326.
84. Porcar, Cosas evanguadas, 69, 78, 79, 101, 114, 121.
85. Keith Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic (London: Weiden-
feld and Nicolson, 1971), 25.
86. Ibid., 29.
87. Ibid., 49-50.
88. Lea, A History, 4:198-199.
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Notes to Pages 317-325
41.3
89. AHN, Inquisition, October 7, 1732, leg. 514, f. 60.
90. AHN, Inquisition, March 18, 1680, leg. 8o4#2, nf.
91. AHN, Inquisition, January 9, 1648, lib. 941, f. 326.
92. AHN, Inquisition, January 28, 1651, lib. 941, ffs. 346-347.
93. AHN, Inquisition, October 3, 1642, lib. 941, ffs. 213-214.
94. AHN, Inquisition, November 26, 1653, leg. 523#i, exp. 7.
95. Ibid.
96. Midlefort, Witch-hunting, 183-185.
97. Jedin, A History, 25; T. M. Parker, "The Papacy, Catholic Reform
and Christian Missions," in R. B. Wernham, ed., New Cambridge Modern
History 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, i960), 45.
98. Jedin, A History, 355.
99. Bossy, "The Counter-Reformation and the People of Catholic Eu-
rope," Past and Present, no. 47 (May 1970): 52-53.
100. Jedin, A History, 99.
101. Antonio Mestre, Ilustracion y reforma de la Iglesia: Pensamiento
politico-religioso de D. Gregorio Mayans y Siscar (Valencia: Ayunta-
miento de Oliva, 1968), 223-224.
102. Pinto Crespo, Inquisicion y control, 253; Lea, A History, 4:99.
103. Kamen, Inquisition and Society, 205.
104. Burke, Popular Culture, 211.
105. See Lea, A History, 4:139, for definitions of propositions.
106. AHN, Inquisition, March 13, 1691, leg. 558#5, exp. 5.
107. AHN, Inquisition, August 3, 1638, "meritos de la causa de fe
contra Fray Jeronimo Navarro," lib. 926, ffs. 7-12; June 3, 1630, lib. 923,
f. 600.
108. AHN, Inquisition, November 10, 1629, lib. 923, f. 574.
109. AHN, Inquisition, September 18, 1638, lib. 923, f. 573.
110. For a discussion of the role of the religious orders in education,
see Francisco Martin Hernandez, "La formacion del clero en los siglos
XVII y XVIII," in Antonio Mestre, ed., Historia de la Iglesia, 4:524-581.
111. AHN, Inquisition, November 22, 1680, leg. 8o4#2, nf.
112. AHN, Inquisition, November 18, 1698, leg. i786#i, exp. 6.
113. Pinto Crespo, Inquisicion y control, 197-233; J. M. Lopez Piriero,
Ciencia y tecnica en la sociedad espanola de los siglos XVI y XVII (Barce-
lona: Labor Universitaria, 1979), 197-204, 373-374-
114. AHN, Inquisition, April 26, 1638, leg. 8o4#2, ffs. 483-484.
115. Lopez Pinero, Ciencia y tecnica, 316-317, 389-393, 415.
116. AHN, Inquisition, June 7, 1691, leg. 8o3#2, f. 382.
117. AHN, Inquisition, November 8, 1691, leg. 8o3#2, nf.
118. Jedin, A History, 371-372, 388.
1 19. The bishop of Sinigaglia voiced the concerns of many of his col-
4 i4
Notes to Pages 325-332
leagues when he demanded "greater care and reverence in the administra-
tion of the sacraments." Jedin, A History, 384.
120. Lea, A History, 4:100.
121. Ibid., 4:96; AHN, Inquisition, September 17, 1625, leg. 507#i,
f- 549-
122. Lea, A History, 4:99.
123. AHN, Inquisition, March 20, 1563, lib. 324, ffs. 39-40.
124. Juan Machado de Chaves, Perfecto confessor y cura de almas,
2 vols. (Barcelona: Pedro de la Cavalleria, 1641), 2:776.
125. See the case of Fray Lorenzo de Santissima Trinidad, a friar ob-
sessed with masturbation who constantly brought it up while confessing
Josefa de Jesus Maria. AHN, Inquisition, May 21, 1710, leg. 564#3, exp.
13-
126. AHN, Inquisition, August 24, 1764, leg. 564#i, exp. 13.
127. AHN, Inquisition, May 4, 1691, leg. 8o3#i, nf.
128. Lea, A History, 4:123-124.
129. AHN, Inquisition, April 14, 1750, leg. 23i7#i, nf.
130. AHN, Inquisition, May 13, 1764, leg. 562#2, exp. 8.
131. AHN, Inquisition, December 12, 1577, lib. 497, ffs. 183-184.
132. Lea, A History, 4:126. See the case of Pascual Giner who lost his
benefice and could no longer support his aged mother and sisters. AHN,
Inquisition, July 4, 1713, leg. 2309, nf.
IX: Decline and Abolition of the Holy Office in Valencia
1. Kamen, The War of Succession, 284-286.
2. AHN, Inquisition, December 16, 1710, leg. 2308, nf.
3. AHN, Inquisition, May 11, 1707, leg. 23o8#i, nf.
4. Jativa was sacked and practically destroyed after being captured on
May 24. Kamen, The War of Succession, 296-297.
5. AHN, Inquisition, May 19, 1707, leg. 23o8#i, nf.
6. Lea, A History, 4:225.
7. AHN, Inquisition, July 26, 1707, leg. 23o8#i, nf.
8. Lea, A History, 4:276. On this occasion, Balmaseda signed himself
"Inquisidor y juez apostolico contra los eclesiasticos disidentes."
9. AHN, Inquisition, January 14, 1710, leg. 503#3, exp. 7, ffs. 127V-
129.
10. AHN, Inquisition, June 19, 1708, leg. 23o8#i, nf. For Macanaz's
role in supervising the confiscation of rebel property, see Kamen, The
War of Succession, 321. Later, when the tribunal attempted to take advan-
tage of an ambiguous clause in its grant to take actual possession of the
Copy righted material
Notes to Pages 332-336
415
village, the Council of Castile acted to stop it. AHN, Inquisition, January
29, 1709, leg. 503#3, exp. 7, ffs. 97-98V.
11. Lea, A History, 1:315, 319.
12. AHN, Inquisition, February 10, 1725, leg. 5i4#i; Kamen, The
War of Succession, 320.
13. AHN, Inquisition, March 10, 1745, leg. 2315, nf.
14. AHN, Inquisition, July 29, 1760, lib. 922, nf.
15. Dommguez Ortiz, Sociedad y estado, 265.
16. AHN, Inquisition, February 23, 1706, leg. 2308, nf.
17. Vicente Martinez Santos, "La Sederia de Valencia 1750-1800,"
Moneda y Credito 134 (1975): 116.
18. Manuel Ardit Lucas, Revolucion liberal y revuelta campesina (Bar-
celona: Ariel, 1977), 22. Also see Fernando Andres Robres, Credito y
propiedad de la tierra en el pais Valenciano (Valencia: Edicions Alfons el
Magnanim, 1987), 240-251.
19. Ricardo Garcia Carcel, "Las rentas de la Inquisicion de Valencia en
el siglo XVIII," Estudis 4 (1975): 236-237; AHN, Inquisition, December
9, 1724, leg. 5i4#i, f. 69.
20. AHN, Inquisition, December 12, 1780, leg. 2324, nf. ; November
30, 1784, leg. 3303, nf.
21. Jose Antonio Ferrer Benimeli, "Inquisicion y Masoneria," in Histo-
ria de la Inquisicion en Espana y America, 4 vols., J. Perez Villanueva and
B. Escandell Bonet, eds. (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos,
1984), 1: 1288.
22. Ibid., 1298.
23. Ibid., 1303.
24. Teofanes Egido, "La Inquisicion de una Espana en guerra, " in Histo-
ria de la Inquisicion, 1243.
25. Marcelin Defourneaux, L Inquisition espagnole et les livres fran-
gais au XVIII siecle (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1963), 62.
26. This cedula is attached to several bigamy cases tried by the Valencia
tribunal. See AHN, Inquisition, January 16, 1776, leg. 5i6#i, f. 2; De-
cember 12, 1782, leg. 5i6#i, f. 50.
27. Francisco Marti Gilabert, La abolicion de la Inquisicion en Espana
(Pamplona: Universidad de Navarra, 1975), 38.
28. Teofanes Egido, "La Inquisicion," 1244-1246.
29. AHN, Inquisition, May 4, 1790; September 24, 1790, leg. 562#i,
exp. 6.
30. AHN, Inquisition, lib. 503, f. 122, quoted in J. Martinez Millan, "Los
cambios en el Santo Oficio espanol," in Historia de la Inquisicion, 1: 1372.
31. AHN, Inquisition, January 27, 1747, leg. 2316, nf.
Copyrighted material
416
Notes to Pages 337-345
32. AHN, Inquisition, June 4, 1756; February 25, 1767, leg. 558#3,
exp. 33.
33. AHN, Inquisition, November 10, 1773, leg. 534, exp. 24.
34. AHN, Inquisition, January 17, 1775, leg. 534, exp. 24.
35. AHN, Inquisition, February 3, 1637, leg. 5og#i, nf.
36. AHN, Inquisition, July 18, 1739; August 7, 1739, leg. 235i#i, nf.
37. AHN, Inquisition, June 22, 1705, lib. 498, ffs. 237-237V.
38. Martinez Millan, "Los cambios," 1378.
39. Ibid., 1277.
40. AHN, Inquisition, June 28, 1752, leg. 2317, nf.
41. AHN, Inquisition, June 25, 1785, leg. 3303, nf.
42. AHN, Inquisition, March 12, 1749, leg. 2316, nf.
43. AHN, Inquisition, August 13, 1715, leg. 2309, nf.
44. AHN, Inquisition, August 17, 26, 1729, leg. 5i4#i, ffs. 9-9V.
45. AHN, Inquisition, September 23, 1760, lib. 932, f. 2309.
46. H. C. Lea Library, University of Pennsylvania, Manuscripts, April
24, 1806, leg. 64, nf.
47. Lea, A History, 4:388.
48. AHN, Inquisition, November 29, 1788, leg. 2326, nf.
49. AHN, Inquisition, December 5, 1788, leg. 2326, nf.
50. AHN, Inquisition, July 27, 1762, leg. 6o4#3, exp. 13.
51. AHN, Inquisition, October 23, 1747, leg. 6i7#i, exp. 6.
52. AHN, Inquisition, February 29, 1774, leg. 6i5#3, exp. 12; August
7, 1773, leg. 62i#i, exp. 2.
53. AHN, Inquisition, December 5, 1788, leg. 2326, nf.
54. AHN, Inquisition, May 2, 1796, leg. 2389, nf. For a discussion of
educational reform at Valencia University, see Richard Herr, The
Eighteenth-Century Revolution in Spain (Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1969), 166, 169.
55. AHN, Inquisition, May 6, 1815, leg. 2321, nf.
56. Mestre, Ilustracion, 448.
57. Gilabert, La abolicion, 178-183.
58. Ibid., 186-189.
59. In 1782, for example, Inquisitor-General Felipe Beltran seriously
considered issuing a new and more liberal index of prohibited books:
Gaspar Gomez de la Serna, Jovellanos o el espanol perdido (Madrid: Sala,
1975X 157-
60. AHN, Inquisition, September 9, 1715, leg. 2309, ffs. 15-20.
61. AHN, Inquisition, December 20, 1803, leg. 2330#i, nf. Gregorio
Mayans y Sfscar was even used as a calificador by the Valencian tribunal.
Manuel Mayans y Sfscar, his brother, served the tribunal as secretary
during the 1730s and 1740s. Mestre, Ilustracion, 203, 423. See AHN,
Notes to Pages 345-351
417
Inquisition, March 15, 1735, leg. 1322, exp. 8, for the genealogy of Man-
uel Mayans y Sfscar.
62. Mestre, Ilustracion, 371.
63. Biblioteca Archivo Hispano Mayansiana, Andres Orbe to J. A.
Mayans, Valladolid, September 25, 1748, as quoted in Mestre,
Ilustracion, 423.
64. Gilabert, La abolition, 151.
65. The number of persons holding inquisitorial licenses to read prohib-
ited books increased dramatically during the century; Defourneaux,
L'Inquisition espagnole, 135. Pablo de Olavide's papal license to read
prohibited books was confirmed by the Inquisitor-General.
66. AHN, Inquisition, May 7, 12, 1792, leg. 2327#i, nf.
67. Ardit Lucas, Revolution liberal, 97.
68. Defourneaux, L'Inquisition espagnole, 86-88, 99. Jean Sarrailh, La
Espana ilustrada de la segunda mitad del siglo XVIII (Mexico: Fondo de
Cultura Economica, 1957), 311-312.
69. Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos, Representation a Carlos IV sobre lo
que era el tribunal de la Inquisition, cited by Gilabert, La Inquisition,
45-
70. Herr, The Eighteenth-Century Revolution, 282, 391-394.
71. AHN, Inquisition, January 7, 1794, leg. 5i6#3, f. 20.
72. AHN, Inquisition, March 12, 1799, leg. 5i7#i, ffs. 19-27.
73. AHN, Inquisition, June 26, 1800, leg. 5i7#i, f. 32.
74. H. C. Lea Library, University of Pennsylvania, Manuscripts, Febru-
ary 23, 1802, leg. 43, nf.; also see AHN, Inquisition, June 11, 1801, leg.
5i7#i, ffs. 78, 95, for correspondence with the Suprema regarding the
transfer of funds realized from the sale of farms by the tribunal.
75. AHN, Inquisition, August 6, 1805, leg. 233i#i, nf.
76. AHN, Inquisition, August 9, 28, 1805, leg. 233i#i, nf.
77. AHN, Inquisition, Novembers, 1808, leg. 233i#i, nf.
78. Lea, A History, 4:400.
79. AHN, Inquisition, May 11, 1808, "cartas del consejo," leg. 5i7#3,
f. 31, as quoted in Lea, A History, 4:539-540; AHN, Inquisition, March 6,
1808, leg. 5i7#3, f. 31.
80. AHN, Inquisition, August 26, 1808, leg. 5i7#i, f. 31.
81. AHN, Inquisition, September 28, 1808, leg. 5i7#i, f. 33.
82. AHN, Inquisition, November 11, 1808, leg. 5i7#i, f. 34.
83. Lea, A History, 4:412, 414.
84. Gilabert, La abolition, 90.
85. Ibid., 194.
86. Lea, A History, 4:412, 414.
87. Ibid., 414.
4i8
Notes to Pages 351-358
88. Ibid., 424.
89. Ibid., 426-427.
90. AHN, Inquisition, March 28, 1817, leg. 5667#2, nf. This docu-
ment is the account of Sernan Noguera from which forty reales was paid
"al consejo por el nuevo impuesto."
91. Marcelin Defourneaux, "Les dernieres annees de L'Inquisition es-
pagnole," Annales Historiques de la Revolution Frangaise (1963): 164-165.
92. AHN, Inquisition, February 1, 1815, leg. 5i7#i, nf.
93. AHN, Inquisition, October 26, 1814, leg. 233i#i, nf.
94. Lea, A History, 4:427.
95. Ibid., 4:428.
96. AHN, Inquisition, November 21, 1816, leg. 5i7#i, nf.
97. Ardit Lucas, Revolucion liberal, 232-33; AHN, Inquisition, July
30, 1817, leg. 467i#2, nf.
98. AHN, Inquisition, December 16, 1818, leg. 467^2, nf.
99. AHN, Inquisition, April 24, 1816, leg. 2331, nf.
100. AHN, Inquisition, June 4, 1815, leg. 5i7#2, nf.
101. AHN, Inquisition, January 26, March 1, 1816, leg. 233i#i, nf.
102. Ardit Lucas, Revolucion liberal, 226.
103. AHN, Inquisition, January 20, 1817, leg. 233i#i, nf.
104. AHN, Inquisition, June 25, 1819, leg. ^\~j#-z, nf.
105. Ardit Lucas, Revolucion liberal, 226.
106. Lea, A History, 4:437.
107. ARV, May 13, 1820, ffs. 326V-327.
108. ARV, May 13, 1820, leg. 1887, ffs. 354V-355, 356V-357; October
12, 1820, ffs. 366-367; October 13, 1820, ffs. 367V-368; October 17, 1820,
f. 368; November 7, 1820, ffs. 369V-372.
109. Ibid., October 4, 1820, f. 365.
110. Lea, A History, 4:449.
111. Ibid., 458.
112. Luis Alonso Tejeda, Ocaso de la Inquisicion en los ultimos anos
del reinado de Fernando VII (Madrid: Zero, 1969), 90.
113. Ibid., 123,
114. Lea, A History, 4:461.
115. AHN, Inquisition, August 6, 1826, leg. 5i7#2, nf.
116. AHN, Inquisition, March 16, 1827, leg. 5i7#2.
117. Tejeda, Ocaso de la Inquisicion, 160, 173-174.
118. Ibid., 220.
119. Lea, A History, 4:462.
120. Ibid., 459.
121. ARV, Clero, leg. 161, ffs. 63, 70, 75, 81.
122. Ibid., f. 81.
Copyrighted material
Notes to Pages 360-361
419
Conclusion
1. Pedro Galindo, Parte Segundo del directorio de penitentes y
prdctica de una buena y prudente confesion (Madrid: Antonio de Zafra,
1680), 450.
2. Henry Kamen, "Toleration and Dissent in Sixteenth-Century Spain:
The Alternative Tradition," The Sixteenth-Century Journal (Spring ig88):4.
3. See chap. 8.
4. Fidele de Ros, Un maitre de sainte Therese: Le pere Frangois de
Osuna (Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1936), 221-226; Tomas Reluz, Vida y
virtudes del Fray Tomas Carbonell (Madrid: Viuda de D. Francisco Nieto,
1695), 306, 325.
Copyrighted material
Glossary
actos positivos:
auto defe:
carta acordada:
Bailta General:
censals:
ciutada:
Diputacid:
E&tament
Militar:
familiar:
furs:
insaculacio:
A decree of Philip IV in 1621 established that any-
one who had obtained three positive results from
genealogical investigations would be considered of
"pure" lineage from then on.
Ceremony at which the sentences of those con-
victed of offenses by the Holy Office would be read
out to the public.
Administrative regulation issued to the provincial
tribunals by Madrid.
The main royal treasury in the Kingdom of
Valencia.
Long-term loans made on real estate.
Distinguished citizens enjoying rentier status.
Standing committee of the Valencian Cortes respon-
sible for collecting the subsidies granted the crown.
The Noble estate of the Valencian Cortes.
Unpaid lay assistant to the Holy Office.
The traditional constitutional law of the Kingdom of
Valencia.
Drawing for municipal offices from a list of names of
persons previously approved for office holding.
421
422
jurat:
lliura:
Peatge and
Quema:
relaciones de
causas:
Sanbenitos:
taqiyya:
Glossary
Chief municipal magistrate. In the city of Valencia,
six jurats would form the city council.
Valencian coin: 20 sous = 1 lliura, 21 sous = 1
Castilian ducat.
Royal customs duties belonging to the crown and
free of any parliamentary grant.
Summaries of completed cases sent to Madrid by
the provincial tribunals.
Penitential garments worn in public by the
condemned.
An attitude of external conformity adopted by many
Moriscos to mask their continued belief in Islam.
Copyrighted material
Selected Bibliography
Archives
Archivo Historico Nacional: Cartas acordadas
Cartas al Consejo
Cartas del Consejo
Expedientes de competencias
Expedientes de visitas
Informaciones genealogicas
Juntas de Hacienda
Libros de concordias
Libros de depositos de pretendientes
Libros de testificaciones
Procesos criminales
Procesos de fe
Relaciones de fe
Varios
Archivo Municipal de Valencia: Manuels de consells y establiments
Libres de insaculacio
Archivo del Reino de Valencia: Clero
Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid: Raros
Henry Charles Lea Library, The University of Pennsylvania:
Manuscripts
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Valentiae: Ioannem Chrusostomum Garriz, 1610.
42.3
4 2 4
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Selected Bibliography
425
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426
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35-58.
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Universitaria Espanola, 1978.
Kagan, Richard L. Students and Society in Early Modern Spain. Balti-
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Selected Bibliography
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Plon, 1968.
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Sicroff, Albert. Les controverses des statutes de purete de sang en
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Tomas y Valiente, Francisco. El derecho penal de la monarquia absoluta.
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Wolff, Philippe. "The 1391 Pogrom in Spain: Social Crisis or Not," Past
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Yerushalmi, Yosef Hayim. From Spanish Court to Italian Ghetto. New
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Copyrighted material
Index
Abenamir, Cosme de, 220
Abenamir family, Morisco familiares, 248,
259. 260. 294
Abjuration, 80. 279. 298. 315. 329
Abogado de presos, 47-78, 143, 121
Abravanel, Don Isaac, 219
Acedo Rico, Juan, count of La Canada, 108
Acedo Rico, Dr. Pablo, Inquisitor of Va-
lencia, LQ8
Actos positivos, 239, 241, 343, 397, 421
Adell y de Bie, Antonio Maria, 342
Adrian, cardinal of Utrecht, 17, 18, 214
Adzaneta, 5, 256
Aguilera, Bernardino de, Inquisitor of Va-
lencia, 19, 43, 51, 67, 73, 97, 128-
131, 284. 366. 372. 382-383
Alarcon, Simon de, judaizer, 121-123,
233-234. 381
Alarcon y Covarrubias, Dr. Francisco de,
Inquisitor of Valencia, 121-122
Albalat, count of, 187
Albalat de la Ribera, 104
Albarracm, 22. 105. 168. 197, 215
Alberique, 159, 245
Albertm, Arnaldo, Inquisitor of Valencia,
127-128, ai3
Albigensian heresy, 9
Albornoz, Carlos, receiver, 93, 385
Albuixech, Joaquin, familiar, 179. 343
Alcala de Henares, 112-113, 121. 363
Alcalde, 24, 31. 44. 51. 70. 71, 114, 141,
159, 174, 185, 197, 373
Alcalde de las carceles secretas, 145
Alcalde de los hijosdalgo, 1 14
Alcaldes de casa v corte, LL4
Alcira, 153, 156, 201-202. 209. 236. 245.
393
Alcocer, 245
Alcoy, 179, 207
Alcudia de Carlet, 166
Aldaya, 331
Alexander VI, pope, 94, 97, 365
Alfafar, 160-161
Alfaquis, 89, 255, 262. 270
Alfonso, Pedro, 212-214. 220
Algemesf, 159
Algeria, 76, 129, 257-258. 264. 269
Alguacil, 26, 49, 68, 153, 160-161. 252.
301, 342, 344
Aliaga, Amador de, receiver, 95-96
Aliaga, Archibishop Amador de, 57, 95,
96
Alicante, 7, 407
Almaden mines, 82
Almansa, battle of, 330
Almenara, Jaime, judaizer, 216
Almenara, Jeronimo, Audiencia notary, 34
Almenara, Pedro Luis, judaizer, 227
Almenara, Tomas, familiar, 242, 396
Almenara family, 227, 240, 242
Almeria, 257
Almotacen, 49-50
Almusafes, 179, 207, 3A3
Alpujarras, second revolt of the, 257. 263
Ambel, Dionisio, familiar, 184
Ambel, Jeronimo, familiar, 181
Americas, tribunals, 3 00
Amigos del Pais, society of, 344
Anathema, 45, 60, 202-203
Andres, Damian, 20
Angel Exterminador, 356
Angeles, Bartolome de los, 247
Anglesola, Jeronimo, familiar, 141
Anglesola, Ramon, familiar, 141
429
430
Index
Anglo-Spanish wars, 1796-1802, 1804-
1808, 347
Angouleme, duke of, 356
Annales school, 3
Anti-semitism, 58, 169, 209-210. 226.
230, 242, 360
Aragon, 6-7, 9-14. 1L 20, 40, 51, 9L. 94,
115. 121. 145. 151. 159. 170. 203.
209-210. 228-229. 238. 244. 256-
257. 261. 263-265. 274. 282. 287.
302, 410, 426
Aragon, Council of, 22, 30-32. 40, 53,
102. 120, 138, 146, 153, 176, 189.
192-193. 249. 260. 283
Aragon, Fernando de, duke of Calabria,
20
Aragonese, 6^1^11,13,16,22,31,51,
89, 102-104. 147. 159, 244. 257,
264. 296. 302-303
Arce y Reynoso, Diego de, Inquisitor-
General, 132, 1 3 5-1 3 6
Arce y Reynoso, Ramon Josef de,
Inquisitor-General, 101, 350
Archbishop of Valencia, 20, 27, 39, 42,
44, 54-55. 57, 78, 86, 12L 127, 236.
248. 287, 311, 317, 399
Arcos, Fray Tomas de los, familiar, 90-91
Arganda, Francisco de, Inquisitor of Va-
lencia, 260
Argiielles, Agustfn de, 346
Armengol, Melchor, rector, sodomite,
206. 303. 306-307
Arquer, Dr. Sigismundo, fiscal of Council
of Aragon, 283-284
Arteaga, Martin Perez de, Inquisitor of
Valencia, 9L 153
Asensio, Juana, 206
Asensio, Dr. Pedro, calificador, 47
Asensio Romero, Pedro, familiar, 35
Audiencia, 7=8, 18-19. 2L. 25, 27, 29,
30, 32-42, 48-51. 53, 56-58, 78,
85, 103, 110, 120, 129, 131, 138,
140-144, 146, 148, 152, 176, 189-
193, 199-200. 237. 317. 337-339.
353, 357, 364, 368-369. 371. 378.
391. 425
Audiencia de cargos, 337
Autos de fe, L 27, 43, 46-47. 70, 83, 85,
86, 95-96. 128. 145, 174. 228. 232,
237, 243, 255, 261-263, 272-273.
279. 284. 287-288. 294. 301. 313-
314, 369, 385, 403, 421
Avila, 113, 369, 380, 381
Ayala, Martin de, archbishop, Valencia,
247
Ayala Verganza, Antonio de, Inquisitor of
Valencia, 118-119, 133-135, 137,
311, 380
Aytona, count of, 38, 48
Aztira, 172
Radfa, Bautista, familiar, 179. 185
Baer, L F, 211
Bailfa, 21-22, 130-131, 191, 421
Balaguer, Agustin, familiar, 182
Ballester, Cristobal, cavalier, 274
Balmaseda, Isidro de, Inquisitor of Valen-
cia, 330-332. 414
Barberan, Gaspar Jeronimo, familiar, 178
Barberan, Jose, familiar, 183
Barberan, Onofre, comisario, 178
Barcelona, LL 178, 342, 364, 379, 390,
410, 413-415, 424-427
Barcelona tribunal, 3, 30, 78, 135-136,
181, 235
Barrachina, Luis, familiar, 182-183
Basset y Ramos, Juan Bautista, 330
Bayonne, 349
Baziero, Francisco, notary of civil cases,
25
Beam, prince of, 257
Beam, province of, 167
Beatas, 206, 219, 232, 9.75-9.7X
Becerra, Dr. Alonso, Inquisitor, 313
Beinart, Haim, 211, 363, 365. 393. 394,
395. 424
Bellot, Miguel, secretario del secreto,
144-145
Bellreguard, 258
Benaguacil, 248, 259, 262
Benavent, Francisco de, familiar, 1 8 3- 1 8 4
Benavent, Ignacio, 190
Benavente, 37, 390
Benavente, count of, 37, 390
Benefice, 118, 127, 205, 232, 254, 306-
307, 329, 414
Benefice holder, 5L 52, 66, 207, 232,
278. 283. 301. 322
Benicarlo, 188, 336
Beniganim, 167, 168
Benisa, 180, 184
Benito de Oliver, Luis, Inquisitor, Se-
ville; fiscal, Valencia, 115
Bennassar, Bartolome, 3, 410
Berenger de Blanes Valterra, Francisco,
57
Bernaldez, Andres, 210
Bernet, Ramon, 36
Bertram Felipe, Inquisitor-General, 106-
107
Index
43i
Bertran, Fray Luis, 404
Bertr&n, Dr. Mathias, Inquisitor of Valen-
cia, 107
Besant, Brianda, judaizer, 213-214
Besant, Pedro, judaizer, 214, 218, 220, 395
Bestiality, 4, 62, 196, 302-304. 307-308.
310-312, 41D
Bigamy, 4=5, 42, 73, 132, 299-302. 329.
334, 415
Black Legend, 272
Blasco, Miguel Jeronimo, Inquisitor, Bar-
celona, 178
Blasphemy, 27. 42. 65. 77. 81. 130. 274.
275, 295-297. 329, 334, 337, 361,
394. 409
Blau, Jaime, familiar, 191
Boil, Jose, familiar, 177
Boil de Arenos, Juan, baron of Boil, famil-
iar, 160
Bonaparte, Joseph, 349
Bonaparte, Napoleon, 2, 349-350
Bone, Francisco, familiar, 185
Bonifaz, Manuel, Inquisitor-General, 167
Borja, Alfonso de, familiar, 47
Borja, Fernando de, viceroy, 141
Borja, Francisco de, duke of Gandia, 88,
282. 305
Borja, Pedro Luis de, 88, 303, 305
Borja, Tomas, familiar, 184
Borja family, 282, 305
Borromeo, Agostino, 3, 363
Borrull, Francisco Javier, comisario, 344.
345. 355
Bot, 207, 306, 307
Boteller, Pedro, Lieutenant-Inquisitor, 26
Bourbons, 8. 103. 105. 108, 116. 233.
331. 333. 379
Boyl, Bernardo, familiar, lord of Manesis,
103. 379
Breva, Bautista, familiar, 171
Breva, Dr. Felix, abogado de presos, 171.
388
Breva, Luis, notario, 171
Breva, Vicente, familiar, 171
Bunol, 81. 176, 177
Bunol, count of, familiar, 1 76- 1 77
Bureau of Espolios y Vacantes, 357- 35 8
Bureau of Public Credit, 355
Burgos, LL 47, 102
Burgos, Dr. Francisco, abogado de
presos, 47
Burriana, 156, 387, 393
Cabades, Fray Augustm, solicitante, 64,
335-336
Caballer, Antonio, 191
Cabecas, Pedro, 54-55
Cachuno, Francisco, secretary, 353
Cadiz, 287, 345-347. 350-351. 354-355
Caja de Consolidation, 351
Cala, 250
Calabria, duke of, 20, 281
Calafat, Jaime Antonio, secretary, Valen-
cia tribunal, 54, 14Q
Calahorra, bishop of, 295
Calatayud, 145, 282
Calatayud, Carlos de, familiar, lord of
Agres, 178
Calduch, Mosen Bernardo, notario, 207
Calificador, 47. 104. 119. 139, 242, 267.
313. 315. 326. 335. 344. 355. 388.
416
Calpe, 196, 265
Calvo, Antonio, familiar, 56
Calvo, Juan, Inquisitor of Valencia, 172,
217
Camara de Castilla, 108, 1 16
Camargo, Juan de, Inquisitor-General,
334 '
Campillo, Juan Antonio, 195
Campillo y Tarin, Dr. Francisco Antonio,
Inquisitor of Valencia, 105, 1 10
Campillo y Tarin, Dr. Joaquin Ramon, sec-
retary, Santiago tribunal, 105
Canals, 184
Canet, 239, 364, 39L 425
Cano, Melchor, 282
Canoguera, Juan, familiar, 238
Canonries, 97-99. 118. 333
Canons, 22, 28, 3L 43-46, 52, 62, 82-83,
86, 94, 97, 10L 103-105, 112. 118.
121-122. 127, 168, 172, 178, 199.
200, 205, 207, 235. 254, 284, 306
Canseco, Gabriel de, LID
Canseco de Quinones, Antonio, Inquisi-
tor of Valencia, 40, Llfl
Capata, Melchor, alcalde, 141, 185
Caracena, marquis of, 39, 269, 369
Carate, Pedro De, 260
Carbonell, Gines, familiar, 179
Carbonell, Roque, familiar, 1 79- 1 8 0
Carbonell, Tomas, 361
Carcagente, 159, 182, 201
Carcel. See Prisons of the Inquisition
Cardenas, Bernardino de, viceroy, 29, 30
Cardona, Felipe de, familiar, 47
Cardona, Sancho de, admiral of Aragon,
228. 256
Carena, Caesare, L 363, 424
Carlet, 166. 251. 255
432
Index
Carlist, 358
Carmelites, 65, 1 3 4
Caro Baroja, Julio, 101. 102. 211
Carrillo, Alonso, archbishop of Toledo, 10
Carroz, Francisco, count of Cirat, 172
Carroz, Jeronimo, 43, 177
Carroz y de Artes, Guillen, familiar, 177
Cartas acordadas, 33. 72. 89. 90. 125.
126, 128. 299, 423
Casey, James, 364. 366
Caspe, 65
Castellano de Aguirre, Alejo, familiar, 24
Castellar, Cosme, alguacil, 26-27
Castell des Castells, 196
Castellon de la Plana, 7, 36, 61, 155-156,
159. 171. 181. 205. 234. 301. 318.
341, 388
Castelrodrigo, marquis of, viceroy, 190
Castile, 9, 11-13. 17, 29, 102-103. 110.
112, 166, 173, 209-210. 232. 244-
245, 248, 276-277. 281. 294, 330.
342. 378-379. 385, 388, 393, 425-
426
Catala, Dr. Juan Bautista, rector Yatova,
solicitante, 64-65, 81, 327-328
Catalan, Fray Juan, calificador, 52
Catalan Revolt, L87
Catalans, 6, 135
Catalonia, 7, 13, 132, 135, 159, 186-187.
261. 287-288. 305. 341. 383
Catarroja, 156
Cathars, 199
Cathedral chapter, 8, 43-44, 60, 78. 178.
284
Cavaliers, 101, 109, 138, 142-143. 145.
147, 161, 166, 178-180, 183. 185.
188, 192, 199, 203, 274, 300, 304
Cella, 13-14
Cenedo, Fray Pablo, solicitante, 90
Censals, 48, 50, 93, 96, 98-99. 135-136.
139. 175. 248. 348. 353. 378. 421
Censorship, 281, 323, 334, 343, 345, 353,
360
Census of conversos, 1506, 61, 225
Centellas, Onofre, 2D
Centelles, Cristobal de, 80
Centelles, Jose Juan, familiar, marquis of
Centelles, 170, 122
Centelles y Moncada, Gaspar de, 88, 96,
282-285
Cerdan de Tallada, Dr. Tomas, 71, 373,
376. 410
Chacon y Narvaez, Juan, Inquisitor of Va-
lencia, 131-137. 383
Chancilleria of Granada, 114
ChancilleriaofValladolid, 108, 110, 114,
120, 122
Charles, archduke (Charles III), 293
Charles II, 145, 332-333 '
Charles III, 8, 341
Charles IV, 349
Charles V, 1^24,28,43,57,81,92,96,
173, 244, 247, 293_296, 388
Chert, 207
Chilches, 257, 265
Chinchon, count of, 255
Churucca, Juan de, Inquisitor of Valencia,
127
Cifontes de Loarte, Pedro, Inquisitor of
Valencia, 106, 381
Cisneros, Dr. Baltasar de, calificador,
275. 313, 382
Cisneros, Garcia de, 275
Ciudad Rodrigo, 253, 381
Ciutadans, 103. 127, 142. 166. 173. 175.
178-180, 185, 199, 304, 343. 421
Civil cases, 7, 19, 24-25. 29-31. 34, 56,
116-117. 176-177, 187, 338-339.
353
Clement VII, pope, 246, 302, 41D
Cocentaina, 252, 221
Cocentaina, marquis of, 54
Cofrentes, 156
Colegio de Villena, 338-339
Colegios Mayores, 109. 113. 122. 185.
234, 347. 380
Comisarios, 22. 31. 36. 51. 62. 104. 149.
178
Competencias (jurisdictional disputes),
117. 192. 423
Comunero Revolution, 102, 173, 294, 388
Concordias, 18-19. 23, 25, 30-35. 56, 58,
131. 153-155. 161-162. 176-177.
186-187. 189. 205. 423
Confiscations, L 14-18. 22, 37, 43-44,
48-49. 52, 54, 59, 9_L 93-98. 117.
149, 175. 217, 219. 226. 228. 233.
262-263. 271, 279, 286, 310, 311,
348, 355, 358, 378, 414, 427
confraternities, 50, 121, 154, 199-200,
251. 264, 392
Conques, Jeronimo, 283, 284
Consell General, 46-47
Constitution of 1813, 355
Consulate of the Sea, 11
Consulta, 54. 189. 334
Consulta de fe, 74, 78, 80, 90, 128. 311
Consultores, 3X 42-43, 78, 119, 128-
129, 13_L 139, 141-142. 146. 229
Contador, 92, 139
Copyrighted malarial
Index
433
Contador-general, 92
Contreras, Jaime, 2=3, 195, 375, 385, 403
Conversions, 209, 210, 246, 293
Conversos (converted Jews), 1, 4, 5, 10,
13^1^20,50,59,61,77,86, 94-
96, 114, 123-124, 126. 138. 140.
143. 161-162. 169, 175, 196, 208-
221. 223-227. 229-231. 234-235.
237-238. 242. 276. 294. 360. 363.
365, 393-396, 398, 424
Cordoba, 109-110, 115. 172, 287
Cordoba tribunal, 3, 123-125. 233-234.
277, 281. 380
Corella, Jeonimo, 260
Corregidores, 187. 296
Corsairs, 257-258. 269
Corte de gobernacion, 241
Corte tribunal, 2, 84, 234, 337
of Aragon, 31-32
of Cadiz, 345-346. 351. 354-355
of Valencia, 7=8, 14-15. 19, 2L 23, 29,
44, 97, 110, 131. 138. 145, 147. 154.
156. 173. 176-177, 241, 244. 257,
261-263. 269. 282. 296. 349. 421
1484, 15
1510, 23
1525, 21
Costa Mattos, Vicente de, 231
Council of Aragon, 22, 30-32, 40, 53,
102. 120. 138. 146. 153, 176, 189.
192-193, 249, 260, 283
Council of canons, 43-45. 200. 203. 235
Council of Castile, 108, 114-115. 117.
119-120. 122, 332, 334. 336. 360.
381. 382. 415
Council of Finance, 1 15
Council of Justice, 335
Council of Regency, 350
Council of Seville, 296
Council of State, 255, 258, 266-267. 292.
335
Council of the Crusade, 1 15
Council of the Indies, 110, 114-115
Council of the Military Orders, 122, 188,
239, 298-299. 397
Council of Trent, 196, 295, 299, 320, 32L
323, 325, 409
Council of War, 187
Counter-Reformation, 85, 413
Covarrubias de Leyva, Diego, 83
Covarrubias Horozco, Sebastian de, 121
Criado, Vidal, nuncio, 49
Criminal cases, 7, 24-25, 29, 34, 114,
117, 176, 188, 190-192, 374
Criminal jurisdiction, 40-41, 189. 338, 339
Crown of Aragon, 7, 9-13, 22, 30-31. 9L
94, 238, 244
Crusade, 252
Cuenca, 101, 109. 115. 121, 136, 166
Cuenca tribunal, 122, 133. 146
Cuevas, 13
Cullera, 179
Cuniga, Juan de, Inquisitor of Valencia,
118, 249
Daqui, Gaspar, 50, 370
Daqui, Juan Bautista, 50
Davalos, Gaspar, bishop of Guadix, 247
Davila, Gomez, of State, 266
Dedieu, Jean-Pierre, 408, 410
Defense, 74, 127, 219, 228, 288-289,
306-307, 339, 353
Defense Attorneys, 48, 64, IL 74-78,
227, 228, 284
Dejamiento, 276, 218
Del Monte, bishop, 320
Denia, 161, 197, 201-202. 205. 236
Denunciation, 64, 67, 215, 219-221, 326,
334, 336
Depositario de pretendientes, 143, 198
Desamortizacion, 348
Despuche family, 26
Deza, Diego, Inquisitor-General, 62
Diaz de Luco, Juan Bernal, bishop of Ca-
lahorra, 295
Diet of Worms, 280
Diaz de Ribera, Ildefonso, count of
Almodovar, 354-355
Diezmos, 254
Diminuto, 60
Diputacio, 7, 21, 23, 30-31. 38. 65. 103.
421
Dominguez Ortiz, A., 270, 379, 381-382.
399-403, 405, 415, 425
Dominicans, 9, U, 12, 151, 328
Donativo general of 1626, 187
Dutch Revolt, 257
Ecija, 209
Ecclesiastical Estate of the Cortes, 44
Edict of faith, 12, 19, 43-45, 60, 202,
294, 299, 303, 326, 333, 351
Edict of grace, 59
El Carpio, marquis of, 108, 109
Elche, 65, 325
El Grau, 198, 300
Elio, Francisco Javier, captain-general,
3 54-355
Elliott, J. IE, 364-365. 379-380, 383
El Penol, 193
Copyrighlad material
434
Index
Embusteria, 315
Encina, Juan de la, Inquisitor of Valencia,
355
Encomienda, 177
Encubierto, el, 245
Enlightenment, 1, 275, 344-345. 347
Enriquez, Fadrique, admiral of Castile,
276
Epila, Juan, Inquisitor of Valencia, 14, 16,
102
Erasmus, 280, 28L 283, 295
Escandell Bonet, Bartolome, 3, 363
Espadana, Francisco, Inquisitor of Valen-
cia, 311
Esparca, Dr. Luis, 94
Espina, Alonso de, 10, 224-225. 230
Espina Velasco, Juan de, fiscal, Valencia,
140. 148
Espinosa, Diego de, Inquisitor-General,
262
Espinosa, Francisco Antonio, Inquisitor of
Valencia, 332
Espinosa, Jacinto, 348
Espinosa, Jose de, 142
Espirito Santo, Fray Juan de, 134
Esplugues de Palavecino, Jose de, baron
of Frignestany, 143
Esplugues de Palavecino, Juan Bautista,
344
Esplugues de Palavecino y Gamir, Anto-
nio, 342
Estament militar, 103, 421
Estates, 20, 29, 37, 43, 49, 132, 263, 283
Este, Cardinal D', 54
Esteve, Dr. Basilio, Audiencia judge, 78
Excommunication, 13, 18-19. 29, 32, 49,
83, 332
Exea, Abdon, Inquisitor of Valencia, 104
Exile, 64, 65, 80-81. 90, 161, 188-189.
191. 193. 236. 279. 299. 305. 311.
315. 317. 319. 329. 332. 336. 338.
375, 381
Extremadura, 277, 407
Eymerich, Nicolas, 10, 19, 66-67. 72, 83,
90, 99, 224, 296, 299, 364-366.
372-375. 395, 409, 424
Fababuix, Francisco, familiar, 207
Fababuix, Dr. Juan, comisario, 207
Fabian y Fuero, Francisco, archbishop,
Valencia, 346, 347
Fabregat, Agustin, familiar, 171
Fabrica de Sevilla, 198, 391
Falco, Bernardo, 354
Familiars, 3, 6-5, 18-19, 22-26. 29-32.
34-42. 46-47. 49-50. 56-57. 62,
68, 88, 103-104. 117. 119. 128.
132-135. 138-143. 151-156. 159-
174. 176-203. 206-208. 232. 235.
238-242. 248. 255. 260. 262. 270.
298, 307, 312, 314, 339-344. 349.
35L 362, 369, 371, 379, 382, 386-
387. 289. 390. 392. 396. 421
confraternity, 154, 199-200. 203
criminal cases, 188-193
distribution of, 1 56- 1 60
familiares of Cordoba, 1 72- 1 73
familiares' prison, 141, 193
genealogical investigations (see sepa-
rate entry)
numbers of, 37-41, 169, 152-203
privileges of, 29-31. 39-42. 46, 47, 49,
qualifications, 161-163, 1 69- 1 75
sociology of, 161-186, 207-208
Fenollet, Dr. Francisco, 78, 284
Ferdinand of Aragon, 9-13, 15-17, 24,
28. 91. 94. 113. 125. 151. 217. 244.
296
Ferdinand VI, 336
Ferdinand VII, 348, 351, 353-356. 3GA
Feria, duke of, 123
Fernandez de Marmanillo, Manuel,
alguacil mayor, 342
Ferrer, Luis, governor, Valencia, 37, 127,
138. 229. 248
Ferrer, Miguel, 22L 297, 298
Ferrer, Pedro de Villaviciencia, Inquisitor
of Cordoba, 380
Ferrer, San Vicente, 210
Figuerola, Dr. Honorato, Inquisitor of Va-
lencia, 40. 41. 42. 103. 126. 177. 282
Figuerola, Melchor, 103, 279. 379
Finances, 18, 92, 97, 98, 294, 307, 385
Fiscal, 13, 20, 73, 77, 9_L 105, 109, 114-
115, 118, 120, 127. 131, 132. 135.
139-140, 141-142, 148, 187. 191,
224. 226. 241. 248. 283. 335. 337.
347. 348, 381, 398
Flanders, 13L 230
Flix, 164, 182
Floridablanca, count of, 336, 344
Foix, Germaine de, governor, Valencia,
247
Folc de Cardona, Antonio, archbishop, Va-
lencia, 121
Forner, Dr. Diego, comisario, 336
Fortalitium Fidei, 22A
Fortresses, 82, 132, 224
Copyrighted material
Index
435
France, 9, U, 89, 232, 257, 287-288.
292. 332. 357. 374. 376. 415. 427
Franciscans, 10, 65, 116, 206, 247, 324,
328
Franco-Spanish Conflict, 347
Freemasons, 333-334. 350. 354
French Republic, war with, 341
French Revolution, 333. 346. 347
Frignestany, baron of, 143
Fuentes, count of, 197
Fuero, 24-26. 29-31. 34-36, 38-42. 50,
56, 129, 14L 154, 16L 182, 188-
189, 193, 198, 200, 303, 339, 346-
347. 353. 367
Furs, 8, 16, 94, 421
Fuster, Adrian, judaizer, 214
Fuster, Enrique, judaizer, 214
Fuster, Francisco, attorney, 82
Galceran de Borja, Pedro Luis, grand-
master of the Order of Montesa, 88,
303. 305-306, 310
Galicia, 3. 102, 114. 179. 186. 223. 233.
425
Galicia tribunal, 3, 179, 223, 233
Galleys, 51, 71, 81-82. 89-90. 131. 192.
258, 267-269. 271. 297-298. 300.
302, 307, 31L 329, 375, 403-404.
412
Galve, 62
Gamir, Antonio, 51
Gandesa, 207, 306
Gandia, 63, 88, 98-99. 104. 156. 159,
201. 205-206. 222. 227. 229. 236-
237, 258, 282, 293, 305, 322-323.
378, 388
Gandia, battle of, 245
Gandia, duke of, 88, 98-99. 104. 237.
282. 305
Garcia Carcel, Ricardo, 4-6, 364-367.
399, 415
Garcia de Loaysa, Francisco, Inquisitor-
General, 282
Garcia de Trasmiera, Inquisitor of Valen-
cia, 111
Genealogical investigations, 102, 107—
108, 123-124. 127, 147-148. 156.
162-163, 166, 175. 205. 235. 238.
351. 385. 392. 421
Germamas, 8. 174. 245, 388. 398
Gibraltar, 242
Ginart, Dr. Onofre Bartolome, abogado,
140
Ginart y March, Tomas, secretary, 240,
241. 398
Ginsburg, Carlo, 2
Giron, Pedro, Inquisitor of Valencia, 46,
63
Giron de Rebolledo, Jeronimo, baron of
Andilla, familiar, lieutenant alguacil,
160. 161
Godoy, Manuel, 348-349
Gonzaga, Vespasiano, viceroy, 39, 186
Gonzalez de Munibrega, Juan, fiscal, Va-
lencia Inquisitor, 20, 127. 226
Gonzalez Montano, Reginaldo, L, 363
Granada, 3, 8_L 101_, 114, 244-245. 257.
259. 263. 287
Granada, Fray Luis de, 81
Granada tribunal, 3. 109. 119. 123. 234
Grandees, 108
Greenleaf, Richard, 3, 363
Gregorio, Francisco, Inquisitor, Mallorca,
181
Gregorio, Jeronimo, Inquisitor, Barce-
lona, 181
Gregory XV, pope, 326
Guadalest, 245, 2£9
Guadasuar, 38, 159
Guadix, 122
Guadoc, 250
Gualbes, Fray Juan de, Inquisitor of Va-
lencia, 12, 101-102
Guardias realistas, 356
Guardiola, Dr. , Audiencia Judge, 237
Guillem, Pablo, canon, lieutenant-
inquisitor, Teruel, 22
Guipuzcoa, 107, 308
Gutierrez, Bernardino, 95-96
Hapsburg, 7. 56. 103. 105. 137. 150. 329.
385
Haro, Philippe de, Inquisitor of Valencia,
108-109. 121. 259
Henningsen, Gustav, 2, 363. 375-376.
391. 412
Henry II, 131
Henry IV, 10, 296
Hermosa, Francisco de, alcalde, 26—27.
197
Hernando de Alarcon, Diego, 122
Herrera y Guzman, Dr. Pedro, Inquisitor
of Valencia, 104, 142, 237
Hespanique, Padre Esteban, solicitante,
327
Hidalgos, 10L 105, 107-111, 114, 123,
340. 341. 379. 401. 427
Hinoga, Martin, familiar, 38
Hoces, Dr. Alonso de, Inquisitor of Valen-
cia, 110
436
Index
Hoces y Cordoba, Lope de, count of
Hornaehuelos, 1 10
Horozco, Sebastian de, 121-124, 382
Horozco y Covarrubias, Juan de, 121
Horstmann, John Heinrich, 286-287
Hovo, Carlos de, Inquisitor, Zaragoza,
118
Huguenots, 251 264, 287-289
Illuminism, 4, 273, 275-280. 293. 407
In eminenti, papal bull, 333
Index of prohibited books, 281, 416
Inquisition, 1-6, 8-30. 32-37. 39-40,
42-43. 45-46. 48-51. 53, 56-57.
59-61, 63-72, 74, 76-80. 82-84,
86, 89-102, 104-105, 107. 110.
112-121. 123. 125. 127-130. 132-
133. 136. 138. 142. 144. 146. 149.
151-152, 155, 159, 167, 169, 173-
174. 178. 181. 187. 190. 193. 195.
197-198. 201. 205. 208-209. 211-
215, 217-225, 227, 229, 23_L 234-
236, 238. 242-243. 247-248. 250.
257. 261-263. 265, 267, 270, 273-
274, 276-277, 280-282. 284. 287,
289-303. 305. 308. 310-312, 313,
315-321. 323-327. 329-335. 338-
339. 342, 344-347. 349-418. 424-
428
early history, 13-17
finances, 18, 91-100
foundation of, 9-13. 211
historiography, 1-6, 84
and other authorities, 18-58, 101-102,
116. 193
papal or medieval, 9-12. 13, 99-100.
151, 296
and popular culture, 295
Inquisitors, 6, 9-17. 19-23. 25-28. 31-
32, 37-38. 40-47. 51, 56, 59-63.
67-78. 80, 86, 88, 90-92. 94, 96-
97, 101-121, 123-128, 131-136,
139-144, 147, 149-154, 160, 163,
167-168. 171-172. 175. 177-178.
181, 186-187, 189-191. 192. 194-
196. 197. 199-200. 201-203. 205-
206. 215-217. 223-231, 235-237.
241-242. 245-246. 249. 253-254.
258-262. 265-267. 272. 277. 279-
282, 284. 286. 296. 298, 303. 308.
310-313, 323, 325, 330-332, 334,
336, 338-339, 342, 344-346. 348,
350-351, 355, 357-358. 360, 365-
366. 369-370, 373. 376-377, 379-
383. 403. 416-417
Inquisitor-General, 6, 10, 12-13. 17, 20,
2X3X4^41,56^69,86,94,96,
10L 105, 101 112, 118, 132-133,
135-136. 14L 152, 161 171-172.
224, 229, 246, 254, 258, 261-262.
277, 280, 282, 313, 323, 331, 334,
336, 339, 342, 346, 350-351, 373,
379. 381-382. 416-417
Insaculacion, 175, 178-180. 199. 389
Instructions, 75, 125-128, 164, 166-168,
206-207. 231. 251
of 1498, 24, 60, 62, 127, 143
of 1561, 62. 79. 88. 90. 125. 236. 313
Irache, 1 13
Isabella of Castile, 9, 11-12, 113, 124,
151, 302
Isabella II, 358
Islam, 85, 244-246. 250-251. 255, 261-
262, 265, 268, 270-271, 294, 422
Jaen, 133
James the Conqueror, 6
Jativa, 62, 91 153, 156, 159, 184, 201-
203, 205, 209, 245, 310, 335, 340-
341. 399. 405. 414
Jerica, 183
Jesuits, 234, 286, 328
Jews, L 4=5, 10, 17, 20, 59, 6L 73-74,
71 86, 111. 140, 143, 161, 175, 194,
209-211. 213-215. 217-220. 223.
226, 231. 242-243. 276. 294, 360,
393-394, 398. 424-425
expulsion of 1492, 217-218
Jijona, 205
Jimenez de Reynoso, Alonso, 253
Jimenez Navarro, Hermengildo, Inquisi-
tor of Valencia, 195, 206, 311
Jovellanos, Melchor de, 347, 417
Jover, Francisco, 35-36, 368
Juan, Mateo, familiar, 29, 36
Juan, Miguel, nuncio, 5Q
Jucar river, 269
Jiicar valley, 156, 182
Judaizers, 4, 10, 49-50, 69, 73, 76-77,
ILL 140, 21L 213, 211 220-223.
227. 229-231. 233. 240. 242. 360.
395. 406
Judge of confiscated property, 49, 95, 226
Julius III, pope, 281
Junta Central, 350
Junta de fe, 90
Junta de hacienda, 92
Junta magna, 334
Junta of Madrid, 249, 254, 260
Juntas de fe, 356-357
Index
437
Jurats, 8, 13, 15, 16, 18, 29, 30, 45-50.
52. 54. 103. 125. 127, 138. 145, 166,
im 24L 317, 330-331. 369. 378.
422
Jurisdictional disputes, 32, 35, 40, 191,
192, 193, 339
Justicia civil, 139, 145
Justicia de Aragon, 51
Jutglar, Gaspar, Inquisitor-General, Ara-
gon, 12
Kamen, Henry, 194, 196, 208, 37_L 374-
375, 378-379, 380, 390-391. 393.
396, 406, 409, 413-415. 419. 426
Koran, 249
La Canada, count of, 108
Lambart, Joaquin, 344, 345
La Olleria, 167
Lara, Francisco de, 233
Law of the Partidas, 302, 351
Lazaro, Juan, familiar, 143, 181
Lea, Henry Charles, 2, LL 7_L 102, 124-
125. 149, 189-190. 193. 273. 329.
365-369. 371-378. 381-382. 384-
385. 387. 390-392. 396-399, 402,
406-418. 423. 427
Leca Garcia, Rafael de, 3, 397
Leon, 102
Leon, Francisco Jeronimo de, 146
Leon, Dr. Jeronimo de, 53, 146
Leon, Sebastian de, judaizer, 234
Lepanto, battle of, 81
Lerma, duke of, 48
Letrados, 10L 103-104. 112-117. 121.
124-125. 127-128. 133
Lieutenant alguacil, 161
Lieutenant inquisitors, 22, 26, 3L, 205.
365
Linan, Fray Cristobal de, 134
Linan, Garbiel de, 133-134
Linan, Dr. Juan Bautista de, 133
Linares, Pedro, familiar, 194, 369
LirK 161
Livera, Dr. Gaspar, 322
Llano de Valdes, Juan de, Inquisitor of
Valencia, 260
Llerena tribunal, 223, 277, 350
Llorente, Juan Antonio, 2, 84, 363-365.
377, 427
Loazes, Hernando de, Inquisitor of Valen-
cia, 236-237. 381
Longrono, Fernando de, 13
Logrono tribunal, 233, 313. 396
Lopez, Simon, archbishop, Valencia, 357
Lopez, Vicente, comisario, 167
Lopez de Camarena, comisario, Teruel,
62
Lopez de Celain, Juan, illuminist, 276
Lopez de Haro, Diego, marquis of El
Carpio, 109
Los Velez, marquis of, 131
Love magic, 6JL 314-315. 317-320. 361.
412
Luther, Martin, 286, 294
Lutheranism, 69, 73, 96, 276, 279-281,
283. 285-289. 294
Lutherans, 281. 285. 287
Macanaz, Melchor de, 332, 334-335, 381,
414
Madrid, 2, 3, 4, 41, 53-54. 56, 80, 84,
114. 119-120. 136. 138, 145, 147.
149. 223. 233-234. 243. 249. 254,
257. 260. 308, 337-338, 346. 349-
351. 363. 365-366. 368. 372. 378.
381-382, 385, 390, 393-394, 396,
398-399, 401. 406-407, 415-416.
418-419. 421. 423-428
Maestrazgo, 207
Magic, 206, 224-225. 242. 312. 314-319.
361. 412
Malleus Maleficarium, 312. 412
Mallorca tribunal, 181
Manrique, Alfonso, Inquisitor-General,
20-21
Manrique de Lara, Jeronimo, Inquisitor
of Valencia, Inquisitor-General, 118,
194
Manrique de Lara, Pedro, duke of
Najera, viceroy, 38, 118, 194
Manrique de la Romana, Jose, familiar,
200
Maqueda, duke of, 37
March, Francisco, 50, 240
Marco, Benito, alguacil, 160
Mann, Vidal, Inquisitor-General, 331
Martinez, Dr. , judge of confiscated prop-
erty, 226
Martinez, Ferrant, 209
Martinez Millan, Jose, 366-367, 376-378.
386. 415-416. 427
Martinez Rubio, Dr. Juan Joseph, Inquisi-
tor of Valencia, 104
Martinez Rubio, Pedro, familiar, 104
Mas des Estellers, 207
Mateo, Pedro Martir, notario, 206. 216-
217
Mateo y Villamayor, Salvador, Inquisitor
of Valencia, 120
438
Index
Mayans v Sfscar, Gregorio, 344-345. 413,
416, 427
Media anata, 132, 187. 191. 198
Medieval Inquisition, 9, 12,68,91, 151,296
Meir y Campillo, Francisco de,
Inquisitor-General, 351
Meliana, 309
Mendez de Haro, Luis, marquis of El
Carpio, 108
Mendoza, Melchor de, receiver, Valencia,
139, 147, 148
Meritos de reos, 82
Milan de Aragon, Francisco, familiar, 203
Military Orders, 24, 109, 110, 114, 120-
122. 184. 188. 239. 241, 299. 380.
382. 397
Calatrava, 200, 202, 239
Montesa, 24, 37, 88, 143, 177, 188,
303, 305, 310, 367
Santiago, 105, 109, 120, 122, 177, 239-
240
Millan, Vicente, familiar, 35
Minuarte, Diego Jeronimo, receiver, Va-
lencia, 149
Miranda, Gregorio de, Inquisitor of Valen-
cia, 43, 61-62. 126. 128-129, 153,
259-262, 383, 402
Mislata, 338
Molinar, Juan, familiar, 26
Molner, Bartolome, 88, 181
Moncada, Francisco de, viceroy, 46, 48
Moner, Fray Rafael, 181. 246
Monestario, Juan de, Inquisitor of Valen-
cia, 16-17
Montemayor, Inquisitor, 355
Monterde de Azpeytia, Jose, comisario,
205
Moors, 7, 19, 244-250. 257. 269
Mor, Dr. Carlos del, 142-143
Mor, Jose Carlos del, receiver, 142
Mora, 64, 205, 324, 378
Mora, Vicente, receiver, 358
Mora de Ebro, 160
Morella, 106, 156, 205, 287. 386
Morillo, Miguel de, Inquisitor, Seville, 12
Moriscos, 4, 7, 34, 37, 43-44, 5JL 56, 6J,
63, 65, 67, 75-76. 80, 82, 86, 88-
89, 95-99. 153, 156, 160, 167-168.
179. 194. 196-198. 229. 244-255,
257. 259-272, 294. 305. 360, 371,
378. 398-406. 411. 422. 424-497
conversions, 245-262
expulsion of, 98-99. 168. 179. 197-
198. 244. 251. 255. 266-269. 271.
272, 360
Morone, cardinal, 295
Mortara, marquis of, 132, 135
Moscardon, 168
Mudejares, 244-246. 398
Muela de Cortes, 156, 269
Mufioz Baquerizo, Diego, Inquisitor of Va-
lencia, 241
Murat, field marshall, 349
Murcia, 53. 105. 166, 184. 234. 240
Murcia tribunal, 166, 184, 234, 240
Najera, duke of, 38-39
Naples, 132, 349-395
Navarre, 44, 102, 229, 308, 313, 369, 415,
426
Navarro, Fray Jeronimo, 322-323. 413
Navarro, Gaspar, 313, 412
Netanyahu, Benzion, 211, 394, 427
New Christians, 4, 6_L ILL 123, 223-224,
230-234. 360. 396
Nicolas V, pope, 211. 393
Nithard, Juan, Inquisitor-General, 112
Noris, Cardinal Henry, 345-346
North African fortresses, 82
Notarios, 43, 139, 147, 385
Notary of civil cases, 25
Nueva Recopilacion, 1 16
Nuncios, 49. 50. 91. 200. 357. 396
Ochagavia, Pedro de, Inquisitor of Valen-
cia, 119, 134, 382
Officials, 3, 7=8, LL 13-19. 22-26, 29-
34, 36-39, 42, 45-49. 51_, 55, 57-
58, 69, 73, 75, 83, 91-92. 95-96.
101-102. 104-108. 112-114. 117.
119. 121-123. 125-126. 129-130,
132. 134. 136-140. 142-147. 149-
151. 154-155. 160-168. 172. 174.
183, 187, 189, 191-192, 195, 197-
200. 202-203. 208-210, 218. 222-
227. 229-230. 232-233. 235. 238,
240-242. 248. 257-259, 261. 272.
274, 280-281, 292. 310. 317. 323.
329-331. 333-334. 338-344, 347.
352-353. 358-357, 366-367. 369,
397-398. 406
Oidors de compte, 282
Old Christians, 10, 65, 162, 2LL 216-
217, 219-220. 226. 230. 244. 250.
252-253. 257. 265. 269. 274. 304.
394. 398. 403. 406
Oliva, 201. 245. 258. 413. 416, 427
Olivares, Conde Duque de, 230, 240
Olmo, Jose del, secretary, 138-139, 145,
147-148. 168
Index
439
Olmo, Jose Vicente del, secretary, 139
Onate, 113
Onate, Juan de, jailer, Valencia, 24, 143,
145
Onate, Miquel Angel de, jailer, Valencia,
144
Onate y Churruca, Juan de, jailer, Valen-
cia, 145
Onda, 256
Onteniente, 178, 183, 185. 205
Oran, 193, 242, 398
Orbe, Andres Ignacio, Inquisitor,
Valladolid, 345, 417
Oriola, Miguel, 227, 229
Orleans, Due d', 331
Oropesa, Alonso de, 211
Osuna, Francisco de, 361
Oviedo, Bartolome de, familiar, 1 88
Oviedo, Colegio Mayor de, 122
Oviedo y Quintano, Pedro de, Inquisitor-
General, 350
Pacheco, Andres, Inquisitor-General, 56
Pacheco de Cordoba, Juan, 108
Pacheco Portocarrero, Pedro, Inquisitor
of Valencia, 108, 121
Palacio, Andres, Inquisitor of Valencia,
217, 246
Palao, Miguel, familiar, 192
Palavecino, Joaquin, secretary, 143, 342
Palavecino y Esplugues, Jose, familiar,
342
Palomares, Julian de, 140, 141, 146, 148-
149, 203
Papal bulls, 11. 12, 13, 19, 33, 97, 116,
118, 335
Papal Inquisition, 9
Papal nuncio, 357
Paramo, Luis de, L. 424
Paris, 101, 365. 372. 376. 379. 381. 393.
398. 408. 415. 419. 424-47,8
Parlement of Paris, 89, 312, 412
Pastor, Antonio, familiar, 153
Paul III, pope, 26L 321
Paul IV, pope, 97, 281
Paz, Diego de, 234
Paz, Felipe de, 234, 397
Peatge, 21, 130. 422
Peatge y Quema, 130
Pecheros, 341
Pedralba, 282-284
Pellicer, Dr. Felicio, notario, 174
Pena, Francisco, 66, 72, 75, 79, 83, 90 ,
99, 365
Penaguila, 245
Peninsular War, 357
Perciva, Vincente, familiar, 171
Perez, Juan, notary, 15, 26, 5L 197
Perez de Arteaga, Martin, Inquisitor of
Valencia, 91
Perez de Pandilla, Juan, familiar, 197
Perez de Prado y Cuesta, Francisco,
Inquisitor-General, 105. 339
Perez Morena, Juan, 26
Period of grace, 60, 212, 216, 22L 225,
246. 262. 371. 395
Philip II, 18, 28-32. 38, 48, 51, 55, 57,
81, 89, 97, 130, 153, 230, 249, 254,
259-260. 282. 295. 300. 376. 390
as Prince, 23, 37, 152
Philip III, 98-99. 122
Philip IV 99, 120, 141. 187, 189. 230,
242, 292, 340, 381, 421
Philip V, 7=8, 105, 331-332, 339, 341
Pimentel de Herrera, Antonio Alfonso,
count of Benavente, viceroy, 37
Pimentel de Herrera, Juan Alfonso, vice-
roy, count of Benavente, 38, 40
Pimentel y Toledo, Antonio, marquis of
Tavera, viceroy, 54
Pinto Crespo, Virgilio, 372, 408, 413, 427
Piquer, Andres, 345
Pirates, 75, 76, 129, 257-258, 265, 268-
269, See also Corsairs
Pisa, Francisco, familiar, 198
Pius IV, pope, 32L 326
Pius V, pope, 254
Pius VII, pope, 350
Pius VIII, pope, 357
Pleitos de hidalgui'a, 107
Poblet, 331
pogroms, 209, 210. 393
Pole, cardinal, 295
Polo, Lorenzo, 264-265
Polop, 245. 265. 377
Polop, Francisco Antonio, receiver, Valen-
cia, 93
Ponce, Fray Juan, calificador, 242. 243
Popular culture, 297, 329, 361, 409, 410,
413
Portugal, 9, 230
Presidio (El Penol), 193
Presidio (of Oran), 193
Prisons of the Inquisition, 4-6. 69, 71.
86. 96, 141, 289. 337. 364-367. 369.
371. 373-378. 386, 388, 393, 395-
396. 399-400. 402-404. 406. 408-
411. 415. 426
Procedures, LKL14,40,59,63,66,68,
Ccpynghtod mato rial
440
Index
72, 76, 99, U2, 190, 2IL 215, 224,
227. 303-304. 312. 345. 359. 387
Procession of the faith, 43, 199
Prohibited arms, 25, 38, 39, 40, 56
Prohibited books, 145. 147. 281. 290.
345-347. 416. 417
Prohibited weapons, 39
Propositions, 196, 274, 277, 279, 283.
299. 321. 322. 324. 325. 329. 336.
360, 406. 409. 413
Protestants, 1. 88. 97. 171. 172. 194. 197.
m 229, 25L 273, 28L 282, 286-
295. 298. 320-321. 326. 363
Puffendorf, 345
Puigmija, Manuel de, judaizer, 220
Punishments, L 5, 9, 27, 31, 34, 55, 62-
63, 66, 68, 78, 80-84. 89-90. 96,
136. 159. 191-192. 215-216. 219.
225, 236, 260, 266-268. 279. 281.
283. 288-289. 291. 296-298. 300.
302, 304, 306, 308, 310-313. 322-
323. 328-329. 361. 403
Purity of blood, 107, 109, UL 113, 121-
123, 140, 16L 165, 169-70. 183-
184. 234-235. 238. 240. 242. 343.
380. 397
Puzol, 156
Quart, 331
Quema, 21, 130. 422
Quevedo, Francisco de, 231
Quintano Bonifaz, Manuel, Inquisitor-
General, 107
Quiroga, Gaspar de, Inquisitor-General,
69-70
Ramirez, Francisco, Inquisitor of Valen-
cia, 44-45, 284
Ramirez de Haro, Antonio, bishop of
Ciudad Rodrigo, 253, 259
Real Caja de Amortization, 348
Receiver, 14, 17, 92-95, 98. 139. 143.
147, 149, 18L 199, 226, 342, 358,
377. 392
Recogimiento, 275
Reconciliation, 12, 25, 34, 50, 59, 6_L 81-
83, 94, 140, 219, 21L 225, 233, 236,
237, 263. 268. 283. 291. 336. 396
Reconquest, 7, 8, 333, 364
Rectories, 205, 247, 253, 254-255. 401
Regensburg conference, 281
Regidor, 110, 182
Rehabilitations, 93, 94, 235-236
Reinoso, Alonso de, Inquisitor of Valen-
cia, 132, 265
Rejaule, Dr. Pedro Juan, Audiencia
judge, 53, 138
Relaciones de causas (case summaries), 2,
3, 5, 87, 89-90, 277, 285. 304. 363.
376. 405-406, 422, 426
Relaxed, 19. 50. 61. 83. 96. 140. 236.
237. 240. 268. 283. 412
Requart, Dr. Jose, physician to tribunal,
47
Ribera, Juan de, archbishop, vicerov, 39,
42-43. 48, 57, 98, 12L 247-248,
251. 254. 266. 291. 305. 399
Rico, Francisco, comisario, 202
Rio, Nicolas del, secretary, 267, 268, 272
Ripoll, Pedro de, judaizer, 215
Roca, Judge, 36
Roche, Ambrosio, Inquisitor of Valencia,
37, 104, 137-142. 147. 149-150.
163. 201-203. 236. 384
Roche, Antonio, calificador, familiar, 255
Roche, Micer, consultor, Audiencia, 129
Roco Campofrio, Juan, Inquisitor of Valen-
cia, 242
Rodenas, 104
Rodrigo, Martin, comisario, 168
Rodriquez de Leon, Manuel, judaizer,
234
Rodriquez Lucero, Diego, Inquisitor-
General, 125
Rojas, Juan de, Inquisitor of Valencia, 90,
259. 262. 265. 305. 402
Rome, 12, 54, 230, 255, 305, 371, 402,
424
Romero, Pedro, familiar, 181
Royal secretary, 120, 334
Royo, Inquisitor of Valencia, 355
Rubielos, 301
Rubielos de Mora, 142
Rubin de Cevellos, Agusti'n, Inquisitor-
General, 336
Rubio, Mohammed, 249
Rusafa, 156, 207. 208, 357
Sacrilege, 319
Sagunto, 156. 209. 218. 253. 334. 344
Saint Dominic, 199
Saint Jerome, order of, 211
Sala, Juan, familiar, 1 94- 1 96
Salamanca, 107. 109. 112. 121. 380
Salas de hijosdalgos, 108
Salazar Frias, Alonso de, Inquisitor of Va-
lencia, 132-133, 138, 383
Salinas, Alonso de, 13_1
Salsadella, 207
Salt, Dr. Onofre, official, Valencia, 143
Copyrighted material
Index
441
Salvador, Jeronimo, familiar, 182
Salvador, Mateo, familiar, 182
Salvador y de Leon, Jose, secretary, 146
Salvador y del Olmo, Vicente, secretary,
Valencia, 145-146
Salvatierra, Martin de, Inquisitor of Valen-
cia, 265
San Andres (parish), 51
San Lorenzo (parish), 56, 77
San Martin, Juan de, Inquisitor, Seville,
12, 66
San Mateo, 146, 202, 341
San Pedro Martir, confraternity of, 154,
199-200. 203
San Salvador (parish), 55
Sanbenitos, 83, 236-237, 243. 360, 397,
422
Sanchez, Bartolome, Inquisitor of Valen-
cia, 267, 272
Sanchez, Lorenzo, notary, 274
Sanchez de Centelles-Calatayud, Pedro,
lordofPedralba, 282
Sanchez de Oruela, Baltasar, lieutenant-
Inquisitor, 365
Sanguino, Benito, receiver, 98, 342, 373
Sans, Jeronimo, secretary, 36, 165
Sans, Bamon, Audiencia judge, 53
Santa Escolastica, Sor Maria de, 334
Santangel, Alonso de, 13
Santangel, Luis de, judaizer, 214
Santangel family, 235, 238
Santiago tribunal, 105
Sanz, Pedro, Audiencia judge, 140
Sanz de la Llosa, Jeronimo, familiar, 202,
203
Sanz de Mercado, Bodrigo, Inquisitor of
Valencia, 16
Sarmiento, Pedro, 210, 230, 393
Savonarola, 295
Scourging, 81. 296. 302. 311. 329, 375
Secretaries (notarios del secreto), 2, 21,
40-41, 54, 74, 84, 91, 105, 140,
143-146. 163, 165, 198, 203, 237-
240. 267. 335. 340. 342. 346. 350.
353. 392, 416
Secretary (royal), 120, 334, 397
Segorbe, 54, 155, 160-161. 203. 205.
207. 234. 256. 259. 270. 400
Segorbe, duke of, 160, 256, 270
Segovia, 118, 259
Sevillan, Jaime Juan, familiar, 49
Seville, 12, 18. 101. 110. 114. 229.232.
257, 273, 282. 284. 293. 296. 326. 380
Seville tribunal, 3, 12, 115-116, 136. 198.
231. 277. 287. 353
Sexual crimes, 4
Sicily tribunal, 3
Sierra de Engarceran, 106
Sierra de Espadan, 156
Sierra Menera, 104
Sigiienza, 1 13
Simancas, Diego de, 90, 112, 363, 376,
380. 394. 424
Simon, Padre Francisco, 8, 51-57, 138,
279
Simple fornication, 4, 299
Sises majors, 45
Sixtus IV, pope, 16
Sixtus V, pope, 316
Sobrino, Fray Antonio, calificador, 267
Sodomy, 4. 63. 88. 115, 198. 302-305.
307-312. 334. 410. 412
Solicitation, 4. 5. 64. 81. 91. 308. 321.
325-326, 328-329, 335, 361
Solsona, Dr. Joaquin, defense attorney, 64
Sorcery, 89, 3 1 3- 3 1 5
Sorell,' Luis, 200, 239
Sorell, Pedro, secretary, 144
Sorell, Bemigio, 239
Sorell, Vicente, familiar, 238
Soto Calderon, Dr. Tomas de, Inquisitor
of Valencia, 1 10
Soto Salazar, Francisco de, Inquisitor of
Valencia, 25-26, 34, 154, 366
Sotomayor, Alonso de, Inquisitor of Valen-
cia, 97
Spain, L 2, 9, 17-18. 23-24. 28, 76, 85-
86, 88-89. 94, 97, 106, 108-109.
111. 118-119, 121-122. 124, 137.
150, 162, 165, 161, 171-172. 175.
181. 183-184. 187. 197. 208-210.
212, 217, 224, 226, 229-231. 233.
234, 239-240. 242-243, 245-246,
252. 257-258, 263-264. 266. 272-
273, 275, 280, 287-288. 290-294.
298. 301. 313-314. 325. 329. 333.
34L 344, 347, 349, 35L 356-357,
359-360. 361-362. 364-365. 383.
385. 393-396. 398. 400. 404. 419.
424-428
Spontaneous confession, 64, 279, 290. 310
Sueca, 161. 179. 185
Superstition, 4, 6L 307, 315-319, 337.
361
Suprema, a 6, 8, 16, 18-19, 2L 21, 30-
33, 35, 37, 39-45. 47-48, 5L 53-
58, 67-68. 71-72. 78, 8L 82, 85,
86, 88-93. 95, 97-98. 115. 117-120.
123. 125. 130-131. 133. 135-141.
144-149. 152-155. 162-164. 172.
Copyrighted m affinal
442
Index
174-177. 182-183, 186-187, 189-
193, 198-200. 227. 229-231 235-
243. 248. 250-25L 257, 259-263.
265, 267, 27a 279, 284, 287-288.
290-292. 296. 298-299. 302-305.
310-313. 317-318, 322-323. 326.
331. 333-334. 333-341. 345. 348-
353. 366-368. 376, 378, 385, 387-
389. 397. 411-412. 417
Synagogue, 17, 197, 213, 218
Tafalla, Calixto, depositario de pre-
tendientes, familiar, 143
Tafalla, Miguel, familiar, 143
Tagarinos, 88, 270
Taqiyya, 248, 422
Tarazona, 229
Terca, Jeronimo, eomisario, 206, 207, 306
Teruel, 6, 13-14, 22, 3JL 5L 62-63. 97,
103-105. 111. 142. 159, 181, 194,
205-206. 213. 218. 264. 265. 287.
327, 340, 366, 379, 394-395. 403
Teulada, 180, 258
Thompson, E. P., 31L 385, 412
Tiberi, monsignor, papal nuncio, 357
Titulos, 108. 111. 379
Toledo, 10, 54, 55, 101, 106, 121-124.
132, 136, 210, 223. 235. 273, 277.
384. 393-395. 410
Toledo tribunal, 3, 122, 136, 166, 233-
234. 277, 283-284
Toranzo, Dr. Miguel de, Inquisitor of Va-
lencia, 355, 357
Torquemada, Frav Tomas de, Inquisitor-
General, 13, 60, 62, 75, 101, 324
Torrente, 234
Torre y Guerau, Juan de la, Inquisitor of
Valencia, 241-242. 330
Tortosa, 26, 27, 132, 153, 155. 160. 167.
182, 205. 206. 247, 259, 262, 306
Torture, 68, 69, 74, 78-80. 89. 227. 228.
289. 314. 374,421
Traiguera, 164. 169. 174. 185. 207. 388
Treaty of Miinster, 292
Tribunal of the Rota, 357
Tudela, Eugenio, familiar, 167
Tunis, 250
Ulldecona, 341
University of Salamanca, 109. 112. 121.
380
University of Valencia, 324-325, 336,
344, 361
University of Valladolid, 113
Urban VIII, pope, 56
Urbino, Fernando de, Inquisitor of Valen-
cia, 332
Urries, Ugo de, secretary, Suprema, 21
Utrecht, 17
Valdes, Cristobal Francisco de, marquis of
Valaparaiso, 3 48
Valdes, Fernando de, Inquisitor-General,
88, 96-97. 101. 152-153. 254. 282.
313
Valencia, 3=8, 13-15, 19-22, 24-29. 38,
43, 45-46. 54-56. 58-61. 7JL 85-
88, 94-97. 99. 101. 104. 120. 126.
127. 130-131. 135-137. 143. 145.
149. 159-161. 172-181. 183-185.
187-190, 195, 208, 212, 218-220,
225, 228, 232, 232-233. 236. 240.
247. 253-254. 264. 269, 272. 274,
283, 281 289, 293, 302-303. 307.
310, 314-319, 330, 342-344, 346,
354-355. 357-358. 364. 366. 371-
376. 378-381, 383-386. 390-393.
396. 398-403, 407-408, 410-413.
415-416, 421, 428
Valencia, citv of, 14-15. 19-20. 22, 24,
26-27. 36. 39, 43, 45, 48-49. 5_L
55, 6_L 69, 7_L 10_L 103-104. 121.
130. 131. 136-137. 139. 142-143.
152-156. 160, 165-167, 172-173,
177, 182, 184, 188, 192, 197-201,
205-206. 209. 229. 317, 330, 335,
340. 378. 422
Valencia, kingdom of, 6-7. 14, 19, 2L 24,
28, 32, 42, 46, 56-57. 103, 131-132,
137. 142, 159-160, 166, 186. 234,
244. 249. 326. 364. 393. 398. 421.
425
Valencian nobility, 20, 98, 160, 245, 261
305
Valencia tribunal, 3=7, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20-
22, 26, 28, 32, 41 50-51. 57-58.
60-62. 67, 69-70. 74, 80, 82, 84-
88, 91-97. 99, 102, 105, 112-113.
115, 117-121, 123, 125, 128, 131-
132. 136-137. 144, 150, 152, 161-
162, 171 185, 189, 203, 208, 211.
213-214. 223-224. 226. 231-235.
238. 241-243. 245, 248. 250-251,
257, 259-268, 270-271, 277, 279,
282. 284-288. 290. 292. 297-301.
304-305. 308-309. 314-315, 317-
319, 322, 325, 328, 332-335, 338,
340, 342, 344-345, 348, 350-354,
356-357. 360. 362. 366. 374-375.
380. 383. 392. 396. 415
Copyrighted material
Index
443
broadened jurisdiction, 51-52. 321-
326. 333
censorship, 323-325
condition of prisons, 68-72, 83, 95-96,
141-142, 226=228
conflict with other ecclesiastical institu-
tions, 42-45. 62, 199
conflict with Valencia city, 45-50
conflicts with other authorities and Va-
lencian nobility, 20-21
confraternity of San Pedro Martir, 199-
203
criminal jurisdiction, 34-36, 40-42,
188. 339
decline and last years, 330-358
district, 159
early history, 13-17, 191-193
familiares and unsalaried officials, 151-
208
finances, 91-100
gang disputes, 141-142, 208, 305
genealogical investigations, 102, 107-
108, 123-124, 127, 147-148, 156.
162-163. 166. 175. 205. 235. 238.
351. 385. 392. 421
illuminism, 275-280. 293
inquisitors, 101-144
Lutherans, 279-290, 294
Moriscos, 244-272
New Christians, LL 223, 224, 230-243
notarios and comisarios, 205-2 08
officials, 138-150
popular culture, 295-320
post-Tridentine morality, 86, 205, 295-
329
procedures, 14, 1 8-59
prohibited arms, 56-57
Protestants, 273, 284-285. 287-294
Punishments, 63, 80-85, 89-91. 94
Relations with Suprema, 88-93. 97.
191. 335
structure, 3, 9, 14, 59, 91-92
subtribunals, 22, 26, 31, 295
visitas, 12, 19, 3_L 43, 57, 60-63. 67,
70, 83, 89, 96, 127, 12a 13L 148.
152-154. 160. 162, 174-175. 185.
194-195. 197. 201-206. 226. 236-
237. 253. 259. 261. 277. 323. 332.
366, 373, 376, 382-383. 392. 410.
423
1528, 70, 127, 175, 226, 253, 259, 261-
262, 323, 332
1560, 1567, 31, 61-63. 152, 154. 194-
195
1566, 19. 67. 83. 89. 129. 174. 185. 197
1601, 160
1672, 206
Valera, Cipriano de, 345
Valladolid, 108, 110, 112-114, 120. 122.
136, 214, 229, 257. 273, 280, 282,
293, 30_L 326, 380-381. 394. 417
Valladolid tribunal, 3
Vail de Uxo, 156, 257, 400
Valldigna, 156, 227, 332
Valle, Juan del, Inquisitor of Valencia, 313
Valterra, Vicente, familiar, 238-240
Vatican, 53, 54, 393
Veinticuatros, of Cordoba, LLQ
Velasquez, Juan, alcalde of prisons, 70
Valasquez, Juan de, 226
Velez, marquis de los, viceroy, 1 8 9-1 9 0
Venegas, Antonio, Inquisitor, Granada,
123
Venegas de Figueroa, Dr. Luis, Inquisitor
of Valencia, 123
Verdun, Nicolas, secretary, 28
Vergonoys, Francisco Juan, familiar, 30
Vincent, Bernard, 270, 399
Vidal, Agustm, 192
Vidal, Alexandre, familiar, 200
Vidal, Juan, secretary, 40-41
Vidal, Pedro Juan, 40-41
Vidal conspiracy, 354
Villadiego, 68, 89, 372, 373, 376, 424
Villafames, 288
Villajoyosa, 194
Villalonga, 245
Villamalur, 182
Villamayor, Francisco de, 120
Villamayor, Jeronimo de, Council of Cas-
tile, 120
Villanueva, counts of, 238-239. 241
Villanueva, Joaquin Lorenzo, calificador,
3 44-345
Villanueva, Tom&s de, archbishop, 42, 55
Villareal, 156
Villarrasa, Juan Lorenzo de, viceroy, 29,
153
Villena, marquis of, 281
Viiiaroz, 234
Vives family, 197
Vives Valeriola, Salvador, 17
Vizcaya, 107
Voltaire, 345
Walton, William, 350-351
War of Succession (1475-79), ID
War of the Spanish Succession, 99, 186.
285, 333, 340, 396, 409, 414-415
444
Index
Witnesses, 14-15. 30, 64, 67-69, 72-74,
76-79. 8JL 108, 127, 155, 162-169,
176. 182-183. 206-207. 212, 215.
217. 219-220. 228, ML 264, 288-
289, 299. 303. 306. 308, 314, 327-
328, 336-337, 344, 359, 373-374,
382. 387
Xaramillo de Contreras, Dr. Manuel, In-
quisitor of Valencia, 336
Yatova, 64, 81, 328, 399
Zaragoza tribunal, 13, 118, 134, 136, 313
Zorilla, Valentin, Inquisitor of Valencia, 358
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He finds, on the contrary, that
a wide range of religious beliefs
and practices existed among
them and that some were even
able to assimilate into Old
Christian society by becoming
familiares of the Inquisition it-
self. Nevertheless, it was con-
troversy over the sincerity of
the converted which spawned
the first proposals for the estab-
lishment of a Spanish national
Inquisition.
That very same controversy,
persisting in the writing of his-
tory, may be resolved by Halic-
zer's stimulating discoveries.
Inquisition and Society in the
Kingdom of Valencia is a
major contribution to the lively
field of Inquisition studies, com-
bining institutional history of
the tribunal with socioreligious
history of the kingdom. The
many case histories included in
the narrative give both Valen-
cian society and the Inquisition
very human faces.
Stephen Haliczer is Asso-
ciate Professor of History at
Northern Illinois University.
He is the author of The Comu-
neros of Castile: The Forging
of a Revolution and the editor
of Inquisition and Society in
Early Modern Europe.
Jacket design: Barry Anderson
\_yhis is an extremely important work, a new departure in the study
of the history of the Spanish Inquisition. Haliczer challenges the
traditional view of the Inquisition as a monolithic and all-powerful
institution, and shows how by the latter half of the sixteenth cen-
tury, after decades of practically unchallenged authority, the Inqui-
sition was forced on the defensive as regional institutions reasserted
themselves and as royal support for it waned. Especially valuable is
Haliczer' s analysis of the Inquisition's adaptation to the changed
circumstances and its accommodation with Valencian society
through a specific pattern of recruitment of its own officials and
familiares from the local populace, f J
— Mark D. Meyerson
University of Notre Dame
very original work, which the field has been awaiting for
years . . . it is valuable for Medieval! Renaissance history, Spanish,
Jewish, legal, and '1492' studies, ff
— Robert I. Burns, SJ.
University of California, Los Angeles
University of California Press
Berkeley 94720
ISBN D-S20-0t?2VD
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